Investigatory Powers Bill

Viscount Colville of Culross Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 30, I shall speak also to the other government amendments grouped with it. We come to the safeguards associated with confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic information, which have been the subject of significant debate during the passage of the Bill. This package of amendments protects the fundamental role that journalism plays in a healthy democracy. While it is right that the Bill provides for the investigation of individuals where they are suspected of serious illegality or wrongdoing, whatever their chosen profession, it is also right that particularly sensitive professions are afforded specific additional protections.

In limited circumstances, it may be necessary to use the powers provided in this Bill for the necessary and proportionate investigation of a journalist—for example, where they are suspected of serious illegality or wrongdoing or where there is an immediate threat to life. In such circumstances, the Bill and the associated codes of practice already contain significant protections for journalists and their sources, recognising the strong public interest in protecting a free press and freedom of expression in a democratic society, including the willingness of sources to provide information to journalists anonymously. So it already places into primary legislation for the first time the requirement for all public authorities to obtain judicial approval for an authorisation to acquire communications data to identify or confirm a journalistic source. We responded to concerns raised in the Commons by clearly setting out in the Bill that the judicial commissioner, a current or former High Court judge, must first consider the public interest in protecting a source of journalistic information and then be satisfied that there is another, overriding public interest before approving such an application.

On top of that, we went further and introduced Clause 2, the overarching privacy clause, which makes it explicit that public authorities using any power in the Bill must have regard to a number of matters, including whether what is sought to be achieved by an authorisation may reasonably be achieved by other, less intrusive means and the public interest in the protection of privacy. Public authorities would, of course, also be subject to the requirements of the Human Rights Act and all the relevant rights and freedoms that it provides for. Of course, all applications to acquire material must be authorised by a relevant authority and approved by a judicial commissioner. The accompanying draft codes of practice require the Secretary of State, or law enforcement chief for law enforcement use of equipment interference, to apply particular consideration in cases where the subject of the warrant might reasonably assume a high degree of privacy, or where confidential information is involved.

Finally, statutory oversight of the use of investigatory powers, whether in relation to journalists or not, is provided through the creation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Further to this comprehensive oversight regime, the Bill creates a number of offences that apply to the public authorities using the powers to sit alongside existing relevant offences in other legislation. This includes a specific offence of unlawfully obtaining communications data, which will sit alongside the offence of misconduct in a public office in common law, to ensure that, where a public authority knowingly or recklessly acquires communications data without lawful authority, appropriate penalties are available.

My noble and learned friend Lord Keen has already spoken about the government amendment requiring the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to include in his annual report information relating to the operation of particular safeguards, such as those for legally privileged material. I want to make it clear that this requirement also applies to those safeguards protecting confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic information. It is also important to remember that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be able to call on whatever expertise he or she sees fit, and will be provided with sufficient resources to do so. This may be technical or communications expertise or, indeed, professional expertise, such as that of media advisers or lawyers.

We have been clear that the commissioner will lead an outward-facing organisation, and we consider that engagement with professional bodies, such as media representative groups, on how the use of a particular power affects their members is exactly the sort of thing the commissioner and their team should be doing. While we do not think that it would be appropriate to mandate this through legislation, it will form part of the role for the commissioner. These further new amendments will strengthen the safeguards in the Bill even further to ensure that the vital public interest of freedom of expression is protected, while still allowing those who are charged with keeping us safe to continue their vital work.

Amendments 30 and 75 protect the key principle that individuals who provide information to journalists should have an expectation of privacy. The Government accept that it is important that confidential journalistic material is handled with the sensitivity that it deserves. So where a relevant authority applies for a warrant where the purpose, or one of the purposes, is to authorise or require the obtaining of confidential journalistic material, the amendment would require the application to contain a statement confirming that this is the purpose, or one of the purposes.

