Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

I would make two points about that. In fact, I supported the noble Lord Cameron in that regard because it was a political decision. It is also worth looking at the practical politics. Although we were for a period of time at variance with the Court, no harm was done to the polity of the United Kingdom in that regard. No harm was done to the interests of the United Kingdom and no terrible international consequence for us flowed from it. I think the Court got it wrong on that occasion, and one of the problems is that there is no appeal system in the Strasbourg Court, so we have to wait until some future decision goes a different way. I think many of us take the view that, in reality, the Court as currently constituted in Strasbourg—it is perhaps less activist, if I may say so, than its predecessors—might well have found differently in the prisoner voting case. However, the fact was that UK Ministers took the decision, and they did what was right in the UK, which was supported by those in all parts of the House, and no harm was done. So the idea that some terrible consequence will flow for the UK because of the ability to seek rule 39 interim measures is just misplaced.

[Sir William Cash]

Would my hon. Friend reflect on this fact about prisoner voting? I discussed the matter with the noble Lord Cameron when he was Prime Minister at the time, but it was regarded by the noble Lord Clarke of Nottingham as a “particular political policy”—I think those were the words he used. How would my hon. Friend describe the issue of illegal migration? Would he not regard that as a particular but very important political policy?

[Sir Robert Neill]

That is why, as it happens, I will not vote against this Bill, because although I have some misgivings, there is a legitimate concern that needs to be dealt with in relation to illegal boats. However, the simple fact is that that is not a reason for the blanket derogation, or the blanket removal of ECHR protections, that is proposed in a series of amendments. That is the difference. My hon. Friend and I are at one, but sometimes a mixture of politics and law arises in these matters. The point I am making is that, frankly, if any Government want to take the political risk of ignoring an interim measure, they can do so under our law as it stands. It happens that they effectively did so on prisoner voting, so they could do that now if they wanted to. I am not going to advise on that, because one has to be very wary not to come to views that may very often not be fact-specific when individual decisions are made.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

Amendments 1 and 2, the latter of which amends clause 26, relate to the commencement and operationalisation of the provisions in the Bill. I have drafted them in this way because of the nature of the Bill itself. We will come to amendment 2 on day three, but amendment 1 paves the way for it, so it may be convenient if I set out the thinking behind both amendments.

As was debated at some length on Second Reading—I will not repeat everything that was said—this is an unusual and rather exceptional Bill, and not necessarily in a good way. If fully brought into effect, the Bill would lead to the United Kingdom departing unilaterally from an international agreement and therefore breaking its obligations under both customary international law and the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, which is a grave and profound step for any Government to take.

I recognise that there are circumstances in which that step can be taken, and the Government asserted on Second Reading that the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol gives rise, or potentially gives rise, to those circumstances. The essence of it, though, depends on applying a factual evidence base to a legal test. The legal test in this case is essentially the international customary law convention of necessity, which is now enshrined in article 25 of the articles on state responsibility, which were adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001 and are recognised by the UN General Assembly, by our Government and by the international community as an authoritative statement of the law. Article 25 sets out that necessity may be invoked if certain tests are met. The point of these amendments is to say that if the Government, or any Government, were to take that step, they should do so upon the most compelling grounds, so that the factual basis for their actions met the legal test. The reputational consequences, politically, internationally and legally, are very significant, so this should be done only when that is thoroughly tested and set before this House to be tested.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is referring to certain tests of a reputational character, so I would be grateful if he would tell the Committee what those tests are right now.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I will be happy to talk about the essential tests of necessity, which are well recognised and well set out, as my hon. Friend knows. But the principle behind the amendment, which I will then go into the detail of, is precisely to say, “If you are invoking that doctrine, a most unusual thing to do, you ought to come to the House and set out the basis upon which you seek to do so.” The House would then have the chance to say whether or not we were prepared, on the basis of what the Government had put before us, to take the very exceptional step of putting ourselves in breach of a treaty obligation. That is the point.

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[Sir Robert Neill]

Let me return to that once I have set out the tests, because that is one issue that, with respect to the right hon. Gentleman—I do have much respect for him—the House ought to consider on the factual basis that is set before it. The first test is that departing from the treaty is the only means available to the state party

“to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril”.

