(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I refer to my interests in the register, in particular in relation to the Prison Reform Trust, of which I am life president and for whose briefing I am grateful.
This is the second debate this month in which the state of our criminal justice system is examined. The earlier debate was initiated by my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham and took place on 3 October. My noble friend and I were in complete agreement that what is required for our criminal justice system is a fundamental review.
Many of the contributions today, following the wise contribution of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, have emphasised the constitutional nature of the prison issues raised. How we treat our victims of crime reflects on the quality of our unwritten constitution, but so does how we treat those the state sends to prison. Sir Winston Churchill was right when he made his now well-known statement in the Commons that the first principle to guide anyone trying to establish a good system of prisons should be to prevent as many people as possible getting there at all. He later importantly added that it is a society’s attitude to its prisoners that measures,
“the stored-up strength of a nation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/7/1910; cols. 1354.]
The Queen’s Speech outlined a raft of criminal justice measures, in particular the new Sentencing Bill increasing the period of sentence served in custody from half to two-thirds for the most serious offences. This has been accompanied by what the Prime Minister announced on 11 August, namely, an urgent review,
“to consider whether changes in legislation are needed to lock criminals up for longer”.
The Prison Reform Trust believes the review was not worthy of that name because the time available was clearly inadequate to enable the subject to be properly considered. However, it is already clear, it can be safely said, that among the main problems the justice system faces is chronic overcrowding. This undoubtedly undermines one of the purposes of punishment: the rehabilitation of offenders.
For many years now it has been accepted that overcrowding in prisons is a scourge, making rehabilitation impossible for those the courts send to prison. In view of this, I ask the Minister to identify the evidence that present sentences are too short. I know of no such evidence. All the evidence of which I am aware shows that there has been a dramatic inflation in the level of sentencing over the past 20 years. For example, the present sentences for violent sexual offending have gone up substantially. More than two and a half times as many people were sentenced to 10 years in 2016 than were in 2006. On average, those serving a mandatory life sentence spend 17 years in custody, up from 13 years in 2001, when I was a judge dealing with these matters. The average minimum term for murder has increased from 12.5 years in 2003 to 21.3 years in 2016.
It is important to remember that criminal justice is different from civil justice in that it is not conducted between two or more individuals but between the Crown and the defendant. It should be a process which conforms to the highest standards of justice. After all, in the majority of cases it involves the freedom of the citizen.
Still, it is obviously important that the interests of victims of crime are not ignored. After all, the primary purpose of prison is to protect the public. However, while the interests of victims must be taken into account, there are limits to the extent that their interests can be paramount. Inflation in sentencing constantly causes the victim to look for higher and higher sentences because often they cannot be expected to know the tariff. Also, in many cases, no sentence will be long enough to undo the harm that has been done. Thus, it is generally the judge who has to get the sentence right, based on his experience and the guidance available to him. Is not a danger of what is proposed that it takes away the judge’s discretion, which can be so important in doing justice?
Prisons have responsibility for keeping both prisoners and prison staff secure, but violence at present is endemic. We should not make the job of the prison staff more difficult by increasing the overcrowding. The present state of prisons is, unfortunately, one of which we should be ashamed.
The effectiveness of the Bar and the probation service has also been undermined. Legal aid, where it is available, inadequately compensates members of the profession for the work they have to do. The problems in prisons are accompanied by a serious deterioration in the effectiveness and morale of the probation service. The need to change is recognised on all sides.
However, as was repeated in the gracious Speech, the Government are embarking on a programme which, far from improving the situation, will, if it is carried out, exacerbate it. They are proposing to lengthen sentences for the most serious offences. This has the danger of encouraging the public to think that sentences as they are now composed are too short. In fact, they are not.
Far from being the overall re-examination of the situation required, the changes proposed are dealing with the problem piecemeal and do not take advantage of the admirable reports available.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I intervene here only because—like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and, for the reasons she has given, I think the matter requires clarification.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment and I understand both her concern and that of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. However, I stress, as the Government did in their response to the Joint Committee’s first report on the Bill, that this measure to enable biometric data to be retained when an individual is arrested under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—PACE—for a qualifying terrorist offence is both proportionate and necessary to help protect the public.
