Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, as well as, of course, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti; I signed her Amendment 19. This House should try to insist that, if the facts change, a mechanism is provided to the courts to reassess the situation. Anything else is profoundly unjust. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, moves his amendment, I will support him.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, as well as supporting the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I rise to speak to Amendment 16, which seeks to minimise the risk of torture arising from the Bill and to safeguard torture survivors. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and my noble friend Lord Cashman for their support. They will speak to the first part of the amendment, while I will focus on the second. We brought it back because of our dissatisfaction with the response from the Minister in Committee. We hope that we might do better now, given the existential importance of torture, which represents one of the most serious of human rights violations.

We know from the work of organisations such as Freedom from Torture and Redress, whose help I am grateful for, that a good number of the asylum seekers in line to be sent to Rwanda will have survived torture. We also know, including from a recent report from the Mental Health Foundation, of the high incidence of mental health difficulties among asylum seekers, the risk of which is increased by traumatic experiences such as torture. These difficulties can only be exacerbated by removal to Rwanda.

In Committee, the Minister pointed out that an individual could challenge removal on the grounds of their “individual circumstances”. But Freedom from Torture warns that providing, in the time available, the necessary “compelling evidence” to meet the exceptionally high bar set by the test means that this does not offer torture survivors an effective safeguard. Indeed, the Minister himself admitted that successful claims on this basis are expected to be “rare”. That might have implications for some other amendments.

In response to my questioning about what mental health support will be available to torture survivors in Rwanda, the Minister referred me to Article 13 of the treaty, but that refers only to the special needs of victims of modern slavery or human trafficking. I can find no reference to the needs of torture survivors.

My noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws interjected that the mental health situation in Rwanda is very poor, with high levels of mental illness but very few suitably trained medical professionals. Since then, I have been referred to WHO’s 2020 mental health profile for Rwanda. This confirms the low level of provision and seems to show that there are no out-patient mental health facilities. If this continues to be the case, would traumatised torture survivors have to be admitted to a mental health unit to obtain any support? As was noted in Committee, civil society remains weak and therefore is unlikely to be able to step in.

More recently, last October, a press release from Interpeace, while commending the efforts that the Rwandan Government have made in this area, warns that

“the country still faces challenges such as the scale of mental health needs that outstrips the capacity of available professionals, low awareness and knowledge of mental health issues”

and “poor mental health infrastructure”.

From the Minister’s responses, it would appear that the Government simply do not know what support will be available and have made no attempt to find out, yet they are happy to condemn this highly vulnerable group to a life in a country that, with the best will in the world, is ill placed to provide that support. Of course, ideally, I would want the Government to accept the case for not sending torture survivors to Rwanda. At the very minimum, I ask the Minister to take this issue back to the Home Office—although I am not quite sure which Minister will respond—and give an undertaking that he will ask his colleagues to talk to the Rwandan Government about support for torture survivors and, if necessary, provide the necessary resources to ensure that support is available, perhaps earmarking part of the enormous sum to be paid to Rwanda identified by the NAO.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak briefly to the generality of Clause 3. I signed the notice opposing Clause 3 standing part—not on this occasion, although that may be something to do at a later stage. We need to be cautious about advancing the proposition contained in Clause 3, because it disapplies the provisions of the Human Rights Act in the various respects specified in Clause 3(2). As the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has rightly reminded your Lordships, this is domestic legislation. It is not legislation imposed on us but legislation that Parliament chose to enact. It is also the cornerstone of the proposition that human rights in this country should be universal in their application.

I regard what we are doing in disapplying serious sections of the human rights legislation in respect of specified groups in the community as deeply dangerous. It is a precedent which we should not formulate. At Second Reading, I took the liberty of reminding your Lordships of what Pastor Niemöller said about not crying out in opposition when bad things were being done. We are being asked to stand on a very slippery slope, and very slippery slopes lead very often to very dirty waters. We should not embark on this exercise.

That is not just my view but the view of, for example, the Constitution Committee. I commend to your Lordships paragraphs 27 to 31 of the report that was published on 9 February. I also commend to your Lordships the views of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which were published on 12 February. Paragraph 95 and conclusion 7 are extremely critical of the Bill.

I turn directly to my noble friends on the Front Bench. I do not blame them personally for what is happening. My noble friend Lord Deben and I were Ministers for many years at all levels. I know perfectly well that my noble friends will communicate our views to their departments, but I also know that they do not determine policy and it is not their fault. However, the overriding conclusion that I have come to from this whole debate is that this Government intend to railroad this Bill through without challenge.

It is on that point that I would like my noble friends to communicate another message to the Government. People such as me are Conservatives. We will always be Conservatives. Yet we are deeply troubled, deeply distressed, by how this Government are operating. It is manifest in many ways in this Bill. We are disregarding the rule of law. We are ignoring the principles of the separation of power. We are disapplying protection given to minorities. We are becoming immoderate in our tone. We have abandoned pragmatism in the conduct of policy. I know why they are doing that. They suppose that they can win the election by dog-whistle policy, but they cannot. The outcome of the election is probably already determined by circumstance and by Mr Johnson and by Liz Truss and various other things that have already happened and which the public are probably not going to forgive the Government for. You cannot solve that problem by dog-whistle policies, but you can deepen the rift between the electorate and us.