I quote from the case law and the text of the convention. Let us just break that down. On “an essential interest”, it might be that the Government could, at some point, make a case to say that the disruption in Northern Ireland, be it economic, societal or political, gets to a stage where it could threaten an essential interest of the UK. I concede that, but I have not, as yet, seen the evidence to justify that.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Sir Robert Neill]

Forgive me, but my hon. Friend asked me to set out the tests and I am doing so. The second test is the necessity to safeguard an essential interest against a “grave and imminent peril”. The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has helpfully provided a briefing, setting out that that imports something that very grave indeed—it is a high test—with a degree of urgency to the matter. A possible, contingent or proximate risk does not come within the test of being a “grave and imminent peril”, and that is a risk with the way in which the Bill is drafted at the moment. Again, evidence might be produced to show that it does apply, and the Government might be able to make their case—they ought to do so.

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[Sir Robert Neill]

With respect, I do not think the amendment would put another hurdle in the way, because it would not prevent the Bill from proceeding and it would not prevent what I know my right hon. Friend wants to see, which is a negotiated settlement. By far the best thing, which everyone in this Committee wants, is for the protocol to be renegotiated. I concede at once that the protocol is not working properly or as it was intended. I also readily concede that part of that is due to a rather intransigent stance taken by the European Commission and its refusal, for example, to give greater flexibility to Vice-President Šefčovič in his negotiating mandate. This is not an issue where all the fault is on one side at all. The EU has not acted wisely or helpfully in these matters, but that is not the same as saying that the international law test is therefore automatically made out as of now.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Sir Robert Neill]

I will give way to my hon. Friend, probably for the last time.

[Sir William Cash]

I think that would be fine at this stage. My hon. Friend refers to “grave and imminent peril”. Does he not agree that at the heart of this entire problem lies the issue of the democratic deficit? I will not go into it now, but I will explain later that I think this is about the manner in which legislation is pouring into Northern Ireland from every side, like a tsunami, as we said in our European Scrutiny Committee report; we talked about starting with a small number of cars and turning into a motorway. The bottom line is that that is a grave and imminent peril, because of the constant and perpetual legislation, week in, week out, with no time or opportunity for people in Northern Ireland to say anything at any time.

[Sir Robert Neill]

The difficulty that my hon. Friend has is that that is an assertion. I am not sure that, as yet, we have had set out to the House the evidence base that the Government say they have and are working on. I referred the Foreign Secretary to that point on Second Reading, asking when we would see the evidence base that will set out the Government’s case and their reasoning.

Referral of Prime Minister to Committee of Privileges

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

Thursday 21st April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

As I will make apparent shortly, I will come to my conclusion on the position of the Prime Minister—as I am entitled to as a Conservative Member of Parliament—once I have heard the full evidence. The importance of the respect of this institution in the various parts of the United Kingdom is, of course, well made, and I take that on board.

[Sir William Cash]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. I also commend the Justice Committee and him in his role as Chair for the investigation that took place in respect of fixed penalty notices. The Counsel for Domestic Legislation, as he will remember, says that there was a great lack of clarity over what regulations apply to specific situations at what times and so on, and I shall refer a bit more to that if I am called to speak a bit later. The bottom line is that I am sure that this very distinguished Chairman of that Committee appreciates that, in relation to the rule of law question that he has just raised, it is by no means clear exactly what the law is on these subjects.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his observations. That brings me on to the point that I was about to make. The subject of the motion is not of itself the fixed penalty notice that was accepted by the Prime Minister, or any of the other fixed penalty notices. It is, as is rightly said, the question of whether there was a deliberate misleading of the House. I think that that is the common ground. Of course, the fixed penalty notices are part of the factual background that gives rise to that, and he is quite right to say that the Justice Committee was critical of the fixed penalty regime that was brought in on a number of counts, and in particular of the confusion that existed in many people’s minds—ordinary individuals whose cases would never be the subject of any comment in this House or in the media—of the distinction, or non-distinction sometimes, between guidance and law. We were critical of that, and critical also of the use of fixed penalty notices for what were specifically described—it is worth putting this on the record—as criminal offences.

I took the trouble to look again at the regulations. The original regulations, the Health Protection (Corona-virus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, which were amended shortly before the incident with which we were concerned, specifically set out in terms that a failure to comply with a restriction under the regulations creates an offence, and the word “offence” is specifically used in the regulation.

