Police: Employment and Discipline

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Monday 9th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not know the answer to that; I will have to write to my noble friend.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will know that the majority of our police officers do a great job, often in the most difficult circumstances. However, we have seen a number of high-profile cases that have undermined the public’s trust and confidence in our police—cases such as that of Sarah Everard or even of the head of the police watchdog himself having to resign over historic allegations. Is not the question for the Government: what are they going to do to work with the police to restore the necessary public trust and confidence in our police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I join the noble Lord in agreeing that we owe our police officers—the vast majority of whom do an excellent job—our thanks and praise. He will also be aware that there have been a number of reports published on these subjects. The police forces will be coming back imminently with their responses to the HMICFRS report, to which I referred earlier. As I said, I think the report specified that it will be within 56 days. It is absolutely incumbent on the Government to work with all police forces to ensure that they deliver the highest possible standards.

National Security Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 44 and 45A. It is striking that in the electoral finance regulations there is a great dissonance between what is required of political parties fighting a democratic election and what would, for instance, be required of not only a bank or financial institution but many charities. I find it difficult to understand why there should be any objection to ensuring that money donated to a political party in the course of a democratic election is susceptible to enhanced due diligence. It is quite reasonable to expect that the origin of those party donations should be visible. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, pointed out clearly, there are very considerable gaps. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that there is a great deal more to be done regarding electoral finance.

I am the chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which, within the last two years, undertook a major report on the regulation of electoral finance. In that, we spoke not only to the political parties but to representatives of those involved in the referendum campaign and a whole variety of people who have an interest in this area. We were then able to come forward with a series of recommendations to try to close a number of the loopholes. Many of them do not relate specifically to foreign interference but there is obviously the opportunity for those who would interfere as a foreign state in our electoral procedures to exploit loopholes in the system.

Regrettably, the Government did not wish to accept our recommendations, which I feel was a missed opportunity. The Elections Act, which has now gone through, did not address a number of the areas relating to electoral finance where there are glaring inconsistencies and anomalies. This is a good opportunity—at least in respect of some of those areas, particularly where they relate to foreign interference—to introduce these amendments, which will go some way towards closing some of the very evident loopholes. From that perspective, I strongly support these amendments.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we very much welcome Clauses 13 and 14—or however they are now numbered, given the Government’s amendments—as they introduce new offences of foreign interference, given the potential impact on our democratic processes at every level. That is a further reflection of the way that the Bill takes account of the new national security environment and the changing and emerging threats that we face.

As the Minister helpfully outlined, the main effect of the Government’s amendments will be to broaden the offences to include when a person acts recklessly. It appears that that has been brought in to reflect references to “recklessness” in other offences in the Bill and following debate in the Commons. That is very welcome. Can the Minister explain why it was not part of the original Bill, and what has caused the change of thinking in the department for it to bring forward these amendments?

I will also reflect on some of the discussion from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, and others, on what is meant by proposed new subsection (2)(e), which refers to

“causing spiritual injury to, or placing undue spiritual pressure on, a person”.

For the benefit of the Committee, it would be helpful if the Government could say more about what they intend, what that encompasses and the thinking that lies behind it. That would be helpful to the Committee in the light of the various comments made.

We also support Amendment 43 from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Wallace. We very much support the concept of an annual report on how these clauses protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. I also understand and appreciate, as I think the Committee does, the Minister’s comment about how this is about protecting the country’s democratic processes from foreign interference, not from the normal democratic and political discourse that one would expect. I am particularly grateful for that, having been accused of being a communist and a member of the Revolutionary Socialist Party—I do not know whether anyone ever came across that in my file. More recently, for the new heads of various bodies, I have been called a traitor for my views on the EU referendum. So I stand here accused of being a communist on the one hand—in my younger days, it has to be said—and then having moved to being a traitor for my views.

The serious point I am trying to make, in a humorous way, is that political discourse takes place, as do debate and argument. It is really important for us to understand the difference in the Bill’s intention that the Minister pointed out. For that to be read into the record is really important so that it is not misunderstood; it is clearly not what the Government intend.

Amendment 44, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Wallace, and of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, is really important. It was very well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Lord, Lord Evans, said that he supports it. There are a lot of arguments for this amendment, but my view is the same as the point the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made—a really important point, particularly at the current time when there is some disillusionment. Accepting Amendment 44 as part of the Bill would help enormously to instil public confidence, to ensure that people understand that our political parties not only are free from foreign interference through political donation but are seen to be free of it from their statements. Instilling public confidence on that is really important.

I move on to my Amendment 45, which is a probing amendment. I say to the Government that it is not necessarily intended to be added to the Bill, but it deals with an important aspect of this discussion. It is how to deal with the issue of informing the public about what we seek to do and the new threats that they face, and how we raise their awareness of them. There is also the crucial question of how this could be done in real time.

I use the example of Canada to cause us as a Committee to think. Canada has a Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which lays out a clear and impartial process by which Canadians can be notified of a foreign threat to the integrity of an election. That includes provisions for informing candidates, organisations or election officials whether they have been the known target of an attack. It has processes which state how decisions are made, and by whom, and as to whether a public announcement should be made to alert people to the threat.

As I said, this is a probing amendment, and I am not an expert on the protocol. I am trying to understand the Government’s view. If we were to believe that foreign interference was taking place, at what point would they think it appropriate, relevant or consistent with the security of our nation for the public to be informed of that? I think the public have a right to be involved, potentially in live time.

I think this raises real difficulties. Let me create a scenario: a general election takes place—let us not use the next year or two; let us say in 10 years’ time—and the Government find that that election is being compromised by foreign interference. What happens? How does the Bill deal with that scenario? We are in Committee, which is when we look at detail. I think there is an important question for the Government about public involvement with respect to their knowledge and awareness of the potential for interference that may take place and what they have a right to know if the Government or the services come to a conclusion that there is foreign interference and that it may be compromising an election, whether it be a general election, a local election or some other part of the democratic process. I think that is an important part of this discussion. I think that, far from it being a weakness for the Government of the day, with the security services and others, to say that they are protecting the integrity of the democratic processes such is their importance, alongside that, should it be necessary for them to alert the public, they should have a system, or protocol to which they can refer, dealing with what the consequences of that would be.

This has been an interesting debate at the heart of another important series of amendments because they seek to protect our democratic processes from the foreign interference the Minister pointed out in his introduction. I look forward to his reply to not only my remarks but to the remarks of other noble Lords.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the notably unrevolutionary noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support for these amendments. I will address his precise question on whether the amendments on recklessness represent a change in government policy and why they are being introduced now. It was always our intention to capture malign foreign interference activity in all its forms with this offence. After the completion of the Bill’s passage in the other place and in light of the comments made in the Public Bill Committee on the lack of an offence that could be committed recklessly, we retested the offence against the operational and policy requirements and we saw that there were examples of conduct, such as where a person’s intention was not to cause an effect but rather to improve their status within relevant organisations of a foreign power, that were at risk of not being in scope for the offence. I hope that answers the question on why it is being done now.

The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked three specific questions about why recklessness is present in only one of these offences. The fact is that there are three different ways to commit the offence. New subsections (1) and (2)—inserted by Amendment 38—relate to a person’s intention, and only subsection (2) deals with recklessness.

Amendment 43 seeks to introduce a requirement for the Secretary of State to lay a yearly report, from the date of the National Security Bill gaining Royal Assent, assessing the impact which Clauses 13 and 14 have had on protecting the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. This amendment duplicates one tabled in the other place. We do not consider it to be appropriate to introduce reporting requirements on the subject in isolation from the existing work on democratic integrity or in isolation from wider consideration of oversight and review mechanisms for the Bill.

Amendment 45 seeks to introduce a mechanism to alert the public to threats to the integrity of elections. We do not consider this to be necessary. Clauses 13 and 14 ensure that there are appropriate criminal sanctions for foreign interference. These provisions sit alongside other non-legislative activity. In advance of democratic events, His Majesty’s Government stand up an election cell to monitor and respond to any emerging issues during the election period. The election cell is led by the Cabinet Office and brings together government departments, the intelligence agencies, the devolved Administrations and external partners to ensure a holistic understanding of risks and to drive any necessary mitigations. The National Cyber Security Centre also meets regularly with the UK’s parliamentary parties and works closely with those responsible for core parts of the UK’s electoral infrastructure. Finally, formally established in 2019, the defending democracy programme is a cross-government programme with the overarching objective to safeguard elections and referendums and related democratic processes in the United Kingdom.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am dredging my memory a little bit here, but I remember the Security Minister about a month ago outlining much more about defending democracy. I will have to refer back to the comments he made in the other place, but I am pretty sure they deal with the questions that have just been raised by the noble Lord.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I think this is a really important point about informing and alerting the public in live time. I would be grateful if the Minister could come back having reflected on that for us.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will certainly have to read all the various information that I can find on the defending democracy programme, which I am pretty sure deals with most of the issues that have just been raised. If I am wrong on that, of course I will make that clear.

Amendment 44 was spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Carlile, Lord Purvis, Lord Evans and others. The amendment seeks to enhance checks on the source of political donations in two ways. First, it seeks to introduce a requirement for political parties to release a policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. Secondly, it requires political parties to include in their annual statement of accounts a statement detailing their risk management approach to donations and the measures in place to prevent the acceptance of impermissible donations. While I understand the intent behind this amendment, let me be clear that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls on political donations to ensure that only those with a legitimate interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent. Given that it has been spoken to by most speakers, I am going to go into a bit more detail on this, with the indulgence of the Committee.

Only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. That includes registered UK electors, including registered overseas electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities or otherwise eligible donors, such as Irish citizens meeting prescribed conditions who can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations which are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. Failure to return such a donation, either to the donor or the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence and any such donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission. Furthermore, the Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.

It is an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already register donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; they are then published online for public scrutiny.

By requiring political parties to detail publicly their approach to mitigating the risk of impermissible donations, proposed new subsection (3) of the noble Lord’s amendment has the effect of providing such donors with the details of mitigations they need to overcome to make an impermissible donation. I am sure that is an unintended consequence, but it is important to oppose this amendment on the grounds that not only do the existing rules mitigate these risks but the amendment itself risks undermining the already strong rules.

National Security Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I wonder whether the noble Lord is considering Clause 28 rather than Clause 23.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

What was Clause 23 has now become Clause 28, because of various changes made by amendments to the Bill. So my noble friend’s remarks will be perfectly in order when we get to Clause 28, but we are not there yet.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

It might help the noble Lord to know that there are a number of amendments tabled to Clause 28, which is a controversial clause and will be debated on the first day of the new year, I suspect.

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Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

60: Schedule 6, page 100, line 19, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may only designate places at which persons may be detained under section 25 which are within the United Kingdom.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would clarify that places of detention must be in the UK.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hacking must make sure that he is here on the Wednesday we come back; I am sure that we will start with the debate he referred to, which will probably be quite a significant and long one. Just to give him time and to get my retaliation in first, I tell the Minister that I have read the relevant bit of Schedule 6—paragraph 1(2)—which he will say makes my amendment irrelevant because it is covered there. I know that; I have put this down so that we can have a debate on it.