I am a great admirer of Matthew Parris, one of my oldest friends. His articles, which he writes regularly, tell one what moderate conservatism should be about. At this stage in government, we need to show that we can reinstate the traditional values of conservatism. That will not save us at the general election, but it will make recovery a lot easier.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Viscount—probably inadequately. I added my name to the clause stand-part notice because, as I made clear at Second Reading, I am dismayed by Clause 3’s disapplication of parts of the Human Rights Act. I support everything that has already been said by various noble Lords.

The main concern raised by bodies such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the Law Society and the JCHR, on a majority, together with more than 250 civil society organisations, is that, in the words of the EHRC, this

“undermines the fundamental principle of the universality of human rights”

and

“damages the UK’s human rights legal framework”.

One of the main voices, a group of asylum seekers and refugees, some of whom are from Rwanda, have said how painful they have found the idea of a two-tier human rights system and the loss of what they rightly see as a legal right to seek protection.

Not only is this becoming a habit on the part of the Government, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has pointed out, but the JCHR report, on a majority, cites as particularly alarming the disapplication, for the first time ever, of Section 6 of the HRA. It warns that this

“would effectively grant public authorities statutory permission to act in a manner that is incompatible with human rights standards”.

As such,

“it is very hard to see how it could be consistent with a commitment to complying with international law”.

As has already been pointed out, the Constitution Committee comments that disapplication—

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Report stage
Wednesday 5th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for bringing back these amendments. I am also grateful to the Home Office for finally publishing its child rights impact assessment yesterday afternoon although, I must say, getting it has been like pulling teeth.

However, on age assessment and other children’s rights issues, it reads more like an attempt at post hoc justification than a serious analysis of the implications for children’s rights. The initial reaction from the children’s sector is damning. That it continues to use misleading statistics on age assessment that were challenged in Committee is disappointing, to put it mildly.

In Committee, I asked for an explanation of

“why the Government have ignored the very clear advice of their own advisory committee on the question of consent”,

raised by Amendment 161. The Minister’s response was:

“Of course we consider the advice”,—[Official Report, 12/6/23; cols. 1806-16.]


but the fact is that Clause 57 represents a rejection of that advice. Will the Minister explain why, having considered the expert advice, the Government then rejected it? In effect, their approach is that of guilty until proven innocent but, as we have heard, Clause 56 will make proving innocence—or, more accurately, that one is a child—much more difficult than now in what is increasingly a culture of disbelief.

The limitations on appeal and JR rights are, as the JCHR points out and despite what the CRIA says, clearly not in any child’s best interests. Likewise, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern and recommended that age-disputed children should not be removed to a third country. I asked in Committee what the Government’s response is, but received no reply; nor was it explained what steps would be taken to ensure the following, in the words of the supplementary ECHR memorandum, echoed in the CRIA:

“The appropriate support and facilities will need to be in place in the country of removal to ensure that the individual can effectively participate in their judicial review from abroad”.


It is difficult to believe that effective participation would be possible, even with support. We need, at the very least, to know what that support would be. Even if the child managed to challenge the decision successfully from abroad, they could then order only a reassessment. How would that be meaningfully carried out if the child is no longer in the UK? If the child were then reassessed as a child, would they be moved back to the UK?

I have a final question. The Nationality and Borders Act provided for a new statutory right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to replace judicial review as the means to challenge age assessment under that Act, so that it

“can be resolved as swiftly as possible”

and

“to ensure that genuine children don’t slip through the net and are classed as adults”.

Over a year on, this section has not been commenced. Can the Minister say why and set out the Government’s timetable for doing so, or has it been jettisoned before it has even come into force?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 156A, although I regret the limited nature of the appeal contemplated by that amendment. I very much welcome Amendment 158A, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

As a matter of principle, I am very much in favour of giving individuals the right of appeal although, as I said when I intervened on the right reverend Prelate, I fear that his amendment provides for a more limited right of appeal than I would wish.

A decision on the age of an individual is critical in determining a person’s status under the legislation. I am concerned that, in many instances, the original decision about age will be made in a somewhat perfunctory manner. I imagine that immigration officers may get rather impatient and make rather perfunctory decisions. At the end of the day, age is a matter of evidence and I cannot find any persuasive reason why the original position on age should not be challenged. In my view, the right of appeal should extend to appeals based on the ground that the relevant authority had made a mistake of fact. That is what the noble and learned Lord seeks to achieve in Amendment 158A. However, if I have correctly understood the amendment and its relation to the Bill, the grounds of appeal are limited to those set out in Clause 56(5) of the Bill as it stands. The grounds specified there are essentially judicial review grounds—for example, that there was some procedural unfairness, or the ground of irrationality—and appeals based on fact are expressly excluded. I regard that exclusion as highly regrettable.

To meet some of the anxieties that I fear will be expressed by the Minister regarding my comments and the amendments, I make this point as well: the rights of appeal could be abused, and I would therefore like the burden of establishing the appeal to be on the appellant. It must be for them to satisfy the relevant appellate body that the grounds of appeal are made out. That may in fact be the existing law and practice—it has been such a long time since I practised in that field of law that I simply do not know. If it is not, it should be, and it would meet many of the anxieties likely to be expressed on the government Benches.