We should not minimise that. We should not say, “This is a civil matter. This is equivalent to a parking ticket.” It is not. That is a simple question of fact. The Ministry of Justice accepted that in the statement it made when the regulations were brought in, and the Justice Committee, in carrying out that inquiry, heard that from the noble Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Sir Jonathan Jones QC, the former Treasury Solicitor when they gave evidence to us. That is common ground.

I will equally accept, as I am sure anyone else with experience in legal matters would, that within the range of fixed penalties, a fixed penalty notice of £50 is at the lower end of the scale of available penalties. The Select Committee raised the question whether the level of fixed penalty notices imposed were appropriate to be dealt with via fixed penalty rather than fine, but that is by way of background. That is all very well. We are dealing with something that was an offence. Accepting the fixed penalty discharges and deals with a criminal matter, but it does not change its nature, so we should not try to minimise it, and I do not.

I will say, without having come to a final decision about the Prime Minister’s position, that I am profoundly disappointed in what happened at No. 10 Downing Street. People were badly let down. My constituents feel badly let down. I feel personally badly let down by what happened. There must be consequences that follow from that. I think anyone would accept, in fairness, that what that consequence is depends on an ultimate assessment of the measure of culpability. That is why I would prefer, both in making my personal decision and ultimately in the House’s making a decision, to wait until we have the full evidence and information before us.

Had the amendment in the Government’s name been moved, I would happily have voted for it, because I think that full evidence includes not just the conclusion of the police investigations and the issuance or otherwise of any other fixed penalty notices, but the content of the Sue Gray report. As anyone will appreciate, the Sue Gray report is likely to include material that gives background and context beyond the strict requirements of the statement of facts that go with a fixed penalty notice. It is important to have that.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

Consideration of Lords amendments
Thursday 10th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I welcome the fact that the Government have accepted that it was unwise, if I can put it charitably, to have certain clauses in this Bill that might have impugned our international reputation for supporting the rule of law. I welcome the Minister’s approach and that of his colleague Lord True in the other place. The Bill is better off without those clauses. I had sought at the very least to ensure there was a parliamentary lock should such clauses ever be needed, but I hope that through the agreement achieved in the Joint Committee, thanks to the work of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, they are not needed at all. It is better, therefore, to leave the Bill clean in that way to serve the other important purposes that it does have to achieve.

That is why, with all due respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), I trust that the Minister and colleagues will firmly resist any temptation to try to reinstate such clauses, which would be unnecessary, provocative in more ways than one, and unhelpful to the purpose we all seek to achieve.

I read with care the speeches of two former Lord Chief Justices and the former leader of my party, my noble Friend Lord Howard of Lympne, who himself was a distinguished Queen’s counsel with many years in practice before he came into this place. They certainly were not talking nonsense; they were making legitimate and fair points about areas of concern, even though I perhaps was more content to go with the view of David Wolfson QC, who was quoted by Lord Naseby, that the taking of such clauses into the Bill was not of itself a breach of international law until such time as they were brought into force. We are none the less better off not going down that route, so I hope the Minister will resist any temptation to put anything of that kind back into this Bill or into the Taxation (Post-transition Period) Bill, because that would muddy the waters needlessly, legally and politically.

We are going to require political goodwill on all sides to make the coming days and weeks work. Were it ever to be necessary to take such extreme measures in such extreme circumstances that might occur, immediate primary legislation on an emergency basis could of course be done, and that would give the parliamentary lock that I was concerned should exist, but through another form. It is not necessary for us to go down that route now, because, frankly, to try to reinstate the clauses would be fatal to the progress of the Bill, and that would not be in the interests of the Government or anyone else. I thank the Minister for the way in which he and his colleagues have approached this matter.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir Robert Neill]

Nobody else has been giving way, with every respect to my hon. Friend. Other people want to get in. I have said what I have to say. In fairness, he and I could happily go on all day about this in a friendly manner of disagreement, but I think possibly that is for outside the Chamber, rather than in it. I say that in the nicest possible way.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 29th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

One of the most salutary but, in retrospect, useful put-downs I ever had when I was a young barrister came when I perhaps overindulged in hyperbole in advancing arguments to the Court of Appeal and Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce said to me, “There’s no jury here, Mr Neill, you can cut out the hyperbole and stick to the arguments.” He was right and perhaps it is not a bad thing to try to do in the Committee on the Bill, as there has been a deal of hyperbole surrounding its passage, coming from those in all parts of the House. We might be better off cutting it out a little and getting back to the nuts and bolts of what we are discussing, because a lot of the Bill is perfectly reasonable and necessary. It is not a necessity I particularly like, because I wish we were not leaving some of the arrangements we currently share, but it has to happen as we exit the transition period. The real difficulty comes from the issues in part 5, which we have discussed on a number of occasions, so let me just return to them.