The same requirement would apply in relation to a targeted examination warrant that seeks to authorise the selection for examination of such confidential journalistic material acquired in bulk. This means that the Secretary of State or law enforcement chief and judicial commissioner will have to be fully aware that they are authorising the obtaining of confidential journalistic material when they come to consider a warrant. The Government are seeking to protect legitimate journalism, while ensuring that those who wish to do us harm cannot hide behind spurious claims of journalism. For this reason, Amendment 268 makes it clear that material acquired or created to further a criminal purpose is not considered journalistic material in the context of the Bill. That seeks to avoid those such as the media wing of Daesh attracting a safeguard intended for legitimate journalists.

In addition to the requirement to clearly state in the application whether the purpose, or one of the purposes, is to obtain confidential journalistic material, the person to whom the warrant application is addressed must also be satisfied that there are specific arrangements in place for the handling, retention, use and destruction of communications containing such confidential journalistic material.

I turn to the amendments which protect sources of journalistic information. A free press cannot operate without journalists, and journalists cannot operate without sources. That is why the Government have focused protections on journalists’ sources and the important public interest in protecting the confidentiality of sources of journalistic information. Amendments 31 and 76 provide further protection by making clear that when a relevant authority seeks a warrant to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information, the application must contain a statement to that effect. This will mean that the Secretary of State or law enforcement chief and judicial commissioner will be fully aware of the intention to identify or confirm a source when they are considering the necessity and proportionality of the warrant. Again, the person to whom the warrant application is addressed must also be satisfied that there are specific arrangements in place for the handling, retention, use and destruction of communications that identify sources of journalistic information.

There are a number of consequential amendments which relate to modification of a warrant. These amendments make it clear that, when modifying a warrant when the purpose is to obtain confidential journalistic material, the same factors must be considered as would be the case in an application to obtain confidential journalistic material.

Amendments 53, 90, 194 and 217 will ensure that, where confidential journalistic material is obtained by a public authority which intends to retain it, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be notified as soon as is reasonably practicable. This applies when the material is obtained through interception or equipment interference through a targeted warrant and when it is selected for examination having been collected in bulk. This is an important safeguard. It ensures that the commissioner is fully aware of the confidential material held by the agencies. It assists in his oversight of the particular handling arrangements that must be in place when this type of material is retained by the agencies.

I turn to the amendments in relation to bulk provisions. Amendments 194 and 217 make it clear that, where confidential journalistic material is obtained by a public authority which intends to retain it, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be notified as soon as is reasonably practicable. This applies when the material is obtained through interception or equipment interference through a targeted warrant and when it is selected for examination having been collected in bulk. It ensures that the commissioner is fully aware of the confidential material held by the agencies and it assists in his oversight of the particular handling arrangements that must be in place when this type of material is retained by the agencies. There are also a number of consequential amendments on this which provide for the definition of a journalistic source to apply to the Bill as a whole rather than solely to Part 3, as previously drafted.

I hope that what I have said by way of explanation of these amendments demonstrates to the House that the Government have listened to the concerns raised in Committee by a number of your Lordships and to representations from journalists’ organisations and that we have responded in a constructive and helpful way. I beg to move.

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing forward this group of amendments, which will go a very long way to protecting the important relationship between the best journalists and their sources. As a journalist, I know how increasingly difficult it is to nurture a relationship with a whistleblower or an anonymous source who is prepared to reveal confidential information in the public interest. The Bill had been in danger of damaging that bond of trust, as I said in my speech at Second Reading. However, Amendment 30 will now place this relationship at the forefront of the judicial commissioners’ minds. During the passage of the Bill there have been questions about the definition of journalism, but these new amendments will give commissioners the powers to decide whether it is in the public interest to protect a particular source of journalism information.

I have also been concerned that targeted interception clauses would have made journalists covering demonstrations greater targets for those wanting to cause harm. The Bill would have opened the journalists to the threat of being seen as agents of the forces of law and order. This would have compromised their independence and ability to report the incident, not to mention putting them in harm’s way. However, Amendment 75 assuages my fear. The noble Earl and the Bill team have gone far to strengthen these safeguards for journalistic material in the various powers considered, but the new codes of practice will strengthen them even further. My only reservation is that the Bill does nothing to allow notifying the lawyers of reputable news organisations to alert them that a warrant to carry out surveillance on their journalists has been issued. This would have given them a chance to explain the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of a source when a warrant was asked for. However, I trust that the changes brought forward in this group of amendments will allow the commissioner to protect those sources of journalism. I know that the noble Earl and the Bill team have worked long and hard to come up with these amendments and I thank them.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as executive director of the Telegraph Media Group and draw attention to my other media interests in the register. Like the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, I am most grateful to the Government, and in particular to my noble friend the Minister—who has, as always, been the soul of patience and emollience—for listening so sympathetically to the arguments put forward in Committee and for engaging in what seemed like countless constructive discussions with media interests on issues which are of acute importance to a free press.