In moving my Amendment 60, I recognise the very important issues raised by Amendments 61 and 63 from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. We are returning to Schedule 6, which deals with detention under Clause 25, “Arrest without warrant”, which is a significant power. We accept that there is clearly a need for individuals to be detained under the offences in the Bill, but I have a number of questions to seek clarification from the Minister—hence my Amendment 60.

Committee allows us to look in detail at various sections and parts of the Bill and seek clarification on what the Government mean by certain phrases. That is of particular interest because many people read our deliberations and they are often used in the courts to try to inform judgments. I hope the Government will bear with me if some of my questions appear to have obvious answers.

Clause 25(1) states:

“A constable may arrest without a warrant”.

Is that only a constable of a police force, not any other organisation? Is it all UK police forces? Does it include other forces, for example a constable of the MoD police, the British Transport Police or the Civil Nuclear Constabulary? Are there any special arrangements for Northern Ireland, given that the Bill says that any officer of any police force can use this power in any part of the United Kingdom? If they are not in uniform, do they have to produce their warrant to show who they are?

In Clause 25(6), the original detention of 48 hours can be extended by a review officer. How many times can this be reviewed and for how long can someone be detained? Is there a maximum limit or can they be renewed on multiple occasions? At what point would there be any judicial involvement in the process to agree any continuing detention beyond the original 48 hours?

Can the Minister confirm that my Amendment 60 is not needed, as I said at the beginning, because paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 6 says that detention has to be in

“land or a building in the United Kingdom which is owned … by a police force.”

Does this include all types of police force? Would it include the buildings and lands of the British Transport Police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the MoD police, et cetera?

Can the Minister also confirm on the record that no person arrested without warrant under Clause 25 can be held in any UK buildings or land in any security service building outside the UK, any Armed Forces facility or land outside the UK, or any other such facility? There is a need for some clarification here, in the sense that UK military bases are sometimes referred to as “sovereign territory”. Does that imply that they are in the UK and could therefore be used, even though they are not within what one would normally assume to be the borders of the United Kingdom?

Can the Minister confirm or otherwise whether Clause 25 can be used outside of the UK to arrest a UK national who is believed to be involved in a foreign power threat activity within the United Kingdom? If so, how does that actually work? If a UK national is arrested abroad because of the threat they have posed through an activity within the United Kingdom, how is that person then detained and brought back, or can the offence not be used against a UK national who is abroad even if they are believed to have committed an offence when they were within the United Kingdom?

I will leave the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to speak to her amendments, but they address the idea that, in a democracy, the proper treatment of detainees must not only be done but be seen to be done. Which body or independent reviewer is or will be responsible for oversight of the operation of Clause 25 and Schedule 6? As I have said, these Benches accept the need for such arrangements, but clarity of purpose and transparency are essential when dealing with issues of arrest and detention. Our democratic traditions demand that we do so in this area, as much as anywhere else. With that, I beg to move.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for introducing this group. As he noted, I will speak to Amendments 61 and 63 in my name, which are inspired, as usual, by the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. My amendments relate to Schedule 6, which applies the conditions for arrest and detention without warrant under Clause 25.

We are concerned that some of the protections in the schedule are not adequate to guard against a descent into somewhat arbitrary detention. The initial period of detention permitted is 48 hours, and there is supposed to be a review at least every 12 hours. There can then be a judicial warrant for up to seven days after the initial arrest, subject to a further extension up to a total of 14 days. Although that judicial part has certain guarantees, there are still elements which cause us concern, including when the detainee and their legal representative may be excluded from parts of the hearing, or an application may be made to withhold certain information relied upon by the authorities. To be denied sufficient information to counter any claims made against them or to be excluded from the hearing are serious moves. Obviously, these themes have been encountered before in anti-terrorism legislation, but we are concerned, for instance, that the use of detention could be based on undisclosed or closed material where the concern relates solely to proceeds of crime.

My Amendment 61 is about where there could be a power to delay allowing the detainee to have a named person—a family member or a friend, for instance—informed of their detention and having the right to consult a solicitor, including where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the person has benefited from criminal conduct or where the recovery of property of value would be hindered by allowing access to a solicitor or notification to a named person. These are very serious impediments to accessing basic rights for a person detained without charge. The JCHR feels that, while these restrictions may be proportionate if necessary for imperative reasons of national security, such as to prevent immediate harm to persons, the case is less compelling where the objective is solely asset recovery. Therefore, Amendment 61 aims to delete paragraphs 9(4) and 9(5)—I hope they are still paragraphs 9(4) and 9(5)—of what is now Schedule 6; the moving story which has tripped up other noble Lords also applies to schedule renumbering.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Forgive me; the answer is that, in the text of the Bill, this is not limited to state threats proceeds of crime. The operation of the Bill is as I just described in my speech and, as I have already said, its safeguards are built into the statute itself.

The second amendment to Schedule 6 tabled by the noble Baroness seeks to remove certain circumstances whereby a review of a suspect’s detention may be postponed. There are various reasons why a review may need to be postponed. For example, the suspect may be receiving medical treatment and be unable to make representations on their continued detention to the review officer. It may be that there is a delay in the review officer arriving at a custody suite, or they may be reviewing another suspect’s detention if multiple arrests have been made in a short period.

It is impossible to predict all the possible circumstances and make specific provision for them in the legislation. The legislation does not provide for the review to be permanently postponed. It is required to be carried out as soon as possible, but this proposal provides for some operational flexibility. The code of practice—which, as I have said, the Government will publish in due course—will provide further information on reviews of detention, and we will state the requirement for any postponement of detention reviews to be recorded on the custody record. In the meantime, similar provision again can be found in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act code of practice code H, which operates for detentions under the Terrorism Act 2000.

With that, I conclude.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very helpful reply, which put on the record clarification of certain things, in particular that the word “constable” applies to all police forces across the UK. That was helpful in answer to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. As the Minister will know, a number of regulations and codes of practice will be coming before Parliament with respect to the detention of people under these powers. They will require some quite careful consideration by Parliament.

With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 60 withdrawn.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Not to be left out, may I do the same?

Amendment 62 agreed.

Migration and Economic Development Partnership with Rwanda

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Tuesday 20th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, a legal ruling has said that the Government’s asylum processing deal with Rwanda is legal, although with a number of qualifications.

First, I will spell out clearly, and for the avoidance of any doubt, what His Majesty’s Opposition think about the current situation. We believe that the Government have failed to stop the criminal gangs putting lives at risk; have failed to prosecute or convict the gang members, with convictions for people smuggling down by 75% in the last two years; have failed to take basic asylum decisions, which are down by 40% in the last six years; and have failed on the issue of small boat crossings, which are now at record numbers, with no decisions made in 98% of those cases. The Government’s solution, among other policies, is to put forward a scheme which is unworkable, unethical and extortionately expensive—the so-called Rwanda plan—rather than sorting out the problems I outlined. Indeed, the decision-making processes are so flawed that, despite the decision on legality, each of the eight cases were considered so flawed and chaotic that those individual decisions were quashed by the court.

It is in all our interests that there is a functioning, competent and humane asylum process. The Rwanda plan, however, is not the way for the issues to be resolved. I will ask some detailed and specific questions to show some of the continuing problems, notwithstanding the legal judgment. Given the importance the Government attach to the scheme, when does the Minister expect the first flight to Rwanda to take off? When can the Home Secretary’s dream of such a flight be realised, or is it just a flight of fancy that should never happen anyway?

The Rwandan Government have said publicly that they have the capacity to take 200 people. Bearing in mind that more than 40,000 people have crossed the channel this year alone, what number does the Minister believe will be enough to act as a deterrent? Is 200 still the number, or are there plans for more?

We have already paid Rwanda £140 million, without a single person being sent there. What has that money paid for? Are we committed to additional sums, and, if so, how much and what will it be for? The Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, according to the Home Secretary’s own Statement yesterday, has said again that

“there is not currently sufficient evidence to demonstrate value for money.”—[Official Report, Commons, 19/12/22; col. 33.]

Why have Ministers yet again ignored that advice?

The court found chaos and confusion in the Home Office’s decision-making on the Rwanda cases, including a failure to consider properly torture and trafficking evidence. Why did that happen? Can the Minister assure us that offences such as torture and trafficking will be taken as evidence? On trafficking, the conviction of people smugglers has dropped from 12 a month to three a month in the last two years, even though the number of smuggler gangs has grown. Would it not be better to stop wasting money on the Rwanda scheme and put it towards tackling the people-smuggling gangs instead?

Can the Minister confirm that families and children will not be subject to the Rwanda policy? If they will not, can the Minister explain how the proposed new legislation to detain and deport anyone arriving here irregularly, which is to be brought forward next year, will work and what its relationship with the Rwanda plan is?

The court judgment also referred to the failure of the UK Government to consider the Rwanda-Israel agreement and why that was abandoned. Why did the Government not consider that evidence? Did the evidence about the Rwanda-Israel deal not show that it actually increased trafficking?

The Rwanda scheme is a damaging distraction from the urgent action the Government should be taking to go after criminal gangs and sort out the asylum system. As I have said, the scheme is unworkable, expensive and unethical. It really should be the task of the Government to come forward with a scheme that works and is effective and efficient. Above all, the Government should stop using rhetoric which may make headlines but does not work. All of us understand that action is needed, but let that action be consistent with the values of our country and the proud tradition we have of offering hope and sanctuary to those fleeing war, persecution and horror. The Rwanda scheme fails that test and should be abandoned.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I read the judgment this morning; it is a very comprehensive judgment and I respect it. However, it is astonishing to me that, on such a flagship issue, in which the Government have invested so much capital, judicial review has been awarded for all those claimants and, therefore, it is at the moment inoperable.

The Government chose to bring this arrangement through a memorandum of understanding, not a treaty, to avoid scrutiny and a proper ratification process by Parliament. We did our best in this House, through the International Agreements Committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, to scrutinise this—but the Government chose a route to put this into place to avoid proper scrutiny. So can the Minister be clear today about what the legal, binding basis is on the commitments that have been provided by both parties to this MoU? What is the legal basis for the data-sharing arrangements that are in place?

In June, I visited the Hope Hostel in Kigali, the reception centre. A large banner at the entrance says, “Come as a Guest, Leave as a Friend”. That banner is adjacent to armoured gates with machine-gunned guards. The contract is awarded to a private company on an annual basis. That will run out in March, so will the Minister confirm that that private arrangement will continue from next March, and will he place a copy of the contract for the operation of the Hope Hostel in the Library of this House?

Some £20 million has been given to provide this centre. I saw nothing like £20 million-worth of facilities when I visited it in June. It had no suitable areas for those vulnerable to suicide risk or those who had come through routes of great danger. This is on top of the £120 million provided to the Government of Rwanda. That £140 million is totally inappropriate, given the desperate plight of those here at home, including those dying of diphtheria—which we thought we had got rid of in the Victorian age. As the Minister was unable to confirm it to me, I have an inaccurate understanding of how many unaccounted-for children there are. If he could update me on that, I would be very grateful. There is no guarantee on the timeframe, so when will the centre that we have paid £20 million for be operational?

