Huawei and 5G

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Matt Warman

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

This has been an important and timely debate. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) has provided the Government with an opportunity to clarify some of their position.

As he knows, the Government’s first priority is to protect our citizens and their interests. That means that the security of our telecoms and critical national infrastructure is of paramount importance. That is why we undertook the telecoms supply chain review—to allow us to make hard-headed, evidence-based decisions.

The UK is a global leader in cyber-security. Our world-class security agencies have set out their security analysis of the telecoms sector in a level of public detail unmatched anywhere in the world.

It is because of the need to manage the risks to national security that we have made the decisions that we have on high-risk vendors, concluding that there needs to be strong restrictions on their presence in the network. It is because we need to improve the security of the network overall that we need a new security framework for telecoms.

Over time, our intention is to reduce our reliance on high-risk vendors, as market diversification takes place. We want to get to a position where we do not have to use a high-risk vendor in our telecoms network at all.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Will the Minister give way?

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[Matt Warman]

In a moment. Although it is driven by security, our decision making reflects the reality of the UK network and the global supply chain marketplace, and that is why diversification is key. I give way to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Can I be very clear on what the Minister said? He is saying that the Government’s aim is to reduce to zero high-risk vendors, of which Huawei is one.

[Matt Warman]

As I say, we want to get to a position where we do not have to use a high-risk vendor in our telecoms network.

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[Matt Warman]

As I said, we are introducing the new regime because of some of the concerns that my hon. Friend addresses. I reiterate the Government’s offer to put at the disposal of any Member of the House as many experts from the public and private sectors that we can, so that colleagues can be in touch with the latest thinking on this issue.

We understand the threat from China and are robust with it when our interests are challenged. We will continue to publicly call out malicious cyber-activity, and the decision to categorise Huawei as a high-risk vendor took into consideration the potential links between Chinese companies and the Chinese state, including the fact that Chinese companies are subject to China’s national intelligence law. The UK has also been vocal in drawing attention to the systematic human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China. The Government have set out our expectations of businesses in the UK national action plan on business and human rights.

The telecoms supply chain review, which was laid before the House in July 2019, underlined the range and nature of the risks, highlighting the risks of dependence on one vendor, faults or vulnerabilities in network equivalence equipment, the back-door threat, and vendors’ administrative access. We need to be alive to the totality of the risks that the telecoms network faces today and will face in the future. High-risk vendors are part of that security risk assessment, but they are not the sole factor.

I want to address some of the myths about how the network will develop. It is true that technical characteristics of 5G create a greater surface area for potential attacks, but it will still be possible to distinguish different parts of the network. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Ruth Edwards) said, what matters are the critical functions within the network. We need to ensure that critical functions, wherever they are, have appropriate security.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Will the Minister give way?

[Matt Warman]

I will come to the issue of the network’s core and edge, which will answer some of the questions that Members want to ask.

Ian Levy, the technical director of the National Cyber Security Centre, set out in a recent blog post that the notion that there is no distinction between the core and the edge cannot be true. He says that, with 5G networks,

“you need lots of smaller basestations as well as big ones, and the small ones will be on lampposts, bus shelters and other places that aren’t secure from physical interference by bad guys. So, if your network design means that you need to run really sensitive functions processing really sensitive data (i.e. core functions) on an edge access device on top of a bus stop, your choice of vendor is the least of your worries and you probably shouldn’t be designing critical national infrastructure. The international standards that define what a 5G network actually is allow you to do all sorts of things, and some of those things could lead to security or operational risks that can’t be mitigated. That doesn’t mean you have to do them.”

We in this country will not do such things.

[Matt Warman]

I will give way briefly to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Does the Minister recognise that it was not Tim Berners-Lee, but Rod Stewart, who foresaw the amazing power of the internet? It is not just the technical experts, but the imagination of people who will build on their technical skills, that will determine where the risks really lie.

5G Network and Huawei

Debate between Tom Tugendhat and Matt Warman

Monday 27th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Minister to make a statement on Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s 5G network.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) for this question. I know he has a deep interest in this issue, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has corresponded with him about it over the past few months. She will address this issue herself in the other place later today.

