Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Martin Vickers and Edward Leigh

Thursday 31st October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)]

6. What assessment the National Audit Office has made of the potential effect on its work of the UK leaving the EU.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Brexit is, of course, a major task for Departments. Since 2016, the NAO has published 26 reports on aspects of Brexit. Most recently it has published reports on the UK’s border preparedness for Brexit and on Brexit’s implications for the supply of medicines to the health and social care sectors.

[Martin Vickers]

My right hon. Friend and I represent neighbouring and largely Brexit-supporting constituencies, and of course we want to get Brexit done as quickly as possible, but can I ask how the NAO will approach post-Brexit financial audit?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

The NAO wants to get the Brexit work done as quickly and efficiently as possible and has been working with all Departments to assess the potential impact on their financial performance of the decision to exit the EU. The exact impact in the current year may depend on the outcome of negotiations.

Northern Ireland Backstop: Conditional Interpretative Declaration

Debate between Martin Vickers and Edward Leigh

Thursday 21st February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh]

As always, I am very grateful to my hon. Friend. One of the advantages of these debates is that we can get such legal points across and put them on the record, and I am grateful to him for making that clear.

With a conditional interpretative declaration to a bilateral accord, the outright rejection of the declaration by the other party means the treaty would not come into force, as I said before the interventions. While there is every chance that the EU might object to a conditional interpretative declaration, that objection might fall short of outright rejection. I want hon. Members to listen to that very carefully, because I am trying to find a way forward for Mr Juncker. If they like, I am actually trying to save his face. I am trying to give him an opportunity to object, but not to indulge in outright rejection.

The EU could argue that attempts during negotiations to achieve an end date were rejected, and I am sure it might start by arguing that. It might also argue that an end date would be incompatible with the concept of the three protocols forming an integral part of the agreement, as provided for in article 182 of the withdrawal agreement. However, perfectly valid counterpoints to those objections exist. We would need to argue that our declaration is compatible with our commitment to use “best endeavours” —a very important phrase—to negotiate “alternative arrangements” so that, as provided for, the backstop applies “temporarily”, if indeed it is ever applied at all. That is a fundamental point.

The fact that the backstop would not necessarily come into force under the terms of the agreement means that, in my view, it is not actually integral to the agreement at all. The termination of the backstop within a reasonable amount of time is fully in accord with the agreement, rather than an amendment to it. I therefore think that the arguments in favour of the applicability of just such a declaration are very strong.

What about the European Union’s likely response to such a move? There are four main possibilities. First, it could accept our interpretative declaration and move ahead with obtaining the consent of the European Parliament to the withdrawal agreement. This might include making a political protest, while accepting the declaration’s legality and applicability. That is the ideal response so far as we are concerned. As guideline 1.6.3 states:

“The interpretation resulting from an interpretative declaration made in respect of a bilateral treaty by a State or an international organization party to the treaty and accepted by the other party constitutes an authentic interpretation of that treaty.”

In other words, we would have obtained a legally binding commitment from the EU to end the backstop—victory.

Secondly, the EU could reply with an assertion that the interpretative declaration is in effect an attempt to impose a unilateral reservation, and therefore has no legal validity, but at the same time agree to negotiate solely on the question of an end date for the backstop to solve this issue head-on. This would mean it had abandoned its previous insistence that no further negotiations were possible—again, a way forward.

Thirdly, the EU might reply that the interpretative declaration has no legal validity, but request further negotiations in the hopes of obtaining something of value in exchange for giving way on an end date for the backstop.

[Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)]

I commend my right hon. Friend for all his work on this issue, and for securing this debate. Unlike me, he is an eminent lawyer, and I am trying to get my head around some of the complexities of this issue. If we invoke this interpretative declaration and the EU objects, is that legally challengeable, and if so in what court?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I think the EU probably would object politically, but that is not enough. That is the point. If it does not want the interpretative declaration to have effect and provide an end date for the backstop, there is only one way out of it: it must refuse to ratify the treaty. A protest or talk of further negotiations is not enough, and that in a sense is the beauty of this. That is why we have these vehicles in international law, and why they have been used on several occasions in the past by countries such as Argentina and others.

There is no point protesting. My hon. Friend says that this is a complicated legal argument, but it is not. It is terribly simple. It is incredibly simple. Under international law one can say, “We interpret this treaty in such a way.” We can deposit that when we ratify the treaty. It is not a codicil as such or a letter; it is deposited with the treaty and has all the legal enforceability of a treaty. If those who are ratifying the treaty with us want to escape from its obligations, there is only one way out: they have to refuse to ratify it. I suggest—I will make this clear again before I sit down—that for political reasons the EU would be unlikely to do that, because it would put all the onus of a no-deal scenario on to it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Martin Vickers and Edward Leigh

Thursday 18th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)]

4. What recent discussions he has had with the National Audit Office on the potential effect on its work of the UK leaving the EU.

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough)]

Brexit is a major task for Departments, and over the past 18 months the NAO has produced 15 reports looking at aspects of Brexit. Recent NAO work has provided evaluations of progress at the Department for Transport and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. In the coming years, the NAO will continue to scrutinise the work of Departments as they implement Brexit. The UK’s exiting the EU has also led to new financial audit work, not least the audits of the Department for Exiting the European Union and the Department for International Trade. The NAO currently undertakes audit work on the UK’s administration of funds paid under the European common agricultural policy. That work will end after the UK leaves the EU.

[Martin Vickers]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comprehensive answer. I know he shares my view that the sooner we leave the EU, the better and that a longer transition is totally unacceptable. Does he agree that it is important that the NAO is able to work with similar bodies, both in the EU and outside it, post Brexit?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

In this job, I shall not be tempted down the path of transition, but I can confirm that the NAO will be just as free to share good practice and will continue to compare notes with both European and international audit bodies. The NAO is an active member of the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, which promotes good practice among Government auditors worldwide, and it is also part of a European regional group of supreme audit institutes. Those strong professional links will not be affected by Brexit, so that is another small plank of “Project Fear” done away with.