Confidence in Her Majesty’s Government

Debate between Baroness Winterton of Doncaster and Chi Onwurah

Monday 18th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank my hon. Friend for underlining that point—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. A lot of Members have put in to speak, and it is important that we get to them. If colleagues wish to take interventions, that is absolutely no problem, but I strongly encourage them to stay within four minutes.

[Chi Onwurah]

Yes, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I have no confidence in a Government who do not support working families in Newcastle. When people have no confidence in the Government, it drains their confidence in politics and democracy generally. After all that has tested our country—the financial crisis, austerity, Brexit, covid, inflation—it is more important than ever that we have confidence in our leadership. But I have no confidence in this Government, because the Prime Minister repeatedly told Parliament that there had been no parties, and he was then fined for partying.

I have no confidence in this Government, because as our Queen contemplated the loss of her life partner of 73 years, alone, Downing Street partied. I have no confidence in this Government because each and every Minister, whether they resigned or not, is tainted by the support that they gave to the disgraced but still presiding Prime Minister. I have no confidence in this Government, because the Prime Minister does not find formal sexual misconduct complaints against a serving Government Minister to be memorable.

I have no confidence in this Government, because when the Minister for Brexit Opportunities and Government Efficiency was asked to justify slashing 91,000 civil servants, he said that technology would enable them to do more with less. The right hon. Member for the middle ages agreed only reluctantly to a digital Parliament and is happy to give the impression that the printing press is a recent and debatable innovation. I have no confidence in the Government, because when giving a valedictory assessment of his meteoric rise and fall, the expensively Eton and Oxford-educated Prime Minister said “them’s the breaks”.

I have no confidence in this Government because they have decided to do without a science Minister, even as they say that science is essential to our economic recovery. I have no confidence in this Government because, as our nation faces a lethal heatwave—one so severe that the rail links between Westminster and my constituency have been severed, and the NHS is braced for a wave of heatstroke victims—the Prime Minister prefers to play “Top Gun” rather than turning up for Cobra meetings. I have no confidence in this Government because the candidates to replace the disgraced Prime Minister are so mired in mud-slinging that they barely mention health, education, jobs or the environment, and have now cancelled further debates because they are so embarrassing. I have no confidence in this Government because they appear to be in an arms race to slash taxes, cut the state, and “postpone”, or abandon, our commitment to net zero carbon emissions.

As we swelter in this country, we should remember that the whole of Europe is less than two thirds the size of the Sahara desert. If we do not meet the climate challenge, the Sahara is coming for us. If the Government think that net zero commitments are “expensive”, they should try costing the retrofitting of air conditioning in every home and school and every other building in the country. That will be but a small part of what it will cost us.

I have no confidence in this Government because they have no ideas and no convictions. They are a zombie Government; worse, they are a vampire Government, effectively dead but still continuing to suck the lifeblood from my constituents. Only a Labour Government can provide the fresh start that we deserve.

Advanced Research and Invention Agency Bill

Debate between Baroness Winterton of Doncaster and Chi Onwurah

Report stage & 3rd reading
Monday 7th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah]

I pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friend’s all-party parliamentary group, with which I am quite familiar. I wholeheartedly agree with him about the importance of that research, and about the link between that important research and this agency. I will develop that point further in a few moments.

As hon. Members have indicated, UK science is not only inspiring; it can also be groundbreaking and is a key economic driver. Our university research base alone contributes £95 billion to the economy, supporting nearly 1 million jobs in scientific institutes, charities and businesses of all sizes. Research by Oxford Economics commissioned by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy found that each £1 of public research and development—such as the money to be spent on ARIA—stimulates between £1.96 and £2.34 of private research and development, and we cannot recover from the pandemic without inspiring and initiating more private sector investment in research and development. Together, private and public sector research can help to address the key challenges facing humanity—from climate change to inequality, from pandemics to productivity.

That brings us very neatly to the broken promises of this Conservative Government on overseas development aid, as raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), and how that betrays the poorest among us and the critical challenges faced by us all. With over £4.1 billion slashed from overseas development aid, the £120 million cut from science and research programmes may appear minor, but that has already had a devastating impact on science here and abroad. Cutting funding from global challenges research fund hubs, for example, threatens researchers at Newcastle University in my constituency, as well as scientists in developing countries working together on water security. These cuts are a consequence of the Government’s decision to scrap the legally binding 0.7% of GDP target for overseas development aid.

