Hong Kong: Human Rights

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

My Lords, China’s national security laws imposed on Hong Kong are wrong for two important legal reasons. First, Hong Kong has not consented to these measures. Its governing authorities tried to pass an equivalent law in 2003, but the proposal fell after mass protests. Article 23 of the Basic Law clearly requires Hong Kong’s consent, as a constitutional requirement, as the Hong Kong Bar Association resolutely maintains. Secondly, these measures are a clear violation of the Sino-British joint declaration, which in paragraph 3 pledges that Hong Kong will

“enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs.”

I support the Government’s suggestion of visa offers to Hong Kongers with BNO status, but I want to ask finally about the Huawei decision, as did my noble friend Lord Campbell. Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong are not the reason to revisit that decision, but they provide evidence about the readiness of Beijing to ignore boundaries between the Chinese central state and other entities to pursue national security. Given this, I cannot see a justification for the Government to continue their plan, and I hope that they will revisit the decision urgently.

Covid-19: Repatriation of UK Nationals

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Thursday 30th April 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord raises a specific issue about Pakistan. First, the figure of 2,000 that I quoted relates specifically to the charter flights. We have been running charter flights from Islamabad and Lahore, because that was where the main demand was. However, I can assure him that, as I speak, there is a flight returning from Karachi as well, in response to demand.

In addition, because we were committed to working with the national carrier, PIA, which continued to operate commercially, we returned over 7,500 people through that channel. The noble Lord will be aware that PIA has recently restarted its flights as well. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, underlined in her remarks that we are not relying on the national carrier alone and are continuing to run charter flights. That will continue.

On the support we are providing, all British travellers coming back to the UK on charter flights are being provided with information as they board the plane about the necessary steps they need to take and the issues that may confront them when they arrive. If any of them show symptoms while on the flight, the flight is held, as has happened in a number of cases, and those people are provided with support as they land in the UK. They are also being advised very clearly.

We continue to advise people to stay at home to protect themselves and others. Each traveller who returns is given that valuable advice.

[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for the openness with which he has answered the questions so far. I would like to ask about British people stranded abroad who have medical needs—primarily those whose needs are not Covid-related. Are our embassies and consulates providing active assistance to those who, wherever they are, might need to source drugs for long-term conditions, for example?

Secondly, on the issue of commercial versus charter flights, the Government clearly made a choice early on to ask individual passengers to contact airline companies and fly home on commercial flights when possible. There was obviously also a lack of co-ordination between the Government and the flight operators and airlines. We have all heard lots of stories of people who found themselves facing vast costs, cancelled flights or companies refusing to reimburse payments. Was it not a mistake to opt so clearly for commercial over chartered flights when this co-ordination was lacking? Are the Government providing any assistance to people who are now back home and have financial implications from having to take flights at raised prices, so that they can pursue these cases?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

First, taking the noble Lord’s question on medical needs, we have asked all our missions to prioritise this. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, I talked about vulnerable individuals. We have been collecting data on people returning home. When people have been waiting because the numbers have been high, particularly in places such as south Asia, they have been provided with support on places where they may be able to get prescription medicine.

We are also providing loan facilities for the most hard-up people. The noble Lord rightly pointed out that many have paid thousands of pounds for flights or were unable to finance the cost of their return flight. There is an interest-free loan facility available to Brits around the world. They need to approach the high commission or embassy which can process it. It gives them an interest-free loan and six months to pay upon their return. That is now operational.

We are looking to extend this support. We have a range of facilities, both pastoral and financial, that we are offering to people who remain in-country while they wait to return to the UK, to address specific needs. I once again emphasise that we have been prioritising the most vulnerable, to ensure they can return as soon as possible.

On the issue of flights and co-ordination, I have already made it clear that I think it was the right decision to stand by commercial operators, particularly when you look at the sheer numbers. To again use the Pakistan example, we returned 7,500 people. I fully accept the criticism that a couple of flights were cancelled and some were delayed, but I assure noble Lords that we were working very closely with the airlines and with Governments to ensure that flights remained operational. While there were challenges for people returning home, the fact that we were able to return over 7,500 people through that route demonstrates that it was the right decision. We stand by that. Pakistan is just one example; Australia is another.

We have operated charter flights when needed, as we did in India and Nepal. We are continuing to run an operation in India that we hope will return all the British nationals seeking to return. I add this, and I cannot emphasise it enough. A lot of noble Lords have been dealing directly with people coming to them individually. This message needs to get out there: if you are booked on a flight, get on the flight, because there are individuals who choose not to turn up at the airport. Unlike commercial operators, we cannot operate massive waiting lists. For those people who can come to the airport in quite a short time, we address that practical problem by facilitating and, in places such as India, ensuring their passage by picking them up directly so that they can get back as soon as possible.

