(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I really think we are giving these matters a significance they do not deserve. I absolutely do not think that the Privy Council should be made responsible for the adjudication. That might have been the case in 1833 and while we had hereditary Peers dominant in this House, but the truth is that the possession of a hereditary peerage will confer no right to sit in this House of Lords. That being so, what is the purpose of this amendment? There is often dispute between prospective Peers: one says that they are entitled and the other says that they are. Well, that is a matter for them. It is a sort of boundary dispute. It would perhaps be a proper matter for a county court—or if, for that matter, there was a financial settlement of some substance, maybe for the High Court—but the idea that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or the Supreme Court should be involved in a quarrel between two people claiming to be a hereditary Peer is complete nonsense.
My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seemed to indicate that hereditary Peers may not exist here in the House of Lords in the future, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, indicated something similar. At what point will there be no hereditary Peers in the House of Lords, and how might that situation—which I would strongly support—come about?
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis is a different situation. Here we have the expression of opinion by the Supreme Court being displaced by the Government through legislation.
My Lords, I do not think it is relevant to cite France. The fact is that this country has a great reputation for upholding the rule of law and international law, and we play a great part across the world. This Bill is threatening that reputation and that role. France does not have that reputation or role, in my opinion.
(2 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very grateful to my noble friend for giving way, but I am afraid that he is wrong about the absence of suspicion. When I was a special constable 40 years ago—I do not have the experience of the noble Lord opposite—I would stand in Trafalgar Square and get messages on the police radio such as, “Race code 3 or race code 9 coming down in a beaten-up Vauxhall: worth a stop.” That is not suspicion; that is arbitrary stopping.
My Lords, we are not focusing right now—nor should we be, in my view—on the issue of the lack of suspicion, although that is fundamental to Clause 11. Let us focus for a minute on Clause 10, which is about stops and searches without suspicion. Those stop and search powers were introduced for police, necessarily and very importantly, to enable them to stop people who they believe may be carrying a knife or another potentially dangerous weapon. I fully support those stop and search powers, but there is not a strong evidence base that the stop and search powers in that context are actually effective in preventing violent crime. So the idea of extending those powers to stop and search people in case they have a placard—a piece of paper—is completely and utterly disproportionate.
In a democratic society, it is utterly wrong to give disproportionate powers to our police to interfere with the fundamental right in our democracy to protest and to go out on the streets to express our opinions. If we forget the issue of suspicion, Clause 10 is utterly disproportionate, anti-democratic and unacceptable, and it will lead to further discordance between the police and lots of communities where we need to build community support for our police. It will have very detrimental effects on all sorts of people across our society. It is for these reasons that I, among others—I hope the whole House—would support withdrawing Clause 10 from the Bill.