New telecoms technologies and next-generation networks like 5G and full fibre can change our lives for the better. They can give us the freedom to live and work more freely, help rural communities to develop thriving digital economies, and help socially isolated people to maintain relationships, so the security and resilience of the UK’s telecoms networks is of paramount importance. The UK has one of the world’s most dynamic digital economies, and we welcome open trade and inward investment. However, our economy can prosper and unleash Britain’s potential only when we and our international partners are assured that our critical national infrastructure remains safe and secure.

As part of our mission to provide world-class digital connectivity, including 5G, my Department carried out a cross-Whitehall evidence-based review of the telecoms supply chain to ensure a diverse and secure supply base. That review’s findings were published in July 2019 and set out the Government’s priorities for the future of our telecommunications. Those priorities are strong cyber-security across the entire telecommunications sector, greater resilience in telecommunications networks and diversity across the entire 5G supply chain. It considered the UK’s entire market position, including economic prosperity, the industry and consumer effects, and the quality, resilience and security of equipment.

However, in July, the review did not take a decision on the controls to be placed on high-risk vendors in the UK’s telecoms network. Despite the inevitable focus on Huawei, that review was not about one company or even one country. We would never take a decision that threatens our national security or the security of our allies. The Government’s telecoms supply chain review is a thorough review into a complex area that made use of the best available expert advice and evidence, and its conclusions on high-risk vendors will be reported once ministerial decisions have been taken.

The National Security Council will meet tomorrow to discuss these issues. This work is an important step in strengthening the UK’s security frameworks for telecoms and ensuring the roll-out of 5G and full-fibre networks. I know that Members on both sides of the House feel strongly about this issue, and the Government will make a statement to the House to communicate final decisions on high-risk vendors at the appropriate time. We will always put national security at the top of our agenda.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The interest shown in the House demonstrates the interest that many of us have in this question. As the Minister made clear, a decision will be made tomorrow which we will not have any further say on. That decision may or may not nest a dragon in our critical national infrastructure, and it will not be reversible by a future Government with any ease; we will live with this decision for the next 10, 15 or 20 years. That is why this question is so urgent and why I am so glad that you allowed time for it to be asked, Mr Speaker.

The question for us has to be: is the risk worth it? We know the stories about Huawei’s co-operation with the state apparatus of China in countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia. We know stories about its connections to the intelligence services and the police state currently running in Xinjiang. We know that there are strong accusations effectively of tech-dumping, with market subsidies allowing Huawei to compete against other companies on an unfair basis. That might be an example of charity by the Chinese Communist party, but if even the Communist party in Vietnam decides to reject Huawei and set up its own network, perhaps we should beware of strangers and the gifts they bear.

This is a really important decision not only for the UK but for our allies. Today, Germany is making a similar decision. New Zealand and Australia have already made decisions. The Czech Government have already rejected Huawei. Over the coming months, more Governments will be looking at our stance on China when considering the threats that some of their institutions face.

Of course, we must work with China and find ways of co-operating in areas such as environmentalism, energy policy and technology, but when we see China’s aggressive moves towards the UN bodies that control the regulation of information and the way in which subsidies are used to take control of important networks, we should be concerned. I hope that the Minister will understand the concern that the whole House feels about Huawei and the idea of nesting that dragon and allowing a fox into the hen house when we should be guarding the wire. I hope that he will see his responsibility clearly.

[Matt Warman]

I agree with some of what my hon. Friend says. He is right that this is a serious and important decision, and it will not be taken lightly by any means. I know that he does not think that I take this matter lightly, and neither does the Secretary of State. He is also right that Parliament should have its say. We are talking about this issue today, but the Intelligence and Security Committee has been writing reports on this since 2013 and made statements as recently as July last year. There have been UQs, and we have had debates in this Chamber and in Westminster Hall. It is right that Parliament expresses its view.

My hon. Friend is right to say that our agencies look carefully at how best we manage this situation and its effects on the global landscape. Britain is in a unique position, so comparisons with other countries can only go so far, but he is right to make those comparisons. I can only reinforce that this decision will be taken with the utmost seriousness.