When I asked the officials in Rwanda about the processing time for those seeking asylum, those in Rwanda for camps because of other conflicts said that the average time was up to 10 years. What commitment has been provided for the process time of those who will be received at the Hope Hostel? I hope that the Minister can be very clear with regards to that.

Finally, we cannot put a price on immorality, but £140 million is a dear price to pay for our reputation being so tarnished. On a previous question, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, referred to the Government’s moral compass. It is pointing in the wrong direction. The UK supported the people of Rwanda, some of the most vulnerable in the world, who are suffering from extreme poverty, with £73.5 million of assistance in 2019-20. This has been slashed by 69% to just £23 million this year—so we are paying £140 million to cover for failed policies at home while denying those most vulnerable in the world and Rwanda UK support. Is this not an immoral, unworkable and inappropriate scheme which, at the very least, should be put to a vote in this House?

National Security Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendments. I respect the issue of the grey area of tactics, but I equally acknowledge that if we are seeking to secure convictions beyond reasonable doubt for life sentences and sentences of 14 years, then the burden has to be, in my view, on having the primary legislation as clear as it can be. I will come back to the wider areas of concern.

The Government have referenced that this is an update not a wholesale replacement of the 1911 Act, which states in Clause 1:

“safety or interests of the State”.

But that is a very specific reference to the penalties for spying. It does not go beyond that, so the reference for the understanding of the interests of the state with regard to that penalty and that part of the 1911 Act are very clear. The difficulty with this Bill, as my noble friend indicated, is that the Government are now using that across a series of different offences which are very broad in nature. We will no doubt come back to some of those within the Bill.

The Government have also said that we do not need to have it clarified in the Bill because they are relying on case law definition for this; they cite Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions—1964 AC 763—as far as that is concerned. I looked at that case, which was specifically about a decision that was made about protesters seeking to access a site where nuclear bombers were going to be taking off. The court found that it was not for the courts to decide what were national security interests; that was a responsibility of the Executive. That is very understandable.

That decision has also been looked at in other cases including Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman in 2001. In that case, with regard to Chandler v DPP on national security issues, Lord Steyn said:

“But not all the observations in Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions … can be regarded as authoritative in respect of the new statutory system.”


So purely relying on the definition of case law on a whole breadth of different offences under this Bill is not sufficient.

I was slightly concerned by what the Minister, Stephen McPartland, told the House of Commons in Committee. He seemed to imply that the real reason why the definition was so broad in this Bill was that the evidential threshold had to be low to secure prosecutions. He said of any further restrictions, as in my noble friend’s amendment:

“That would create a higher evidential threshold to secure prosecution in an area that is often difficult to evidence due to the sensitive nature of the information that may have been obtained or disclosed. Put simply, we would have to explain why it caused damage, which may require evidence that compounds the damage. That would provide challenges to our law enforcement agencies and courts”.—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 12/7/2022; cols. 81-2.]


I am not a lawyer, but I imagine that our courts are fairly well equipped to handle such cases, which are sensitive or relating to national security, as they have in the past. I was troubled to read that the Minister gave the argument that we needed to keep the definition so broad to create a lower evidential threshold, but the penalty is life imprisonment. That surely cannot be right.

More alarmingly—this goes to the noble Lord’s point about wider interests—the Minister referred to the wider elements, not just national security but economic interests. He also referred to public health interests, saying that these areas would be covered in the Bill, and not just when they are used to threaten national security. So it is not just the grey tactics that concern us with regard to national security grounds, but the greyness of how, potentially, Ministers and prosecutors will seek to define that wider national interest. On the public health interest, I can understand that a malign interest may wish to use such a tactic, as I understand the North Koreans tried to do with malware and the NHS. Those are all tactics but, ultimately, these are national security concerns and not public health concerns.

Fundamentally destabilising our economy should be a national security interest. The examples my noble friend Lord Beith gave of undermining certain sectors or competition are not sufficient to meet a trigger for national security. Therefore, I believe that that triggering should be in the Bill, which is why I support my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very important group of amendments which in many ways goes to the heart of much of the debate that will take place on a number of amendments. It reminds the Committee that the heart of the issue is Clause 1(1)(b), which says that to commit an offence

“the person’s conduct is for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Fundamental to that is that what we are discussing here, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, ably set out, is what we actually mean by the interests and safety of the United Kingdom. It is to the great credit of our country that we can debate that here to try to decide what it should be.

I agree with the majority of noble Lords who have said that it is important that we try to understand how to make sure that defending the interests and safety of our country is about national security and defence. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, reminded us that there are grey areas in that respect. That is not a criticism of having the debate, but it means that we have to decide where we want to draw the line. I have mentioned this to the noble and learned Lord Hope, and I pray him in aid. He mentioned it with respect to the Public Order Bill, and again with this one. It is an abrogation of this Parliament’s responsibility if it does not seek to answer these difficult questions and just leaves it to the courts, saying that it is for the courts to decide and determine. We ourselves should try to give greater clarity to what we as legislators think that phrase actually means.

It is incumbent on the Government to say what they will do to try to define this, as Amendment 2 moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my Amendment 3 seek to do. Either they should say “We don’t need to do that”, lay out why it is not necessary for Parliament to determine it and why they think we should leave it to the courts, or say how we will get some sort of definition that makes sense and gives greater clarity. To be frank, that is a real problem for the Bill.

As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, pointed out in his interesting and incisive remarks, along with other noble Lords, the Government say at paragraph 62 of the Explanatory Notes:

“The term safety or interests of the UK is not defined”.


They have already made up their mind that they do not need to define it. The basis of these amendments is that we think they do. We do not oppose the Bill or think it is not important that we protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom, but somewhere along the line our Parliament should try to say what that means. The Government say in the Explanatory Notes that it is not defined and, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned,

“case-law has interpreted it as meaning, in summary, the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers (see the Court’s view in Chandler v Director Public Prosecutions (1964)”.

I remind noble Lords that in that judgment, the House of Lords—constitutional arrangements were different then—essentially rejected the idea that it was for a jury to determine or decide whether something was in the interests of the state. As Lord Pearce’s judgment stated,

“the interests of the State must in my judgment mean the interests of the State according to the policies laid down for it by its recognised organs of government and authority, the policies of the State as they are, not as they ought, in the opinion of a jury, to be.”

I am not a lawyer—I have been a politician all my life—but I would argue with that. It may be quite correct from a legal point of view, but sometimes Parliament has not caught up with public opinion or where people are. Often, juries are an important way of determining what the public think, and they work.

We have seen recent examples of that. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, reminded us well of all the different issues that have arisen with protests. They are irrelevant to the Bill, but let me give another example: assisted dying. Time and again, juries have refused to convict on assisted dying, because they will not convict somebody in those terrible circumstances and do not believe that Parliament has caught up with the reality of where we are.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I entirely understand why the noble Lord is concerned about any uncertainty in these provisions, given the significant penalty, but is he at all reassured by the fact that it would be necessary for a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a defendant knew or ought reasonably to have known? That is quite a high threshold to be crossed before you even get on to this definition.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I agree; I am just making the point that a definition would also help and give us certainty and clarity. It is important for a Bill that seeks to address issues of national security that it seeks to define that. The debate has already taken place in Parliament; the noble Lord takes the view that it is unnecessary, but I think a definition would be helpful. A number of noble Lords have said that, in the Bill as drafted, it appears that not only national security or defence issues will fall under the Bill but a whole range of other potential offences which have nothing to do with national security or the defence of the realm.

That is the clarity we seek, and it is right to explore it in Committee. It will be interesting to hear what the Minister says as to why my amendment or those of the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, are unnecessary. Maybe he will use the argument the noble Lord put forward to say that that is what makes it unnecessary—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the thrust of the noble Lord’s argument. I was just reflecting on the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Of course, the jury will have to reach beyond reasonable doubt whether the individual knew. The question is what the mechanisms are of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the person knew what those interests of the Government were, if those interests are not specific and linked to national security. If the Government have made a case that those interests are as broad as the Minister in the House of Commons indicated—that they were linked with public health or economy—that makes the task in the courts much harder, I would have thought. Therefore, it is in the interest of securing better prosecutions that those restrictions are on the face of the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has indicated.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is quite right. As I said, the problem with the Bill is that there is no indication of what else may be covered by the “safety or interests” of the state, or what the limits of those terms might be. As I have been arguing, and as others have said, as well as the prevention of terrorism and espionage, they could extend to policies on energy, national infrastructure, the protection of water, power, food, health services, transport, law and order, organised crime and immigration controls. The extent of the powers that may be taken in the Bill could be used in relation to a wide range of state interests, not just state interests related to national security or to the defence of the realm. The interests of the state clearly are ensuring that we have enough energy, but should that be covered by a National Security Bill? These are questions that the Minister needs to answer, and it will be interesting to hear his answer.

I will make a couple of final remarks. Like many, I am somebody who has never read the Official Secrets Act 1911, but in preparation for Committee—and knowing the depth of knowledge, experience and wisdom that we have around—I thought it was necessary to make sure I was quoting. The Official Secrets Act 1911 says under “Penalties for spying”:

“If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State—”.


The Official Secrets Act 1911 says that it has to be for a purpose “prejudicial” to the interests of the state. Logically, should not defendants or people have the right also to argue that their act was not prejudicial to the state? The Act says that your act has to be prejudicial, so surely you have a right and a responsibility to prove that it was not prejudicial. That argument could take place within the courts or wherever. This argument about someone’s actions in relation to the safety or interests of the state, and whether they were prejudicial, needs some sort of definition. Without it, how on earth do we know whether somebody is going to commit an offence under this Act? It would be for somebody to interpret.

Can the Minister clarify what the Government mean by “safety or interests” of the state? Who determines what they are? How can anybody act against that in a way which does not break the law, whether it be through protests or actions? If I take action outside of an RAF base, protesting against it and trying to disrupt things going in or out, or if I am at the peace camp at Faslane, will that be classed as a protest? Where does it become something that falls foul of the Bill? In other words, where do you draw the line? That is an important question for the Government to answer.

My amendment and those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others say to the Government that it is not good enough just to say the “safety and interests” of the state. What does that mean? People have challenged that over the decades. They have stood up and said that the safety and interests of the state are something that they challenge or do not agree with. Through history, that is how progress and reform have taken place. At the time, those protesting, taking action or conducting various activities have sometimes been accused of undermining national security or acting against the interests of the state.

We do not want to pass a law which leads to more confusion or a greater inability for Parliament to say that these are the sorts of actions we mean. That is the whole point of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I support. It says that if it does not relate just to defence and national security, where is the grey zone that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, mentioned? Where do we draw the line? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, keeps reminding us, we should not abrogate our responsibility on that. It is our fundamental responsibility to try to answer that question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this was a helpful debate, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank all those who participated. These amendments seek to limit the “interests” element of the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” test which applies to many of the clauses in Part 1. As noted by many noble Lords, this concept was explored extensively in the other place.

The majority of these amendments change the “interests” element to cover only security or defence interests. This moves away from the safety or interests of the UK test that already exists and is understood in current espionage legislation. Indeed, the Law Commission noted its support of the Government’s decision to retain this term. At the oral evidence session to the Public Bill Committee, it noted that

“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act”—

those of 1911 and 1920—and

“avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security”,—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]

as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, noted.