There are issues with people now approaching us about airlines that have not refunded and are offering Air Miles, et cetera. Airlines need to look very hard at the people they serve. I share the noble Lord’s concern. People want compensation for the routes they did not use. Airlines need to step up to ensure that they can deliver on that. However, as we all know from the recent announcement from British Airways, airlines themselves are now extremely challenged because of the economic impact of Covid-19.

Cyprus

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook, for this debate. For 40 years we have seen moments of opportunity come and go but very little progress towards a settlement in Cyprus. Now, as many speakers have said, we have a moment of opportunity that we have not had since the Annan plan of 2004—the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, referred to that—and possibly a moment we have not had since 1974.

The people of Cyprus deserve a settlement to bring stability, peace, settlement of long-standing grievances and issues, and the possibility of prosperity. The failure to achieve a settlement in Cyprus, however, also undermines the search for security in a crucial region that is a hinge between Europe and the Middle East. Instability in Cyprus continues to affect the function of the European Union and the ability of the European Union to co-operate effectively with NATO.

For our part, as many speakers have said, the UK has a special responsibility to be a supportive force for resolution because of our colonial past, because of our pivotal roles in the European Union and NATO, and because we are a guarantor power. This year it seems we have a moment for very cautious optimism but, as always, we need optimism grounded in realism.

I will make a few remarks about the principles of our party’s approach to achieving a settlement in Cyprus, to assess the progress in the process that began with the February declaration and to look at the wider issues that any successful process needs to address.

I will start by setting out our party’s approach. We are committed to a just and lasting settlement for the whole of Cyprus. That settlement has to be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. We strongly believe that, to use the formulation of the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook, a settlement has to be negotiated by Cypriots, for Cypriots and under the auspices of the UN. Only then will it be acceptable and provide for a just and sustainable solution.

While we do not support recognition for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots have interests, aspirations and a burning desire for peace that are as valid as those of Greek Cypriots. Cyprus’s population is about 800,000, of whom 80% are Greek Cypriots and about 11% Turkish Cypriots, but, despite this numerical asymmetry, any just settlement must be based on the principle of equality of treatment of the two communities.

While peace has to be negotiated by Cypriots themselves, we believe that the UK has a privileged role. We are the main export market for Cyprus, and Cyprus punches above its weight as a destination for UK exports. As the noble Lord, Lord Maginnis, has reminded us, our historical role has been, to put it mildly, a chequered one. Britain took administrative control of Cyprus after the Congress of Berlin in 1878—a Disraeli special—and declared Cyprus a British colony in 1915. Under the terms of the 1960 treaty, we remain one of three guarantor powers.

Of course we have another role, as about 3% of the island of Cyprus is comprised of UK sovereign bases. In government, we proposed that about half the land in bases in Cyprus would be made available to a united island once a resolution was found. Will the Minister tell us the coalition Government’s position on that proposition now that negotiations have begun again?

Recent developments have given us some cause for hope, particularly the joint declaration process that started in February. The declaration signed by representatives of both communities marked the most significant breakthrough that we have had for at least 10 years. There are encouraging signs in the declaration of principles that can form the basis of a lasting settlement. The declaration confirms the unacceptability of the status quo. It commits to the integrity and identity of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. It affirms respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedom. It states that,

“any settlement will be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality”,

to form a single, sovereign Cyprus inside the European Union. It envisages a federal constitution,

“composed of two constituent states of equal status”,

legitimised by separate and simultaneous referenda.

These are all encouraging shared commitments. It is further encouragement that, although progress has been slow, there have been further meetings, most recently at the beginning of last week. The meeting seems to have made some limited progress—I am being more optimistic than my noble friend—on mutual confidence-building, and ended with a five-step road map being submitted to the Greek Cypriots by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and an agreement to meet again later this month.

I want to ask the Minister about reports that the Turkish Cypriot side has suggested a meeting with the guarantor powers, including the UK, at some point this year after discussions have begun on the highly vexed issue of territory on the island. Are the Government involved in discussions on participating in such a summit? What is the Government’s response to the Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu’s proposal that the referenda take place before the year’s end?

The progress in negotiations is welcome to all of us, but we know that agreement has proved elusive in the past for good reasons. There are significant areas of disagreement and difficulty—issues that have sabotaged previous plans for the past 40 years.