I welcome the amendments that the noble Earl has brought forward today. They mesh together with Amendments 10 and 11, which form the umbrella for the safeguards being introduced. They go a considerable way to meeting the concerns raised by the media. They do not, of course, go as far as some in the media would have liked in an ideal world. In Committee we looked at prior notification, which the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has just mentioned. However, we do not live in an ideal world, and it is very welcome that these amendments recognise in the Bill the significance and special importance of journalistic material. Given the particular difficulties of prior notification, which I fully understand, and the fact that we are at a late stage in the legislative process, this package is a practical way forward to keep the structure of the Bill intact, while providing important safeguards, although perhaps limited in some respects for confidential sources.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Viscount Colville of Culross Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Viscount Colville of Culross]

25: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Protection for journalistic sources, materials and activities
(1) Save in the exceptional circumstances identified in subsection (2), the regimes provided for by Parts 2 to 7 may not be used to access, obtain, record, hold, consider, analyse, disclose or otherwise deal with information, material or data—(a) of, or concerning, the activities relating to journalistic information, or(b) if the purpose of so doing is to obtain information identifying a journalistic source.(2) The exceptional circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are—(a) the case is one of great emergency,(b) immediate action is necessary, and(c) the relevant investigatory powers under the regimes provided by Parts 2 to 7 can be used lawfully having regard to those provisions.(3) In any case where the regimes provided for by Parts 2 to 7 are disapplied by subsection (1), any person who could otherwise have sought to use one of the investigatory powers specified therein may apply to a judge for an order allowing that person to access, obtain, record, hold, consider, analyse, disclose or otherwise deal with such information, material or data in a way provided for by Parts 2 to 7.(4) An application for an order under subsection (3) shall be made on notice to the media organisation affected unless the judge determines that an application without such notice is required in order to avoid prejudice to the investigation.(5) Paragraphs 7 to 9 of Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 shall apply in relation to the service of a notice of application for an order under subsection (1) as if the application were for an order under Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.(6) Criminal Procedure Rules may make provision about proceedings under this section where the judge determines that an application without such notice is required.(7) A judge may only make an order under subsection (3) if the person making the application has convincingly established that— (a) the order is directed towards one or more of the legitimate aims specified in Article 10.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights,(b) there is an overriding public interest necessitating the order,(c) reasonable alternative measures to the order do not exist or have been exhausted, and(d) the order is proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims being pursued.(8) The costs of any application under subsection (3) and of anything done or to be done in pursuance of an order as a result of the application is to be at the discretion of the judge.”

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a producer and director at the BBC.

The protection of sources of journalistic material has been talked about in the other place and in your Lordships’ House. Maintaining the trust of these sources is crucial to enabling the important role that is played by the free press in exposing wrongdoing in private and public institutions. That must be in the public interest. There is a difference between the public interest and what the public is interested in.

This Bill curbs the collection of journalistic material in violent and difficult situations, such as riots or demonstrations that turn violent. I very much welcome Clause 2, which covers privacy. That concerns all citizens. This amendment asks for an extra protection for sources of journalistic material and information across the powers of the Bill. It responds to noble Lords’ concerns about the difficulty of defining a journalist. In Clause 73, the words “journalistic material” are used. The amendment uses the same concept and refers to:

“Protection for journalistic sources, materials and activities”,

using the definition of journalistic material set out in PACE. This definition can be used as a basis for decision-making by the carefully trained and very experienced judicial commissioner who is charge of this process. The commissioner will decide what is journalistic material and what is not. I am sure that the public interest—again, rather than what the public are interested in—will be the most important criterion. This would mean that PR communications, which are for commercial benefit rather than public interest, will be excluded. Likewise, it would exclude fundamentalist bloggers who are clearly sending out propaganda whose material could never pass the test of public interest.