New clause 4 tabled by the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), which sought to reverse that decision, has not been selected for debate, though a debate on the issue may follow; certainly, the debate is not going away. Particularly in relation to ARIA and the amendments before us, it is really important to emphasise that for UK science, research and credibility, these cuts have a significant impact. The UK has been the only G7 country to cut aid in the middle of a pandemic, and in so doing it has united hon. and right hon. Members across this House who are horrified by the harm done—harm such as, in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, in Yemen, slashing aid by 60% without conducting an impact assessment, and harm such as cutting bilateral funding on water, sanitation and hygiene—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. I would like the hon. Lady to return to the Bill.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, because that is exactly the point to which I am going—to the amendments. Just to say that the funding for coronavirus research, which is the kind of world-beating or leading research that we would hope ARIA will be looking at, has been cut by 70%, which will kill the project. A Government happy to withdraw support for vital research projects across the globe are not a Government who wish to act in the best interests of science, the country or the world.

On ARIA itself, we have many serious concerns. We recognise the need for new mechanisms to support high-risk, high-reward research in our science sector, and as such ARIA is a step in the right direction. ARIA can transform our scientific landscape and we can build an institution that furthers our societal aims for decades to come, but we have concerns, which our amendments seek to address, about the lack of direction, strategy and accountability in the Government’s current proposals. Without such improvements, we fear that the agency could be used to pursue vanity projects disconnected from the public interest.

The first major issue with the Bill is the absence of a mission for ARIA, which has already been raised. What is ARIA for and what is it working towards? Labour’s amendment 12 would require ARIA to have a specific mission for ARIA’s first decade, and we want that mission to be climate change.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Debate between Baroness Winterton of Doncaster and Chi Onwurah

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 25th May 2021 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Provision of information to the Intelligence and Security Committee—

“The Secretary of State must provide the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is reasonably practicable with a copy of—

(a) any direction or notice (or part thereof) that is withheld from publication by the Secretary of State in the interests of national security in accordance with section 105Z11(2) or (3) of the Communications Act 2003;

(b) any notification of contravention given by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 105Z18(1) of the Communications Act 2003;

(c) any confirmation decision given by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 105Z20(2)(a) of the Communications Act 2003;

(d) any reasons for making an urgent enforcement direction that are withheld by the Secretary of State in the interests of national security in the accordance with section 105Z22(5) of the Communications Act 2003; and

(e) any reasons for confirming or modifying an urgent enforcement direction that are withheld by the Secretary of State in the interests of national security in accordance with section 105Z23(6) of the Communications Act 2003.”

This new clause would ensure that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is provided with any information relating to a designated vendor direction, notification of contravention, urgent enforcement action or modifications to an enforcement direction made on grounds of national security.

New clause 3—Network diversification—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the impact of progress of the diversification of the telecommunications supply chain on the security of public electronic communication networks and services.

(2) The report required by subsection (1) must include an assessment of the effect on the security of those networks and services of—

(a) progress in network diversification set against the most recent telecommunications diversification strategy presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State;

(b) likely changes in ownership or trading position of existing market players;

(c) changes to the diversity of the supply chain for network equipment;

(d) new areas of market consolidation and diversification risk including the cloud computing sector;

(e) progress made in any aspects of the implementation of the diversification strategy not covered by subsection (a);

(f) the public funding which is available for diversification.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay the report before Parliament.

(4) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than two months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on the impact of the Government’s diversification strategy on the security of telecommunication networks and services, and allow for a debate in the House of Commons on the report.

Amendment 1, in clause 14, page 21, line 27, at end insert—

“(3) The Secretary of State must, in the process of carrying out reviews and drafting subsequent reports, consult the appropriate ministers from the devolved governments.”

[Chi Onwurah]

It is a great pleasure to speak in this debate on Report. As I may have mentioned before, I am a chartered electrical engineer; before I entered Parliament, I worked for 20 years helping to build out the networks—fixed wireless and mobile—that became the internet. I am proud of that work and of the immense contribution that the telecommunications sector makes to our society, our economy and our security.

