European Court of Human Rights: Khodorkovsky Case

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I, too, would like to commend the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, for the great knowledge, conviction and clarity with which he spoke about this subject. I thank him for bringing this timely debate, coming as it does two days before an important judgment by the European Court of Human Rights on whether Mr Khodorkovsky’s rights to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European convention have been violated.

Mr Khodorkovsky has been detained and imprisoned by the Russian authorities since October 2003, nearly 10 years ago. It is fair to say that he is a controversial character in post-Soviet Russian history, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, pointed out. Prior to his arrest in 2003, he enjoyed an astonishing—and astonishingly rapid—rise to economic success, and to cultural and political prominence. He had a career ranging from internet trainer, philanthropist and funder of political parties to Minister of Fuel and Energy and financial trade magnate. If the proposed merger between Yukos and Sibneft had gone through after 2003, he would have been at the helm of one of the world’s largest oil companies.

During this period, however, he became the subject of a range of allegations concerning fraudulent activity: allegations that he engaged in asset-stripping of Yukos for private gain, and that he engineered forced sales of oil within the holding company to transfer billions of roubles to shell companies owned exclusively by him. Whatever one’s view of these allegations, the concern, which tonight’s debate has shown is shared by Members on all sides of the House, centres on Mr Khodorkovsky’s experience of Russian justice—the circumstances and process surrounding his arrest, trial and continued detention. The central point is that expressed by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in November 2004, when it said that,

“the circumstances of the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos executives suggest that the interest of the State’s action in these cases goes beyond the mere pursuit of criminal justice”.

I want to talk briefly about three aspects arising from the long and continuing saga of this case: first, the circumstances surrounding Mr Khodorkovsky’s arrest and charges; secondly, his treatment in the Russian judicial and prison system since he was detained; and thirdly, wider lessons for the state of justice in Russia today. Starting with his initial detention in 2003, Mr Khodorkovsky was arrested after an investigation into the tax and financial arrangements surrounding Yukos’s purchase of a stake in a company called Apatit. He was arrested to appear as a witness, but within hours of being in custody he was charged with fraud. In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights found that his arrest was,

“unlawful as it had been made with a purpose different from the one expressed”,

and that he had been held in “degrading and humiliating conditions”.

It has been widely thought that the motives for his arrest and prosecution go well beyond the pursuit of justice. Many have noted, for example, that in February 2003, just a few months before formal investigations began, Mr Khodorkovsky accused the Russian Government of large-scale corruption at a meeting with President Putin that was broadcast on Russian television. The European Court of Human Rights found in 2011 that it did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that his first trial was politically motivated and that the charges against him were grounded in “reasonable suspicion”. However, Mr Khodorkovsky’s family and supporters, as well as the Council of Europe committee that I referred to earlier, see his detention as motivated by a desire to weaken an outspoken political opponent.

Whatever one’s views on political motivation, two worrying aspects of Mr Khodorkovsky’s initial prosecution seem clear. First, the arrest furthered a widespread impression that the Russian authorities were engaged in selective prosecutions against those oligarchs and senior businesspeople who had come into conflict with the Putin regime. In the words of the US State Department, the arrest,

“raised a number of concerns over the arbitrary use of the judicial system”.

It damaged not just the Russian economy and the climate for investment but confidence in the consistent application of the rule of law in Russia.

Secondly, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that part of the motivation behind his arrest and subsequent treatment was to enable the Russian state to regain control of strategic economic assets. A 2009 Council of Europe report spells this out clearly, noting that,

“Yukos, a privately owned oil company”,

was,

“made bankrupt and broken up for the benefit of the state-owned company Rosneft. The assets were bought at auction by a rather obscure financial group, Baikalfinansgroup, for almost €7 billion. It is still not known who is behind this financial group. A number of experts believe that the state-owned company Gazprom had a hand in the matter”.

What representations we have made to Russia about the Government’s view of this first trial, given that this is the issue at hand in Thursday’s judgment? In addition, given that the Russian criminal procedure code stipulates a direct dependence between the court’s acknowledgement of the violation of Article 6 of the European convention and the necessity of cancelling a sentence, can the Minister tell us whether the Government have talked to the Russian Government about our expectation that they should comply with the decision of the court and adjust his sentence accordingly?

I turn now to the second set of issues: the way in which Mr Khodorkovsky has been treated by the Russian judicial and penal system since his trial. The timeline of his 10 years in prison is both depressing and bizarre. In 2005, he was taken to a labour camp attached to a uranium mining and processing plant—at which, according to my quick Google search on it, inmates now have,

“much better chances of survival than in the past”.

In April 2006, he was attacked by a prison inmate. In February 2007, new charges were brought against him just before his parole was due, one year before the Russian presidential election. The emergence of new charges related to the alleged crimes of which he was initially convicted. At the time, President Obama said it looked like,

“a repackaging of the old charges”.

France’s Human Rights Ambassador expressed a similar view, saying:

“It seems odd that Khodorkovsky could be sentenced twice on facts which look the same, or even contradictory … the charges seem to be so unclear … the defence does not even know what the precise charges are”.

In August 2008, he was denied parole for myriad reasons including—famously—because he refused to attend sewing classes in jail. When he was convicted of the second tranche of offences in October 2010, the judge convicted him and colleagues of stealing 40% more oil than the prosecutors had even alleged.

Alongside this, as set out in a joint letter by Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and three other reputable NGOs, there is evidence of: intimidation of defence counsel, Yukos executives and witnesses; repeated procedural irregularities during the second trial over the use of evidence; and prosecutorial misconduct. An assistant to the judge who convicted Khodorkovsky in his second trial in 2010 alleged that the judge had the verdict read against his will. She remarked that,

“everyone in the judicial community understands perfectly that this is a rigged case, a fixed trial”.

It is little wonder, in light of these and other facts of the case, that Amnesty International designated both Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev “prisoners of conscience” in 2011 and that grave concerns about his treatment at the hands of Russian justice have been expressed by Parliaments in Italy, Germany and the United States, as well as by President Obama, Angela Merkel and our own Foreign Secretary.

Lastly, I turn briefly to the wider set of concerns, of which this case is merely a particular example, about access to justice in Russia. Other noble Lords have talked about people such as Sergei Magnitsky, Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova. This is not an isolated case. Just last week we saw Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption campaigner, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for embezzlement. The case bore many familiar hallmarks: ambiguity about the charges; an admission by investigators that the authorities’ inquiries were prompted by political activities on the part of the defendant; and near-universal condemnation of the verdict by Russian media and public opinion, as well as NGOs abroad. Mikhail Gorbachev commented after the verdict:

“Everything I know about this case ... unfortunately confirms we do not have independent courts”.

We are also seeing a more restrictive social and legal climate for free expression since President Putin returned to power. Human Rights Watch has commented that the Russian authorities have,

“introduced a series of restrictive laws”—

the foreign agents law, the treason law and the assembly law”—

“harassed, intimidated, and in several cases imprisoned political activists … and sought to cast government critics as clandestine enemies”.

Does the Minister share my anxiety about these developments? In what forum have the Government shared these anxieties with the Russian Government?

Finally, some may argue that issues of internal due process should remain a matter for national Governments, a point to which the noble Lord, Lord Bates, alluded in his remarks. My honourable friend Emma Reynolds, the shadow Minister for Europe, has said,

“raising human rights issues is not about interfering in the affairs of the Russian Government, but is a way of holding Russia to its international obligations. Russia has signed the European convention on human rights, the universal declaration of human rights, the charter of Paris and the EU-Russia partnership and co-operation agreement … In signing each of those agreements, Russia made a solemn commitment to respect human rights … It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the Russian Government are living up to their side of the bargain”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/12; col. 932.]

Syria

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Wednesday 10th July 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure that the proposed international peace conference on the Syrian conflict takes place in the near future.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, all our efforts have focused on securing a successful outcome at the forthcoming Geneva conference. A negotiated political settlement remains the best way in which to end the current bloodshed. The US, Russia and the UN are working intensively on the details of the conference; it is inevitable that there will be challenges, but the UN Secretary-General has stressed that the three parties are committed to convening the conference as soon as possible.

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

I thank the Minister for that Answer. Given the failure of the G8 summit to agree a date for the start of the Geneva 2 talks, does the Minister think on reflection that it was a mistake for the Government to spend the run-up to the G8 raising the volume on the possibility of the UK arming the Syrian rebels? Does she agree that it would be damaging for the prospects of an international peace conference if the Government were to repeat the mistake in the coming weeks and months?