First, there is the bundle of issues around territory, property and displaced persons. The legacy of both the violence of the early 1960s and the Turkish military intervention in 1974 is a complex set of issues around the need for land swaps, restitution of property, the status of areas such as Morphou and Famagusta, and church property on the island. It is estimated that around 200,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to leave their land in Northern Cyprus after 1974, and the issue of repatriation of new Turkish settlers on the island was a key factor in the unravelling of the Perez de Cuellar plan in the mid-1980s. These issues are the most sensitive of all and demand more than any other—

[Lord Maginnis of Drumglass]

I apologise for interrupting, but I did not pick up what the noble Lord said. Did he say that Greek Cypriots had to abandon their territory and did he fail to mention the fact that Turkish Cypriots—for example, on the site of the present airport in the south—had to abandon theirs? Did he overlook that point?

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

No, absolutely not. The noble Lord is absolutely right: Cypriots of both communities have had to leave land. Working out a final agreement on settlement and property restitution affects both communities. These issues demand more than any other a spirit of pragmatism, compromise and trust between the representatives of the two communities.

Secondly, there are the issues around the Cypriot economy and trade with the European Union and the neighbourhood. On the Greek side of the island, Cyprus has seriously suffered from the fallout of the financial crash and a bailout—or rather a bail-in, to be more accurate—of Cypriot banks which imposed a levy on depositors, in banks that were supposedly covered by a deposit insurance scheme. It was a move which in my view the EU would not have countenanced for the larger members of the EU but which was seen as okay for smaller ones.

Meanwhile, Turkish Cyprus continues to have no direct trade relations with the European Union. Ten years ago, the EU proposed giving more than €260 million to the Turkish Cypriots for infrastructure spending and to open up trade with them, but, sadly, very little progress has been made on this front in the past decade. I would like the Minister’s view on whether there is any prospect with the advent of a new Commission and a newly elected European Parliament for any limited progress in the next few months in that area.

Lastly, there is the question of constitutional arrangements. Prior to 1974, Cyprus had a constitution that one expert called,

“unique in its tortuous complexity”.

Of course, any constitutional arrangement that provides rights of self-government for two communities, as well as rules for decision-making at the federal level, is bound to be complex, but so-called consociational arrangements for countries with a history of conflict between two or more communities can take root and endure. I appreciate that these solutions take time, but can the Minister tell us whether any thinking is going on in the Government about offering assistance in the form of constitutional expertise to the communities?

There is a line in the February declaration that reads that,

“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

It is a simple maxim, but a crucial one. If 2014 is, as the communities’ leaders seem to want it to be, the year in which a successful negotiation is concluded, they have to provide a credible and legitimate way through on all these issues and not just on some.

It is said of Aphrodite, who was born in Cyprus, that because of her beauty, other gods feared their rivalry over her would interrupt the peace among them. Surely it is time for us all to combine our efforts to ensure that peace and stability in Cyprus are interrupted no longer.

Israel and Palestine

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Tuesday 8th April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

My Lords, the situation on the ground continues to change. That is why I have stood at this Dispatch Box on a number of occasions over the past 12 months and said that this provides a unique opportunity to try to make progress. We support the discussions that Secretary Kerry is leading, and we urge both sides, who have said that they are still prepared to talk, to get back to the table to try to achieve a resolution.

[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

What explanation have Her Majesty’s Government received from the Israeli Government about why they did not release the fourth group of Palestinian prisoners last week?

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord will be aware that this was the fourth tranche of the prisoner releases that were agreed last year. The first three have taken place; the fourth has been delayed. The noble Lord will be aware that there is a difference of opinion about how these matters are seen. Israel felt that these prisoner releases were directly linked to the peace talks. The Palestinians believed that they were directly linked to no further action at the UN. Clearly, the discussions that took place at that stage were vague. I take comfort from both parties having indicated that they are prepared to come back to the negotiating table because that is where progress will be made.

Crimea

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Thursday 13th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

My Lords, the Government’s position, supported by the Opposition, has always been to try to de-escalate the situation and ensure that diplomatic contact is the way that this matter is resolved. The matter is continuously changing. My noble friend Lord Hill of Oareford updated the House by repeating the Prime Minister’s Statement earlier this week. I can inform the noble Lord that further meetings are planned for tomorrow and we are doing all we can to persuade Russia that the annexation of Crimea and, indeed, the referendum, which we see as illegal and illegitimate, should not go ahead.

[Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)]

My Lords, I ask for clarification of the Government’s approach to this crisis. The UK is a signatory to the 1994 Budapest memorandum, which protects Ukraine’s territorial integrity. What is the Government’s legal understanding of what action that commits the UK Government to in the event that another signatory, such as Russia, violates its terms? Is the UK Government’s position that the aim of talks between Ukraine and Russia, which we all hope will take place in the near future, is to reaffirm the commitment to the Budapest memorandum or to supersede it with a new agreement?

[Baroness Warsi]

My Lords, the Budapest agreement is very clear. It basically lays out Russia’s obligations in relation to respecting the territorial integrity and independence of the state of Ukraine. We believe that Russia’s actions are in breach of that. That is why we have made it clear that it is important that we try to resolve the matter by de-escalating what military activity is happening on Ukrainian soil and through talks.