I am very pleased that today we are dedicating parliamentary time to our telecommunications sector. I thank all Members across the House who served on the Bill Committee for our many hours of fruitful debate as we strove to secure improvements to the Bill. I also thank the officials of this House, particularly in the Public Bill Office and the Library, who have provided such excellent support.

I declare an interest: many provisions in the Bill deal with the regulator Ofcom, and my last telecommunications role was with Ofcom. I joined it in 2004 just a few weeks after it was born, when it was to be a light-touch regulator, small and nimble. As a consequence of my time in the sector, I have been calling for greater security, particularly for our mobile networks, since I first entered this place in 2010.

The Labour party and I welcome the intention behind the Bill, but a number of areas in it need to be addressed. We are here today because of the Huawei debacle of the Government’s making. The Government have been forced to require the removal of Huawei, at an estimated cost of £2 billion and a delay of two to three years to our 5G roll-out, after overseeing Huawei’s rapid rise to be the foremost supplier to the telecoms company that carries our country’s name and universal service obligation: British Telecom.

The telecoms supply chain review found that there were no incentives for our mobile network operators to provide secure networks. Moreover, successive Tory Governments have squandered the world-leading position on broadband infrastructure left to them by Labour in 2010, as the United Kingdom has fallen down the league table from 27th to 47th in the world for average internet speeds. This lack of sovereign capability and absence of an effective telecoms strategy has resulted in our dependency on high-risk vendors, which the Bill seeks to address.

I am sure that you will be pleased to know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I will not repeat the same arguments on Huawei that have dominated the debate over recent years. Given where we are now, we support the aims of the Bill. National security is the first duty of any Government, and Labour will always put national security first. Our telecoms infrastructure is clearly critical to our defence and security, as well as our economic prosperity.

We agree that, as the Bill sets out, the Secretary of State should have powers to designate vendors of concern and require mobile network operators to take appropriate action, and that Ofcom should have the power to monitor and enforce those directions. However, we wish to improve the Bill in three key areas, which our new clauses 1, 2 and 3 seek to address.

The first area is national security. Labour prioritises national security, and the sweeping powers that the Bill gives the Secretary of State must be used in the interests of securing our critical national infrastructure. Removing Huawei does not, in and of itself, make our networks secure now or protect them against future threats; that requires a number of additional measures, some of which are in the Bill and some of which are not. For a start, if our telecoms network is to be secure, there must be expert democratic oversight of the measures that make it secure—yet the Bill makes no provision for Parliament’s experts, the Intelligence and Security Committee, to be informed or consulted. We want to fix that.

Secondly, the security of our network depends on an effective plan to diversify the supply chain. We are very concerned that the Bill does not even mention diversification and thus risks short-changing our national security, our technological sovereignty and our telecoms infrastructure. We want to ensure that progress is made in diversification as a prerequisite for the security of the telecoms network and a UK sovereign capability should be a part of that.

Thirdly, the Bill gives many new responsibilities and powers to Ofcom. That follows a vast expansion of Ofcom’s remit over the past 10 years. We want to make sure that Ofcom is appropriately resourced to carry out its duties and to be forward looking, not simply looking back.

One of the great failings of the Bill is that the Government are so fixated on fighting the last battle—the Huawei battle—they are not looking to the future. That is, in part, because various Government Back-Bench Members have very real concerns about the rise of China and its influence on our infrastructure. But these concerns, however well justified, seem to be blinding the Government to threats that are not Chinese in origin. We want to fix that. We want Ofcom to have the resources and the will to monitor the evolution of our telecoms networks, so that future threats, wherever they come from, can be identified and we do not find ourselves forced, as we are now, to make a huge change to our networks, at a huge cost to our economy.

I turn to new clause 1. As I said in my opening remarks, I joined Ofcom in 2004 when it was in its infancy as a slimline regulator. I kept a copy of the Communications Act 2003 on my desk. Since then, that Act has already doubled in size as Ofcom has acquired responsibility for critical national infrastructure: the BBC; the Post Office; online harms—that Bill is coming down the road; and, in this Bill, parts of national security as well. This latest expansion of Ofcom duties will necessarily add a strain not only to its budget, but to its resources. In January, in response to my written question, the Government stated that Ofcom would have the resources that it needs to do the job, in which case the Minister should be keen to support new clause 1, which requires Ofcom to report on the adequacy of its resources in fulfilling its functions under the amendments made in the Bill.

