Debates between Stephen Doughty and Gavin Williamson during the 2024 Parliament

Wed 13th Nov 2024
Chagos Islands
Commons Chamber
(Urgent Question)

Chagos Islands

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Gavin Williamson
Wednesday 13th November 2024

(1 week, 6 days ago)

Commons Chamber
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.

Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.

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Gavin Williamson Portrait Sir Gavin Williamson (Stone, Great Wyrley and Penkridge) (Con)
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Quite simply, do we have the unilateral right to extend—yes or no?

Stephen Doughty Portrait Stephen Doughty
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I have made it very clear that we have the right to extend the treaty beyond the 99-year period, and the right hon. Gentleman will be able to scrutinise the detail of that in due course.

Sanctions: Iran

Debate between Stephen Doughty and Gavin Williamson
Wednesday 23rd October 2024

(1 month ago)

Commons Chamber
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Stephen Doughty Portrait The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)
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I beg to move,

That the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 (SI, 2024, No. 944), dated 11 September 2024, a copy of which was laid before this House on 12 September, be approved.

These regulations amend the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023. The instrument was laid before Parliament on 12 September under powers contained in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, and the measures entered into force the following day. As the Minister responsible for sanctions, I would like to start by setting out the Government’s priorities in this area. Since coming into office, I have been clear that we must have the necessary powers and tools to implement and enforce our sanctions regimes effectively.

The proper implementation and enforcement of UK sanctions is critical to maximising their impact, and this Government are committed to improving the UK’s track record on sanctions enforcement. That is why, on 10 October, we launched the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation—OTSI—which enhanced civil enforcement powers to maximise the impact of the UK’s trade sanctions. These powers include the ability to issue civil monetary penalties for sanctions breaches, and for OTSI to make details of breaches public. There are also new reporting requirements on sectors that are well positioned to find evidence of trade sanctions breaches. We have put in place similar civil enforcement powers for transport sanctions, aligning the enforcement of trade and transport sanctions with our approach to financial sanctions.

I have also brought together ministerial colleagues on sanctions enforcement, and colleagues in the Treasury, the Home Office, the Department for Business and Trade, the Department for Transport and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero are working towards a shared vision of how to enhance it. That will include ways in which we can further support UK overseas territories and Crown dependencies with their sanctions enforcement. We plan to be transparent on what we are doing, and I look forward to updating Parliament on enforcement actions in due course.

The Government have deployed sanctions in innovative and impactful ways, including in the sanctions package we are putting forward today. We have taken swift and decisive action to increase pressure on Russia’s war machine, spearheading a call to action at the European Political Community in July to tackle Russia’s shadow fleet. We have sanctioned 43 oil tankers that were transporting Russian oil, as well as nine liquefied natural gas vessels involved in shipping Russian LNG, including from Russia’s flagship Arctic LNG 2 project, to target the Kremlin’s energy revenues.

We have also enhanced our response to the threat from the Iranian regime, and I will now turn to the details of the instrument before us. It contains measures to deter the Government of Iran from causing regional and international instability, by disrupting its unmanned aerial vehicle and missile industries and its access to items critical for military development. I hope the House will support these important measures today.

The Iranian regime’s development and proliferation of large volumes of advanced conventional weapons, including UAVs and missiles, continues to destabilise the middle east and also prolongs Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. Iran’s use of an unprecedented number of UAVs and missiles during its attack on Israel on 13 April demonstrated how Iranian weapons development and proliferation is fuelling conflict and escalation in the middle east.

The Iranian regime also used hundreds of these arms in its attack against Israel on 1 October, which we condemn in the strongest terms. That attack once more endangered the lives of innocent civilians and escalated an already incredibly dangerous situation, and that cannot be tolerated. In response to Iran’s 1 October attack on Israel, the UK has designated nine individuals and entities involved in facilitating Iran’s destabilising activity. That includes senior military figures and the Iranian Space Agency, which develops technologies that have applications in ballistic missile development.

We are deeply concerned about the prospect of further escalation, and all efforts must now be concentrated on breaking the cycle of violence. At this moment, when tensions are at their peak, calm heads must prevail and all sides must take immediate steps to de-escalate. A regional war is, of course, in no one’s interest. However, this is the latest incident in the long history of Iran destabilising the region, including through its political, financial and military support for its proxies and partners, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and its aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria. We have been clear and consistent that Iran must cease this support.

Gavin Williamson Portrait Sir Gavin Williamson (Stone, Great Wyrley and Penkridge) (Con)
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I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. Does he accept that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a key component of the destabilisation sponsored by the Iranian regime? Will he update the House on the Government’s thinking on proscribing that organisation? I think he would find many allies across the House who would be keen to see that happen.

Stephen Doughty Portrait Stephen Doughty
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I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. We of course recognise the huge threat that the IRGC poses, and we will take the necessary measures to counter it at home and around the world. He will understand that the Government keep the list of proscribed terrorist organisations under careful review, and we do not, of course, comment in the House on whether an organisation may be under consideration.

As I said, Iran is now one of Russia’s top military backers and has supplied it with hundreds of UAVs since 2022, including different models of drones. Russia has used those to target Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and to kill innocent civilians, prolonging the suffering of the Ukrainian people. In September, Iran supplied Russia with hundreds of close-range ballistic missiles. That is a further escalation of Iran’s military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and will further enable Russia’s invasion. In return, Iran is receiving Russian military and technological support, enabling it to further develop its military capabilities and enhancing the risk it poses to the region and beyond.

The legislation before us expands the UK’s trade sanctions against Iran, with the aim of disrupting its UAV and missile industry and its access to items critical to military development. It includes sanctions in relation to the items on the Russia common high priority list. The list, which was jointly agreed by the UK, the EU, the US and Japan in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, identifies items that Russia is using in its weapons systems, ranging from semiconductors to machine tools. Those items are also significant in Iran’s production of advanced conventional weapons. As the House will know, there have been many public reports about Iran’s supply of weapons to Russia. Through the instrument, we are therefore prohibiting the export, supply, delivery and making available of those items to Iran.

We are also prohibiting the provision of ancillary services associated with the goods, such as brokering services, technical assistance, financial services and funds. All the items prohibited by our partners in the EU in May are also prohibited by the instrument. In addition, prohibitions will be applied to some items identified by the Ministry of Defence as significant to Iran’s UAV and missile industries.

We have also taken the opportunity to simplify some of the existing trade sanctions on Iran so that businesses are better able to implement them. These trade restrictions complement our existing export controls and sanctions, ensuring that no UK business or person, wherever they are in the world, can facilitate the export, transfer, supply, delivery and making available of these items to Iran without prior authorisation.

I hope that the House will support these measures. I commend them to the House.