[Baroness Warsi]

The Government have consistently approached this matter by responding to the situation on the ground. I do not think that they can be criticised for actually responding to it and encouraging agreement when we think that it is possible. The countries that we are trying to get agreement between—the US and Russia, with the UN of course playing a facilitating role—are all committed to Geneva 2 and to a transitional executive authority that would be in accordance with the wishes of the Syrian people. It was right, in the run-up to the G8, to get as much agreement as possible, and it continues to be right to continue to push Russia and the US to come to an agreement to bring the coalition and the regime around the table.

Syria and the Middle East

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Monday 1st July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for this opportunity to debate the situation in the Middle East and Syria in particular. I pay tribute to her continuing concern for and commitment to the issues in the region, which I think is evident to everyone in the House.

I want to focus my remarks on Syria and the immediate region around it, and to look at four related issues: the state of the conflict; the case for arming the Syrian rebels; the spillover of the conflict into the wider region; and where the international community’s efforts should be focused.

The basic facts of this conflict make for grim reading: two years of violence and civil war; more than 90,000 people dead, with 5,000 now being killed each month; suggestions that chemical weapons have been used; 4 million people internally displaced; and 1.5 million refugees in neighbouring states, about half of whom are children. It is a situation that appals us all and demands our attention and engagement.

However, a response must start with an understanding of the country, of the region and of the conflict. It is a recent conflict, but one with deep roots. Thomas Friedman has gone so far as to say that what is happening in Syria, as in other Middle Eastern countries, is,

“the long-delayed consequences of the end of the Ottoman Empire”.

Syria, like Iraq, is an artificial state that was born after World War 1 inside lines drawn by imperial powers. The communities of Syria—Sunnis, Alawite/Shia, Kurds, Druze and Christians—were forced to live together under rules agreed by others, not by their own consent. As Assad’s authoritarian rule collapsed, Syria now looks more like Lebanon in the 1975-90 period: a fragmented, sectarian country, with continuing violence between communities, and a central state that has neither the might nor the legitimacy to bring order to the whole country. This is a conflict whose resolution demands some fundamental reconceiving of the kind of country that Syria is and the social contract that underpins it.

The conflict is marked by three dominant features. First, the civil war is becoming more entrenched, with no prospect of decisive military victory for either side. Optimism about the prospects for a victory for the Syrian rebel forces has subsided in recent months. Assad’s forces have better armoured equipment and significant air power strength. They have gained confidence from recent captures of rebel strongholds, and have successfully consolidated in recent months the main population centres and the routes that connect them—from Homs to the coast, from Damascus to the Jordanian border. They have stopped the flow of senior defectors, and have trained a militia of 60,000 to guard positions formerly held by the Syrian military. Any strategy based on a prospect of military defeat for the regime at this point looks highly unrealistic, to put it mildly.

Secondly, the conflict is characterised by the involvement of multiple foreign powers on all sides, the overwhelming preponderance of which is escalating violence. The regime is benefiting from weapons, technical assistance, surveillance drones and help in monitoring internet traffic from Iran. Hezbollah and Iran have built a 50,000-strong militia to support Assad’s forces. On top of this, Assad benefits from significant Russian assistance, with multiple active arms contracts between Syria and Russia, and an S-300 air defence system about to be delivered to Syria from Moscow—the announcement of which was made just after the Foreign Secretary vetoed the EU arms embargo.

On the rebels’ side, foreign fighters are coming from a range of Arab countries through the Jordanian and Turkish borders to fight Assad. Extensive support continues to be provided by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the latter having allegedly spent $3 billion funding the rebel forces and offered $50,000 to every Syrian army defector and his family. Qatar has sent 70 military flights to Turkey with arms and equipment. According to American intelligence sources, and despite the expressed concerns of the Obama Administration that such weapons may fall into the hands of militant Islamists, Qatar has shipped Chinese-made shoulder-fired missiles to be used against Assad’s air force.

Foreign power intervention in Syria on both sides not only makes the conflict more entrenched but makes the securing of peace more complex. The outgoing head of the Syrian national coalition, Moaz al-Khatib, said shortly before leaving his post:

“The people inside Syria have lost the ability to decide their own fate. I have only become a means to sign some papers while hands from different parties want to decide on behalf of the Syrians”.

I would be interested to know what conversations with the Qataris and Saudis, in particular, the Government have had about the extent and form of support which they are providing to the rebels, and whether the Minister shares the concerns of many about the effects of that support.

The third feature of the conflict that stands out is the fragmented nature of the rebel movement. One expert described it as a “bewildering array” of groups: defectors, Kurdish groups, volunteers, local militias, Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, foreign fighters and the official Free Syrian Army brigades. Many of them are fighting for a reformed, democratic Syria, but some of the Sunni militias are becoming increasingly radicalised, aligning with groups such as al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, who have called for a jihad against the Alawites and want an Islamic state. At least one al-Qaeda-affiliated group, the Islamic State of Iraq, has proclaimed an affiliation with the Nusra front and in April, al-Qaeda in Iraq boasted that it was reinforcing al-Nusra with experienced fighters and about half of its budget.

The rebels are brave and committed to ending Assad’s cruel rule, but they are a diverse, fluid and unstable collection of groups whose agendas and interests compete with one another as well as reflecting the interests of foreign powers. The character of the rebel movement becomes a crucial consideration when we turn to the question of the wisdom of the UK collaborating in supplying it with lethal military support. I note that, following the lifting of the EU arms embargo in May, the Foreign Secretary said:

“We haven’t taken any decision about funding”—

arming the rebels—

“but we don’t rule any option out”.

I understand that, but it is a statement that raises the question: what exactly is the justification for arming Syrian rebel forces? Is it that it would help bring a decisive victory? If so I fear that that is heroic given the facts on the ground. Would it level the playing field? If so, it does not seem a strategy likely to reduce violence, but rather to prolong it. As the Foreign Secretary himself said:

“There is no purely military victory available to either side without even greater loss of life”.

Is the case that tilting the balance would be more likely to lead to a military stalemate so that Assad would agree to come to the negotiating table? If so, how realistic is that, given that Assad seems to be doubling down in his military strategy, given that he continues to receive extensive support from other countries, and given that the insistence that Assad cannot be part of a post-conflict transition—whatever the wisdom of that position—is unlikely to make him want to put his weapons down? Or perhaps the case is that arming the rebels makes a palace coup in Damascus to depose Assad more likely? If so, that is a highly speculative basis for such a consequential strategic decision.

Given the state of play of the conflict, I am not convinced that arming the rebels can plausibly be thought to be part of a strategy that reduces violence rather than fuels it. There is a second consideration: what assurances do we have that any weaponry given would stay in the hands of moderate rebels rather than Islamist rebels? The Foreign Secretary has said that non-lethal equipment has already been given to the rebels and that there is no evidence it has got into the wrong hands. With respect, that is insufficient reassurance, for many reasons. There are reports of clashes between rebel groups over resources such as oil already. The market for lethal equipment is significantly different to that for non-lethal equipment; and the consequences of it falling into the wrong hands are much more severe. The absence of systems of monitoring is therefore considerably more concerning in the case of lethal assistance. The Minister alluded to the possibility of Syria becoming a failed state. How do we know that the weapons will even stay inside the borders of Syria?

There is also concern about the compatibility between a strategy of opening up the possibility of arming rebels and the credibility of a commitment to a negotiated solution. Does the Minister agree in retrospect that it was perhaps short-sighted for the Government to use the run-up to the G8 summit spending so much time talking about the case for arming the rebels, rather than how to secure a start date for the Geneva II conference? Is there not a danger that offering more weapons might encourage the rebels to seek a military victory rather than resolution in a negotiated settlement?

Overall, concerns about the coherence of the rebel forces, the security of the destination of weapons, the improbability that making more weapons available would bring a quick end to the conflict and the tension between moving towards Geneva II and making more arms available all combine to suggest that arming the rebels would not be a move likely to help to reduce violence and promote stability.

I turn to a further reason why we should be reticent about increasing the supply of arms inside Syria. The conflict is fast spilling over into the wider region; in Iraq, for example, it is having a seriously destabilising effect. Sectarian tensions are growing as Sunni minority protests in favour of reform combine with growing Shia angst that a pan-national Sunni counteroffensive is mobilising across the region. In Turkey, border incidents such as the bomb that killed 50 people on 11 May reflect the porous frontier across which insurgent groups pass every day. Turkey’s relations with Iraq, Syria and Iran have degenerated spectacularly, while domestic political unrest is increasing.