The experience of the Government and the Governments of allied states is that espionage is frequently targeted at and can result in significant damage to all sorts of national interests, some of which may fall outside the scope of security or defence interests. Indeed, any attempt to narrow or define the interests to the UK risks creating a test that is quickly outdated, as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve.

A number of noble Lords referred to the Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions case that was heard in this House in 1964. It concluded that the interests of the state meant the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is noticeably distinct from protecting the particular interests of those in office. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and others said in relation to the 2001 case. However, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the Government do not think it can be defined in legislation. It needs to retain flexibility for future threats as they evolve.

For this reason, it would also not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to attempt to define the UK’s interests in a Statement to Parliament, as in the proposed amendment to Clause 1. Notably, these amendments do not include economic interests, interests related to public health, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, or interests related to preserving our democracy—to name just a few areas that would be overlooked by them. We know that these areas are targeted by hostile actors, and they should rightly be protected.

I was asked what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely understand the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, but, with respect, the fallacy that he falls into, and the fallacy into which the Government fall—the Minister has articulated it—is that, in the interests of being able to prosecute a wide range of activities, they threaten to lower the threshold for such prosecutions to a point where the responsibility for the decision on guilt lies not with a jury considering guilt or innocence but with those who decide to prosecute because they perceive a threat to the interests of the United Kingdom, and the interests of the United Kingdom are very wide.

I agreed with almost everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said; the one thing he did which I did not agree with was that he misquoted the Bill. The Bill is not about prejudice to the safety “and” interests of the United Kingdom. Everywhere that the phrase occurs, it says the safety “or” interests of the United Kingdom”.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Lord is quite right; I should have said that, and I meant to. I apologise to the Committee; that is what I meant to say. I thank the noble Lord for clarifying that.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am quite sure that no apology was needed for what was plainly a slip in a detailed speech made without reference to lots of notes. But the point is an important one, because the protection of the interests of the United Kingdom is free-standing, and the point that almost every noble Lord who has spoken has made is that, because they are defined, there is no clarity at all.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked about opacity. It is not just opacity; it is that no one can know what is criminal. The prosecutors are there to decide what they will charge—certainly with the consent of the Attorney-General where that is required. However, where they make that decision, the jury is left with an impossible position. The judge is bound to direct the jury properly, under the terms of Chandler—that the interests of the United Kingdom are effectively what the Government of the day determine those interests to be—and the offense is left effectively without any clarity at all. That is our objection. I take it a little further, but it is an objection that illuminates the danger of going down that path. It is unjust not to have clarity about what behaviour is criminal, particularly where the sentences are so serious. It is also damaging to public confidence in the criminal law itself if prosecutors and defenders cannot know what is criminal and what is not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will very briefly follow my noble friends to agree with that proposition. There has been reference to the foreign power condition, and I will refer to that too.

First, I take the opportunity to say that I am grateful to the Minister for what he said to me earlier by highlighting Clause 29(5). Yes, it does include that the foreign power condition can be met,

“if the person intends the conduct in question to benefit a foreign power”,

without necessarily identifying that foreign power. However, that is not an exclusive meeting of the test, as my noble friend Lord Marks has indicated. The test can be met, for example, if one of two business partners who has some intellectual property or something of commercial value is in negotiations with, say, a sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf and then there is a dispute between the two business partners. While one wants to sell that to the sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf, the other says, “You can’t do that, because that is now in breach of the National Security Bill, because I believe that this is a trade secret.” That is because a foreign power, under Clause 30(1)(c), is

“an agency or authority of a foreign government”,

so a sovereign wealth fund seeking investment could be within that definition. Therefore, I have sympathy for the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but a counterpoint has been raised by asking whether the Bill is the most appropriate way for national security to cover those aspects—and, on balance, I do not think that it is.

However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret is unlawful where the acquisition, use or disclosure constitutes a breach of confidence in respect of confidential information. As I understand it, that was the thrust of his argument. That is also the law: we have transposed the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2018 into UK law, so we have that intellectual property legislation—including a nine-page trade secrets regulation. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord said, and all of it, I think, is covered within existing legislation. The question then arises as to what the intent would be if one is either selling a trade secret or giving a trade secret to a foreign power to advance that foreign power.

That could absolutely be included in the Bill. The concern is that, given the way the Bill is drafted, so many other aspects could also be. That is the point we are trying to tease out: whether the Government intend that trade secrets are, as the noble Baroness indicated, some form of economic warfare, espionage or tactic. That is where the interest of the Bill should lie. It should not be the mechanism whereby trade disputes, commercial disputes or intellectual property disputes are resolved. Ultimately, that is where the Bill could be used. I do not think there are any in this Committee, but I am certain there are creative lawyers who might look for the most appropriate vehicle for the less appropriate cause. I am worried that the Bill would become one of those.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the new offences of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. We support these new offences and agree that the Government should safeguard against threats to the UK’s trade policy. We see them as important amendments. None the less, we have had an interesting and important debate today. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined, Amendments 8, 9 and 10 are about trying to understand why the Government believe that the offences need to have such a wide scope and whether narrowing them down would really have the unintended or bad consequences that the Government believe they would.

I have a couple of specific questions for the Government. The Bill says that there has to be a direct link to a foreign power, but suppose somebody obtains information such as a trade secret and sells it not to a foreign power but to a competitor business. Is that covered under the legislation? Is it the case that, under the Bill, to prosecute there would need to be a link from the individual to a foreign power and not just to a competitor within the UK?

The measures in Clause 2(4) to (7)—I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to this in his Amendment 11—are really quite important. Why can the offence take place only outside the UK if it is in respect to possession by a UK national, as opposed to a UK national and/or a UK resident, or any other description of persons? Having talked about a narrow definition, I wonder why the Government have restricted the measures in subsections (4) to (7) to a UK national. I would be interested to hear the Government’s answer to that.

An interesting discussion and debate has taken place within the Committee about the JCHR recommendation. It is an interesting point that we will all want the Government to clarify. What is the Minister actually saying to the points from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford? The JCHR quite clearly states that:

“The theft of trade secrets that pose no risk to national security is more properly governed by the offence of theft (and other breach of confidence and intellectual property rules) than through new espionage offences.”


It would be interesting to understand whether the Government think the JCHR is wrong or whether it has a point. If the JCHR is wrong, why do the Government believe it is wrong? Maybe the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, have greater relevance with respect to this Bill. With those few remarks, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in another lively and entertaining debate. Amendment 8 seeks to add a “safety or interests of the UK” test to Clause 2. Amendments 9 and 10 seek to narrow the definition of a “trade secret” so that it captures only information which is actually subject to measures to protect it. Amendment 11 seeks to expand the scope of a “UK person”. The Government reject these amendments and I will try to explain why.

The offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets targets threats designed to undermine our economic prosperity, tackling the whole-state approach to national security adopted by state actors. The Government believe that economic prosperity and national security are inherently linked. You cannot have one without securing the other, and Clause 2 seeks to protect both.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the definition of UK persons. It goes beyond a UK citizen and includes someone who lives in the UK; it is not just UK citizens. The noble Lord also asked about foreign power and corporates. I would answer that it depends very much on the corporate. If I am wrong on that, I will write to the noble Lord.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am not going to disagree with the Minister, but on the question of the letter—and I am pleased that he is writing to me—could he put it in the Library, and do that with respect to all the letters, so that every noble Lord can see his answers to the various questions?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I am happy to give that reassurance. This is just me flying somewhat solo, so I shall clarify that, but I can think of a number of circumstances where it would very much depend on the corporate. But I shall seek official clearance on that. In light of all those answers, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we all hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will not be criminalised by this Bill, but we look forward to the Minister’s response and for the exemptions to which the noble Lord referred to cover him.

I want to make a couple of brief remarks, again supporting what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is trying to do, which is to narrow the focus—that has been the subject of much of the debates have had on the various amendments. This amendment would require an intention that the conduct will prejudice the safety or security or defence interests of the United Kingdom and apply that to a number of clauses. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined quite adequately why a discussion about that and a decision for the Government are needed. I hope that the Minister will explain why the Government do not think it is necessary rather than just dismissing it.

I wanted something to be clarified, notwithstanding the fact that it may be a simple response. On visiting many military bases, one finds people outside them taking photographs and numbers and watching the activity because it is a pastime; it is something that is of interest to them. I do not think that the Bill will criminalise that, but on behalf of people who have an interest in something that I personally would not have an interest in doing, I wonder whether the Minister could clarify it. I have seen people taking photographs at RAF bases of the planes taking off. It is simply something of interest to them. It would be helpful for the Minister to clarify that they would not be caught by the Bill, even if unintentionally.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was right to remind us about intention. It is important. We will come to the public interest debate later, but she referred to journalists and whistleblowers, who risk being criminalised even though their intention is not to undermine national security. That will take us to the public interest defence debate that we will get to later in the Bill.

In answer to the points and amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, I think that the JCHR amendments—whether or not they are all right, and we heard a debate earlier on about them—are really important for the JCHR to have put before the Committee. What it is essentially saying is, “We think this is possibly something which impacts on the freedoms that we enjoy in our democracy”, freedom of expression being the one that the noble Baroness just referred to. The Government seek to modernise the national security law, which we all agree with—there is no disagreement in the Committee about that—but the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, should not apologise for the JCHR; rather, we should congratulate it on coming to all of us and asking us to justify what we are doing and on asking the Government to justify what they are doing in the name of national security. There is a compromise to be made sometimes between national security and complete freedom to do X, Y or Z. All of us accept that. The debate, as we heard on earlier amendments, is where you draw the line. I, and other noble Lords, think it is important—whether in respect of this group or others—that a debate takes place in this Parliament, and we should attempt to do better at defining what we actually mean rather than just leaving it to the courts.

I say to the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Jones, and to others who continually remind us about the JCHR that I am sure it is sometimes immensely irritating to the Government, but that is the job. That, in a non-flippant way, is important, because there are compromises with freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to do X, Y or Z, and freedom for people to go about doing things exactly how they want to. It is a price we pay for our national security; how high that price should be is something we should not flinch from debating in this House.

The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seek to put intent into these offences. If the Government do not believe that is important, it is necessary to argue the case as to why. On whistleblowers, journalistic freedom and so on, which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, mentioned, I am sure we will come to that debate later when we discuss the public interest defence. I finish by saying again to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford: more power to your elbow.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for another very interesting short debate. These amendments seek to amend or add a safety or interests test to the various offences throughout the Bill. I will address each offence separately, given the different effect each amendment will have on each offence.

Amendments 12, 15 and 16 would narrow the scope of the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service, so that the offences would apply only to assistance that would, or is intended to, prejudice the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The Government reject these amendments. We believe that any activity taking place in the UK on behalf of a foreign intelligence service that the UK has not even informally agreed would be inherently prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. I pause, as here lies at least some explanation to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who none of us want to see in the dock in Court 4 of the Old Bailey.

Creating an additional legal test to prove beyond reasonable doubt why that activity is prejudicial would add an unnecessary hurdle for a prosecution. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked why the Government are criminalising assisting a friendly foreign intelligence service in the case of Mossad. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, also dealt with this example. I would say that we are criminalising covert assistance and I highlight the additional safeguard of the public interest test in the prosecution. We believe that any activity taking place in the UK on behalf of a foreign intelligence service that the UK has not even informally agreed to would be inherently prejudicial.

