Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Harper and Lord Winston

Committee stage
Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

Many years ago, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, introduced a similar Bill. I, very misguidedly, introduced an amendment to the title of the Bill; I suggested that the word “euthanasia” should be in the Bill. I did this without believing either that the Bill should pass or that it should fail—I was genuinely uncertain—but, earlier that week, I had talked to a 16 year-old schoolgirl in a school. In the short conversation we had, she asked, “Do you think we always feel that we have to go for and strive for perfection?” I found that very difficult to answer, so I pondered on it.

One of the issues here is exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Frost, has just shown. He tried to demonstrate that there are no absolute meanings of words. In that case, I used Greek, but this is something that we need to go beyond now. These words will mean different things to different people. We waste a lot of time doing this sort of meddling with language when it is unnecessary and when there is no issue with the legal quality of the Bill, which, of course, must be paramount. It is clear that the language we have at the moment is undoubtedly intelligible and largely workable.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, let my start by picking up the point that was just made by the noble Lord, Lord Winston. We should be plain and simple in saying what is going on. In effect, the Bill’s central purposes are to amend the Suicide Act and to legalise somebody’s ability to assist someone else in killing themselves. We should be frank about that; that is what we are doing. If people find us being clear and speaking plainly about what we are doing either uncomfortable or distressing, that should make us pause and ask ourselves whether what we are doing is the right thing. We should not change the language to make the thing that we are doing more palatable. We should speak plainly about it then judge accordingly.

There are some real consequences. One of them was set out by my noble friend Lord Shinkwin when he referred to people with learning disabilities. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will correct me if I have got this wrong, but I think that, when he gave evidence to the committee, he was clear that he wanted someone with a learning disability to have the same ability to access assisted suicide as anybody else, assuming that they meet the other eligibility criteria. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin put it very well when he said that people with learning disabilities need to have things explained in clear and straightforward language. That is really important.

In an earlier debate, my noble friend Lord Markham talked about relying on the experts, but we cannot do that because we know that they do not always make the right decision. We know that, during the Covid pandemic, many people with learning disabilities were given “Do not resuscitate” notices because some people had made the decision that their lives were not as worthwhile as others. People made decisions about them that they would not have made about somebody who did not have a learning disability. It is important that we make sure that the language we use about this decision, which could not be more important, is understandable and that the consequences are understandable for everybody who will be impacted by such a decision. My noble friend Lord Shinkwin made that point well.

My noble friend Lord Frost has already made the point about the use of the phrase “committing suicide”; I reflected on it before I signed his amendment. Personally, I do not like using that phrase—the “commit” piece, not the “suicide” piece—so I paused before I signed his amendment. However, I thought that having a debate and pressing on clarity was important. Obviously, we are in Committee. If my noble friend were to bring forward these amendments on Report, I would want to work with him on the language. I think that removing “commit” would be better because, as my noble friend correctly said, the Suicide Act has removed that vocabulary.

But using the word “suicide” is accurate. Just because somebody has a terminal illness, that does not mean that in taking their own life they are not committing suicide. It is important because it gets through to people the consequence of what we are doing here and the fundamental reshaping we are doing to the way in which society looks at this. That is why so many of us are concerned about it.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Harper and Lord Winston

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to the debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done the Committee a service in tabling this amendment. It has enabled us to think in advance of the debate that we will have when we get to Clause 3 on the existing wording in the Bill about the Mental Capacity Act. Some of those issues came out in the debate that we have just had. It has been helpful to cue that up.

I want to comment on a couple of issues following on from the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. Two different things are being talked about with capacity and ability. I listened carefully to the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Scriven. There is a clear mental capacity test. But as others have said—I will not repeat the quote—experts in assessing capacity from the Royal College of Psychiatrists think that this decision was not thought about when the test was designed and that it is not an adequate test. I will not labour the point now, but we should think about whether we need a new test or, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, an additive process where we take the Mental Capacity Act test and add something to it. There are amendments on both of those—a new test or adding things to it.

That comes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, made. Of course, it is true that people make life and death decisions about medical treatment and about whether to refuse medical treatment. But there is a qualitative difference between refusing medical treatment, even if the consequence of refusing that medical treatment will be to hasten the end of your life, and to make a decision for active steps to be taken to administer substances to you which will end your life. They are very different things, and they are treated differently in the law. Perhaps that is the reason why we have had that slight cross-purpose. We need to be very precise about our language when we come to have that debate on capacity. I think that that would be helpful. That is all I will say about that at this point. I suspect that we will have a very extensive debate on Clause 3.

I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting at something a little wider, which was not just about the capability of the individual to make a decision—that is the capacity piece. It was also about both the information they are furnished with and whether they have all the information at their disposal to be able to exercise their capacity to make a decision. It is not just about whether the information is available but whether the services are available that make that a truly proper, informed decision. Clearly, she has enormous expertise in palliative care.

Whether that palliative care is available in practice is incredibly important. Somebody could have capacity, and we could judge that they do. I listened very carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, said, with her expertise on the Mental Capacity Act, and I listened carefully to my noble friend Lady Browning about the importance of recognising how it works in practice, but it is also about whether those services are available. You could have the capacity and a lot of information provided to you, but if the palliative care services are not available to you, you do not have the ability to make a meaningful choice about whether you wish to end your life. I think that is what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting at in that wider use of the word “ability” on top of capacity.

When we get to Clause 3 and the amendments to it, one of the things we should think about is whether we accept that the Mental Capacity Act is a good basis. As people on both sides of the argument have said, it is a tried and tested situation. As we heard earlier, it has been tested in court, up to and including the Supreme Court. We should think about whether we want to replace that with a completely new test or whether we actually stick with the Mental Capacity Act and perhaps have some additions to it, which recognise that it is a qualitatively different decision from whether you are having medical treatment or not. That is the essence of it.

In the place it is in the Bill, just accepting the word “ability” probably is not the right thing to do. We want that wider debate. But the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done us a service in flagging up some of the issues that we can now think about in advance of the debate on Clause 3.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps he could just clarify a point. Medical royal colleges are often quoted as having a view, but they are very seldom unanimous. I wonder whether he could tell us not just the percentage of psychiatrists but how many psychiatrists who are members of the royal college specifically had this view and how may did not. That is really important. There were a number of people who just did not respond to a question.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am happy to answer. I do not know how many did. My understanding is that the royal college, whatever its decision-making processes are, has publicly said that it does not think this is adequate. As I said, I did not quote it, because it had been quoted at length. I put some weight on that.

As a relatively new Member of your Lordships’ House, I am also very struck that this House is blessed with those who have enormous experience in the law, who have to make some of these decisions in practice, and experienced legislators, such as myself, who have looked carefully at the operation of the legislation, both in taking it and post-legislative scrutiny. Many Members have personal experience, either themselves or through family members, of the exercise of these laws in practice. I will listen very carefully to them.

Therefore, the view of the Royal College of Psychiatrists is clearly an important one that I will put some weight on, but I will also listen very carefully to others in the House, who I think will add enormously to this debate as we weigh up this important piece of legislation. I thank the noble Lord for his question.