European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Deech

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 6th September 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, this is a straightforward technical amendment to plug a gap which I noticed as soon as the Bill was published; indeed, I referred to it in my speech on it. As we know, the Bill mandates the Prime Minister to seek an extension to the withdrawal date provided for in Article 50 in the form of the letter in the Schedule. It goes beyond the earlier withdrawal Bill, known as the Cooper-Letwin Bill, of April. That Bill required the Prime Minister of the day to seek, but not necessarily to achieve, an agreement about extension. Mrs May could have picked up the phone, asked Monsieur Barnier for an extension and then said that on reflection she did not want it. Of course, that is not what happened.

That loophole is closed by the Bill in Clause 3(1) to (3). Subsection (1) says that, if the European Council agrees an extension to 31 January 2020, the Prime Minister “must, immediately” agree to the proposed extension, without qualification or consultation. But subsection (2) says that if “a date other than” 31 January is offered, the Prime Minister may not have to agree; subsection (3) says that if the Commons decided to disapprove the extension offer, the UK does not have to agree it.

I do not know why the two are treated differently. I note that the Commons is given this opportunity to consider the offer if an extension is granted that is not 31 January; it could be 30 January, or December next. But if the extension is 31 January, this is what might occur. Suppose the European Union agrees to an extension to 31 January but attaches a condition—for example, the holding of a second referendum, a payment of billions, settling issues to do with migration, or even a new Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has to accept it immediately, as set out in line 4 on page 3—no consultation, no Commons approval, unlike the provision in subsection (2). My amendment adds to the arrangement contemplated in subsection (1) the same requirement that the Commons should have two days to consider and accept or reject any condition attached. That must be right. I imagine the difference was an oversight, unless the proponents can explain the discrepancy.

I also note, but have not attempted to amend, a difficulty with the meaning of “two days” in subsection (2) and “two calendar days” in subsection (3). They are different—why? Imagine that the European Union offers an extension which is not to 31 January and that this is offered in early October or during some period when Parliament is not sitting. Is Parliament to be summoned to agree the question, or does “two days” mean two sitting days—indeed “Lords sitting days”, whatever they are—as set out in Clause 1? Might Parliament be prorogued to sidestep these time provisions? It is not clear. What is clear is that the Commons should have some power, for two days, to scrutinise and approve any offer of an extension to 31 January in exactly the same way as it is empowered so to do if the date were to be 1 February. That is the purpose of my amendment. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham]

I will make a point that I made in the previous debate in the hope that the Government will respond. I hope they will also respond to this amendment. Clause 3(1) is premised on the basis that the European Council decides to agree an extension. So long as the United Kingdom is a member of the European Union, in respect of a unanimous decision, it is at least possible in theory for the United Kingdom to oppose the extension, despite having applied for one. I seek an assurance from the Government that they will not seek to oppose an extension for which they have applied.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Deech

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, my purpose in adding my name to Amendment 12 is to enable the Government, through my noble friend, to explain what arrangements they intend to put in place before Brexit, in order to ensure that the United Kingdom is a full participant in the formulation of foreign and security policies which inevitably will be of great and enduring consequence to us all. The absence of such arrangements would be a conclusive argument against leaving the European Union. Noble Lords should be clear about this: if we wish to punch above the weight that naturally attaches to a country of relatively modest resources, it is because we are part of and not outside the structures of the European Union.

For five years, I had the good fortune to serve in the Foreign Office under the overarching authority of Douglas Hurd. It is much to be regretted that he is not able to participate in this debate. His authority within the diplomatic and international community was great. This was due in part to his patience, his personal integrity, the temperate language that he always employed and his willingness to compromise. He never sought to promote himself by appealing to the wilder fringes of any political party. My noble friend was a model of a Foreign Secretary and I commend his example to all his successors. I digress for a moment and say that I very much regret that this House does not have the opportunity of hearing from Mr Jack Straw and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, both of whom would have made a valuable contribution to this debate.