I listened with care to the Minister, and I do not doubt his sincerity and good intentions in this regard. He must have thought it a pretty rum do when, as a trade Minister, he found himself in the middle of a lawyers’ argument, but that has never stopped the lawyers making that case. I recognise that the Government have endeavoured to shift to try to make clear some of their intentions in relation to the difficult and sensitive matters that part 5 threw up. I will not pretend that we should have started from here; it might have been better to have contemplated the idea of some emergency legislation should we be confronted by what, I am glad to say, the Minister says is an unlikely eventuality, as this is what we all want to avoid if at all possible. I can see arguments the other way as well, so I welcome the constructive approach the Government have adopted towards myself and a number of my hon. Friends who had significant reservations with the Bill, as tabled, to try to make it clear that it is not the Government’s intention to act in a way that would undermine our reputation as a nation and jurisdiction that supports and upholds our obligations in international as well as domestic law.

[Sir William Cash]

I am glad my hon. Friend is referring to a constructive role. I gather from what he said the other day that he was talking very much in terms of last resort, and I want to be constructive, too. As he knows, I have already made the point that the Labour party has been passing Acts of Parliament that clearly and unequivocally override international law and that this has also happened in relation to other legislation in the UK, as I pointed out to my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May). So will my hon. Friend bear that in mind when he is considering the question of last resort, the threshold he referred to the other day and the fact that this is more common and happens more frequently than he may appreciate and that sovereignty, above all else, is the keystone upon which the whole of Brexit depends?

[Sir Robert Neill]

I am not sure whether or not that is an argument for Brexit; on that basis, the Don Pacifico affair was a great statement of national sovereignty, but I do not think it was a great triumph of intellect, integrity or national interest. Leaving that to one side, I accept that there will be a number of occasions when Governments may have departed from their international obligations, but that does not make any of them desirable and it does not mean that we should not seek to limit the circumstances in which that might occur to the barest necessities. So I think we have some common ground there, or at least I hope that we have. That is why I welcome the statements the Government have made to flesh out their intentions on the way in which part 5 would be used.

I say to Opposition Members that I accept that there are certain circumstances in which we might find ourselves in difficulty because of the attitude of our counterparties in the EU. I hope that that will not come to pass and that we are seeing just a matter of the rhetoric of negotiation. There is, however, a respectable legal argument, which has not been ventilated before, although it is held by a number of senior lawyers I have spoken to, to say that, as we all know, the withdrawal agreement is binding on the UK as a matter of international law—that must be right—but that that is based upon the true construction of the withdrawal agreement.

The withdrawal agreement is clearly subject to the provisions that stipulate that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. There is an obligation on the parties in good faith to negotiate a free trade arrangement between the UK and the EU such as would render the need for checks on goods passing between the UK and Northern Ireland largely, if not completely, unnecessary. Provided that is done, I do not think any of us get into any difficulties. I accept that in negotiations there has been some language—I hope it is no more than the language of negotiation at this stage, a posture—that might suggest that the EU could argue for a substantial array of checks that might go beyond that which is compatible with the true construction of the agreement in so far as it must respect the role of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Robert Neill]

I recognise that that is a widely held argument.

[Sir William Cash]

Total tosh.

[Sir Robert Neill]

With respect to my hon. Friend, I do not regard it as total tosh. I happen not to agree with it in totality, but I do not think that we should ever dismiss serious legal argument from serious practitioners on either side of the question as being out of consideration. It is a matter that we ought to weigh carefully. I do think that there is an answer. Part of that answer is the one I have just been formulating, which suggests to me that there can be certain circumstances in which the breach of the true meaning of the agreement is such that the UK itself will be entitled to use its international law right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I just wonder whether my hon. Friend would consider that bringing in a Bill was a matter of privilege for the House.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I am sure that it is a matter of privilege for the House, but I just come back to the point: I do not think that that engages with the issue we are concerned with here. Of course, it is perfectly within the rights of the House to bring forward any legislation it likes. I know my hon. Friend played a role in having section 38 inserted into the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, but, with respect, that simply restates that which we already knew and probably picked up in the first week of the law course; that, essentially, Parliament is sovereign and of course it can legislate in the way that it wishes. It can legislate in a way that is incompatible with international law. That does not make it a desirable course to go down. I think that is the point that needs to be said. Of course, it may be possible and I do not think privilege is engaged. The point I am seeking to make is that the UK should be very wary about doing anything that breaches its international obligations. I do not think it has yet and there are reasons why we may be able to avoid that, but that is why I think we need to keep the debate a little more calm in terms of what the rights are.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

I assure the hon. and learned Lady that I am not giving way. I am very happy to do so normally, but not today.

