(1 week, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberI do not want to commit myself to where it will be. It will come somewhere, but I assume the best place for it, subject to advice, would be either with the co-ordinating doctor or the independent doctor, or the panel or all three, having to ask why.
My Lords, I also extend my thanks to the staff of the House for all their diligence in looking after us, particularly at this late hour. I thank all those who have participated in this important debate which, as I said at the start, goes to the heart of what this Bill sets out to do. While I am mindful of the time, I want to acknowledge the fact that there are a number of colleagues who wanted to participate in this debate but were prevented from doing so because of where they live across the UK. I myself would not be here right now if it was not for the fact that I am leading on this group of amendments. I would be with my family, acknowledging the Jewish Sabbath, as I do on a customary basis every single week.
I think it is worth rapidly reflecting on the contributions which build the case for these amendments. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, about his lived experience of being told that he was going to die, and he is obviously still with us—we are delighted he is still with us—decades later. The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, talked about the challenges of a six-month terminal prognosis and errors in diagnosis. That point was echoed by others during our debate. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, talked about the challenges of non-medical motivations dominating the reasons for choosing an assisted death in some other jurisdictions, which really is the prompt for the amendments that we have discussed this afternoon. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said that the capability to have an assisted death alone should be due to the terminal illness itself. It was illuminating to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about his socialist ideals. However, the context in which we consider this Bill is that we are not just individuals; we exist within a society.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cass, who corroborated how these amendments in a medical context ensure that the motivations for an assisted death are concrete, clear and defensible. I listened closely to the challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Moore of Etchingham—I do not think he is in his place. He asked how these amendments will make a difference, and this was a point echoed by my noble and learned friend. These amendments cement the principle of this Bill. It makes very clear to the public that it is your terminal illness that has to be the reason why you are pursuing an assisted death. Currently, the requirement is that doctors have to assess the patient and, instead of just establishing a clear, settled and informed wish to die, they must, via these amendments, establish that the terminal illness is the reason. That is not to say that there is no risk of someone being misled—that is the inherent risk to this entire Bill, in particular because of the lack of training that will be available to doctors as set out currently in the impact assessment.
The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, showed us how these amendments connect to meeting the public’s expectations of this Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made it clear that the motivation to have an assisted death should be because of terminal illness and we should set that out in the Bill. This is yet another issue that is not clear and we need those clear boundaries. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for setting out some real-life case studies and examples of why these amendments matter.
I believe that this debate, and, indeed, how my noble and learned friend set out his conclusion just now, has confirmed that there is a real difference at play in how we understand what the Bill sets out to do. For some—I hope I am not mischaracterising, but this was certainly in the contributions of the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, and alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Markham, and my noble friend Lady Royall—it is about autonomy: allowing those who are already dying to exercise choice over the timing and manner of that death. For others, like me, it is primarily about compassion in seeking to prevent or minimise the suffering associated with their illness. These are related positions but they are distinct. My amendments have sought to establish which is the position of the Committee.
For myself and, in particular, those with a strong interest in mental health and suicide prevention, it is the latter that offers the stronger consideration for introducing a system that I am concerned is fraught with obvious risk to the vulnerable and those at risk of pressure. That means that we must do more than simply establish that a person is terminally ill and that they genuinely wish to end their lives; we must have a means of establishing the link between those two questions so that we do not open the door to having the state, which should protect vulnerable people, instead becoming complicit in their premature deaths.
None of these amendments, I believe, prevents there being additional motivations for seeking an assisted death. I intend to revisit this fundamental issue at the next stage and, indeed, through my engagement with this enormously consequential legislation. I will certainly consider the Government’s assessment of the wording as set out by the Minister, and I hope that the sponsor will also consider the profound concerns that have been raised during the course of the debate when we return on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(2 weeks, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberThe commissioner for the EHRC raised a number of points in relation to the risk of discrimination under the convention. The Government have done an equality impact assessment and, broadly, they adopt the approach that it is unlikely that the courts will interfere in a deliberate choice made by the Government, or the legislature in this case, as to what the limits would be of an assisted dying Bill. I agree strongly with that. It is the approach that the English courts have reflected in relation to assisted dying, and it is the approach that the European Court of Human Rights has taken as well. I therefore do not think that the views expressed by the commissioner to the Select Committee are right, but I am more than happy if the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, would like to raise specific ones—or all of them—she can do so with me, and I can raise them with the Government as well.
On this particular point, there is something fundamental that would equip all of us in this Committee, irrespective of our views on the principle of the Bill before us, which is the equality impact assessment—it is lacking. The equality impact assessment came forward from the Government only at the end of Committee in the House of Commons. The response from the Equality and Human Rights Commission is that that assessment is wholly inadequate and is in no way commensurate to the length and detail that we would expect on a government Bill.
We have obviously already heard from the Minister in response to the current set of amendments, but I would urge that, in future responses, we hear from the Government about whether they might be forthcoming with an updated equality impact assessment in order to inform our discussions, debates and deliberations on what we might be considering going forward. So far, what we have heard from the Equality and Human Rights Commission is that we do not have the information before us. As the commission responsible for this legislation, it has some serious concerns, particularly in terms of the societal impact of this Bill that has in no way been addressed or deliberated by the Government in the way that it would have been otherwise.