European Court of Human Rights: Khodorkovsky Case

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I, too, would like to commend the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, for the great knowledge, conviction and clarity with which he spoke about this subject. I thank him for bringing this timely debate, coming as it does two days before an important judgment by the European Court of Human Rights on whether Mr Khodorkovsky’s rights to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European convention have been violated.

Mr Khodorkovsky has been detained and imprisoned by the Russian authorities since October 2003, nearly 10 years ago. It is fair to say that he is a controversial character in post-Soviet Russian history, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, pointed out. Prior to his arrest in 2003, he enjoyed an astonishing—and astonishingly rapid—rise to economic success, and to cultural and political prominence. He had a career ranging from internet trainer, philanthropist and funder of political parties to Minister of Fuel and Energy and financial trade magnate. If the proposed merger between Yukos and Sibneft had gone through after 2003, he would have been at the helm of one of the world’s largest oil companies.

During this period, however, he became the subject of a range of allegations concerning fraudulent activity: allegations that he engaged in asset-stripping of Yukos for private gain, and that he engineered forced sales of oil within the holding company to transfer billions of roubles to shell companies owned exclusively by him. Whatever one’s view of these allegations, the concern, which tonight’s debate has shown is shared by Members on all sides of the House, centres on Mr Khodorkovsky’s experience of Russian justice—the circumstances and process surrounding his arrest, trial and continued detention. The central point is that expressed by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in November 2004, when it said that,

“the circumstances of the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos executives suggest that the interest of the State’s action in these cases goes beyond the mere pursuit of criminal justice”.

I want to talk briefly about three aspects arising from the long and continuing saga of this case: first, the circumstances surrounding Mr Khodorkovsky’s arrest and charges; secondly, his treatment in the Russian judicial and prison system since he was detained; and thirdly, wider lessons for the state of justice in Russia today. Starting with his initial detention in 2003, Mr Khodorkovsky was arrested after an investigation into the tax and financial arrangements surrounding Yukos’s purchase of a stake in a company called Apatit. He was arrested to appear as a witness, but within hours of being in custody he was charged with fraud. In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights found that his arrest was,

“unlawful as it had been made with a purpose different from the one expressed”,

and that he had been held in “degrading and humiliating conditions”.

It has been widely thought that the motives for his arrest and prosecution go well beyond the pursuit of justice. Many have noted, for example, that in February 2003, just a few months before formal investigations began, Mr Khodorkovsky accused the Russian Government of large-scale corruption at a meeting with President Putin that was broadcast on Russian television. The European Court of Human Rights found in 2011 that it did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that his first trial was politically motivated and that the charges against him were grounded in “reasonable suspicion”. However, Mr Khodorkovsky’s family and supporters, as well as the Council of Europe committee that I referred to earlier, see his detention as motivated by a desire to weaken an outspoken political opponent.

Whatever one’s views on political motivation, two worrying aspects of Mr Khodorkovsky’s initial prosecution seem clear. First, the arrest furthered a widespread impression that the Russian authorities were engaged in selective prosecutions against those oligarchs and senior businesspeople who had come into conflict with the Putin regime. In the words of the US State Department, the arrest,

“raised a number of concerns over the arbitrary use of the judicial system”.

It damaged not just the Russian economy and the climate for investment but confidence in the consistent application of the rule of law in Russia.

Secondly, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that part of the motivation behind his arrest and subsequent treatment was to enable the Russian state to regain control of strategic economic assets. A 2009 Council of Europe report spells this out clearly, noting that,

“Yukos, a privately owned oil company”,

was,

“made bankrupt and broken up for the benefit of the state-owned company Rosneft. The assets were bought at auction by a rather obscure financial group, Baikalfinansgroup, for almost €7 billion. It is still not known who is behind this financial group. A number of experts believe that the state-owned company Gazprom had a hand in the matter”.

What representations we have made to Russia about the Government’s view of this first trial, given that this is the issue at hand in Thursday’s judgment? In addition, given that the Russian criminal procedure code stipulates a direct dependence between the court’s acknowledgement of the violation of Article 6 of the European convention and the necessity of cancelling a sentence, can the Minister tell us whether the Government have talked to the Russian Government about our expectation that they should comply with the decision of the court and adjust his sentence accordingly?

I turn now to the second set of issues: the way in which Mr Khodorkovsky has been treated by the Russian judicial and penal system since his trial. The timeline of his 10 years in prison is both depressing and bizarre. In 2005, he was taken to a labour camp attached to a uranium mining and processing plant—at which, according to my quick Google search on it, inmates now have,

“much better chances of survival than in the past”.