We would be happy to consider further the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the drafting of Clause 3, but need more information about that hypothetical situation. Who would counsel be advising and when? For example, is he advising a foreign intelligence service which has an agreement to operate in the UK? In those circumstances, the prosecutor’s options would of course be very different.

On Amendment 16, the existing distinction between activities taking place inside the UK and those taking place overseas was deliberate. For activity taking place overseas, Clause 3(4) requires the conduct to be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. This has been done to ensure that we target activity overseas which has an appropriate link to the United Kingdom. On this amendment, and Amendments 12 and 15, it is the Government’s view that activity taking place inside the UK, where not covered by the defences in Clause 3(7) and without even informal agreement or consent, is inherently prejudicial to the UK’s safety or interests.

As I understood the example from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, of a French citizen working in a bar or a bank, surely the answer is that they could simply call 999. I do not think there is any need to tighten up the definition in the context of the example she gave. In further response to the points the noble Baroness raised, I quote from paragraph 43 of the Government’s formal response to the JCHR report:

“Alerting a foreign intelligence service to a potential terrorist plot against the UK would not be conduct in relation to UK activities by that intelligence service. If the UK and France have an agreement to work on such activity together in the UK then that would fall under one of the defences available.”


Regarding Amendment 19, it is the Government’s view that an individual who knew, or reasonably ought to have known, that their conduct has a purpose that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom should not be outside the scope of the offence simply by virtue of it not being the intention behind the activity to cause harm to the UK. To require the higher level of intention that this amendment seeks to introduce would create gaps that would jeopardise our ability to prevent harmful activity at the sensitive sites these provisions seek to protect. The Government consider it correct to penalise such conduct irrespective of the specific intention of the perpetrator, so long as they have, or should have, knowledge of the damage their action could cause. The Government therefore cannot accept the proposed amendment.

I will address Amendments 20 and 21 together, given that they both would add some variation of the safety or interests of the UK test to Clause 5. For the current Clause 5 offence to be committed, a person must engage in specified conduct in relation to a prohibited place that is unauthorised. They must know, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is unauthorised. This therefore protects those who have no reason to know that the activity they are conducting at that specific location is not authorised. There is no requirement to prove intent against the United Kingdom, as the offence is aimed at circumstances where activity is unauthorised but it cannot be established that a person had a purpose they knew, or reasonably ought to have known, was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. For example, if a person trespasses on a site that they know is a prohibited place and steals something from it, that is not on the face of it damaging to the safety or interests of the UK. This is reflected in the lower maximum penalty for this offence of six months’ imprisonment.

The Government consider that including a further condition to prove that conduct is prejudicial to the safety, security or defence interests of the UK significantly reduces the utility of this offence and creates an unhelpful overlap with the Clause 4 offence. This would result in these provisions not being able to capture the full range of potentially harmful activity that prohibited places face. I add that it would seem clear that the innocent photographer taking pictures of RAF aircraft at an air show would not be caught by this offence for the reasons I have set out.

Amendment 47 would add an additional condition to the offence provided in Clause 15(1). The Government reject this amendment because it would create an additional and unnecessary evidential burden to overcome, severely limiting the efficacy of the offence at preventing hostile foreign intelligence activity against the UK. I suggest that no one would ever be prosecuted in the hypothetical situation advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.

The effect of the amendment would be to require the person committing the offence to know, in all circumstances, what the foreign intelligence service intended to do through the provision of the relevant material benefit. Furthermore, the prosecution would be required to prove that knowledge in court on the basis of admissible evidence, which would be a difficult task.

Were this offence to be amended as suggested, it could be simply circumvented by the foreign intelligence service ensuring that the person who would otherwise commit the offence is not told what is intended. In such circumstances, conduct as set out in the offence as drafted would not be a crime. It is the Government’s view that a foreign intelligence service funding operations in the UK is inherently prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

As to Amendment 49, noble Lords seek to include an additional element of intent as part of the preparatory conduct offence under Clause 16, through the addition of a provision requiring proof that persons engaged in preparatory conduct were acting with a purpose that they knew would prejudice the safety or security or defence of the United Kingdom. In the Government’s view it is unnecessary to include this additional element; if a person engages in preparatory conduct with the intention that it will lead to one or more such offences, the preparatory conduct offence will be committed only if the person has the intention that each element of those offences will be met in the future. I do not accept that the offence could be unintentionally committed in the manner postulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

Public Order Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

These are very important amendments, which should give reassurance to journalists and observers of protests. This points out just how bad the Bill is as far as journalists are concerned, as opposed to how bad it is for everybody else who might be subjected to these offences. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, talked about the reasonable excuse defence. All the reasonable excuse defences in this Bill are post-charge defences and would not prevent journalists and others who have a reasonable excuse being arrested and detained for five hours, as the LBC reporter was. This really highlights the debate we have had today. The dangers this over- reaching, overbroad legislation poses for journalists shine a light on the dangers it poses for protesters generally.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to speak to these important amendments in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott and Lady Jones, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The way they spoke to the amendments, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, was not only moving but challenging. I want to say something more generally, as other noble Lords have, about what happened to Charlotte Lynch.

Every now and again, something occurs in our society and our democracy which should act as a wake-up call. We all speak here and say that we are proud of our democracy and of our freedoms and traditions. Of course we are. I do not believe that we live in a totalitarian country, but even in a democracy things occur that are totally unacceptable. Such things require the state to act and respond, require Parliament to take action, and require a Minister of the Crown to look at what has happened, listen to what is being said and respond in the way that the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott and Lady Jones, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Lords, Lord Deben and Lord Paddick, mentioned.

The Minister’s brief will probably say that the amendments are not necessary, that we have ways of dealing with this and that it is an isolated incident that means that no action is required—we can condemn it and say it should not happen, then move on. It is too serious to do that. You cannot do that with certain things that occur. This is not a weakness; it is a strength when a democracy responds in this way. It is a strength when a democracy shines a light on things that have happened. This is not to blame an individual officer or circumstance; it is to say that, for whatever reason, something happened in our democracy—this was about a journalist—and the police operated unacceptably.

That is what the amendments seek to do. They ask the Government, “If these amendments are not the right way of solving the problem, what are you going to do, other than say warm words, to ensure that it will not happen again?” That is what Parliament wants to hear and what all of us here expect from the Government. We do not want a massive condemnation of the country’s police or a massive assertion that every time you go out on a protest, people are arrested. But Charlotte Lynch, as well as the other two that the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, mentioned, Felgate and Bowles, were reporting on a protest and were arrested. That is astonishing. It is incredible, quite frankly, when you go through the actual events. Despite producing a card, they were arrested, handcuffed, taken away and detained for hours.

That cannot just be explained away. How on earth did it happen? Where was the senior officer? Where was the very senior officer? Where was even somebody saying, “Hang on a minute. What is actually going on?” That happened in our country in 2022. Let me repeat: nobody is saying to the Minister that we live in a totalitarian state, but you cannot have a situation like that occurring without the Government of our country responding in a way that is appropriate and reflects the seriousness of it. That is why the amendments have been put forward. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is right that Amendment 127A is better because it talks about observing as well and has a broader scope, or whether the Government’s lawyers could come forward with an amendment, but something needs to be done that addresses something that has really occurred.

We talk about other countries where this happens, and ask why they do not do something about it. Actually, we need to look in the mirror and reverse it on to ourselves and say, “Why don’t we do something about it?” I repeat, because it is so important, that the Government’s defence mechanism—and I have been in government and know what happens—will be: “It’s a very serious matter, but, of course, it’s not the normal state of affairs.”. That is absolutely not the point.

I was rereading the briefing we have had from the NUJ, from Amnesty and from other people. It is just words sometimes, because words and principles matter. Principles that underpin out democracy are important, particularly when it comes to the freedom of the press, freedom of expression and freedom of journalists, broadcasters or whoever to go and do their business and report on demonstrations or protests. The Government’s own statement on 3 November said:

“Media freedom is an essential part of a healthy information ecosystem. The free flow of independently generated and evidence based information is the scaffolding for building democracy.”


That says it all.

Warm words matter, but so does policy and so does government reaction. It was a terrible situation that occurred with Charlotte Lynch. There are other examples where that has happened, and I cannot finish without responding to my noble friend Lady Symons. I played all sorts of roles during the miners’ strike. I was in Nottinghamshire as a local councillor representing and, by and large, working alongside miners who were on strike in a community where the vast majority were working. People know—and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, will also know the situation in Nottinghamshire with his background—the important role that journalists and broadcasters of all sorts played, including by my noble friend’s late husband, in reporting that. That is the strength of democracy. It is a crucial series of amendments, and if the Government are not prepared to accept what the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, has said, what are they going to do about it?

Before I forget—I just got carried away with my own rhetoric—I want to ask one simple but important question. The Hertfordshire police did an inquiry into what happened in respect of Charlotte Lynch. They published five recommendations on 23 November. Given the importance of this, they made all sorts of recommendations about training and guidance. They also said:

“Hertfordshire Constabulary should consider ensuring that all officers engaged with public order activity complete the NUJ package and identified learning is shared.”


That means shared with other forces across the country. That is really important. If something good can come out of what happened to Charlotte Lynch, surely it is an improvement in police practice. It is also about the Government themselves considering whether something needs to be said in this Public Order Bill that strengthens and underpins the right of journalists to go about their business. Sometimes it is action that is needed as well as warm words.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the Minister responds, I have to say that, while I do not often take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—normally we are on the same side—I am more concerned than he appears to be about what happened in Hertfordshire. That is because, when somebody is arrested and taken to a police station, a sergeant or a custody officer has to satisfy himself or herself that there are grounds to detain that individual. I cannot believe that the journalist did not say to the custody officer, “I’m a journalist”. Yet a sergeant or above—as a custody officer has to be—authorised the detention of that journalist. That does not sound like officers on the front line getting a bit overenthusiastic and not having the right training; that was a sergeant in a controlled environment who was not at the scene of the protest and who authorised the detention of somebody he or she knew to be a journalist. That sounds more like something systemic than something unusual.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I will respond to the noble Lord. If I, in any way, gave the impression that I underestimated the significance or seriousness of what happened to Charlotte Lynch, that was certainly not my intention. I hope that most noble Lords can see the vehemence with which I support doing something about what happened to Charlotte Lynch and using that—if that is the right way of putting it—as a way of ensuring that the Government respond in a way that protects journalistic freedom across our country, whatever the circumstances.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, before I begin responding to the debate, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his most gracious apology, which I am obviously very happy to accept. I also acknowledge that the debate in question was long, free-ranging and somewhat tortuous.

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on Amendments 117 and 127A. I completely agree with much of the sentiment that has been expressed when speaking to the amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and to which the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott and Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have added their names. As I made clear during the debate on the first day in Committee, I share the concerns about the recent arrest of journalists reporting on the Just Stop Oil protests on the M25. The Government are absolutely clear that the role of members of the press must be respected. It is vital that journalists can do their job freely and without restriction, so I agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, and my noble friend Lord Deben, that it is a vital part of our democracy that journalists must be able to report without fear or favour.