Ofcom lacks experience in national security measures—this was discussed during the evidence stage—and the expansion of duties will require the recruitment of people with the required level of security clearance and experience. That is not going to be easy, as we heard during the evidence sessions. Emily Taylor of Oxford Information Labs said that Ofcom

“will have to acquire a very specific set of skills and capabilities and that will require substantial investment and learning as an organisation”.––[Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 19 January 2021; c. 72, Q84.]

These skills are rare. The memo from the Minister, for which I am grateful, sets out how Ofcom and the National Cyber Security Centre will work. While it is welcome that they will work together, it did not provide the reassurance that we need. Indeed, it suggests that Ofcom will be entirely dependent on the NCSC for cyber skills and therefore, presumably, unable to understand the advice that it receives from the organisation.

New clause 1 requires Ofcom to report annually on the adequacy of measures taken by network providers to comply with changes introduced in the Bill, empowering the Government to track the effectiveness of the legislation. However, new clause 1 does more than that. It ensures that Ofcom has the human and informational resources to be forward looking. As I said, we are concerned that the Bill is backward looking and does not look to future threats. New clause 1 requires Ofcom to provide an assessment of emerging or future security risks based on its interrogation of network providers’ asset registers.

I am pleased that the Government are taking steps—as I understand it from the Minister—to formalise existing best practice in the telecoms sector and ensure that national providers maintain asset registers. I can tell Members that that has not always been the case. As the Minister said during the Committee stage, asset registers are an

“important part of the existing landscape”––[Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 21 January 2021; c. 162.]

But I ask him: why does he not take this further? We need to ensure that we have a good understanding of our national assets and so can assess emerging threats. Doing so would have made Huawei’s dominance visible earlier and it would now enable warning signs of future concerns—and there are future concerns. Again, Emily Taylor said:

“I feel a little like we have been fetishising 5G and a single company for the last two years, perhaps at the expense of a more holistic awareness of systemic cyber-security risks… Healthcare systems probably would not have been top of the list two years ago, but now they are. The SolarWinds attack shows that the identity of the vendor is not always the key risk point. SolarWinds is a very trusted vendor from a like-minded, close ally country, and yet it turns out to be a critical single point of failure across key, very sensitive Government Departments, both in the US and the UK.––[Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 19 January 2021; c. 74, Q88.]

So I want the Minister to consider that in his response on this proposal.

Point of Order

Debate between Baroness Winterton of Doncaster and Chi Onwurah

Thursday 21st January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I wonder whether I might seek your advice. During Women and Equalities questions last week, the Minister for Equalities told me that her first report

on the disproportionate impact of covid-19 on ethnic minority groups in October had concluded that there was no evidence suggesting that ethnicity itself is a risk factor. That is not correct and creates a false impression. The detail of workstream 3 of the four workstreams that form “Term of Reference 3” states:

“Further data, research and analysis on the above factors is needed to fully understand the disparities from COVID-19 to ethnic minorities.”

That is the point that I was making. It continues:

“In summary, the evidence shows an increased risk for Black and South Asian ethnic groups.”

How can the Minister correct the record in what is a really important area and a subject of great concern to many black and ethnic minority communities?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for her point of order and for giving me notice of her intention to raise the matter. I understand that she has also given notice to the Minister for Equalities, the hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Kemi Badenoch). I am sure that the hon. Lady was not implying in any way that there was any intention on the part of the Minister to give incorrect information. As she knows, I am not responsible for the accuracy or inaccuracy of anything that may have been said by Ministers from the Dispatch Box. I am sure that the Treasury Bench will have heard what she has had to say and that any Minister would come to the House as quickly as possible if they felt that any information had inadvertently been given that was inaccurate. She has made her concerns known to the House and I am sure that she will find other ways to pursue the matter as well.

I will suspend the House for two minutes to ensure that necessary arrangements are made for the next business.