Lebanon is perhaps of most immediate concern in the fallout zone. It is the country that is first in line for contagion, but also a metaphor for the fragility of the entire region. Although it has a population of only 8 million it has taken more than 500,000 refugees. It is divided internally on Sunni-Shia lines and has a weak central state and porous borders. It is very close to major population centres in Syria, and Hezbollah operates as a state within a state. In recent months Lebanon has delayed elections and lost a Government, while in June, fighting between the Lebanese army and radical Sunni groups and Alawite-Sunni tensions have led to violence and death in different parts of the country.

Given Lebanon’s fragility and importance as a nexus of conflict for the entire region, it deserves our attention, even though it has traditionally fallen into the francophone area of influence. Will the Minister explain what we are doing to support the Lebanese Government and their army at this crucial time? What more could we do directly to ensure that some sort of stability is maintained in the crucial coming months? In particular, is the Minister alive to the perception some in Lebanon have that the West talks only to Sunni and not Shia groups, and to the destabilising potential that such perceptions may inadvertently have?

The danger that the Syrian conflict will trigger conflicts among neighbours with porous borders should make us think twice before embarking on a strategy of providing more weapons. However, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, the alternative to supporting military action is not inaction. Although we are a long way from being the major influence on the region, there is much we can and should be doing or even leading on in the international community to improve the situation. In the short term we can prioritise working with Governments in the countries most at risk of spillover, to shore up the legitimacy of internal state structures. We should prioritise ensuring that G8 countries honour their commitments to supporting humanitarian assistance to refugees, and should lead the case for pressing for greater and safer access for aid agencies. We should focus our engagement with the rebels on unifying them, rather than arming them, and should spend diplomatic capital on urging other actors in the region not to take action that escalates the conflict from either side.

However, we should also make it a priority to think about the format, structure and terms of the negotiations that—one day—will be the only means to a stable solution. A central issue is to understand whose participation will be needed in those negotiations if their outcome has a chance of ending the violence. The noble Lord, Lord Williams of Baglan, who has considerable experience and wisdom in matters of international diplomacy, has remarked:

“Negotiating with friends and allies is never the challenge. The real diplomatic challenge has always been negotiating with those with whom we are diametrically opposed”.

The question of whether any stability can be secured in Syria without engaging with Iran in particular is a serious and very difficult one. We stand side by side with the Government in their stance towards Iran, on both the nuclear security issue and in condemning their sponsorship of violence and terrorism outside Iran. However, the election of President Rouhani last month seems to offer tentative grounds for some cautious optimism about a change of stance in Tehran. Of course, it is very early days, but to hear President Rouhani promise “constructive interaction” with the world through a moderate policy, pledge that Iran is,

“ready to show more transparency”,

and that it will build a new relationship with the international community marks at least a rhetorical departure from his predecessor’s posturing. In light of this, and with the genuine full understanding that we must wait for change to become more than a promise, will the Minister tell us whether there are plans to engage in a different way with Iran under President Rouhani, and whether she thinks that Iranian participation in any Geneva II conference is either possible or desirable?

The sad truth is that an end to the Syrian civil war seems a long way off. Only by facing up to the fundamental facts of the conflict—that there is no prospect of decisive victory, that the conflict has started to destabilise the wider region, and that a number of external powers have become actively engaged—will we gain a proper perspective on the likely consequences of any further intervention of our own.

Syria

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the Statement. We have all watched events unfold in Syria with increasing horror, and we on this side of the House share the determination that Britain plays its part, in partnership with the international community, in helping to bring about a cessation of violence. I shall ask questions about three aspects of the Statement: first, arming the Syrian rebels; secondly, efforts to bring about a long-term settlement in Syria; and thirdly, humanitarian assistance to the victims of this horrific war.

I begin with the issue of arming the rebels. The Prime Minister has suggested in recent months that arming the rebels is key to tipping the balance and creating peace in Syria. The Statement said that:

“The case for further amendments to the EU arms embargo on Syria is compelling, in order to increase the pressure on the regime and to give us the flexibility to respond to continued radicalisation and conflict. We have to be open to every way of strengthening moderates and saving lives”.

This signal should not surprise us. In recent weeks, there have been reports of a confidential document that sets out a range of options that would allow the UK to send lethal support to Syria’s opposition. The Statement had carefully chosen words on this subject. However, I believe that the prospect of what could be a decade-long sectarian civil war in Syria, fuelled in part by weapons supplied by us or others, should give the Minister and her colleagues serious pause for thought before embracing that course of action.

The struggle in Syria today is between forces funded and armed by outside sponsors, notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran. Also participating are foreign religious groups, not directly controlled by the sponsors, namely the Sunni, Salafist and Iranian-aligned militias, together with anti-western al-Qaeda-aligned fighters. So will the noble Baroness answer these questions? If the Government’s priority is peace, how does contemplating arming the rebels address the central question faced by the international community: how to create a sustainable political settlement in a fractured country? Surely future actions or policies of the UK Government should be adopted only on the basis of their capacity to contribute to that peaceful outcome.

Syria today is awash with weaponry. So what is the Minister’s assessment of how much weaponry would be required to tip the balance against Assad, and how in practical terms will the Government ensure that if they supply weapons they do not fall into the hands of al-Qaeda supporting jihadists? The choice for the international community today is not between sending military support to Syria’s opposition and doing nothing. Assad is sustained by external support from Russia and Iran and the foreign funds that allow him to pay his forces. Will the Minister explain why this Statement did not place more emphasis on the practical steps that could be taken to choke off Assad’s finances and the country’s energy supplies through the effective enforcement of sanctions?

Secondly, I turn to questions about international efforts at establishing a settlement in Syria, in particular an international peace conference. I agree with the Minister that we should seize the opportunity afforded by the proposed US-Russia conference to try to end the fighting and prevent the Lebanisation of Syria. We will continue to argue for exactly this type of direct engagement with the Russians, as we have done for some time. As a country which has experienced minority rule for 40 years, a comprehensive peace settlement for Syria must be inclusive. So all parts of the country’s diverse society should be involved in this peace conference—whether Alawite, Sunni, Kurd, Shia, Druze or Christian—because it would be wrong to underestimate the fear, particularly in the Alawite community, but elsewhere as well, that a change from minority rule to democracy provokes.

We have learnt from recent history that when a country with such a range of religious and ethnic identities emerges from a bloody war, communities can be slow to trust each other again. In this regard, will the Minister tell us what lessons she draws from the experience of Syria’s neighbour Iraq, where the disbanding of the Ba’ath Party and its associated structures contributed to the challenges that that country faced in the immediate post-war period? Will the Minister also explain the Government’s assessment of the scale of post-conflict planning by partners in the international community currently under way and what role our Government play in facilitating that? Will the Minister also assure the House that in the Government’s conversations with the Syrian national council and with our allies, they are making the case for the importance of a peace conference which genuinely involves all parts of Syria’s diverse society?

Thirdly, I turn to the issues around humanitarian assistance. We strongly welcome the Government’s humanitarian funding for the Syrian people, but I am sure the Minister accepts that Britain alone cannot take on the burden of upscaling the humanitarian response in Syria in the wake of a peace agreement. It is vital that the Foreign Secretary delivers on the pledge he made at the G8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting he chaired, when he said that his priority was,

“ensuring that donors who generously pledged their support at the Kuwait conference fulfil their commitments”.

What are the Government doing to ensure that all those commitments from different countries are turned into payments to help rebuild Syria? I finish by asking the Minister for a final assurance: that before any decision to loosen the EU arms embargo is taken, she or a colleague will come in advance to this House and make the case for doing so?

Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, for a provocative and quite brilliant contribution today. It makes me wish I had heard all his contributions over the previous 25 years or so. I offer him my best wishes for the future.

There was a time when the ambition to make progress in disarmament was considered a sign of naivety in international affairs. I am pleased to say, as this excellent debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has demonstrated, that this is no longer true and that the commitment to multilateral disarmament is shared by those of all parties and no party.

This is as true internationally as it is of the debate in Britain. To quote President Obama, the ambition,

“to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”,

has in the past few years come to enjoy support from American Administrations, both Republican and Democrat, Presidents of the Soviet Union and of Russia and the Global Zero campaign’s advocates, who include a roll call of distinguished figures from dozens of countries.

It is worth reminding ourselves why multilateral disarmament is so vital to the world’s safety and security. First, the end of the Cold War marked the expiry of Cold War security doctrines that relied so heavily on nuclear weapons, in particular the American-Soviet deterrence doctrines. Deterrence of course remains crucial, but relying excessively on nuclear weapons to do the deterring is not only more hazardous, but less effective in a world where the threats we face are changing in character, where states still threaten but, increasingly, not only states threaten.