In April 2006, he was attacked by a prison inmate. In February 2007, new charges were brought against him just before his parole was due, one year before the Russian presidential election. The emergence of new charges related to the alleged crimes of which he was initially convicted. At the time, President Obama said it looked like,

“a repackaging of the old charges”.

France’s Human Rights Ambassador expressed a similar view, saying:

“It seems odd that Khodorkovsky could be sentenced twice on facts which look the same, or even contradictory … the charges seem to be so unclear … the defence does not even know what the precise charges are”.

In August 2008, he was denied parole for myriad reasons including—famously—because he refused to attend sewing classes in jail. When he was convicted of the second tranche of offences in October 2010, the judge convicted him and colleagues of stealing 40% more oil than the prosecutors had even alleged.

Alongside this, as set out in a joint letter by Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and three other reputable NGOs, there is evidence of: intimidation of defence counsel, Yukos executives and witnesses; repeated procedural irregularities during the second trial over the use of evidence; and prosecutorial misconduct. An assistant to the judge who convicted Khodorkovsky in his second trial in 2010 alleged that the judge had the verdict read against his will. She remarked that,

“everyone in the judicial community understands perfectly that this is a rigged case, a fixed trial”.

It is little wonder, in light of these and other facts of the case, that Amnesty International designated both Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev “prisoners of conscience” in 2011 and that grave concerns about his treatment at the hands of Russian justice have been expressed by Parliaments in Italy, Germany and the United States, as well as by President Obama, Angela Merkel and our own Foreign Secretary.

Lastly, I turn briefly to the wider set of concerns, of which this case is merely a particular example, about access to justice in Russia. Other noble Lords have talked about people such as Sergei Magnitsky, Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova. This is not an isolated case. Just last week we saw Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption campaigner, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for embezzlement. The case bore many familiar hallmarks: ambiguity about the charges; an admission by investigators that the authorities’ inquiries were prompted by political activities on the part of the defendant; and near-universal condemnation of the verdict by Russian media and public opinion, as well as NGOs abroad. Mikhail Gorbachev commented after the verdict:

“Everything I know about this case ... unfortunately confirms we do not have independent courts”.

We are also seeing a more restrictive social and legal climate for free expression since President Putin returned to power. Human Rights Watch has commented that the Russian authorities have,

“introduced a series of restrictive laws”—

the foreign agents law, the treason law and the assembly law”—

“harassed, intimidated, and in several cases imprisoned political activists … and sought to cast government critics as clandestine enemies”.

Does the Minister share my anxiety about these developments? In what forum have the Government shared these anxieties with the Russian Government?

Finally, some may argue that issues of internal due process should remain a matter for national Governments, a point to which the noble Lord, Lord Bates, alluded in his remarks. My honourable friend Emma Reynolds, the shadow Minister for Europe, has said,

“raising human rights issues is not about interfering in the affairs of the Russian Government, but is a way of holding Russia to its international obligations. Russia has signed the European convention on human rights, the universal declaration of human rights, the charter of Paris and the EU-Russia partnership and co-operation agreement … In signing each of those agreements, Russia made a solemn commitment to respect human rights … It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the Russian Government are living up to their side of the bargain”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/3/12; col. 932.]

Syria

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Wednesday 10th July 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure that the proposed international peace conference on the Syrian conflict takes place in the near future.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, all our efforts have focused on securing a successful outcome at the forthcoming Geneva conference. A negotiated political settlement remains the best way in which to end the current bloodshed. The US, Russia and the UN are working intensively on the details of the conference; it is inevitable that there will be challenges, but the UN Secretary-General has stressed that the three parties are committed to convening the conference as soon as possible.

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

I thank the Minister for that Answer. Given the failure of the G8 summit to agree a date for the start of the Geneva 2 talks, does the Minister think on reflection that it was a mistake for the Government to spend the run-up to the G8 raising the volume on the possibility of the UK arming the Syrian rebels? Does she agree that it would be damaging for the prospects of an international peace conference if the Government were to repeat the mistake in the coming weeks and months?

[Baroness Warsi]

The Government have consistently approached this matter by responding to the situation on the ground. I do not think that they can be criticised for actually responding to it and encouraging agreement when we think that it is possible. The countries that we are trying to get agreement between—the US and Russia, with the UN of course playing a facilitating role—are all committed to Geneva 2 and to a transitional executive authority that would be in accordance with the wishes of the Syrian people. It was right, in the run-up to the G8, to get as much agreement as possible, and it continues to be right to continue to push Russia and the US to come to an agreement to bring the coalition and the regime around the table.

Syria and the Middle East

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Monday 1st July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for this opportunity to debate the situation in the Middle East and Syria in particular. I pay tribute to her continuing concern for and commitment to the issues in the region, which I think is evident to everyone in the House.