Schedule 2 contains amendments to the laws governing the retention, review and deletion of fingerprints and DNA profiles by the police for counterterrorism purposes. This is a complex area of law, and it may assist the Committee if I first spend a short while explaining the current position. The relevant statutory framework was introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which established the principle that the biometric data of people who have not been convicted of any offence should no longer be kept indefinitely. This means that for the vast majority of people who are arrested and whose fingerprints and DNA are taken by the police, that biometric data will be promptly deleted if they are not convicted. This system is overseen by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, currently Professor Paul Wiles.
When passing the 2012 Act, Parliament recognised that it would be irresponsible, and would put the public at risk, to make this a blanket requirement in every case, regardless of the risk the individual might pose. So it made limited and tightly circumscribed provision for biometrics to be retained for limited periods in certain circumstances in the absence of a conviction. For example, if a person is arrested using the general power of arrest in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and is charged with a qualifying sexual, violent or terrorist offence, but is not ultimately convicted, it was recognised that there may be a range of reasons why they were not convicted and that they could still pose a risk of harm to the public, despite the discontinuance of the case.
In these circumstances it would be inappropriate, and indeed complacent, to ignore this risk to public safety and to require the police to immediately and automatically delete the individual’s DNA profile and fingerprints once a case is discontinued or the suspect is acquitted. The 2012 Act in these circumstances provides for a clearly limited three-year retention period before the data must be deleted. Similarly, if a person is arrested on suspicion of being a terrorist under the Terrorism Act 2000, whether or not they are subsequently charged, there is also a three-year retention period. This means that the police are better able to identify whether the individual is involved in terrorism, or other activity that poses a threat to the public, during that period. But it also means that the individual’s biometrics will not simply be held indefinitely.
In counterterrorism cases a person’s biometric data can be retained beyond the point when it would otherwise have to be deleted only if the chief officer of police of the area in which the material was taken personally considers that this is necessary for national security purposes. In these circumstances he or she can make a national security determination—or NSD—authorising retention for a further limited period, subject to a maximum of two years currently, and renewable if retention continues to be necessary. NSDs will, of course, be made only where it is proportionate to do so. This determination must then be reviewed and approved by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, who has the power to order deletion of the data if he is not satisfied that the determination is necessary. An NSD can be renewed for a further period, but only if the legal tests continue to be met and if the commissioner approves the renewed NSD. The assessment is made on the basis of intelligence and other relevant information about the threat the individual poses. We shall, of course, come to national security determinations in the next group of amendments, but it is helpful to provide an overview of these provisions up front to inform the debate on Amendment 47.
The amendments to existing legislation contained in Schedule 2 do not depart from these principles. Rather, they are intended to strike a better balance between on the one hand enabling the police to use fingerprints and DNA in an agile and effective way to support terrorism investigations and protect the public, and on the other ensuring that this continues to be subject to proportionate safeguards, regular case-by-case review and robust independent oversight.
We should not underestimate the value of biometric data in helping to secure convictions in terrorism cases. Such information played a vital role in the conviction in June of this year of Khalid Ali. Noble Lords will recall that Ali was arrested not far from this House and was subsequently convicted of terrorism offences, including his involvement in the use of explosive devices against coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2—which Amendment 47 would delete—will harmonise the retention periods for biometric data obtained when an individual is arrested on suspicion of terrorism, but not subsequently charged, under PACE and the Terrorism Act 2000. At present, an individual arrested under the Terrorism Act may have their biometric data automatically retained for three years. However, this automatic retention would not be available if the same individual were arrested in relation to the exact same activity under PACE.