On the specific case of the arrest and detention of the journalists at Just Stop Oil’s M25 protest, I was pleased to see the independent review into the arrest and detention of the journalists that concluded on 23 November. The statement issued by Hertfordshire Constabulary confirmed that the arrests were not justified and that, going forward, changes in training and command would be made. It acknowledged that it was the wake-up call to which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred. The review has proposed a series of recommendations which Hertfordshire Police has confirmed it is acting on. They include:

“A further review to ensure that any Public Order Public Safety officers and commanders who have not yet carried out the College of Policing National Union of Journalists awareness training are identified and do so within 30 days; Directions to ensure that all commanders have immediate access to co-located mentors”,


to the policemen who are logging activity,

“and public order public safety tactical advisors throughout operations”

and:

“An immediate operational assessment of the number and experience of the Constabulary’s cadre of Public Order Public Safety commanders.”


I hope that the noble Baroness was somewhat reassured by that statement and the confirmation from the constabulary that it clearly got it wrong in that case, as well as the mitigations in place to ensure that it does not happen again.

In answer to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Coaker, the police make mistakes. We agree that it was wrong, but we do not legislate for instances where it was clearly a false arrest and, therefore, unlawful.

More widely, I seek to assure noble Lords that the police cannot exercise their powers in any circumstance unless they have reasonable grounds to do so. It is highly unlikely that simply recording a protest creates sufficient grounds for the use of powers. The College of Policing’s initial learning curriculum includes a package of content on dealing effectively with the media in a policing context. In addition, the authorised professional practice for public order contains asection on the interaction of the police with members of the media, including the recognition of press identification.

Both the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Boycott, referenced SDPOs, to which we will return later. The noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, specifically asked whether attending two or more events might give cause to one. The answer is no, because they would not be causing or contributing to serious disruption. However, as I said, that is a debate to which we will return.

Therefore, I support the sentiment behind the noble Baroness’s amendment, but I do not think that it is necessary and respectfully ask her to withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Obviously, I defer to the noble Lord’s expertise on matters custodial, but—I am flying solo a little bit here—I imagine that, whatever the erroneous reasons given for the arrest, the custodial sergeant or whoever was in that position felt that some investigation was required.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Does the noble Lord not realise how disappointing his response is in many ways? As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, just said, what happened in Hertfordshire was a real challenge to us to respond to something which seems to threaten journalistic freedom to report on protests. All of us are saying that, for the Government to turn round and say, “Don’t worry: it was a rare occurrence and it won’t happen again—no need to worry” with a shrug of the shoulders is just not the sort of response that one would hope to get from the Government. As I said, I do not believe we live in a totalitarian state, but every now and again a challenge emerges which threatens to undermine aspects of our democracy, and in this case it is journalistic and broadcasting freedom.

I think that we, certainly I, would expect the Government to reflect on what the movers of the amendment said and on some of the many moving speeches, including from my noble friend Lady Symons, and whether there is a need for the Government to act in order to protect one of the cherished freedoms that we have. I think that is what people in this Chamber—if I read again what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said; the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, made the point through her amendment; and I have tried to do it through the words that I have said—are expecting from the Minister, rather than simply, “Well, it was just one of those things that happened and it won’t happen again.”

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Very briefly, what concerns me about this—well, lots of things concern me—is that the police, including the custody sergeant, should have known it was an illegal arrest, but they must have thought they could get away with it. That really irks me. It is the thought that the police were so high-handed, and that is why it has to be explicit so that they cannot in any sense claim ignorance of the law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, it is difficult to argue with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb: if the Government, as they have, bring back those parts of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill that they want to reinstate, why can she not ask this House to remove those parts of Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 that she does not want retained? The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has adopted a less provocative approach in his probing amendment, Amendment 127, to establish how often the new noise trigger powers have been used by the police in relation to protests outside buildings—with or without double glazing.

We on these Benches vehemently oppose the provisions in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act that the noble Baroness wishes to repeal, although we subsequently and reluctantly accepted the usefulness of Section 80. But that was then, and this is now. I believe that the Committee should perhaps operate on the basis of appeals in criminal trials and ask this: what new evidence is there to persuade Parliament that we should now reverse the decisions that it made a year ago?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Before I forget, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for signing Amendment 127, which deals specifically with noise. I have a lot of sympathy with much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has said about many of the powers, but I will concentrate specifically on noise, so may disappoint her.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

126: After Clause 18, insert the following new Clause—
“Consolidated public order guidance(1) Within three months of the day on which this Act is passed, the College of Policing must, with the approval of the Secretary of State, publish consolidated guidance on public order policing. (2) Guidance under this section must consolidate into a single source—(a) the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice for public order, and(b) the National Police Chiefs’ Council and College of Policing’s operational advice for public order policing.(3) The Secretary of State must require the College of Policing to annually review its guidance under this section.(4) The College of Policing may from time to time revise the whole or part of its guidance under this section.(4) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament any guidance on public order policing issued by the College of Policing, and any revision of such guidance.(5) Guidance under this section must include—(a) legal guidance on existing public order legislation and relevant human rights legislation;(b) operational guidance on best practice in public order policing, including how best practice should be shared between police forces;(c) specific operational guidance in addressing techniques for locking on;(d) minimum national training standards for both specialist and non-specialist officers deployed to police protest-related activity;(e) guidance on journalistic freedoms and the right of journalists to cover protests without interference.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the need for public order policing guidance to be consolidated into one accessible source and regularly updated, as recommended by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. It would require guidance to include minimum training standards, clear information on relevant law, and operational guidance on best practice.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I emphasise my Amendment 126 in this group, which probes the need for public order policing guidance to be consolidated into one accessible source and regularly updated, as recommended by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. It would require guidance to include minimum training standards, clear information on relevant law and operational guidance on best practice.

Throughout the Bill we have argued that this legislation does not answer the actual issues. Rather than layer upon layer of new legislation, we need to use the powers the police already have. Police need clarity, excellent training and robust and up-to-date guidance on how to use the powers they have, what the rights of the British people are and what best practice is out there. Our officers need the support and resources to be confident in what their powers are and to use them effectively and proportionately, not be left to interpret broadly defined new powers every few months. As we have just been debating, we have seen stark examples of what happens when this goes wrong.

My Amendment 126 reflects issues raised by His Majesty’s inspectorate in Matt Parr’s report on public order policing, Getting the Balance Right?, published in March 2021. On guidance, the report found:

“The College of Policing’s ‘authorised professional practice’ … is out of date: it does not include recent relevant case law, or information on certain new and emerging tactical options. The College is planning a review.”


Has this review taken place?

The report welcomed work by the National Police Chiefs’ Council and College of Policing to put together operational guidance for protest policing, but

“found problems with some of its legal explanations, particularly how it sets out the police’s obligations under human rights law.”

This document was being revised in light of the inspectorate’s concerns. Has that taken place?

Crucially, the inspectorate recommended that it would be beneficial to consolidate relevant guidance into one source, as my amendment seeks to do, with arrangements to keep the guidance current and regularly revised as is necessary. My amendment provides for that, as I said, but what action have the Government taken on this with the police?

Noble Lords have experienced how difficult it is to find a comprehensive summary of the existing powers that the police have to manage protests. We have asked the Government whether it would be possible to publish a comprehensive guide to all the powers available to the police so that we can see for ourselves whether there are any gaps.

On training, can the Minister provide information to us on what national training standards are in place for the police on their protest powers? One issue picked up in Matt Parr’s report and reflected in the amendment is the deployment of non-specialist officers to protest sites. The report found

“a wide gap between specialist … officers and non-specialists when it comes to understanding and using existing police powers. Non-specialist officers receive limited training in protest policing, and lack confidence as a result … In every force we inspected, interviewees told us that some of these non-specialist officers do not have a good enough understanding of protest legislation.”

What changes to training will be required as a result of the Bill, when it becomes an Act, or Acts that have preceded it? How many specialist officers are available for deployment and how often are non-specialist officers being deployed out of necessity, with the obvious potential consequences?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not know the answer. I will write to the noble Lord with the detail. Regarding the specials, as long as they are trained, surely that is the point.

Chief officers are responsible for demonstrating that they can appropriately mobilise to a variety of public order policing operations at a force, regional and national level in accordance with the national mobilisation plan. The College of Policing sets consistent standards across England and Wales to ensure consistency across forces, allowing officers from different forces to operate in tandem when deployed to other force areas.

The required capacity for public order capabilities is informed by the assessment of threats, harm and risk from the National Police Coordination Centre, as agreed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Officials and Ministers in the Home Office regularly probe the National Police Coordination Centre on its confidence that forces can respond to disorder. At present, it assesses that forces are able to meet current protest demands. Forces have been able to use public order resources to respond to incidents including the awful disorder in Leicester in August and September, as well as Just Stop Oil’s recent disruptive campaign on the M25.

Amendment 142A seeks to ensure that statutory guidance issued under Clause 30 is subject to the affirmative scrutiny procedure, rather than the negative procedure, as the Bill currently allows. This follows a recommendation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I thank the committee for its consideration of the Bill. I hope, but am afraid I doubt, that noble Lords will forgive me for echoing the arguments made in the Government’s response here. SDPOs do not represent a new concept. Successive Governments, dating back at least to 1998 and the creation of anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act, have legislated for civil preventive orders of this kind, which can impose restrictions on liberty, backed by criminal sanctions. Many of these preventive order regimes include similar provision to that in Clause 30 for the Secretary of State to issue guidance which was not subject to the draft affirmative scrutiny procedure. Guidance issued for serious violence reduction orders is subject to the negative scrutiny procedure. Having said that, I listened very carefully to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I will write to him with an attempt to unravel some of the discrepancies that he mentioned.

We therefore see it as entirely appropriate that the guidance is subject to the negative scrutiny procedure and respectfully encourage noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the last remark the Minister made, about writing to my noble friend Lord Rooker, was useful. Reflecting in the letter on the comments by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, might be helpful as well.

I will focus on my own amendment. I thank all noble Lords who contributed on it. The reason for it was the need for co-ordinated and updated guidance. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that the updated guidance will come at the beginning of 2023.

You can see why there is a need for clarification. An article in the Daily Telegraph just yesterday, quoting the chief constable of Greater Manchester, Stephen Watson, said:

“criticism of officers by the public for being too slow to clear the protesters was ‘not an unreasonable judgment’.”

He went on to say:

“The public has seen us reacting too slowly, less assertively than they would have liked.”


That is the second-most senior police officer in the country saying that the police should have acted more quickly with respect to the protesters. He goes on—and I am not a trained police officer, just reflecting on what the chief constable said in a national paper:

“I think fundamentally, if people obstruct the highway they should be moved from the highway very quickly. The so-called five stage process of resolution can be worked through”


quickly. He goes on, and here is the point that the guidance needs to clarify. Is the chief constable of Greater Manchester right, or are the other officers? The article says that his argument is that

“officers spent too much time building a ‘copper-bottomed’ case for prosecuting people for offences such as public nuisance rather than arresting them for the lesser crime of obstruction.”