I want to focus my remarks on Syria and the immediate region around it, and to look at four related issues: the state of the conflict; the case for arming the Syrian rebels; the spillover of the conflict into the wider region; and where the international community’s efforts should be focused.

The basic facts of this conflict make for grim reading: two years of violence and civil war; more than 90,000 people dead, with 5,000 now being killed each month; suggestions that chemical weapons have been used; 4 million people internally displaced; and 1.5 million refugees in neighbouring states, about half of whom are children. It is a situation that appals us all and demands our attention and engagement.

However, a response must start with an understanding of the country, of the region and of the conflict. It is a recent conflict, but one with deep roots. Thomas Friedman has gone so far as to say that what is happening in Syria, as in other Middle Eastern countries, is,

“the long-delayed consequences of the end of the Ottoman Empire”.

Syria, like Iraq, is an artificial state that was born after World War 1 inside lines drawn by imperial powers. The communities of Syria—Sunnis, Alawite/Shia, Kurds, Druze and Christians—were forced to live together under rules agreed by others, not by their own consent. As Assad’s authoritarian rule collapsed, Syria now looks more like Lebanon in the 1975-90 period: a fragmented, sectarian country, with continuing violence between communities, and a central state that has neither the might nor the legitimacy to bring order to the whole country. This is a conflict whose resolution demands some fundamental reconceiving of the kind of country that Syria is and the social contract that underpins it.

The conflict is marked by three dominant features. First, the civil war is becoming more entrenched, with no prospect of decisive military victory for either side. Optimism about the prospects for a victory for the Syrian rebel forces has subsided in recent months. Assad’s forces have better armoured equipment and significant air power strength. They have gained confidence from recent captures of rebel strongholds, and have successfully consolidated in recent months the main population centres and the routes that connect them—from Homs to the coast, from Damascus to the Jordanian border. They have stopped the flow of senior defectors, and have trained a militia of 60,000 to guard positions formerly held by the Syrian military. Any strategy based on a prospect of military defeat for the regime at this point looks highly unrealistic, to put it mildly.

Secondly, the conflict is characterised by the involvement of multiple foreign powers on all sides, the overwhelming preponderance of which is escalating violence. The regime is benefiting from weapons, technical assistance, surveillance drones and help in monitoring internet traffic from Iran. Hezbollah and Iran have built a 50,000-strong militia to support Assad’s forces. On top of this, Assad benefits from significant Russian assistance, with multiple active arms contracts between Syria and Russia, and an S-300 air defence system about to be delivered to Syria from Moscow—the announcement of which was made just after the Foreign Secretary vetoed the EU arms embargo.

On the rebels’ side, foreign fighters are coming from a range of Arab countries through the Jordanian and Turkish borders to fight Assad. Extensive support continues to be provided by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the latter having allegedly spent $3 billion funding the rebel forces and offered $50,000 to every Syrian army defector and his family. Qatar has sent 70 military flights to Turkey with arms and equipment. According to American intelligence sources, and despite the expressed concerns of the Obama Administration that such weapons may fall into the hands of militant Islamists, Qatar has shipped Chinese-made shoulder-fired missiles to be used against Assad’s air force.

Foreign power intervention in Syria on both sides not only makes the conflict more entrenched but makes the securing of peace more complex. The outgoing head of the Syrian national coalition, Moaz al-Khatib, said shortly before leaving his post:

“The people inside Syria have lost the ability to decide their own fate. I have only become a means to sign some papers while hands from different parties want to decide on behalf of the Syrians”.

I would be interested to know what conversations with the Qataris and Saudis, in particular, the Government have had about the extent and form of support which they are providing to the rebels, and whether the Minister shares the concerns of many about the effects of that support.

The third feature of the conflict that stands out is the fragmented nature of the rebel movement. One expert described it as a “bewildering array” of groups: defectors, Kurdish groups, volunteers, local militias, Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, foreign fighters and the official Free Syrian Army brigades. Many of them are fighting for a reformed, democratic Syria, but some of the Sunni militias are becoming increasingly radicalised, aligning with groups such as al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, who have called for a jihad against the Alawites and want an Islamic state. At least one al-Qaeda-affiliated group, the Islamic State of Iraq, has proclaimed an affiliation with the Nusra front and in April, al-Qaeda in Iraq boasted that it was reinforcing al-Nusra with experienced fighters and about half of its budget.

The rebels are brave and committed to ending Assad’s cruel rule, but they are a diverse, fluid and unstable collection of groups whose agendas and interests compete with one another as well as reflecting the interests of foreign powers. The character of the rebel movement becomes a crucial consideration when we turn to the question of the wisdom of the UK collaborating in supplying it with lethal military support. I note that, following the lifting of the EU arms embargo in May, the Foreign Secretary said:

“We haven’t taken any decision about funding”—

arming the rebels—

“but we don’t rule any option out”.