Secondly, the international community’s commitment to multilateral disarmament is the corollary of its determination to prevent nuclear proliferation. Maintaining minimally sufficient arsenals, inside an international legal framework that has verified constraints on nuclear weapons, is the only way to combine national security needs with a minimisation of the risks of proliferation. Reversing our reliance on nuclear weapons globally is integral to preventing their proliferation into dangerous hands. However, there is a moral pressure point here, too. If we demand that states without nuclear weapons commit to never having them, possessor states have a duty and self-interest to take the necessary steps towards co-ordinated disarmament. It is the bargain at the heart of the non-proliferation treaty, and as concerns about North Korea, Iran and nuclear terrorism increase, its logic becomes more, not less, compelling.

Over the past 25 years, I am proud to say that Britain has been a leader both in its own unilateral actions and internationally. We have eliminated two complete weapons systems. We are the only possessor country to have a deterrent based on just one system. We have reduced the number of warheads by 75% since the end of the Cold War, so that we now have less than 1% of the global stockpile. We have led the way on nuclear security through our global threat reduction programme, which has helped nearly 20 beneficiary countries so far. We are world leaders in innovation in the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles and in proposals such as a generalisable nuclear fuel guarantee. I pay tribute to this Government for continuing our leadership on reducing dependence on nuclear weapons with their decision to reduce the number of operational warheads and reducing our overall stockpile.

That is a strong moral lead, and it puts the UK in a position to be a demandeur with our allies and beyond, and to make real and continuing progress in multilateral disarmament. As Malcolm Rifkind said last year at the Munich Security Conference, momentum is everything. 2009-10 was, as many speakers have said, in many respects a period of optimism. There was the innovation of the nuclear security summit cycle; a new START treaty and the NPT Review Conference in 2010. However, that momentum has now stalled. Optimism about further progress in US-Russia disarmament discussions is hard to find. Progress on the outcomes of the 2010 NPT conference has been limited at best. The attention of the possessor states is rightly focused on the dangers posed by Iran, North Korea and others, but the price has been a further detachment between the twin goals of non-proliferation and multilateral disarmament. Meanwhile, there is the continuing backdrop of China, India and Pakistan focusing more on expanding and modernising their nuclear weapons capacity than seeking to limit it.

It is not our responsibility alone to prioritise regaining this momentum, but it is our responsibility. With the start of the second term of President Obama’s Administration, we have a chance to try to restore American focus on this issue, too.

What needs to be done? I think the challenges lie in four different areas, and I ask for the Minister’s view on the Government’s plans in each. First, we need to restore energy to building the architecture of treaties and regimes that breed confidence, and that attempt to bring as many states as possible into the net of international legal obligations around nuclear weapons, nuclear material and nuclear security.

Specifically, we have slightly less than two years to show concrete progress on the range of commitments under the NPT Treaty before the 2014 PrepCom meeting. What are the UK’s priorities? The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty still awaits the signatures of eight countries that hold nuclear technology. Key to this is the United States. President Obama has said that he will pursue ratification with the Senate. Can the Minister reassure us that we are using our relationship with the White House and State Department to ensure that he lives up to this commitment?

I also ask the Minister for her assessment of the prospects of two other initiatives. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, mentioned, the postponement of the Helsinki conference for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons suggests bleak prospects, but I hope that she can provide some silver lining. What are the prospects for the elusive fissile material cut-off treaty? They should have improved since President Obama reversed the Americans’ long-standing problem with verification methods. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, pointed out, Pakistan is a stumbling block here. Will the Minister say what pressure is being brought to bear on the Pakistani Government?

Secondly, we need to continue momentum in measures to increase nuclear security. This is crucial to confidence-building, perhaps more than anything else, and is key to unlocking progress on both the non-proliferation and the disarmament fronts. The nuclear security summits cycle has been one of the best developments in recent years. The summits have led to important first steps in areas such as safe disposal of highly enriched uranium. Britain has led the way in this area—in research work, in international assistance to other states, and in transparency by opening up to review missions from the IAEA. Will the Minister confirm that the UK is on course to meet its commitments for the next nuclear security summit in Holland and outline its agenda for that summit?

Thirdly, we need to build on the real achievements of the START treaty signed in 2010 by Russia and the USA in significantly reducing the numbers of deployed strategic warheads and missile launchers, and in achieving some progress on monitoring and inspections. That treaty looked for a while as though it would be the prelude to further milestones on US-Russia co-operation on disarmament. As many speakers have said, sadly, that has not materialised. What does the Minister think is a realistic ambition for phase 2 of the START process? How can the UK play a supporting role in helping to bring that about?

There is one area in particular where I believe there exists widespread support for a major breakthrough; namely, the goal of NATO and Russia removing all tactical nuclear weapons from combat bases on the European continent. Attachments to legacies of the Cold War with little or no credible deterrence capability drains valuable resources from an alliance facing up to new kinds of threats, such as those potentially in north Africa. The Global Zero Commission, which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, along with Malcolm Rifkind, David Miliband and others, has supported so vigorously, has called for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe to be the next disarmament priority. Do the Government share that view?

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

I am listening very closely to the noble Lord’s setting out of the policy of the Opposition. Given that the British nuclear deterrent, as has already been pointed out, is about the smallest of any of the nuclear powers, does he believe that the next step for this country would be to look again at continuous-at-sea?

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

The noble Baroness has interrupted just as I was about to come to that issue. There are also issues around Britain’s own deterrent which have been widely discussed today. We must ensure that disarmament activity is conducted in a transparent and verifiable manner. That is why the previous Government initiated their work with Norway on verifiable warhead dismantlement, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and hosted the first P5 consultations on disarmament in London in September 2009. The dangers of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and insecurity around nuclear materials should make us more determined than ever to achieve co-ordinated disarmament but they also continue to justify our retention of the minimum capacity needed to achieve our deterrence objectives. Coming to the noble Baroness’s point, we in this party have said that we are open to examining any new evidence since our review of Britain’s nuclear weapons arsenal in 2006 and we will consider its findings alongside other studies, such as the cross-party BASIC Trident Commission, which is chaired by my noble friend Lord Browne, to see if there are credible alternatives.

In our view, that examination should have two priorities—capability and cost. With that in mind, we look forward to the publication of the Trident Alternatives Review, which Danny Alexander tantalisingly said this week,

“will set out a clear, credible, compelling, set of arguments for alternatives”.

He flagged up that there may be seven or eight alternatives in the mix. Will the Minister clarify how open her part of the Government is to the alternatives that might arise from that?

Lastly, there is a group of more conceptual although equally crucial issues around the doctrines that make up our security concepts. I appreciate that there are limits to what the Minister can say on UK thinking on these issues but perhaps she will say whether the Government are alive to making progress on defence concepts that are less dependent on nuclear weapons and whether NATO is planning to address this issue in any way.

John F Kennedy remarked:

“The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution”.

He also said:

“Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment … The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us”.

That was more than 50 years ago at a time in history that now seems a world away. But it was a time that was, if anything, more ordered in terms of nuclear security than the one we live in now. The nuclear era in the wake of the Cold War is much more hazardous and more economically burdensome. The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons may seem a dim prospect at the moment. But just as the difficulty of preventing nuclear proliferation should inspire us to redouble our efforts to contain the spread of nuclear technology, so the difficulty of maintaining momentum on multilateral disarmament should inspire us to be leaders among nuclear weapons states in the future.

Iran

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what legal advice they have received on whether a pre-emptive military strike on Iran would violate international law.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, the Government do not believe that military action against Iran is the right course of action at this time, although no option is off the table. We believe that the twin-track approach of engagement with Iran and pressure through sanctions is the best way to resolve the nuclear issue. We do not comment on legal advice and will not speculate about the legality of various scenarios.

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

I thank the Minister for that Answer. I have asked this Question because of a report in the Guardian which suggests that the Attorney General’s Office has argued internally in government that providing assistance to forces that could be involved in a pre-emptive strike would be a clear breach of international law. Will the Minister clarify the Government’s understanding of the principles that should inform any decision about assisting forces in a pre-emptive strike on another country?

[Baroness Warsi]

I can inform your Lordships’ House that we are not advocating military action against Iran. We continue to believe that the twin-track process of pressure and engagement offers the best hope of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. In relation to legal advice, the noble Lord will be aware that it is not practice to inform this House or notify parliamentarians of specific legal advice, if any, that we may be obtaining.

Middle East: Recent Developments

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Friday 13th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for today’s debate. There has been an excellent, wide-ranging and stimulating discussion on the changing face of the Middle East. I have certainly learnt a huge amount over the course of today from noble Lords with far greater experience and expertise than I have.