I know the Minister is concerned that free speech should flourish and that sources who provide this journalistic material do not feel that they are unnecessarily being surveilled by the authorities using the extraordinary powers available in our digital age. I am grateful to the Government for listening to these concerns, and I welcome the safeguards provided in Clause 73 for the protection of sources of journalistic information in the power of communications data.

Amendment 25, however, aims to extend those protections for sources to the other powers set out in the Bill. I am particularly keen for the power for targeted equipment interference to be covered by a safeguard for sources. This could be material owned by the journalist or the source who is giving the information. Targeted equipment interference includes the ability to use a mobile phone’s microphone as a bug. It could also include looking at a journalist’s electronic notebook and at footage shot in the course of a story, which, as a broadcast journalist, worries me a lot.

I note that there are thresholds in the Bill for issuing this kind of warrant, which include national security and serious crime. The definition of serious crime is explained in Clause 235. Paragraph (a) states that it has to be an offence for which someone,

“could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 3 years or more”,

but paragraph (b) states that it is where,

“the conduct involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose”,

I am worried that the definition in paragraph (b) is very wide and represents too low a threshold. It includes any conduct that,

“involves the use of violence”,

and,

“conduct by a large number of persons”,

and therefore includes the classic case in which the police try to get hold of footage filmed at public demonstrations. Violence is a very wide concept. If serious crime was limited to paragraph (a) or to indictable offences only, there might be a point, but allowing the definition of serious crime to cover any violence by a large number of persons is too low a threshold and would get round the tried and tested means of accessing information through PACE.

I know from experience that journalists are often seen by demonstrators and rioters as extensions of the authorities. This process started abroad, but it is now often seen in this country. As a result, we are seeing journalists targeted for taking footage of riots or violent behaviour. This is a dangerous trend, which we should all try to prevent. In the Dale Farm case, when the police wanted to see footage from Sky News, the judge ruled that the request posed a danger to broadcast journalists. He said:

“If the perception takes hold that such people are working on behalf of the police, or are likely to co-operate with them by supplying such material routinely, life could become very difficult. They might find it more difficult to obtain access to areas where demonstrations are taking place or to work in the vicinity of those who are prone to violence. Moreover, at its most acute, the perception could increase the risk of violence towards cameramen or their equipment”.

I ask the Minister to look again at the Bill and to extend the protection for journalistic material across the powers. This provision would ensure that the judicial commissioner would be asked to look at warrants and would have to bear in mind the safeguards needed to protect journalistic sources.

Proposed new subsection (4) asks for notice of a warrant request to be given to the media organisation, unless there are exceptional circumstances, such as a great emergency or when immediate action has to be taken. This is important so that it can explain the dangers involved in exposing the source. I understand that, as the Bill stands, the judicial commissioner, if concerned about the dangers of a warrant being granted to the journalist and the dangers this might pose to the journalistic source, will have the right to ask for more information. My fear is that they might not have been given all the facts by the people requesting information. It might just be that the person making the request is not even aware of the danger to the journalistic source from exposure to surveillance.

I quite understand the fears of the Government that notification to a media organisation might defeat the whole purpose of the exercise, but PACE covers the physical property of journalistic information and gives a right of notification so that the application can be challenged. PACE, however, dates back to 1984, when the internet was still a glimmer in the eyes of Sir Tim Berners-Lee. We never imagined the presence of digital information in worldwide communications at the press of a button. Mobile phones, computers and the internet are the notepads of the 21st century. The Bill is a wonderful recognition of the changing way in which we communicate, and it covers this. Surely this amendment is an opportunity to update the notification section of PACE to cover the equipment of our age that is used to gather journalistic information.