I understand that, but it is a statement that raises the question: what exactly is the justification for arming Syrian rebel forces? Is it that it would help bring a decisive victory? If so I fear that that is heroic given the facts on the ground. Would it level the playing field? If so, it does not seem a strategy likely to reduce violence, but rather to prolong it. As the Foreign Secretary himself said:

“There is no purely military victory available to either side without even greater loss of life”.

Is the case that tilting the balance would be more likely to lead to a military stalemate so that Assad would agree to come to the negotiating table? If so, how realistic is that, given that Assad seems to be doubling down in his military strategy, given that he continues to receive extensive support from other countries, and given that the insistence that Assad cannot be part of a post-conflict transition—whatever the wisdom of that position—is unlikely to make him want to put his weapons down? Or perhaps the case is that arming the rebels makes a palace coup in Damascus to depose Assad more likely? If so, that is a highly speculative basis for such a consequential strategic decision.

Given the state of play of the conflict, I am not convinced that arming the rebels can plausibly be thought to be part of a strategy that reduces violence rather than fuels it. There is a second consideration: what assurances do we have that any weaponry given would stay in the hands of moderate rebels rather than Islamist rebels? The Foreign Secretary has said that non-lethal equipment has already been given to the rebels and that there is no evidence it has got into the wrong hands. With respect, that is insufficient reassurance, for many reasons. There are reports of clashes between rebel groups over resources such as oil already. The market for lethal equipment is significantly different to that for non-lethal equipment; and the consequences of it falling into the wrong hands are much more severe. The absence of systems of monitoring is therefore considerably more concerning in the case of lethal assistance. The Minister alluded to the possibility of Syria becoming a failed state. How do we know that the weapons will even stay inside the borders of Syria?

There is also concern about the compatibility between a strategy of opening up the possibility of arming rebels and the credibility of a commitment to a negotiated solution. Does the Minister agree in retrospect that it was perhaps short-sighted for the Government to use the run-up to the G8 summit spending so much time talking about the case for arming the rebels, rather than how to secure a start date for the Geneva II conference? Is there not a danger that offering more weapons might encourage the rebels to seek a military victory rather than resolution in a negotiated settlement?

Overall, concerns about the coherence of the rebel forces, the security of the destination of weapons, the improbability that making more weapons available would bring a quick end to the conflict and the tension between moving towards Geneva II and making more arms available all combine to suggest that arming the rebels would not be a move likely to help to reduce violence and promote stability.

I turn to a further reason why we should be reticent about increasing the supply of arms inside Syria. The conflict is fast spilling over into the wider region; in Iraq, for example, it is having a seriously destabilising effect. Sectarian tensions are growing as Sunni minority protests in favour of reform combine with growing Shia angst that a pan-national Sunni counteroffensive is mobilising across the region. In Turkey, border incidents such as the bomb that killed 50 people on 11 May reflect the porous frontier across which insurgent groups pass every day. Turkey’s relations with Iraq, Syria and Iran have degenerated spectacularly, while domestic political unrest is increasing.

Lebanon is perhaps of most immediate concern in the fallout zone. It is the country that is first in line for contagion, but also a metaphor for the fragility of the entire region. Although it has a population of only 8 million it has taken more than 500,000 refugees. It is divided internally on Sunni-Shia lines and has a weak central state and porous borders. It is very close to major population centres in Syria, and Hezbollah operates as a state within a state. In recent months Lebanon has delayed elections and lost a Government, while in June, fighting between the Lebanese army and radical Sunni groups and Alawite-Sunni tensions have led to violence and death in different parts of the country.

Given Lebanon’s fragility and importance as a nexus of conflict for the entire region, it deserves our attention, even though it has traditionally fallen into the francophone area of influence. Will the Minister explain what we are doing to support the Lebanese Government and their army at this crucial time? What more could we do directly to ensure that some sort of stability is maintained in the crucial coming months? In particular, is the Minister alive to the perception some in Lebanon have that the West talks only to Sunni and not Shia groups, and to the destabilising potential that such perceptions may inadvertently have?

The danger that the Syrian conflict will trigger conflicts among neighbours with porous borders should make us think twice before embarking on a strategy of providing more weapons. However, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, the alternative to supporting military action is not inaction. Although we are a long way from being the major influence on the region, there is much we can and should be doing or even leading on in the international community to improve the situation. In the short term we can prioritise working with Governments in the countries most at risk of spillover, to shore up the legitimacy of internal state structures. We should prioritise ensuring that G8 countries honour their commitments to supporting humanitarian assistance to refugees, and should lead the case for pressing for greater and safer access for aid agencies. We should focus our engagement with the rebels on unifying them, rather than arming them, and should spend diplomatic capital on urging other actors in the region not to take action that escalates the conflict from either side.