We have heard a variety of perspectives on the individual countries in the region: we heard about the Israel-Palestine issues from my noble friends Lord Haskel, Lord Mitchell and Lady Blackstone and from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We heard a considerable amount about Iran from the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and others. I want to make a slightly different kind of speech. I want to take a step back from the details of specific countries and ask how the extraordinary events of the past two years in the Middle East should force us to reassess what kind of foreign policy is appropriate for a region experiencing such profound change.

I would argue that the suddenness, the irreversibility and the variety of transition processes that we are seeing—from Libya and Tunisia in the west to Iraq in east—should force noble Lords on all sides of the House to think again about the kinds of challenge faced across the region. It should make us reconsider the instruments of foreign policy that are most suited to supporting the region’s move to greater stability, greater prosperity and greater democracy. Although I shall not discuss the question of military intervention directly, I associate myself with the strong scepticism expressed by both the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, about the consequences of such intervention, however well intentioned.

The security situation in the Middle East has always been of greater concern to the international community than that of any other part of the world. Crises in the region can trigger global recessions; they divide the international community as well as bringing sustained misery to those in the areas affected. Perhaps because of the region’s unparalleled sensitivity, the approach of the West to the region has, with some notable exceptions—such as over Palestine and Iran—been characterised by a strong preference for stability over change.

Broadly speaking, our approach to the Middle East has been governed by a set of orthodoxies: an orthodoxy that the governance of Arab nations of the Middle East was broadly stable, at least at the level of the regimes; an orthodoxy that the interests of the international community lay in support—tacit or explicit—for these regimes, because the maintenance of order, and the suppression of sectarianism, required us to support authoritarian rule; an orthodoxy, especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979, that we should be reticent in wishing for democracy in countries where the ballot box might deliver Governments who were radical, populist and Islamist in character; and, among some, an orthodoxy that there was no great yearning for democracy among the populations of many Middle Eastern countries.

The developments of the past 18 months have exposed the limits of these orthodoxies. Some of the most remarkable moments of our era—Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia; the demonstrations in Tahrir Square; the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi; the Yemeni President agreeing to hand over power after a third of a century in power; and the announcement of Mohamed Morsi’s victory in Egypt just two weeks ago, when many thought democracy would be strangled at birth—have forced us to think again about the categories that we use to understand the Middle East and the way we respond.

The responses within the regimes to the popular pressure have been diverse and in many cases surprising. The Egyptian regime of President Mubarak collapsed quite quickly, while in Syria, as we all know, the continuing brutal response of the Ba’ath Government to opposition demonstrations and, now, armed civil war has disgusted the international community. In general, the regimes of Arab monarchies have proven more resilient than Arab non-monarchies. In Iraq, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, we are watching the first fragile steps of nations towards some kind of post-authoritarian democracy, however imperfect. These developments are still in train. The political situations are fraught and fluid, but, although we have not arrived at stable settlements in any of the countries of the Middle East, we know that a foreign policy for the region based on past orthodoxies is no longer up to the job.

I suggest a revised approach to foreign policy for the Middle East and three different categories of action: first, policies to help end conflict, contain violence and protect civilians; secondly, policies to help support peaceful transitions and new constitutional orders; and, thirdly, in the longer term, policies to build up the democratic capacity of post-authoritarian countries.

Before turning to these three categories, I suggest that there is one precondition for the effectiveness of any aspect of our foreign policy towards the Middle East: the need for international co-ordination of policy. We will rarely, if ever, have a positive effect on the lives of the people of the Middle East by going solo. When the international community is co-ordinated in taking disciplined and decisive action, it has a chance of success. In Libya, concerted action by and through UN followed by military support to Gaddafi's opponents helped avert the threat of a protracted civil war, while the co-ordinated imposition of US and EU sanctions two weeks ago on Iran’s oil exports has already had a significant effect on immobilising Iran's oil tanker fleet. However, where the international community has been divided, as it has in different ways over the Iraq conflict, Israel/Palestine and most recently over Syria, our ability to support peaceful change is diminished.

Co-ordination requires close partnership with our allies in the EU, as well as in the US. Although I shall not make any other partisan remarks in this speech, I hope that, despite this Government’s seemingly accelerating Euroscepticism, they can in this area of foreign policy at least commit to working in constructive partnership with our European allies.

I turn to the three categories of foreign policy that I mentioned earlier. The first is the immediate task of action to help end conflict and protect civilians. Violence is a daily occurrence in too many countries of the Middle East. Bahrain has witnessed violence perpetrated by security forces against pro-democracy protesters. In Libya and Iraq, security forces, armed gangs and militias continue to disrupt government and economic life and to threaten and kill innocent civilians. In Syria, now in a state of civil war, yesterday saw the highest number of deaths in one day, I believe, since March 2011. As we have heard, the total death toll now is around 17,000. I strongly support William Hague’s call this morning for access for an urgent United Nations investigation of the atrocious massacre in Traymseh yesterday.

Disturbingly, Syria’s internal conflict also now seems to threaten to spread to Turkey, Lebanon and perhaps even Israel. Foremost among our challenges in the international community is to prioritise efforts to force the cessation of violence in these varied situations, without which the other aspects of transition simply cannot take place properly. In this context—and in light of today’s report by the Joint Committees on Arms Export Controls recommending a change in our policy towards sales of weapons and military equipment to authoritarian regimes—what is the Minister’s view of the action the Government are proposing to look again at the rules for exports to such countries as Syria and Bahrain, where the world has witnessed such brutal oppression?

Alongside efforts to contain and defuse violence sits the priority of responding to dire humanitarian situations across the region. In Yemen, estimates suggest that nearly half the population—about 10 million Yemenis—are,

“either hungry or on the edge of hunger”.

In Aleppo in Syria, there are reports that residents are now forced to scavenge for food and fuel, yet international humanitarian access is virtually non-existent.

Finally, a less widely noted but severe challenge to many countries is the deterioration of their economy. Transitions—even successful ones—bring uncertainty and thus undermine the confidence of investors. For example, Egypt has seen foreign investment collapse to quarter the levels seen under Mubarak. Global economic fragility continues to undermine opportunities in the Middle East, particularly for young people. That is often cited as one of the causes of the Arab spring. Across the Arab world, over half the total population is now under 25, yet youth unemployment remains at frighteningly high levels—and is growing.

These immediate concerns tend to dominate discussion of our foreign policy in the Middle East. But, however remote the prospect of more stable times might appear at the moment, it is crucial that our foreign policy begins to look to the longer-term needs of countries undergoing transition. These needs may be less immediate but responding to them may be the most effective way of our playing a part in securing a more peaceful and democratic region.

Let me turn to the second category of actions: policies to help support stable transitions and the emergence of new constitutional orders. We know that the toppling of long-standing undemocratic regimes is more often the prelude to disorder, chaos, the surfacing of age-old sectarian enmities and sometimes protracted violence than it is the first step towards some kind of Swedish liberal democracy. The first challenge is to support efforts to establish processes that can help countries navigate the multiple small steps from overthrow of the regime to providing officials whose election enjoys broad legitimacy. In their different ways, Libya, Egypt and—most successfully—Tunisia are all embarking on this delicate but transformative process.

We may feel like bystanders as we watch, for example, the tussle between the newly elected president and the military elite in Egypt—to a large extent, we must let these transitions chart their own course—but the onus is on us all to find ways of supporting the process of transition, such as UN efforts to press for a national unity government in Syria, as discussed today, or building on the success of the limited transition deal brokered in Yemen by the Gulf Co-operation Council. Now is the time for us to consider ways in which we can support the establishment of new constitutional arrangements that suit—as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, reminded us—the particularities of each country but which embed authority in elected institutions and protect the rights of citizens of whatever religious or ethnic background. In the long term, the stability of countries undergoing transitions will depend on the legitimacy of the institutions of political power. This might seem a long way off but we can play an important role in stimulating what one might call “constitutional imagination” about which institutional arrangements suit the emerging democracies of the Middle East.

For example, in countries marked by bitter sectarian conflict, such as Lebanon, Bosnia or even Northern Ireland, institutional arrangements that embed power sharing in legislative, executive and administrative life have been central to ensuring basic stability and legitimacy—sometimes called consociational democracies. In other countries, different kinds of federalism are used to meet the demands of different communities for greater relative autonomy. It may seem odd, or perhaps utopian, to argue that such applied political science should be an integral part of our foreign policy thinking, but experience from across history suggests that a constitution that responds to historical grievances and commands respect for its fairness as well as its efficiency is a huge prize in the search for true stability.