In a terrorism case, retention for national security purposes would require the police to make an NSD with the approval of the Biometrics Commissioner, or would otherwise require the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner under Section 63G of PACE if retention was necessary solely for the prevention or detection of crime generally. However, the noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that this inconsistency between the retention regimes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Terrorism Act 2000 would remain. This could therefore result in the situation where the police are deprived of information that could prove vital to keep the public safe. The measure as drafted will remove this anomaly and ensure a consistent approach to the retention of biometric data for all those arrested on suspicion of terrorism, by providing for the same retention period regardless of the power of arrest used.
I do not accept the noble Baroness’s argument that this is a race to the bottom in terms of civil liberties. I say that because, as the Committee would expect, we have consulted the Biometrics Commissioner about this and other provisions in Schedule 2. In relation to this particular provision, perhaps I may read out what Professor Wiles has said:
“In my 2017 Annual Report I mentioned several issues that I thought the Government might wish to consider reviewing as part of the CT legislation review ordered by the Prime Minister ... I … noted in my Report my concerns about the police applying for ‘pre-emptive’ NSDs, often where a person has been arrested under PACE on suspicion of a terrorism offence. It is proposed in the CT Bill to allow biometric material taken after a PACE arrest for a terrorism offence to be retained automatically for three years (with the possibility of extending this period by making an NSD), as is already the case for the biometrics of those arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences under TACT”—
that is, the Terrorism Act. He goes on:
“It seems to me to be a sensible approach to bring the retention periods for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences into line”.
Given that authoritative opinion, which we sought expressly from the Biometrics Commissioner, and his view that this aspect of the Bill adopts a “sensible approach”, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberLike the noble Lord, I was very sad when my right honourable friend the former Home Secretary had to resign her position. I have seen the document—the Statement—that everyone else has seen. I am sure there will be measures in train to make sure that Ministers are sufficiently supported in the job they do.
My Lords, I have been very pleased to hear what the Minister has said so far about the efforts that are being made. However, is it not quite obvious that one of the most important steps that could be taken would be to improve the representation available to immigrants, who often find the complex law on immigration beyond their capabilities?
The noble and learned Lord makes a good point. My response to the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, threw up a slightly different but substantial reason for things being delayed and appeals being upheld—that is, documentation coming forward at the last minute, making it too late for the Home Office to withdraw the appeal and sort out the issue. The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right: for many, it can be a very confusing and distressing time. However, we are making huge efforts to improve the process—for example, by withdrawing cases at the 20-week point to make sure that they are looked at again and that we do not have the problem that noble Lords are referring to.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt is with great diffidence that I seek to say a few words as almost everything that can be said on this subject has been said by the three very distinguished noble Lords who preceded me. This is ground that has been well trodden. I fear that the importance of the two amendments may not be appreciated for that reason and that it will be said, “Oh yes, we all know everything contained in the amendments and therefore we can do without them”. Perhaps I can rely on my experience in a different capacity to enable me to say that such an approach would be wrong.
For five years, at least, it was my responsibility to try and oversee the sentencing in the courts of England and Wales. We all knew that our sentencing was not working as well as it should. We were distracted from time to time by arguments about whether prison worked but that really was not the issue. The issue was: were we imposing sentences that would most likely result in the offender who was before the court not reoffending but instead, as a result of his previous offending and being brought before the court, setting himself or herself on a new road to live as a law-abiding member of the community? Every time that could be achieved—it was not easy to achieve—the community would receive protection that it would not otherwise receive. Every time that that was done, the public would be less in danger than if the course that was adopted was achieved.
That is particularly true in that difficult ground which lies between sentences that can properly take place in the community and those that cannot. There is a very simple way of approaching this. What every court that has to impose sentences involving deprivation of liberty should do is to impose a sentence that is no longer than it has to be. If it has to be a sentence of custody, then it should be as short as is appropriate. In the case of short sentences, any sentencer should have well in mind the real restrictions on what can be done by the Prison Service for those who are sentenced to a short sentence. In the great majority of cases, the position is clear: nothing positive can be achieved by a short sentence, other than to mark the nature of the offence. Magistrates and judges are faced again and again with a situation where they have tried to avoid sending an offender to custody, but his or her conduct has shown that the alternatives are just ignored. Then, with reluctance, the sentencer can, and should, in my judgment, impose, as a final resort, a sentence of imprisonment, as long as the sentencer bears in mind the need to keep that sentence as short as possible. Those are a minority of cases. They are not the cases that make up the statistics to which the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, referred. They cannot account for that number of people being given sentences that cannot achieve anything positive as the final deterrent.