The amendment suggests that notification should be given through the media organisation. In the vast majority of cases, the application will relate to a newspaper or broadcaster, and a lawyer will be available for the news outlet in either broadcast or print. In-house lawyers regularly receive sensitive information, such as orders from family courts, privacy injunctions and super-injunctions, and are well able to handle sensitive information such as police requests for footage under PACE or the Terrorism Act, or indeed any police request. So I do not think handling such a request will be an issue. If there is a concern about the media organisation or the journalist involved, we should talk about the judicial commissioner being involved and helping make that decision.

I understand that noble Lords are concerned that there could be false claims of journalistic sources, which could be used to prevent a warrant. I suggest that the journalist would have to sign a witness statement that the claim is true; if found not to be, they would have perjured themselves and be subject to the might of the law. Once again, in this issue the judicial commissioner would have an important role to play. They would use their experience and training to decide whether the recipient is noteworthy or not.

The amendment represents very important safeguards for free speech in our country. I know that the Government greatly support this principle. I urge the Minister to consider carefully the changes to the Bill set out in the amendment and I beg to move.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 25, moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I declare my interest as executive director of the Telegraph Media Group and draw attention to my other media interests in the register.

As the noble Viscount has said, the issue of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources has been a leitmotiv during the obsequies of the unloved Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and throughout the passage of this Bill, during extensive pre-legislative scrutiny, in all its stages in the other place and now here in Committee in your Lordships’ House. But we are now nearing the end of it all and so this is probably our last opportunity to get it right. It therefore deserves the closest and most thorough attention.

I doubt that there are many here who need persuading about the importance, in a free society, of the protection of sources. The arguments were most formidably summed up in the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom in a famous ruling in the European Court of Human Rights some 20 years ago, which stated:

“Without … protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected”.

The protection of sources is crucial for investigative reporting, whistleblowing and indeed free and unfettered political debate. Without adequate protection, investigative journalism becomes almost impossible, whistleblowers do not come forward to the press and wider media to alert them to issues of public interest, and political debate becomes sterile and bland.

Your Lordships should not underestimate the difficulty already faced by journalists in getting confidential sources to speak on matters of often profound public interest. There has been so much attention given in recent years to the way in which sources have been exposed through surveillance and the misuse of anti-terrorist legislation that it is becoming harder and harder to get sources to come forward. Some even fear for their lives because they could easily become targets themselves if it became known that they had co-operated with a reporter. It is not an overstatement to say that, on occasion, the protection of sources can be a matter of life and death. That is why we must take with the utmost seriousness the passage of any legislation in this House which damages free expression and undermines the protection afforded to confidential sources by opening up the possibility of the state being able to shadow the work of journalists, track what they are up to, identify their sources and see what information they have made available.

I know that the Government are acutely aware of the importance of this issue and have listened with great diligence to the concerns of the media and others. I am very grateful to them for the action that they have already taken to strengthen the Bill in this regard, and the amendments in the other place are a very welcome step in the right direction. Unfortunately, I do not believe that they have yet gone far enough. Yes, there are safeguards, and they are very welcome. But they are not strong enough, and above all they will not work properly, and that is what this amendment is all about.

As I have said, this is a matter of real and urgent concern to the whole of the media—publishers, editors, trade unions, the national and regional press, magazines, broadcast and digital—and there has been unprecedented co-operation among interests which are often competing. The reason for this level of unity is, I am afraid, a profound sense of déjà vu. During the passage of RIPA back in 2000, a similar coalition of interests, led by the Newspaper Society, warned that its wide terms and lack of adequate safeguards would inevitably lead to the undermining of confidentiality of sources. The industry warned that the number of organisations which could use RIPA powers should be limited and that the grounds for the use of those powers should be more strictly limited. The industry was repeatedly told that it was crying wolf and that there was no way the Bill could be so abused. On 6 March 2000, Jack Straw, then Home Secretary in the other place, gave a specific guarantee on that subject.