That brings me to my third and final category of policy interventions: ways to make democracy work effectively and to reinforce the habits of democracy. We know from the experience of transitions in Africa, South America and elsewhere that real stability and functioning democracy do not, as the noble Lord, Lord Risby, reminded us, emerge spontaneously when elections happen and new constitutions are drawn up. Over time—and it may take a long time—embedding the habits of democracy, ensuring that obstacles to the effective functioning of democratic institutions are overcome, is indispensable. The path from nominal to genuine democracy is often long and tortuous, but it can be shored up with support from countries such as ours.

Let me take two brief examples of barriers to effective democracy to make the point. First, when authoritarian regimes collapse, the collapse often reveals a nexus of power structures underneath that prove much more resilient to change and persist into the period of democratic transition—a good case being that of the military in Egypt at the moment. The historic experience of countries such as Pakistan and Turkey shows that the relationship between the military and formal democratic institutions can remain problematic for a long time. In other countries, it is the relationship between religious and secular authority that can limit the extent to which democracy can truly take root. There are no easy answers to those cases where countervailing forces limit the effectiveness of democracy, but we need to take them seriously and use experience from other countries to inform our approach in addressing them.

A second example is the need to build up civic capacity in countries that have had precious little organised civic life outside organised religion and the state. We know from previous transitions that the development of what some American political scientists have called a civic culture, acceptance of the authority of the state and widespread participation in civic life are important parts of what makes democracies end up working well. In this area, we need to take a much broader conception of foreign policy: one that embraces the role of political parties in Britain working with new political parties in the region; one that seeks partnerships with NGOs to build capacity with nascent NGOs in the Middle East; one that looks to support the work of organisations such as the BBC, the British Council and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Anderson and the noble Lord, Lord Risby, which do so much to promote debate, culture and transparency; and, as my noble friend Lord Giddens reminded us, imagination about how social networking can be used to strengthen civic society.

Our foreign policy towards much of the Middle East was historically based on the premise of stability, but we now find ourselves in an era of dramatic change. It was based on a view that stability and democracy were not easy bedfellows, but we now find the thirst for democracy spreading across the region. It is a time of great excitement and great uncertainty. Our foreign policy towards that part of the world needs to adjust.

The three areas of priority that I have suggested are approaches that enable us to welcome transition from authoritarian rule toward some kind of democratic future rather than, as is too often the case, being scared of the instability that it brings. Turbulent times are dangerous times, but they need not be cause for pessimism if we work in partnership with other nations to build a foreign policy based on a commitment to support and reinforce democratic values. The courage that the people of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria and elsewhere have shown deserves nothing less.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Thursday 17th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I, too, thank FCO and MoD staff around the world for their extraordinary service and dedication. I know from my own time as an adviser in the previous Government that their professionalism, discretion and judgment are huge assets to this country in good as well as difficult times.

When the Prime Minister and his team came to power two years ago, they made it clear that their foreign policy would not be driven by any doctrine or philosophy. Instead, the Foreign Secretary pledged to be hard-headed and pragmatic. Not for him were wild fancies of reform of the architecture of international institutions, or visions of the future of Europe or the Atlantic alliance. Instead, the direction of foreign policy has, at most, been characterised by certain themes: taking emerging nations seriously rather than the traditional preoccupation with the troika of Europe, the Middle East and the USA; putting Britain’s commercial interests at the heart of foreign policy; and focusing on building up a portfolio of strong bilateral relationships rather than investing in multilateralism.

Many observers will support these themes and may have sympathy for underpromising on the vision front when it comes to foreign policy. But the modesty of the Government’s overall approach to foreign policy has, I fear, become a liability rather than an asset. Although muddling through may have been an adequate approach in normal times, it is an approach that looks rudderless in the times of extraordinary and unexpected changes that we are living through.

We are living in times where Europe finds itself in a protracted economic crisis that has become a political crisis, in which democracy and growth have been weakened while austerity and anti-political sentiment have strengthened. The Arab world has seen an uprising against non-democratic regimes—a popular rejection of the false choice between radical Islamism on the one hand and stability based on repression on the other. Yet there is continuing uncertainty about what comes next. We have witnessed the death of bin Laden, widespread war-weariness in response to the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, a shift in American priorities to trans-Pacific rather than transatlantic relations and, recently, Brazil overtaking Britain as the sixth-largest economy in the world.

These are dramatic changes in the landscape and Britain has a reasonable expectation to know the Government’s strategy in response to them. Where do they see Britain’s place in this changing world? Where should we concentrate our efforts and where should we be less engaged? You would be hard pushed to find their answers. It is one thing to boast the absence of doctrine and quite another to lack coherence. Yet that is what the respected Atlantic Council earlier this week concluded about this Government’s foreign policy. It said that the,

“coalition government has yet to develop a coherent strategic vision for the United Kingdom’s role in a changing global landscape”.

It went on that,

“British foreign policy vision and strategy remain unclear,”

and,

“threatens to leave London isolated”.

There is no better example of that than the Government’s approach to defence. Their 2010 strategic defence and security review failed to provide any genuine strategic rethinking of Britain’s role in the world and did not survive its first contact with reality. It delivered aircraft carriers without aircraft—an extraordinary outcome that the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, described as,

“little more use than a pub with no beer”.

It made our Libyan operations dependent on a frigate planned to be cut and Tornado jets set to be reduced. It was characterised by a rapid lunge for savings rather than a considered review of strategy, and the recent U-turn on the Joint Strike Fighter—reinstating a Conservative cut to the procurement plan inherited from Labour—shows what happens when decisions are taken too quickly and ends are not supported by means.

When it comes to European matters, I confess initially to having been baffled by what exactly the Government thought they were doing. There have been consistencies, in particular the Conservative part of the coalition’s determination to plunge cavalierly into isolation within Europe. It began back in opposition days when, as is now widely known, David Cameron made a deal with his Eurosceptic—more accurately, Euroseparatist—Back-Benchers to pull the Conservative Party out of the mainstream centre-right grouping in order to form a new grouping of what might politely be called maverick parties further to the right. The result has been diplomatic isolation of the Conservative Party in Europe.

Late last year came the decision to pull out of participation in the process of drawing up a new fiscal compact. British business was crying out for influence at a time of economic turmoil but the Prime Minister once again chose isolation. He said that he could not receive guarantees on behalf of the City of London but then walked away, ensuring his inability to protect its or any other British interests in the continuing series of monthly discussions that followed. He apparently thought that fellow non-euro countries would join him—they did not. He then claimed that he had managed the extraordinary achievement of vetoing a treaty before it had even been written. The Deputy Prime Minister disagreed, saying:

“The language gets confusing. Veto suggests something was stopped. It was not stopped”.

Indeed, it was not: something that walked, talked and smelt like a treaty got signed earlier this year by euro countries whom it affected. Non-euro countries that stayed in and ratified the arrangement without being affected by its terms got the right to attend and participate in some of the eurozone meetings on wider issues of competitiveness and institutional arrangements. Britain is not there. The Prime Minister’s team said, “Ah, but by not signing this ‘non-treaty’, we ensured that it would not be justiciable in the European Court”—except that they had not. Article 8 of the new treaty made clear that the ECJ’s rulings on issues brought to it under the treaty would be binding. The whole episode has been a mess, a sacrifice of British influence for the sake of keeping the Conservative Party from splitting at the seams.

Not content with institutional isolation on an unprecedented scale, recent months have seen the Government develop a penchant for diplomatic isolation inside the EU as well. The Prime Minister twice declined to meet—even informally—with Mr Hollande, first in Paris and then in London. Instead, Mr Cameron took the unusual step of endorsing Mr Hollande’s opponent, President Sarkozy, in Le Figaro. That approach caused consternation not just in France but in the ranks of our own Foreign Office. One senior diplomat told the Daily Mail:

“We put all the chips on one card and it turned out not to be the ace … It was an error of judgment and not what was advised”.

What is the Government’s approach to the current crisis of the euro? On Sunday, George Osborne angrily warned of the self-fulfilling dangers of speculating about the demise of the euro. Today his boss, the Prime Minister, said it was time for leaders of the euro to make up or break up. Which is it? Is the Government’s policy that the euro should survive, or that it might be better if it breaks up? The Government want us to believe that the problem of the euro lies in the design and policies of the euro area alone. We all know that there are problems galore in that area, but the Government want us to believe that it is just their problem and theirs to sort out. The British public, however, as well as the electorates of France and elsewhere, know that there is a second element to Europe’s economic crisis: the failure of a politics of austerity of which the Government are a champion, not simply a spectator.