Furthermore, a Conservative Government, in the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, provided clauses that were notwithstanding anything contrary to the arrangements of the Act. It goes on. It is a substantial list.

I will go further. Those who are interested can look at my previous contributions to other debates, where I extensively describe the myriad occasions when the EU itself has broken international law and, furthermore, when EU member states have egregiously broken international law and admitted it in their own Parliaments. For example, Helmut Schmidt, in the Bundestag, could not have been clearer, going through every single treaty that Germany deliberately broke in defence of its own vital national interest, because that is itself a reason why national law can have a degree of predominance over international law.

National and constitutional law, in certain circumstances —where it affects sovereignty, as in this case in the United Kingdom—can prevail against international law. I am extremely grateful to my good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), who I know recognises this. It has taken a bit of time for us all to come to terms with that, because it is a bit complex, but the reality is that it is well established in international law itself. The German federal court confirmed this as recently as 2015. I quoted the court in a previous debate, so it is already on the record that it is well within the framework of international law for a country—a democratic country, I hasten to add—to actually override international law in its own vital national interest, and most specifically, as in this case, on questions of sovereignty.

I will therefore just touch on my exchange with the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). With regard to Miller 1, the Supreme Court unanimously confirmed that, under the dualist approach, treaty obligations only become binding in the UK system to the extent that they are carried out in domestic legislation, and that whether to enact or repeal legislation, and the content of that legislation, is for Parliament alone.

This principle was approved unanimously by the Supreme Court in Miller 1.

[Sir Robert Neill]

indicated assent.

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend is nodding his head because he knows this is the case.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

Monday 21st September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

This has not been the most edifying spectacle for the House of Commons over the past few days, but I hope that, at the end of the day, we can find a constructive way forward. I say that it is not edifying because, although much of the purpose of the Bill is important and valuable, to act in contemplation of something that most of us would regard as unworthy—namely, to breach an international obligation—is not something that one should ever seek to discuss lightly. Equally, it is not something that can ever be an absolute, because there can be certain extreme and pressing circumstances where such a derogation is permissible, but the bar has to be a very high one. That is why the discussions that have taken place between some of us and the Government, and the Minister’s response, are important, as far as my thinking is concerned. On the face of it, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) observed, without safeguards and caveats, clauses 42, 43 and 45 would without more ado be unconscionable, and we could not support them.

I want also to speak to my amendment 4 and the Government’s amendment 66, which I hope will provide a means of reconciling that position with the need to find a constructive way forward.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Sir Robert Neill]

If my hon. Friend will allow me to develop my point a little, I will of course give way to him in a moment.

Without a parliamentary lock, I do not believe that it will ever be appropriate for a sovereign Parliament to contemplate breaking an international obligation. There has to be a test for the parliamentary lock to be met. I welcome, therefore, the Minister’s comments on Government amendment 66 and the test that he has adopted—and that was previously put out by Downing Street—at the Dispatch Box in respect of the high bar that would have to be met before the House could or should be persuaded to support such a course of action. For me and, I suspect, many other Members, the bar would have to be a high one.

[Sir William Cash]

Does my hon Friend agree that that bar becomes very apparent when dealing with the essential question of sovereignty and whether the EU is recognising sovereignty in the negotiations in the way that was clearly stated in the protocol and in the essential elements of the agreement? We are sovereign and our constitution is special in that respect, compared with some other countries that have provisions in written constitutions.

[Sir Robert Neill]

Let me put it this way: if my hon. Friend is saying that the test is something akin to that in article 46 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, which permits a departure from an international obligation if the violation that causes it is

“manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance”,

I am not a million miles away from him. It is not an exact analogy and I do not think my hon. Friend was trying to make one, but it would have to be something similarly fundamental.