I do not know whether that is right or wrong, but somewhere along the line there needs to be clarification through the guidance package, which we hope will come at the beginning of 2023. It should say that, to deal with protests quickly and robustly but according to the law, these are the options available in coming to any decision. The chief constable of Greater Manchester is clearly saying that the police could have done better by using the lesser offence of obstruction. Is he right or wrong? The guidance may be able to sort that out for us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 126 withdrawn.

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[The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford]

My Lords, I add my support to Amendments 146 and 147, to which my right reverend friend the Bishop of Manchester added his name—I know he regrets that he is unable to be here today. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for bringing these important amendments forward. Throughout the debate on the Bill, it has been clear that there are many justified and genuine concerns about provisions and the expansion of police powers laid out in it. I believe that it is therefore appropriate that further reflection should take place, and these amendments would provide for exactly that opportunity, requiring parliamentary debate of an HMCI report concerning improvements to the vetting, recruitment and discipline of protest police officers. In recent years, we have arguably seen an accelerated decrease in trust in the police, and it is critical that any expansion of powers such as those set out in the Bill does not occur without regard for the real implications of such measures.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I will make a couple of brief comments in support of the amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, forcefully made the arguments for Amendment 150, and I will not repeat them. I also support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s amendments —she also made the arguments.

I will add one thing to the amendments of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester—obviously spoken to by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford. Amendment 147 talks about the “vetting, recruitment and discipline” of specialist officers. It is especially important that these amendments have been tabled. I know that the Government will be as worried, concerned and appalled as the rest of us in the week where we have seen the resignation of Michael Lockwood as the director-general of the Independent Office for Police Conduct due to a criminal inquiry. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti made a point about vetting. I have no idea what the process or procedure was when Mr Lockwood got the post, but one wonders about the vetting that took place, and this raises the question yet again. We will not have a big debate about all this, but I think that what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s amendments get at is that, if we are to restore public confidence, we have to address some of these issues. Unfortunately, at the moment, we seem to have one thing after another which undermines the valuable work that so many of our officers do.

I will raise one other point about commencement. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised the issue of Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Talking about the commencement of the Bill, he was worried about Section 78’s definition of

“Intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”


and how it related to the provisions in Bill. Before the commencement of the Act, as it will be, some clarification of how it relates to Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 would be helpful for our police forces as they interpret the law.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling their amendments; I absolutely understand the sentiment behind them. It is obviously important that the measures passed in the Bill are continually subject to inspection, reporting and scrutiny by the relevant bodies, such as HMICFRS. However, I remind noble Lords that the use of police powers is already carefully scrutinised by public bodies such as HMICFRS and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will forgive me for not referring to the ongoing case against the departing chief.

X-Rays: Child Refugees

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I disagree with the noble Lord. As I have already said, there is clear evidence that many people claim to be a minor when they are not. Clear safeguarding issues arise if a child is inadvertently treated as adult and, equally, if an adult is wrongly accepted as a child and placed in accommodation with younger children to whom they could present a risk.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister has just told us that the Government are assessing the evidence. Can he tell us what assessment they have made of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health? Its members are experts in this area and it has said that the use of X-rays for age assessment does not work and is unethical.

National Security Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction and the very helpful briefings he has given me. I also thank the services for arranging that. While in the business of thanks, I thank the services for all they do on our behalf now, in the past and in the future.

First of all, I will set some context for this Second Reading debate. We are all united in our desire to protect our country, our democracy and human rights and freedoms across the world. We agree with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which said in its recent report that, overall, this Bill

“is a welcome attempt to modernise espionage offences … and … broadly in line with recommendations of the Law Commission’s … review”.

We support the passage of the Bill and much that is in it.

The Bill introduces new measures to update the protection of the UK’s national security, the safety of the British public and the UK’s vital interests against modern hostile activities and threats posed by state and non-state actors. Many of these threats reflect the modern age in which we live, through cyberattacks and information and disinformation campaigns that are used to undermine or destabilise our institutions or policies, with direct interference always a possibility. All of this is delivered in ways and by using methods that were unthinkable in the past, so change is long overdue.

However, in responding to these changes, in renewing our national security interventions and in reflecting on our policies, we should never undermine the very values that we cherish and seek to protect. So, as I said, in supporting the Bill, we will challenge the Government, hold them to account and challenge them to explain why certain policies and powers are needed. This is not to undermine national security but to demonstrate confidence in our institutions. Transparency and openness are, as far as possible, a strength. Shining a light on what we do—debating security in this Parliament and implementing actions that are then subject to scrutiny here and in the courts—stands in sharp contrast to other states and bodies across the world that are shrouded in mystery and operate in total secrecy in the shadows. The contents of this Bill, therefore, are to be welcomed in general, but there are areas which need further debate during this Second Reading, in Committee and beyond.

First, I say to the Minister that, in discussing such changes and details, there must be absolute confidence that the Government practise what they preach. Does the Bill make it absolutely clear that a Foreign Secretary, or any other Minister, should not be meeting former KGB officers in secret and without officials, and that, if advice is given by the Security Service about the appointment of any Peer, as reported, it is acted on? The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee said in its report, published just last Friday:

“The reappointment of the home secretary sets a dangerous precedent. The leaking of restricted material is worthy of significant sanction under the new graduated sanctions regime introduced in May, including resignation and a significant period out of office.”


In his response, can the Minister reassure us all that everyone in the Government will act according to the principles that have been have laid out, and that the Bill will help to achieve this? It seems to me that someone working for any of the services doing the same would at least have been severely reprimanded, if not sacked.

Clause 1(1)(b) refers to

“the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”,

and the term is used or implied throughout the Bill. Who decides what that is? What are the “safety or interests” of the UK; what does the term include and exclude? Sometimes there is real debate in this House as to what the actual interests of the UK are. Should we not seek to define that, rather than just leaving it to the courts? Too often, we abrogate our responsibility; we are the legislators, and we should debate such issues. Again, as the JCHR says:

“More thought must be given to how the legislation will affect whistle-blowers, protesters and journalists who are engaged in activities which are part of a healthy functioning democratic system.”


This was a warning from a cross-party Joint Select Committee of this Parliament. Do we need a public interest test in the Bill? I have no doubt that this will be debated. What protections are there for investigative campaigners and journalists? It simply will not be good enough for the Government to say that there is nothing to fear. What does it mean that an offence is committed only if the “foreign power condition”, which is explained later in Bill, “is met”? Yet, from Clause 29 onwards, the clauses do not say “hostile power”, so the scope is extended, and we will need to discuss and debate that.

Who has to register under the lately added foreign activities and foreign influence registration scheme? How were the exemptions in Schedule 14 arrived at? A lot more detail and clarity will be needed. The Minister will have to be a lot clearer than, for example, in Clause 63, which states that “specified persons” will be “specified … in regulations”.

So many bodies, groups and individuals receive foreign support quite legitimately. We are told by the Campaign for Freedom of Information that the following have recently received or receive some funding from foreign Governments for their international work: Action Aid, Anti-Slavery International, ClientEarth, Global Witness, Privacy International and Reprieve, to name a few. Are they affected by the regulations in the legislation? Who else is and why? These are serious questions. Protecting information should not be about protecting Governments from the exposure of mistakes, embarrassment or worse.

In keeping the Bill—or Act as it will be—under review, who will be the independent reviewer? Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, keeps TPIMs under review. Will it be him or his office or whoever follows him? Will they be responsible for the STPIMs in the Bill? What about other parts of the Bill? Mr Hall has said:

“My answer is that I think it actually is quite a good fit for the reviewer’s job, and I think it probably is right that the person who does the independent review of terrorism legislation should also do the state threats legislation.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col.6.]


Do the Government agree? What is the thinking on that?

Surely, as the Minister outlined, one of the most contentious parts of the Bill is Clause 28. It creates an exemption under the Serious Crime Act for MI6, GCHQ and our Armed Forces when acting in the proper exercise of any function of an intelligence service or Armed Forces. We believe that this would remove the need to get a Section 7 authorisation under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which allows the Secretary of State to give immunity from civil and criminal liability for pre-authorised crimes abroad. We believe there is a real risk that Clause 28 removes the role of Ministers even when there is a reasonable defence also available. The implications that possibly result from this are clear and, at the moment, unjustified. Why do the Government believe it necessary? As the House of Commons Library briefing stated:

“The provision therefore appears to be intended to extend immunity from criminal prosecution to actions which could not be proved to have been reasonable.”


This is hugely contentious and, notwithstanding what we may hear about further reassurances given to the ISC, it clearly cannot in its present form be right. Many senior MPs of all parties have criticised the clause for allowing actions with no safeguards, such as ministerial approval. As my colleague Holly Lynch MP said, or as David Davis MP said, how will we be able to criticise other nations for laws which allow their services to conduct foreign operations in that way when we will have a law which will do the same?

There are many other aspects to the Bill, including restricting the award of damages and the granting of legal aid, which will require debate. We also look forward to associated actions regarding the online harms Bill and what liaison is taking place for that. The need for joined-up government is clear if we are to take the example of Hikvision. Does this Bill deal with a technology that has raised such security concerns that the Government themselves will exclude it from their own buildings? In Committee, the Minister also committed to considering whether the Bill should clarify whether only sites located in the UK can be designated as places of detention. Has that been clarified?

We all wish to ensure national security. We all wish to modernise to meet the fresh challenges and the new threats we face. This Bill is an important chance for us to debate where the line should be drawn between security and our freedoms and democracy. Eroding those freedoms and human rights cannot be justified simply by saying “security” or “national interest”. They need to be argued for, with careful decisions made as to the correct balance. This Bill gives us the chance—the opportunity—to do that and we should take it. In doing so openly and transparently, we can showcase our democracy and respect for freedom even in the face of the new threats we face. Of that we can, and should, be proud.

Immigration Skills Charge (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Monday 5th December 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I thank the Minister for that introduction. I will deal with the first item, on the immigration skills charge, and my noble friend Lady Northover will deal with anything I have left out and the second one.

First, this SI is important for what it does not say as well as for what it does. Can the Minister tell me how these proposals link with the research and development tax relief and tax credits, which will come in through the Finance Act? They seem very relevant to what we are talking about. In particular, will the tax credits relating to research and development for work carried out outside the UK impact on this statutory instrument?

Further to that, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, the Minister for Innovation says that these regulations

“are compatible with the Convention rights.”

Is the Minister for Innovation the correct person to make such a ruling? It seems rather like putting the gamekeeper in charge of the poacher.

Paragraph 7.5 of the Explanatory Notes says that

“This amendment to the regulations will codify the exemption.”


It would be useful to have, even in the notes, some empirical examples to show that this is the case.

In his introduction, the Minister talked about the effect in the EU, as distinct from in the UK. I would like him to confirm that the Government see this as reciprocal relief for workers from the UK working in the EU.

Lastly, the Minister said that there was no loss of revenue. However, the notes say very clearly that there is no impact assessment. How can he be so sure and blithely say that there will be no loss of revenue when there is no impact assessment? He may be quite right, but this is really asking us to believe something without empirical examples.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction to the regulations. I agree very much with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about the SI being interesting for what it does not say as much as for what it does say. I have a couple of brief questions for the Minister; I will make some longer remarks on the next SI.