Rather than continue this mixture of thinly veiled Schadenfreude, issuing dramatic ultimatums to Merkel, Hollande and others from the sidelines and calling those who disagree with government policies dangerous, does not the Minister agree that the Prime Minister would be better advised to engage in helping to find a solution to this crisis, and at least contemplate the possibility that his approach to recovery through austerity is just not working?

Finally on Europe, in the gracious Speech, the Government outlined their plans to approve Croatia’s entry into the EU and to remove future UK liabilities for European bailouts. We will work constructively with the Government when we see those Bills, but is the Minister confident that his own party’s Back-Benchers will do likewise? Given his party’s record on rebellions over Europe, including what I believe was the largest post-war Commons Back-Bench rebellion, is he 100% sure that there is not trouble ahead for his Government from those who see even the slightest treaty change as reason either to say no or to demand a referendum?

I turn to the Middle East, where the most pressing and worrying issue is the continuing oppression and violence in Syria. We have supported the Government’s approach since violence began last year, including their support for the Annan peace plan, but it is difficult to view the continuing cocktail of oppression by the Assad regime, inter-ethnic violence, recurrent terrorist attacks, and, just last weekend, spillover of violence into northern Lebanon, with anything other than serious pessimism. Does the Minister remain confident that the existing approach of the international community will achieve any success in limiting the violence and halting the spread of the conflict?

When it comes to Israel-Palestine, I am pleased to say that all sides of the House share the ambition of helping to secure a universally recognised Israeli state living alongside a sovereign and viable Palestinian state. That outcome can be achieved only through a negotiated settlement between the parties involved. Although the region is no nearer either peace or even a peace process than it was two years ago, the international community has a role beyond simply being interested spectators. We must continue to condemn the appalling rocket attacks from Gaza, and at the same time continue to call on Israel to cease settlement building on Palestinian land. We must also, in an atmosphere where militants committed to violence threaten to attract support away from moderates committed to peace, do what we can to strengthen the hands of the moderates. In that context, we felt it right last year to support the recognition of Palestine in the context of its application to join UNESCO. Does the Minister continue to think that the Government’s refusal to recognise Palestine was correct, and can he clarify whether he speaks for both parties in the coalition if he answers that it was?

We recognise the continuing threat that Iran’s policy towards its nuclear programme poses to Israel and to the wider region. That policy must change, and the Government’s support for strict sanctions on the regime is entirely right and welcome. However, will the Government clarify whether Britain is seeking to postpone an EU ban on insurance for ships carrying Iranian oil, as has been reported recently? Perhaps the Minister would also clarify what is the UK government’s agenda for the P5+1 talks with Iran in Baghdad next week?

In Afghanistan Britain has nearly 10,000 troops actively engaged, and our gratitude to them for their extraordinary bravery and sacrifice cannot be repeated often enough. Again, we welcome the fact that a cross-party consensus, even in the most trying and difficult times, has been maintained. Progress has been made, in particular with the growth in the size of the Afghan national army, but, as ever, serious challenges remain, and as NATO nations’ attention turns to exit dates and the logistics of winding down their military commitment, the nature of those challenges is changing.

While we support the Government’s actions in Afghanistan, I confess to having concerns that the Prime Minister’s commitment to making it his “number one priority” is slightly at odds with the fact that it is nearly a year since he made a parliamentary Statement about it. First, the NATO summit in Chicago takes place next week and, in light of recent announcements by the Australian Government, the incoming French President and President Obama, one key issue for Britain must surely be to ensure that NATO brings order to bear on individual countries’ dates for withdrawing their forces. Secondly, Chicago must provide greater clarity about the status of forces agreement between Afghanistan and those forces remaining in the country after 2014. Thirdly, there are widespread concerns that insufficient international diplomatic efforts are being applied to the task of achieving a lasting political settlement in Afghanistan. It is a subject we have heard little on from this Government, and there is no standing process in place to reassure Afghans and the wider region that it is the focus of the international community’s attention. We know from experience in Iraq of the dangers of not planning sufficiently for building a lasting peace. There can be no basic stability in Afghanistan without serious work to build self-sufficient political processes.

My colleague and noble friend Lady Kinnock will address issues around development policy and Africa later. I would like to finish by looking at the issue of the Government’s approach to multilateralism. It is fair to characterise the UK’s approach to engaging with the wider world as bilateralism writ large. With economic as well as strategic interests in mind, it has picked a selection of countries and focused its diplomatic and commercial efforts on building better links with them. It is an approach captured in the beautifully vague phrase in the gracious Speech that the Government will build relations with the emerging powers. However, where does this leave the Government’s approach to multilateral institutions? The challenges we face as a country—climate change, global economic instability, terrorism, food and water supply issues, and a gradual, cumulative shift in wealth and power to the east and south—do not observe geographical borders. We are moving from a world where military, diplomatic and economic power is no longer concentrated in one or maybe two great powers but is becoming de-aligned, fragmented and uncertain. These are challenges to which bilateralism writ large cannot provide an adequate response.

This is why the case for multilateralism embedded in strong international institutions and based on consent in the international community is so strong—and so much in our national interest. Yet multilateralism is not in great shape at the moment: Doha has been stalled for years; the international climate change agreements are making inadequate progress to meet the scale of the challenge we face; prospects for an arms trade treaty do not look very promising; and the G8 and G20’s response to continuing economic uncertainty in the last two years has hardly encouraged faith in those forums’ capacity to mount a fight-back against collapsing growth, fragile banks and low confidence. This is a time for Britain to lead in helping to restore faith in multilateral institutions, but the Government are showing no leadership whatever at the multilateral level. I would struggle to find any even semi-seasoned observers of the Government’s foreign policy to tell us what their plan of action is for the upcoming G8 summit, let alone what they want to achieve when the UK takes over the chairmanship in 2013. I know that June is next month rather than this, and so a long way off, but I have not got the first clue what Britain wants out of the G20 meeting in 32 days at Los Cabos.

The Government may eschew doctrines as flights of utopian fancy, but sometimes doctrines are revealed by silences rather than speeches. The Government’s continuing failure to take multilateralism seriously is not the hallmark of realpolitik but a failure to take a hard-headed, long-term view of the British national interest. Oscillating between isolationism and rhetorical bursts from the sidelines does not add up to a foreign policy. If the goal is, as it should be, to serve our strategic and economic interests by building stronger institutions and more effective rules in the international arena, foreign policy must be much more than simply an occasional opportunity to seek domestic political advantage at home.

Christians in the Middle East

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Friday 9th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I thank the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury for giving this House a chance to discuss the plight of Christians across the Middle East. Some debates in this Chamber are about issues that divide us, but this is not one of them. The great virtue of this debate is that it is not to argue about policy but to bring to the attention of this House and those who follow its debates the disturbing and deteriorating situation faced by Christians in the Middle East. It is a subject that has received remarkably little attention in the UK, where the Middle East is more often thought of as the location of holy sites in Christianity's history rather than as the home of active Christian communities in the modern era. It is also surprising in the light of the startling fact revealed by the Aid to the Church in Need report earlier this year that 75 per cent of all religious persecution in the world is carried out against Christians.

The situation and welfare of Christians in the Middle East is a cause for concern for all of us, whether or not we share the Christian faith, partly because we should proudly defend the rights of minorities in the region as elsewhere, but also because, as the noble Lord, Lord Sacks, reminded us, the way religious minorities in the Middle East are treated is a litmus test in that most fragile of regions for the presence of the basic levels of tolerance and respect that are needed for genuine stability to emerge.

We have heard much today about the persecution that the 10 million to 15 million Christians living in the Middle East today continue to face, but I believe that if we want to understand this persecution—why it occurs where it does and how to respond to it—we need to understand the diversity of Christian experiences in different countries of the region. In some countries, Christians have been the subject of outright atrocities, such as the attacks just in the past 12 months on a Coptic church in Alexandria and on a Catholic church in Baghdad, in which a total of 73 Christians were murdered. In other contexts, Christians find their churches attacked and the security services in those countries uninterested in finding and prosecuting those responsible, or find the land of their churches seized. Some Christians face discrimination in basic constitutional rights while in countries such as Iran, Christians ostensibly have formal rights recognised in the constitution but in reality face discrimination when it comes to employment, political and other rights.