From my point of view, one could conceive—I use my words carefully—that a Government might be able to persuade the House that there was such a threat to the position of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, and to the welfare of its economy and people, that one might take such a step. That is why, having thought and hesitated for some time, I am prepared to allow the Government the opportunity to make that case. None the less, it is a high bar, and I have to say that the fact that other jurisdictions—be it the EU or others—may have derogated from international treaties is not of itself persuasive. Many of us would need to be persuaded by the evidence that was brought in relation to the specific circumstances that might trigger the bringing into force of the three clauses under the arrangements set out in Government amendment 66. That is the point and will be the only test that will be relevant.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 12th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

The speeches from both Front Benchers have been very thoughtful and that matches the significance of this debate. My right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor made a very compelling case for this legislation. It is not the type of legislation that the House should undertake lightly, but protecting the public must ultimately trump all other considerations. It is always right that we should protect the public in a way that is commensurate with the rule of law. I believe that the Government and the Lord Chancellor have managed to achieve that balance and I am glad that the official Opposition recognise that, too. That is a fundamental duty for all of us, and reconciling the two is a considerable achievement, given the pressures we are under at this time.

The reason that I think it is necessary to move in this way has been well set out. I speak as somebody who represents a London constituency: many of my constituents work in and around the places where we have seen so many atrocities. That brings home to us profoundly the catastrophic risk that can come when an individual is released. Even though the index offence that caused them to go to prison may not have led to a very long sentence, the nature—I am sorry to say—of the type of terrorism that we see now, often based on perverted ideologies and the deep-seated hatred that that breeds, gives us the need to be particularly careful and cautious about all forms of release going forward. The automatic point of release will be moved to two thirds—in fact, that will no longer be automatic but will, in all cases, be considered by the Parole Board, and that is a worthwhile and important aspect of the Bill.

[Sir William Cash]

I am listening with great interest to everything that my hon. Friend says, as ever. Does he think that the question over the Bill is that it will have a limited effect, whereas the problems that we face have a much longer-term consequence? Does he believe, therefore, that we ought to have a more rigorous analysis in future—this is only emergency legislation—to make sure that human life in this country takes priority over the interpretation of law?

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Robert Neill and William Cash

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons & Committee: 2nd sitting
Wednesday 8th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

When dealing with issues of interpretation of European law in the context of our own previous methods of judicial interpretation, those of us who are familiar with Maxwell as compared to Craies know what the differences are. Does my hon. Friend believe that we should be moving towards the stare decisis system—in other words, a system based on precedent—rather than to purposive interpretation, which is the basis on which European law currently operates? Professor Richard Ekins of Oxford University and others are very conscious of that. He has written a very interesting paper.

[Sir Robert Neill]

It is indeed a very interesting paper. Having been brought up as a common lawyer myself, my preference is inevitably to move towards a stare decisis approach. I think that that is something that we all wish to move back to as we reconstruct our statute book and legal texts thereafter. My hon. Friend and I will be entirely in accord on that.

The question is really about the route that we choose to get there and ensuring that we have proper scrutiny of that route, because any deficiencies in regulations would likely result in a judicial review. That is another irony: I am sure that the Government would not want greater risk of judicial review of their actions than is absolutely necessary. It would be a funny Government who made work for lawyers in relation to judicial review. That might be interesting for some of us, but I am sure that it is not something that the Government wish to do. However, without more explanation as to why we are going down that route, that is the risk.

First, I suggest to the Minister that he should seriously consider whether we move to a “necessary” as opposed to “appropriate” test—an objective test—which is much more likely to withstand challenge in the courts, because it is more likely to be readily evidenced and, I would have thought therefore, to the Government’s advantage. If the Government get their ducks in a row early when making regulations and have evidence to back the objective test, they are much more likely to withstand legal challenge.

Secondly, the Government would be much less likely to face challenges and we would get better scrutiny if we moved—certainly for the majority of policy considerations —to using the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. That would perhaps be a fair balance in the House. We will not necessarily be able to do primary legislation for all of our withdrawal, because there is too much of it. Sensible use of secondary legislation, to remove references to the European Union or something of that kind, can of course be done by the negative procedure. When policy considerations are involved, however, the use of the affirmative procedure would be consistent with the Government’s objective of bringing back control to the House, and with the movement towards our traditional UK approach to legal matters. I hope that the Minister will say something about that when he responds.