Policing and Crime Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will make some brief observations. When the Government come to consider the recommendations concerning funding at inquests, I hope they will agree to the concept of parity of funding, for all the reasons that have been ventilated on previous occasions. But I repeat what I have said to your Lordships’ House before about the triggering mechanism: I do not believe that the police and crime commissioner should be the trigger for that. The coroner should be the trigger for it. There are three very brief reasons for saying that.

First, the coroner is much better placed to form a view as to the relevance and importance of the representation in question. I do not see that the police and crime commissioner would necessarily have access to the relevant information. Secondly and differently, in some inquests, where the conduct of the police or, indeed, the police and crime commissioner could itself be in question, there is a danger of a conflict of interests. Thirdly, sometimes the integrity of the decision of the commissioner will be in question. What happens when the commissioner is facing an election in short order? He or she may well make a decision influenced by the electoral consequences of that decision. All these things seem to suggest very powerfully that the trigger should be the decision of the coroner, not of the police and crime commissioner.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, seemed to suggest that the Government are using the Bishop Jones report as some sort of excuse to not respond to what is suggested by the amendment. Of course, I will hear what my noble friend has to say, but as I understand the position, the question is being considered very seriously by the Government but it would be rather strange not to consider a report of this magnitude dealing with the best-known example of a series of inquests with improved legal representation before coming to the conclusion, to which they may or may not come, that a response to the amendment is appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the House will recall that Amendment 134 sought to increase the maximum penalty for the more serious stalking offence, where the behaviour of the offender puts a person in fear of violence, from the current five years to 10 years. The amendment would also increase the maximum penalty for the racially or religiously aggravated version of the offence from the current 10 years to 14 years. I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, but she is not in her place so I thank her in her absence, for introducing that amendment and explaining her concerns about the current maximum penalties during the debate on this amendment on Report.

The Government have reflected carefully on that debate and wish to ensure that the criminal justice system deals with these offences properly. The Government continue to keep maximum penalties under review and are ready to increase them where there is evidence that they are not sufficient to protect victims. Current sentencing practice suggests that, in the majority of cases, the maximum penalty of five years is sufficient to deal with serious stalking. In a small number of the most serious cases, however, courts have sentenced near to the current maximum. For those most serious cases, we are persuaded that judges should be able to pass a higher sentence than the current five-year maximum. This would afford greater protection to victims and be commensurate with the serious harm caused by these cases. The Government therefore tabled Amendment 134A, to which the Commons agreed, which replicates with some fine tuning the provisions of the noble Baroness’s amendment.

However, we are going further. As I said during debate on Report, we are keen to retain consistency between penalties for related offences. The Commons amendment in lieu will also therefore increase the maximum penalty for the related Section 4 harassment offence of putting a person in fear of violence. In line with standard practice, Amendment 134A also provides that the increase in maximum penalties for these offences will apply only to crimes committed on or after the date of commencement. As the Commons amendment in lieu builds on Lords Amendment 134, I trust that in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, the whole House will be content with the substitution. I therefore beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I am sorry to say that I really disagree with my noble friend on this matter. There is absolutely no justification for increasing the maximum sentence, and I have two reasons for saying that. First, I do not believe that the increase will provide an additional deterrent. Either the person in question is rational, in which case a maximum sentence of five years is a sufficient deterrent, or they are not rational, in which case it will make precious little difference. I note my noble friend’s point that the judges have rarely sentenced at the higher end of the existing maximum. My other point is a general one. I am very concerned about overcrowding in prisons. There has been a tendency to increase the sentences imposed by the courts. The newspapers and Parliament are responsible for that in part, and I do not wish to see Parliament increasing the pressure on our prisons. This is a small contribution to that, and I am bound to say I am against it.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch (UKIP)]

My Lords, I notice that in Amendment 134A the proposal is to increase the penalty from seven to 14 years for what is described as an offence,

“which consists of a racially or religiously aggravated offence under section 4 … of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997”.

Before we agree to this increase in the penalty, will the Minister enlighten us about what, particularly, a religiously motivated offence might be? Specifically—and I have asked this before in Written Questions and had unsatisfactory Answers from the Government—could such an offence be caused by a Christian preaching the supreme divinity of Christ and therefore denying the supremacy of Muhammad? Would various assembled Muslims be free to regard that as a religiously aggravated offence under this section?