I tried, and other senior judges tried, to inculcate within the magistrates and the judiciary the importance of keeping the number of prisoners serving short sentences to the minimum. I am bound to say that I never succeeded. Having listened to the speeches made in the course of this short debate, I think it would be marvellous if copies of Hansard containing them could be placed before each judge and magistrate. I am not going to suggest a further amendment to achieve that, but I want to underline that even though it is so well known that the effectiveness of short sentences is so limited, and even though it is so well known that the resources that are spent on short sentences are needed for community sentences, it does not happen. That means that these amendments could just make a difference. For that reason alone, I hope the Government will consider the amendments most seriously. I think it is appropriate to adopt them.
Perhaps I might ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, a question. Does he agree that the villain of the piece is the sensationalist writing—if you can actually call it writing—in some of the populist press about penal matters? Does he also agree that we ignore at our cost the reality that even judges—if I may say so, with respect—are human beings, that magistrates living in the community are very much human beings, and that unfortunately there is a degree of intimidation to the effect that if they do what they believe is right in the circumstances they may be pilloried in a way that is going to be unpleasant for them and their families? Is it not time that we all got together and started confronting that element of the media and saying, “You are the very people who are exacerbating the issue of crime and misconduct in society by playing for short-term gains and completely misrepresenting the reality”?
I would be bold beyond my own abilities to be bold if I were to try to attribute responsibility between the various players in our society as a whole. I think that we all contribute to the present situation. Judges cannot hide behind the media; magistrates cannot hide behind the media; and I certainly would not have sought to shirk the responsibilities I had by hiding behind the media. Nothing would please me more than if the media could learn the wise lesson that the noble Lord, Lord Judd, was suggesting that they should learn.
The noble Lord is absolutely correct. Sentencing is a lonely business. When you are put under considerable pressure in trying to determine the right sentence, you try to put out of your mind what you read daily in the media, but sometimes it is a very difficult thing to do. But it can just make the difference that I have said is so important between taking the decision of imposing a short sentence and taking the much more sensible course of imposing a positive sentence—one of the sentences that the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, wants the courts to be aware of—which can so much better be imposed of service in the community.
My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in this debate but it has been so important that I felt that I really had to.
Some noble Lords may know that I sit as a magistrate so it is with some trepidation that I follow the noble and learned Lord. I sit as a very junior magistrate in central London and I sit on a probation liaison committee. That committee is of huge importance, both to me personally and to all my colleagues. Of course, we become aware of the sentencing options. It is a training event that happens regularly—it happens every Thursday as well as more substantial training events—and I and my colleagues regard it as extremely helpful to be brought up to date on a continuous basis with all the community sentence courses that are available.
I very much support the first amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater. It is of huge importance. It is particularly important that it is on a statutory basis because that will recognise the importance of that work in giving magistrates confidence in the community sentences so they can go ahead and issue them. That is an absolutely central point, about which I can talk from my own experience.
I also take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, about programmes sometimes being too long to fit in with the length of the community sentence. I have come across this issue several times. One needs to have a real faith and trust in the probation reports that one is given in order to come up, if you like, with the minimum time realistically to achieve the elements within those sentences. Again, that comes down to a question of professional trust between the different elements in any court.
Even though I agree with the general views on minimum sentences, I am rather less enthusiastic about the noble Baroness’s second amendment which concerns them. In my experience, some 90 to 95 per cent of the short-term sentences that I have given have been for people who have broken their community orders. I understand that that is not an attractive argument but that is the reality of my sentencing experience here in London. Of course we constantly look at the alternatives. No one wants to give short-term custodial sentences. I understand that they are very often ineffective, but the reality is that very often the people to whom one gives those sentences have already failed on their community orders.