First, I do not agree with the proposition that it was a bad equality impact assessment. Secondly, the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, legitimately raised the question of differing economic circumstances and whether that could that lead to discrimination. If differing economic circumstances could lead to discrimination—the point that she quite properly raised—then almost every single piece of assisted dying law throughout Europe would be contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. One has to provide some degree of realism about what the limits of the law are. What the courts here and in Europe are saying is that this is a sensitive and delicate area where they will defer to legislatures.
(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI guarantee to the noble Baroness that the age is not going to go down from 18 as far as this Bill is concerned. The future is not in my gift, unfortunately. However, as far as the future is concerned, it is extremely unlikely that a subsequent Parliament is going to reduce that age.
My Lords, this has been an important debate that really has encapsulated what this House is here to do. There are, of course, other amendments in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that we have not discussed. It is worth just putting on record that these seek to prevent discussions with children and will be an essential question to scrutinise and discuss in the next group.
I just wish to very briefly respond to three points that have been made during this group, because it is relevant and important to conversations that will no doubt continue because of the weight of opinion and support that has come forward for these amendments.
I listened very closely to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and I just want to make clear that, for all these young people, it is not the exception. It is impossible to imagine a young person who would not have an EHCP. That is the context in which I presented and spoke to these debates. It is not just a small group: we anticipate all of them, apart from a young person who might receive a terminal diagnosis over the age of 25 and will not have time to have an EHCP. Otherwise, we are considering all young people in this context of an EHCP that local authorities have a statutory responsibility for, and it is in that context that I make those representations.
I listened very closely to my noble friend Lord Winston, and he did make some important comments. It is clear that there are some elements of brain development that do evolve and complete by the age of 18, but there are many others that do not. Global experts and authorities on adolescent brain development such as Professor Laurence Steinberg, Professor Casey, who is the expert on neurobiological maturation, and Professor Jay Giedd, who is the MRI pioneer in adolescent brain research, all say that the prefrontal cortex responsible for executive functions does not reach its maturity until the early to mid-20s, continuing to develop well past the age of 18, and that an 18 year-old does not yet have the capacity.
I am reminded again that we have heard a lot of comments from Professor Sarah-Jayne Blakemore. She is the leading UK neuroscientist on adolescence, and she has said that an 18 year-old does not yet have the fully mature capacity for long-term planning and evaluation of consequences that characterises adult executive functioning. We should listen to her comments very closely.
Finally, my noble friend Lady Hayter said that young people would not be asked—it would be something they would request. I would point out that the Bill does enable a doctor to raise this with anyone from the age of 18. It is in that context that I have brought forward these amendments.
I will not refer to all the other important contributions and comments that have been made, but I want to make one final point. It has been very clear from the debate in the other place that even some of those most in favour of assisted dying in principle are highly concerned about the risk of children and young people being drawn into it. The amendments in this group have sought to act on both their concern and the evidence that this House took during our own Select Committee. In all the debates we have had on the Bill, and will no doubt continue to have, we have to grapple with the simple fact that there is no going back if we get it wrong. For young people in particular, we should, as we have been asked to do, err on the side of caution.
I am very glad to hear that my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer will consider an assessment for those aged 19 to 24, but I urge him to accept the simplest and strongest safeguard of all, which is to raise the eligibility to 25. I look forward to further discussions on these matters. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.
My Lords, I am grateful for all the interventions. These changes are only drafting changes. Some legitimate points were made, particularly by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Lawlor, but they did not really go to the drafting points.
I go to the concerns various Members have expressed. Amendments 6 and 7, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, would prevent doctors having a conversation with people—I am not saying this in a bad or a good way, but that is what she wants to do—particularly before they reach 18. There is a point there, but it is nothing to do with the change I have introduced in my Amendment 6. My amendment would simply make it clear that there has to be a preliminary discussion before you can go ahead to assisted death. I have done that to make it clear that it is one of the eligibility conditions; it says nothing about what should be talked about or whether such a conversation should take place under the age of 18.
In fact, as the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said, Clause 6 states:
“No registered medical practitioner or other health professional shall raise the subject of the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act with a person under the age of 18”.
I do not think that the noble Baroness’s amendment would add to that protection. The key point is that all Amendment 6 is doing is saying that you have to have a Clause 5 discussion.
The next point, raised by a number of Peers, is that I am watering down the protection in relation to domestic abuse. That, as a matter of drafting, is wrong. It is only a matter of convenience that, having defined domestic abuse as including everything so defined in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, you get coercion, control and economic abuse as forms of domestic abuse. To avoid having to repeat that every time the Bill refers to training, I have simply referred to domestic abuse, and that is then defined at the top of page 41. I very much hope that people will accept that that is the position.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who is shaking her head, raises a different point about the position in relation to abuse that is not domestic. Perhaps your lawyer is exercising undue influence on you. That is a point that I will respond to in writing, but it is not a point raised by my drafting change, because all the restrictions have been in relation to domestic abuse, not to what the lawyers would call undue influence. But it is a perfectly legitimate point, which I will come back to in correspondence with her.
On this very point, and for the record, I think many noble Lords will want to hear specifically how my noble and learned friend’s Bill will ensure that, when it comes to the training, all elements of domestic abuse as set out will be covered in that training, particularly given the concerns raised both here and in the other place.