But, of course, we know exactly what happened. We have heard of, and seen, numerous examples where local authorities and the police then subsequently used RIPA powers of surveillance to access phone records to crack down on whistleblowers talking confidentially to the press; and it has often been the local press, who are the guardians of local democracy and accountability, who have been in the firing line. In one case, involving the Derby Telegraph, a local authority used RIPA powers to spy on a reporter who had been talking to council employees. In another, deeply disturbing incident, Thames Valley Police used RIPA powers to place a probe inside the car of a source who had been talking to a reporter from the Milton Keynes Citizen, Sally Murrer, and, on the back of recordings obtained, arrested the journalist and strip-searched her. In 2012, Cleveland police used RIPA powers to access the phone records of three Northern Echo journalists to try to find out the source of its coverage of a Cleveland Police internal report that revealed elements of institutional racism within the police force.

All this—and much more that we may never know about—happened despite protestations from the then Government that this could not possibly happen. The reason for that, as we have seen in countless other cases of legislation involving press freedom and confidentiality of sources, is that the legislation has not been watertight, proper and comprehensive safeguards were not written into the Bill, and it has been too easy for those wanting to access sources to find loopholes through which to crawl. This mistake cannot be allowed to happen again.

It is easy to see where the problem with this Bill arises. As the noble Viscount said, yes, there are safeguards in Clause 73 relating to prior judicial authorisation, and that is welcome, but it is inadequate in a number of respects. For one thing, it governs acquisition of communications data only for the purpose of identifying or confirming the identity of a journalistic source. Crucially, it does not apply to acquisition of data for other purposes. But most importantly, it does not allow for prior notification to the media of an application to use the Bill’s powers, and the opportunity for the media to make submissions on whether this will impact on the confidentiality of a source.

It is all very well having judicial safeguards in place, but they will not work unless the judicial commissioner assessing the application has all the relevant information before applying his or her judgment and making an informed decision. After all, how can a judicial commissioner possibly know what they do not know? That is almost Kafkaesque. Without input from the media—and I recognise that there must be exceptions to this where a journalist or media organisation is under suspicion—they could not possibly, for instance, know how the use of surveillance could actually place the life of a source, or indeed of a journalist, in danger and other such considerations. In those circumstances, the important tests outlined in the Bill cannot be properly applied, and as a result the safeguards simply will not work.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Government are clear that the regime provided for in the Bill is not inferior to the provisions of PACE. It requires that applications be made to a court for a production order on notice to the holder of the material. In the case of communications data the whole of the material is a telecommunications provider, not a journalist. We are therefore clear that nothing in the Bill enables the investigatory authorities to circumvent the protections for journalists’ sources contained in PACE. Indeed, in 2015 the Interception of Communications Commissioner conducted a detailed investigation into the allegations that public authorities had utilised RIPA to avoid the use of PACE and clearly rejected the claim. The amendments that we have made to the Bill combined with the other safeguards for acquiring communications data mean that the relevant considerations laid out in Schedule 1 to PACE are addressed on the face of the Bill.

[Viscount Colville of Culross]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords across the Committee for their support for this amendment. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for pointing out the dangers to journalists that are possibly posed by this Bill and how the amendment might be able to ameliorate that situation. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, for reminding us of the recommendations of his committee. There was a worry that there was less protection for journalists under the Bill than had existed under PACE. I know that the Minister has answered the point, but obviously there is widespread concern that that is the case.

I ask the Minister to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who after all was a senior policeman. He himself pointed out that when it comes to looking at serious crime, particularly the worries over violence in demonstrations, it is all about keeping the balance and making sure that journalists do not become a target for violence and that we protect them. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, for pointing out the importance of keeping the anonymity of whistleblowers. Of course the whistleblower Act protects whistleblowers, but only once they have been named. What we are trying to do is to maintain their anonymity.

I thank the Minister for the discussions that we have had in the run-up to the Bill, but I ask him to look once again at the protections in place for journalists under different powers. I do not think, as he said, that we are asking for blank protections for journalists. We are asking for them to be carefully controlled with different thresholds and controls to exist in different powers. I am also sorry that the Government do not feel the need to notify journalists that a warrant is going to be issued. It would be extremely helpful and it is important in making sure that the process works better.

I hope that the Minister will at least continue discussions with us between now and Report stage about how we can extend the protections for the sources of journalistic material. For the moment, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 25 withdrawn.