Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Simon Hoare and Gavin Newlands

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands]

I neglected to say earlier that it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. As has been outlined by the Labour Front-Bench spokesman, clause 2 extends the offence that would result in criminalisation for the publication of an image, the wearing of an item of clothing or the display of an article such as a flag in such a way that would arouse reasonable suspicion that a person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.

It should be noted that it is already an offence to wear certain clothing, or to carry, wear or display certain articles in public places. The behaviour of those who disseminate terrorist publications intending to encourage terrorism, or being reckless as to whether the behaviour encourages it, is already criminalised by section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 and will attract a 15-year maximum sentence under the provisions of the Bill.

The clause would criminalise those who might be highlighting their support for a proscribed organisation, which is akin to using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. It overcomplicates the response and risks targeting innocent individuals in the attempt to target people who would look to do us harm. In a briefing, which I am sure the hon. Member for North Dorset fully endorses, Liberty—his favourite campaigning group—[Interruption.] I was talking about Liberty.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

I know you were.

[Gavin Newlands]

Indeed.

[Gavin Newlands]

Yes, I know. I said it for that very reason.

[Simon Hoare]

It was a Pavlovian response.

[Gavin Newlands]

In that briefing, Liberty makes a fair point, when it says that

“further criminalisation of photographs of a costume only exacerbates the risk that law enforcement officials attempting to interpret the meaning of a photograph will mistake reference for endorsement, irony for sincerity, and childish misdirection for genuine threat.”

[Simon Hoare]

I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that I do not think my response to the oral evidence—if one can grace it with that word—provided by Liberty was unique to me.

[Gavin Newlands]

That may well be the case, but having served on previous Bill Committees with the hon. Gentleman, I am well aware of his high opinion of that organisation.

It must be noted that the clause risks putting additional strain on resources. It may lead to the investigation of innocent individuals when it would be more effective to target those about whom we should be worried. The new offence does not require an individual to be a member of a proscribed organisation or to have ever offered support to it. The only requirement is that the circumstances around publication arouse reasonable suspicion that a person is a member of or supports a proscribed organisation.

During the evidence session on Tuesday, we heard a number of everyday examples where someone could be in breach of clause 2. As we have heard, that could include someone dressing up in fancy dress for Halloween, a tourist having a picture with a Hezbollah flag, the display of a historical flag, or a journalist or academic researching a particular field of study. Greater clarity and safeguards are required to protect innocent parties from being in breach of this new offence.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Simon Hoare and Gavin Newlands

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Simon Hoare]

Q You may have a different view of this question, depending on which end of the telescope you are looking through. Is there anything that you would have liked to have seen in the Bill to help you with your respective jobs and tasks that is not there?

Gregor McGill: From a Crown Prosecution Service perspective, the Bill is a proportionate response to the threat we face.

Assistant Commissioner Basu: We have discussed the designated area offence and, briefly, the Protect duty. I caveat that by saying I understand how difficult a Protect duty would be. Some 80% of British businesses are small and medium-sized enterprises and I know it would be difficult. I do not want to impose a financial cost on people; I just want them to understand the seriousness with which we need their help. I am not sure that legislation is the right vehicle for that, but it is something we have debated.

The last point I have not mentioned is that we have a continual issue with people marching and waving flags—the whole display issue—and we do not have a power of seizure of flags, which is part of the evidential chain for a successful prosecution. That is a minor point. Otherwise, it is a well-balanced set of proposals.

[Gavin Newlands]

Q If I can draw attention to schedule 2, the retention of biometric data. Mr McGill, we—or certainly I—have heard that removing the oversight accorded by the Biometrics Commissioner could be seen as a retrograde step. Any data vulnerability is an issue, but it is particularly important when it comes to biometrics. In America there was a hack of 5.5 million unencrypted fingerprints, which would obviously be an issue if it were to happen over here. With all that in mind, could you provide any examples that would support the notion that the detection of crime is improved by retaining the biometric data of people who are not charged, whose charges are dropped or who are, indeed, found innocent?

Gregor McGill: That is quite a wide question. I do not have specific examples of that, although we could look for them. What we do know is that successful investigations and prosecutions use a number of investigative tools and evidence from different places. The more powers that investigators and prosecutors have to exercise those safeguards, the stronger the prosecutions and better the results. An example of where we have used biometric data for that? Off the top of my head, I do not know in these circumstances.

Assistant Commissioner Basu: The most famous example in recent years was Sardar, a cab driver from Wembley, in 2014. The US shared his biometrics with us. He had been overseas and become a terrorist. The reason we were able to match was that in 2007 he was subject to a schedule 7 stop and his biometrics were taken. So he was not convicted of anything. His biometrics were taken and retained for seven years. He was clearly suspected of travelling for a purpose, but not enough to cross the threshold. He travelled and was later convicted of murder.