Many Christians in the region find their communities and their faith maligned in popular culture and sometimes, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, mentioned, in school textbooks and on private television channels. In countries like Saudi Arabia, Christians are unable to worship freely without intimidation or fear of arrest, while for Palestinian Christians, for example, restrictions on freedom of movement affect their ability to practise their faith. I am thinking here of remarks made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Wright of Richmond, and Monsignor Twal, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, who recently pointed out that many Christians living in Bethlehem find themselves unable to visit the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem because of the walls that now separate communities in the region.

For millions of others, however, daily life is not characterised by incidences of gross violence but by a steady growing anxiety about the situations in which they live; anxiety about the commitment of Governments to uphold their basic rights; anxiety about their ability to profess their faith with confidence as their numbers reduce over time; and anxiety about what the future holds in countries in the middle of political transition with uncertain outcomes.

The responses of Christians to these uncertainties, as we have heard today, have been diverse. Many who face intimidation have chosen to convert to escape the possibility of persecution. For example, we know from one study that in one three-year period in the late 1980s, 50,000 Egyptian university graduates converted away from Christianity. Some, such as some within the Lebanese Christian community, are quietly arming themselves for self-protection as a precaution. Others, such as many of the Egyptian Copts, are embracing nascent democratic processes, supporting secular and liberal parties. But across the region, the most notable response has been the choice to emigrate, as the most reverend Primate said, which, combined with growing differentials in the birth rates between Christians and other groupings, has led to dramatic reductions in the Christian population.

For example, in 1948, Jerusalem was 20 per cent Christian, but now it is less than 2 per cent. In Bethlehem, about which we have heard a lot today, Christians were for a long time around three-quarters or more of the population. Now, although the figure is disputed, as we have also heard today, it is under 20 per cent. Lebanon has gone from being a majority Christian country to Christians constituting around 30 per cent or less of the population, and this number is still going down—so more than half of Lebanon’s Christians now live outside the country. Well over half of Iraq’s 1.5 million Christians have fled the country in the past 10 years.

As numbers go down and Christian minorities become even smaller minorities, the anxiety about future persecution and intimidation grows. Why has this situation become more precarious? The noble Lord, Lord Parekh, earlier offered some illuminating reflections on this subject. I think that it is the result of three different developments. The first is the changing balance of populations, which has been discussed today, and—whether rational or not, or based on fear or evidence—Christians have begun to feel more intimidated than before. The second is the mounting suspicion of the West among Muslim populations and the association of Christians with the political agenda of the West, particularly in the light of military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the growth of radical Islam in some parts of the region. Again, Monsignor Twal expressed the thought well from the perspective of Christian Palestinians in Jerusalem:

“Muslim fundamentalists identify us with the Christian West—which is not always true—and want us to pay the price”.

The third factor is the failure of secular ideologies in the Arab world—from Nasserism to Arab nationalism to pan-Arabism—that in practice offered a relatively protected sphere for Christians. This takes us to the central paradox of the region, which has been discussed by not only the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, today but also by the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, who has spoken eloquently on this subject. We might think of it as the paradox of the Arab spring. The paradox is that the courageous turn by populations against the corrupt authoritarianism of regimes in Arab countries and the instinct, however crude, towards greater democracy in some form has increased rather than diminished the degree of threat felt by Christians in the region. In some quarters this has even created a kind of nostalgia for pluralism under autocracy of the sort that on occasion was experienced by Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

The implications for Christians of the uncertainty and the political vacuum under the Arab spring are difficult territory for all of us. But I believe that the right response is to maintain a principled approach and support for democracy while at the same time not falling prey to naivety. The Arab spring has surely shown us that it is an illusion to think that true security and stability, and sustainable protection of the rights of minorities, can be secured by support, whether tacit or otherwise, for authoritarianism. Our support for the aspiration of populations in Arab countries to create their own brand of democracy must be full throated. As the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury put it recently in an interview:

“A real participatory democracy in the region is bound to be in the interests of minorities because good democracies look after minorities”.

The key word here is “real”—a real participatory democracy. That means a participatory democracy in which the first key principle, the authority of the will of the majority, is combined with the second key principle on an equal standing, which is the fierce insistence on observing basic civil and political rights for all minorities.

Britain’s influence in the region is of course coloured by our historical role and we have to tread very carefully in the light of that, and I am not suggesting a blunderbuss approach to evangelising liberal democracy. I also know that in countries such as Lebanon, our embassy has being doing valuable work in building confidence among the Christian communities. But I wonder if the Minister, in replying, could outline the way in which the insistence on basic constitutional provisions, the formal protection of rights and the assurance of the observance of those rights, including for Christians, is woven into our diplomatic engagement with the new regimes in countries such as Tunisia and Libya, and especially in Egypt and Iraq. Picking up on a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, I ask what role the Government see for the European Union under the leadership of my noble friend Lady Ashton in applying pressure on regimes in the area to ensure better protection.

I also ask the Minister for his view on the approach adopted by the United States since the Clinton presidency. In 1997, President Clinton initiated a new Freedom from Religious Persecution Act to,

“support the aspirations of ethnic and religious minorities in other nations as they strive for their own right to worship freely”.

It set up a US Commission on International Religious Freedom, which submits an annual report on areas of concern. An office was set up in the White House inside, I believe, the National Security Council, to recommend ways in which US foreign policy should be informed by evidence of religious persecution, and it allowed the President to take action on aid and trade policies in response to that evidence. Some commentators argue that there is evidence that this approach had some limited effect on, for example, making the Mubarak regime behave a bit better towards the Coptic minority, particularly on the return of church land and allowing church repairs. I am not advocating this approach, but, again, I would be keen to hear the Minister’s reflections on it. What is his view on whether this approach has been effective and do the Government have any thoughts on adopting some kind of similar approach in the UK going forward?

I have one last thought about optimism. Many people, including many noble Lords from whom we have heard today, approach the subject of the position of Christians in the Middle East with pessimism. They see conflict in the past and have fears for the future. The Arab spring has tended to make the pessimists more pessimistic. I believe, as I argued earlier, that we must be alive to the diversity of Christians’ experiences of intimidation and persecution and seek to understand the factors that propel it. But I also want to follow my noble friend Lord Turnberg and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey, in their search for a glimmer of hope, as I believe my noble friend put it, and sound a cautious note of optimism about the prospects for interfaith relations in the region. I do not believe that the conditions under which Christians in the Middle East live will necessarily worsen or that there is something in the DNA of the history of the Middle East that makes their marginalisation and ever increasing persecution inevitable. Alongside the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Guildford, I think that the history as well as the contemporary politics of the region offers some cause for optimism for those who strive for a peaceful future.

Let me briefly illustrate this with the case of Egypt. As we have heard, Coptic Christians in Egypt are the single Christian grouping in the region, and events over the past 50 years have given them good reason to be anxious. Since 1981, more than 30 attacks on Copts have been recorded, and I stress that those are just what have been recorded, with over 200 Christians killed. As alarming as these attacks has been the anaemic response by the Egyptian security services. On New Year’s Day this year, an attack on a Coptic church in Alexandria killed 21 people, while churches in Cairo are now cordoned off by police checkpoints. Private Muslim channels hurl vitriolic abuse against Copts. Just two months ago today, hundreds of Copts marched on state-run TV stations to protest the failure of the authorities to investigate the burning of a church in Aswan. Soldiers responded with violence and 28 people died, with 325 wounded. We must be determined to do what we can to ensure that outrages of this sort, as well as daily, more low-level intimidation, are not a hallmark of Egypt’s future.

However, the history of Egypt has another strand to it. It shows that, at times, with leadership on both Muslim and Christian sides, the relationship between the two populations can be marked by equality and co-operation. After 1856, when the Ottoman Sultan conceded the principle of equality before the law to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, there was a period within which Copts became fully integrated into the Egyptian political system. After the 1919 revolution, when Copts and Muslims united in that great cause to oppose the British occupation, there followed a brief period of genuine co-operation to build a new political order.

If you are looking for sources of hope, you do not have to go back to benign episodes of Egyptian history. You should cast your mind back to the extraordinary scenes in Tahrir Square earlier this year, when Muslims and Christians stood side by side with shared courage and shared determination to demand reform. Muslim groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have professed their tolerance towards other groups. While there is widespread cynicism about their being true to their word, we should encourage them to be true to it, challenge them to live up to their pledges, and use our influence to empower the moderates and marginalise the extremists rather than approaching these groups with a pre-formulated certainty that they have no intention to act in good faith.

These causes for optimism should not make us complacent about the appalling situation faced by so many millions of Christians in the Middle East, but they should give us encouragement to think that the story of Christians in the region is not one of inevitable decline and that it is worth us engaging to ensure that, working with more liberal and moderate voices in the region, the future can be a better one for Christian populations.