When working under Lord Hurd of Westwell, I had immediate departmental responsibility for a number of important areas: the collapse of the former Soviet Union; central and eastern Europe, most especially the war in former Yugoslavia; and the turmoil, then as always, in the Middle East. We did, of course, have distinctive political policies on all these matters and we have distinctive bilateral relations with the relevant countries and institutions. But looking back on my time in the Foreign Office I am sure it is true that we made a real difference when we were able to work with our European colleagues and within the framework of collective European policy.

Collectively within the European Union, the United Kingdom was more influential than it would ever have been standing alone. This is not the age of Lord Palmerston or Don Pacifico. If one looks forward to the major international problems that we now face, that judgment remains good. Consider the ambitions of Russia; the ever-increasing power of Asia, especially China; the fact that America is once again detaching herself from the rest of the world and, most notably, Europe; the risk of war on the Korean peninsula; international terrorism; the problems posed by climatic change; the instability in the Middle East and the rise of militant Islam. In respect of all these matters, a collective approach is infinitely more effective than the individual policies of a middling power such as ourselves.

There are also some specific problems to consider. What of our permanent seat at the Security Council? As a member of the European Union, our permanent seat was less controversial than it might have been. Outside the EU, our status as a permanent member will be under increased pressure and, in any event, the status of France will be greatly enhanced.

What about Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands? Outside the councils of the European Union we will not be able to rely on the automatic support of our European neighbours. Further, on any view, our role as America’s principal interlocutor with the European Union will cease. These considerations, by themselves, leaving aside all others, are a good and sufficient argument against leaving the European Union: that is my considered position. However, for the purposes of this debate, these concerns should cause this House to put questions to Ministers. We are repeatedly told by the Prime Minister and others that while we are leaving the European Union we are not abandoning our close ties. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, usefully summarised our position paper, whatever it actually meant. We need more detail. We do not want bland reassurance. “Brexit means Brexit” is a quite meaningless phrase. It is not a policy or even an indication of a policy. Indeed, it is conclusive evidence of an absence of policy. Therefore, I say to my noble friend that this House is entitled to know in detail what arrangements will be put in place before we leave the European Union to ensure that the United Kingdom is a full, active and influential partner in the policy decisions that will certainly affect the lives of our fellow citizens for years to come. I doubt that this House will get a clear answer. I suspect that we will be none the wiser when the Prime Minister makes her long-awaited policy speech at the end of the week.

If decisions were made at last week’s meeting at Chequers, that is welcome. It is almost, though not wholly, true that any decision is better than no decision. However, we are entitled to ask why on earth such strategic decisions were not taken before we triggered Article 50 and not now, with but 12 months or so to go. The absence of any arrangements and procedures of the kind identified in these amendments is by itself a good reason—there are many other good reasons—to reject the policy of leaving the European Union. Therefore, I look to my noble friend to give clear guidance on what procedures and arrangements the Government propose to put in place. This House is entitled to clear and precise answers to these questions, for they are fundamental in character. This is not a time for indecision, fudge, weasel words or lack of clarity. Having our cake and eating it is not an indulgence now available to us.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I had not meant to intervene but since the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, has speculated on my views, I wish to put some things in context. Obviously one seeks clarity but I think there is a certain note of hysteria going around. Only a few moments ago, we had a question and answer session showing just how impotent the EU, and, indeed, any of us, have been in relation to Syria. The EU does not even manage to pay its subscriptions to NATO and has been impotent in relation to Russia’s behaviour recently. However, our own performance as a permanent member of the Security Council, a position from which we cannot be dislodged unless one entirely rips up the charter, has been admirable. If we want to continue to be an interlocutor between the continent of Europe and America, it is not a good idea to shoot ourselves in the foot by being even more uncivil towards President Trump than is absolutely necessary. As far as foreign policy and security are concerned, we are members of the Five Eyes group, which, from what I have read, is rather more efficient in its actions than what is going on in the EU. While we of course want clarity, there is no need to panic. We have to consider what the EU has done historically in relation to foreign policy. Over the last 40 years, it has had as many failures as successes whereas our record has been pretty good.