The SI has been through the other place, so we accept it, but we have certain questions about it. Why have the Government come to the conclusion that these exemptions are needed? In line with the point from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about what the SI does not say, what are the Government’s plans, at the same time as bringing forward exemptions such as these, to ensure that there are excellent training and opportunities for our resident workforce? How does this SI fit with the stated, explicit intention of the Home Secretary and the Government to reduce levels of migration, something which we have contested?

As the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, mentioned, an impact assessment for the SI has not been published. The Minister gave some limited explanation, but I would like to know why not, and how will the impacts of the changes in this SI be monitored if an impact assessment is regarded as unnecessary or indeed if one appears in future? We have no idea where we are without impact assessments.

For example, these changes are designed to increase the number of skilled migrants in this area. How many skilled migrants have there been under the scheme so far? With no impact assessment, how can we know how successful this charging scheme has been since it was introduced in 2017? It is supposed to incentivise employers to invest in training and upskilling the resident workforce and reduce reliance on migrant workers. As the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, says, without the impact assessment, how do we know that the Government have achieved their own policy objective? The charge was introduced to discourage employers from seeking the skills they needed abroad. Whatever the rights and wrongs of that, that was the whole purpose. How do we know it has been successful?

What the Government have done is say that they need a couple of further exemptions to plug a skills gap that they have identified. The charge rate is £349 million a year. How is that money spent? From my reading, it appears that it just goes into an amorphous pot of money. How is that used to address the skills gap in the UK? There are skills shortages which we are seeking to plug through this skills exemption scheme, among other measures. Alongside that, there is the paradox that there are huge numbers of unskilled jobs which are unfilled. How will the Government deal with the apparent paradox of a skills shortage and yet millions of unfilled, unskilled jobs? Whatever the SI says, that is surely the policy gap and issue that the Government need to address.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Palmer and Lord Coaker, and for the opportunity to address some of the questions I have been asked.

I start with the point from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on the effect of relaxing immigration controls—if I have paraphrased that part of his question correctly. I acknowledge his concerns that creating new exemptions to the immigration skills charge appears contrary to the objectives of reducing net migration and ensuring that employers prioritise investment in resident workers. These are targeted exemptions, however. The Prime Minister recently spoke of the need to promote innovation in the economy and we think it sensible to ensure that sustained-growth businesses benefit from some easement of the usual requirements of the immigration system. That is why we have introduced the scale-up visa and why a disapplication of this charge is part of that package.

Similarly, we wish to promote cross-border trade and inward investment from overseas, and the rules that apply to movements of intra-company transferees fall within the scope of trade negotiations. In the case of the EU, we reached a reciprocal agreement that such charges should not apply to intra-company movements, and UK businesses with a presence in the EU will benefit from the certainty that that agreement provides.

I will address the point raised by both the noble Lords, Lord Palmer and Lord Coaker, on the impact assessment. Clearly, the immigration skills charge is a tax and it is therefore not subject to a formal impact assessment process. The Government have considered this matter carefully and any impacts will be minor. The scale-up visa route is new and was never planned to be subject to the charge; as such, a waiver is in place and so its exemption will not contribute to any reduction in revenue.

The number of EU intra-company workers who will be exempted from the charge is expected to be about 2,000 annually. This will account for a reduction of income in the region of £3.3 million per year—less than 1% of the total annual income from the charge.

I turn to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, on the Explanatory Memorandum and its attestation on the European convention. Paragraph 5.1 reads,

“The Minister for Immigration, Tom Pursglove, has made the following statement regarding Human Rights: ‘In my view the provisions of the Immigration Skills Charge (Amendment) Regulations 2022 are compatible with the Convention rights.’”


I submit that he was the correct person to make the declaration at the time that it was made.

I turn to the question of reciprocal benefit with the European Union. It is understood that arrangements are being made in various parts of the EU, including France, where a €200 charge for British intra-company workers is being removed to comply with obligations under the agreement.

A general question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was on how the money is spent on skills. The money is paid into the Consolidated Fund and then allocated to the devolved nations in accordance with the Barnett formula, as I said. The skills budget is well known to the noble Lord and is used, in that way, to alleviate any skills deficit.

The costs of collection was one issue touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. The Home Office publishes annual accounts setting out financial details, including the total costs for collection of the immigration skills charge and immigration civil penalties. For the financial year 2021-22, the cost associated with collection was £7.7 million. Details relating to what is included within the cost of collection are also contained in the annual accounts report. The costs include payment of handling charges associated with collecting the immigration skills charge, as well as the cost of staff involved in administering the charge and preparing the trust statement.

Immigration (Persons Designated under Sanctions Regulations) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Monday 5th December 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that explanation and for the Explanatory Memorandum. It is clearly important that the two processes—whether or not someone is eligible to have their immigration status accepted and whether or not they are subject to a sanction—should be kept separate. Can the Minister tell us whether there have already been any cases where these have become entangled? Why was this not picked up when the sanctions legislation went through the House? I recall our debates on that and do not remember this being flagged, although I remember that we had to sort out quite a number of inadvertent challenges in that legislation.

The Home Office states that this draft SI would “address a discrepancy” whereby provisions designed to ensure compliance with the UK’s international obligations, which the noble Lord has laid out, put people subject to an immigration sanction “in a better position” than people making human rights or protection claims under existing immigration rules. Once more, as with the other SIs this afternoon, that is a very interesting use of language: a discrepancy being in effect a mistake.

Again, I express my sympathy with officials, because of course these things happen. When departments have to shift away from their main aims at the same time as unscrambling legislation from our EU membership over 40 years, it is not surprising that this happens. I express sympathy with the officials who have had to deal with it, as I and the noble Lord, Lord Benyon, did in debates on the previous SIs.

I note that we have four officials here, who otherwise could be working on more substantial matters. I ask again, as I did in the previous debate: if we need such an SI to be processed with the manpower that we have here, how many more would we have to deal with if we removed the amount of secondary legislation that the Government propose and then had to sort out all the discrepancies that might creep in as a result? Given that 40 years would have to be unscrambled in the space of about a year, does he not think that that is rather unwise? There is nothing about leaving the EU which necessitates that, regardless of what his colleague implied. The Minister may have in his notes that same line as the rebuttal.

Leaving the EU is one thing but chucking out babies with bathwater when you do not intend to is clearly another. It happens so easily, as we can see from all these SIs this afternoon—all these discrepancies. I hope the Minister will reflect on that. This particular SI seems straightforward and we support it, but I look forward to his wider response.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Again, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Murray, for introducing the SI, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for her remarks and comments. I will spend a couple of minutes setting out some background, because this is an important SI that puts right a discrepancy. Some background and some reflection on this order will be important for those who read our proceedings.

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provided for an autonomous UK sanctions regime following our departure from the EU. Part of that sanctions regime included travel bans, which exclude a person from entering or remaining in the UK. The vast majority of travel bans are imposed on individuals who are outside the UK and who have no connection with the UK.

In a small number of cases where a travel ban is served on a person already in the UK, it impacts their immigration status; it cancels their permission to be in the UK and makes them liable for removal. A person can appeal that decision by submitting a human rights or protection claim, in line with our obligations under the ECHR and the refugee convention—again, the Minister pointed that out.

The original SI, which this one amends, made it clear how those appeal procedures would work by clarifying which court or tribunal would hear them. We supported that original SI; the use of sanctions against people who have committed some truly appalling crimes is absolutely vital but must rightly be reflected in line with our obligations under the ECHR and our commitment to the refugee convention. The previous SI provided clarity on how those cases—which were likely to be very rare—would be heard, and the SI was welcomed across the parties.

As the Minister pointed out, the Government have now noticed a discrepancy, which this amending SI addresses. If a person is subject to an immigration sanction—a travel ban—the effects of the sanction do not kick in until any human rights or protection claim has been concluded. This means that a person under the sanction keeps their immigration status and can travel in and out of the UK during that time.

Conversely, if a person who is not subject to an immigration sanction—a travel ban—is appealing an immigration decision on human rights or protection grounds, that appeal can be treated as withdrawn if that person leaves the UK. The Explanatory Memorandum explains that this means that a person subject to an immigration sanction is therefore in a better position than those who are not subject to a sanction and are appealing a decision under the Immigration Rules. The order would provide that the effects of an immigration sanction come into effect if a sanctioned person leaves the UK to bring them into line with existing provisions for those not subject to a sanction.

Whenever we have discussed this set of circumstances where a person who is already in the UK is made subject to a travel ban, we have noted that these cases are likely to be very low in number, as most immigration sanctions are imposed on individuals who are outside of the UK and do not have UK connections. Is the Minister able to give an indication of how often a travel ban has been made against a person who is already in the UK since the introduction of our own UK sanctions regime following the passage of the Bill in 2018?

Today’s SI seeks to amend a discrepancy, where someone subject to a sanction may be in a more advantageous position than someone who is not subject to a sanction but is appealing an immigration decision on human rights grounds under the Immigration Rules. The noble Baroness, Lady Northover, alluded to this and asked various questions. I would like to ask when this discrepancy was first noticed and how it came to light. Is it currently—I assume the answer is yes—made clear to a person appealing a decision on human rights or protection grounds that their appeal may be withdrawn if they leave the UK?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the considered debate and the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

I entirely agree that this is an important SI and am grateful for the support shown for it. It clearly closes an unfortunate lacuna that had been revealed. In answer to the question asked by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, the discrepancy came to light as a consequence of a decision to impose designations in March. Clearly, the Committee will not expect me to go into the facts of individual cases, but that was the genesis of the regulation. Unfortunately, when sanctions are brought in at pace to achieve the vital objectives outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mistakes can occur in drafting. This was such an instance. It cannot be right that we let these people have a better position than those who would ordinarily make use of the asylum and humanitarian protection schemes. The cases are necessarily quite entangled, and obviously, as I have already said, I will not go into the facts surrounding them.

Travel bans are used to restrict the movements of those whose behaviour is considered unacceptable by the international community, those who are associated with regimes that threaten the sovereignty or independence of neighbouring countries, those who would seek to do harm, those who would seek to shelter themselves or their ill-gotten gains in other countries, and those whose aim is to profit from human suffering. The UK does not ignore its other international obligations. Those subject to a travel ban who claim fear of persecution or breach of their fundamental rights have the opportunity to make a claim before we take action to remove them from the UK. They have their statutory right of appeal against a decision to refuse their claim. If the appeal succeeds, the travel ban does not apply, meaning that they will not be removed or required to leave. It cannot be right that when sanctions can be imposed on someone, they can then come and go as they please, abusing our hospitality. Should they choose to leave the UK without a resolution on their claim, they should not find themselves in a more generous position than others.

In answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on the overall spread of Russian sanctions, I can confirm that, together with our international partners, we have imposed the largest and most severe package of sanctions ever imposed on a major economy. The UK alone has sanctioned 1,200 individuals and over 120 entities since the start of the invasion, including 20 banks with global assets worth £940 billion and over 130 oligarchs with a combined net worth of over £140 billion, as well as introducing unprecedented trade measures.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Will the Minister repeat the sentence about oligarchs? Did he say million or billion?