My Lords, does the noble Lord not think that the amendment clearly covers that case? It allows a short sentence to be imposed when there is no other appropriate way of dealing with the offender. If you have imposed a sentence and the offender has not complied with it, surely that is a classic example of a situation where there is no other appropriate method of dealing with the offender. I say that with diffidence because I appreciate how difficult it is for magistrates to deal with the sort of offender the noble Lord has just described.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, is of course correct. Magistrates already give their reasons and say why it is so serious that only a custodial sentence will do. I was really addressing the speech made by the noble Baroness, a substantial part of which was against short sentences per se. I understand that the amendment does not make that point, but, because of her speech, I felt duty bound to point out that the reality is that we are very often sentencing for breaches of community orders. Nevertheless, this is an important debate and I am happy to support both amendments.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this group of amendments seeks to address an opportunity to introduce restorative justice into the Bill. Indeed, in the previous group of amendments, the noble Baroness spoke of the Government’s enthusiasm for restorative justice and the amount of money that they are investing in it. Restorative justice was referred to in favourable terms in the original Green Paper. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, has spoken, too, with real strength of feeling on restorative justice. He has said:
“Restorative justice is not a soft option. Facing up to wrongdoing can be a difficult and unpleasant process”.
I agree with that, but I add for myself that I think that it is a necessary part of the restorative justice process. I take it as read that all parties are in favour of adding a restorative justice provision to the sentences tool kit.
My Amendments 177DA and 177G specifically address youth sentences. Magistrates in youth courts need to have confidence, of course, that non-custodial alternatives to custody will work, and restorative justice, including conferencing, has a definite place in the right circumstances. If it were a specific requirement of a youth rehabilitation order, which is the burden of my amendments, it would emphasise its value and ensure that restorative justice is at the front of the sentencers’ minds when they come up with the sentence. The whole principle of youth sentencing is that youths often lack the maturity of adults and, in particular, may well not have considered the effects of their behaviour on their victims. It is true and proven that restorative justice can bring this home in a powerful way.
I accept that at present a restorative justice requirement could be requested as part of a supervision requirement or activity requirement. These obviously already exist, but the advantage of introducing a specific restorative justice requirement would be to keep that option at the forefront of magistrates’ or judges’ minds when they are sentencing.
The amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, take a more ambitious approach, in that he specifically addresses the question of remand and having a pre-sentence restorative justice programme which would form part of a pre-sentence report. Presumably—although the noble and learned Lord will speak to the amendment himself—the sentencing bench would take into account how effective that pre-sentence restorative justice programme has been.
In conclusion, I regard restorative justice as an effective tool in the box. There is a substantial body of evidence that it works. I have made the point before, but I shall make it again, that judges and magistrates see the consequences of these community sentences when they fail. We see the failures, because it is the job of magistrates and justices to come up with further sentences when people fall down on their community sentences, whether in the youth or the adult courts. But I believe that restorative justice has a proven benefit and that this group of amendments presents an opportunity to put it into the heart of this Bill. On that basis, I beg to move.
My Lords, it may be appropriate if I speak now to Amendment 177DAA, which is in my name. Your Lordships will see that the amendment is supported by a trio of very distinguished names. Perhaps I may say a word about the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool, who cannot be here today. Unfortunately, he has been ill but I know he was very anxious to be here to support the proposal in any way he could. The other distinguished name which I mention with deference is that of the noble Lord, Lord Hurd. He is the president of the Prison Reform Trust, and I am proud to indicate that I am its new chairman. The Prison Reform Trust and the Restorative Justice Council are very enthusiastic about these proposals.
I was grateful for what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said in regard to his own amendments because I certainly endorse what he said about their virtues. He also indicated that my amendment perhaps goes a bit further. That is true but although I claim no credit for this, because others more able than I played a part in it, I draw attention to the fact that the amendment proposes, first, to give the court discretion as to whether it remands,
“the case in order that the victim shall be offered the opportunity to participate in a process”.
Because I know that the issue of costs will be high in the minds of those who appear on behalf of the Government, I also draw attention particularly to the proposal that the,
“court may not remand the case for the purpose specified … unless it is satisfied that arrangements for a process of restorative justice can be or have been made in the area where the offender will reside”.
This proposed new clause is really meant to cover the situation which I believe we are in.
The virtues of restorative justice are becoming more widely known because of the hard work that has been done by various organisations in different parts of the country. I was pleased to hear what the noble Baroness said about the Government's intention on restorative justice. I am of course aware that the Minister has also spoken in its favour. Regarding this amendment, I urge that it can do something very positive. It can put the stamp of approval on restorative justice into a statutory form. It can then allow the process that has already started to continue, and as and when the positive aspects of restorative justice can be brought into practice in different areas, arrangements can be made. In this way, there can be a growth of the use of restorative justice which is in keeping with the nature of the exercise.
In appropriate cases, it very often has a most markedly positive effect, first of all upon the victim. When we are dealing with criminal justice, it is important that we should not neglect anything that might be positive for the victim, and I am sure that the Government do not intend to do so. The other aspect is that it helps the process that, as I understand it, the Government propose to adopt and will ease the exercise that needs to be performed.
I was not intending to move this amendment, although I wanted to add one or two words to what has been said, in which case perhaps I should move it. Like the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I was very grateful for noble Lords’ contributions, which were of an extremely high order. I think that restorative justice is something that we now need to seize hold of and take forward. Although I listened with interest to what was said by the noble Baroness about the fact that the amendment may not be needed, I ask her to take it away and think about it, and I do so for two reasons. First, if she will—
If the noble and learned Lord is proposing to continue with his speech, would he allow me to put the Question, as I think that strictly speaking we are out of order? We need to put on the record that the amendment proposed is Amendment 177DAA.
I apologise—I should have given the Deputy Chairman that opportunity. Perhaps I may continue with what I was saying about the possible misinterpretation of the amendment. If I understood the noble Baroness correctly, she said that one of the shortcomings of the present draft is that it does not take into account the situation of the victim, who must of course consent before he can take part. The whole core of the first subsection of the amendment is to give the victim the opportunity—I emphasise that word—to participate. It is absolutely of the essence of the amendment that the victim must consent.
I have not taken part in many of the debates, but I have the strong impression as I have listened to parts of debates—and a significant part of this one this afternoon and evening—that there is a danger that we are putting off everything until another time. We will find ourselves in exactly the same situation. If noble Lords wish to spend the time that the legislation deserves by examining it in detail, it is like a dash of cold water for amendment after amendment to be turned down when, for example, as far as drafting goes, the matters outstanding are well capable of amendment in a few minutes by a meeting with the Bill team.
There is a serious point at stake which goes to the heart of the legislative process. We have too much legislation but when legislation is introduced we must examine it with care. We must not lose the opportunity, by delaying tactics, of making amendments that can properly be made. I beg to move.
I support the noble and learned Lord. I was surprised to hear the Minister say that it is very important that the victim should consent. Amendment 177DAA states that,
“the court may remand the case in order that the victim shall be offered the opportunity to participate”.
It does not say in any sense that this will be imposed on the defendant.
I refer noble Lords back to the concluding remarks that I made. I fully understand that amendments may not be phrased quite as we might wish but I hope that I addressed the principles. We are very supportive of restorative justice. I gave reasons why we feel that we want to take this further forward and see it in practice before building it into statute. My noble friend Lord Carlile anticipated that I might say something like that, and I expect that the opposition Front Bench thought likewise. We can continue to discuss this. We accept the principles and wish to take it further forward. Whether that means that it will go into statute is another matter. I hope that on that basis the noble and learned Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Taking into account what has just been said in coming to my conclusion, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.