However, we should also make it a priority to think about the format, structure and terms of the negotiations that—one day—will be the only means to a stable solution. A central issue is to understand whose participation will be needed in those negotiations if their outcome has a chance of ending the violence. The noble Lord, Lord Williams of Baglan, who has considerable experience and wisdom in matters of international diplomacy, has remarked:

“Negotiating with friends and allies is never the challenge. The real diplomatic challenge has always been negotiating with those with whom we are diametrically opposed”.

The question of whether any stability can be secured in Syria without engaging with Iran in particular is a serious and very difficult one. We stand side by side with the Government in their stance towards Iran, on both the nuclear security issue and in condemning their sponsorship of violence and terrorism outside Iran. However, the election of President Rouhani last month seems to offer tentative grounds for some cautious optimism about a change of stance in Tehran. Of course, it is very early days, but to hear President Rouhani promise “constructive interaction” with the world through a moderate policy, pledge that Iran is,

“ready to show more transparency”,

and that it will build a new relationship with the international community marks at least a rhetorical departure from his predecessor’s posturing. In light of this, and with the genuine full understanding that we must wait for change to become more than a promise, will the Minister tell us whether there are plans to engage in a different way with Iran under President Rouhani, and whether she thinks that Iranian participation in any Geneva II conference is either possible or desirable?

The sad truth is that an end to the Syrian civil war seems a long way off. Only by facing up to the fundamental facts of the conflict—that there is no prospect of decisive victory, that the conflict has started to destabilise the wider region, and that a number of external powers have become actively engaged—will we gain a proper perspective on the likely consequences of any further intervention of our own.

Syria

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the Statement. We have all watched events unfold in Syria with increasing horror, and we on this side of the House share the determination that Britain plays its part, in partnership with the international community, in helping to bring about a cessation of violence. I shall ask questions about three aspects of the Statement: first, arming the Syrian rebels; secondly, efforts to bring about a long-term settlement in Syria; and thirdly, humanitarian assistance to the victims of this horrific war.

I begin with the issue of arming the rebels. The Prime Minister has suggested in recent months that arming the rebels is key to tipping the balance and creating peace in Syria. The Statement said that:

“The case for further amendments to the EU arms embargo on Syria is compelling, in order to increase the pressure on the regime and to give us the flexibility to respond to continued radicalisation and conflict. We have to be open to every way of strengthening moderates and saving lives”.

This signal should not surprise us. In recent weeks, there have been reports of a confidential document that sets out a range of options that would allow the UK to send lethal support to Syria’s opposition. The Statement had carefully chosen words on this subject. However, I believe that the prospect of what could be a decade-long sectarian civil war in Syria, fuelled in part by weapons supplied by us or others, should give the Minister and her colleagues serious pause for thought before embracing that course of action.

The struggle in Syria today is between forces funded and armed by outside sponsors, notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran. Also participating are foreign religious groups, not directly controlled by the sponsors, namely the Sunni, Salafist and Iranian-aligned militias, together with anti-western al-Qaeda-aligned fighters. So will the noble Baroness answer these questions? If the Government’s priority is peace, how does contemplating arming the rebels address the central question faced by the international community: how to create a sustainable political settlement in a fractured country? Surely future actions or policies of the UK Government should be adopted only on the basis of their capacity to contribute to that peaceful outcome.

Syria today is awash with weaponry. So what is the Minister’s assessment of how much weaponry would be required to tip the balance against Assad, and how in practical terms will the Government ensure that if they supply weapons they do not fall into the hands of al-Qaeda supporting jihadists? The choice for the international community today is not between sending military support to Syria’s opposition and doing nothing. Assad is sustained by external support from Russia and Iran and the foreign funds that allow him to pay his forces. Will the Minister explain why this Statement did not place more emphasis on the practical steps that could be taken to choke off Assad’s finances and the country’s energy supplies through the effective enforcement of sanctions?

Secondly, I turn to questions about international efforts at establishing a settlement in Syria, in particular an international peace conference. I agree with the Minister that we should seize the opportunity afforded by the proposed US-Russia conference to try to end the fighting and prevent the Lebanisation of Syria. We will continue to argue for exactly this type of direct engagement with the Russians, as we have done for some time. As a country which has experienced minority rule for 40 years, a comprehensive peace settlement for Syria must be inclusive. So all parts of the country’s diverse society should be involved in this peace conference—whether Alawite, Sunni, Kurd, Shia, Druze or Christian—because it would be wrong to underestimate the fear, particularly in the Alawite community, but elsewhere as well, that a change from minority rule to democracy provokes.

We have learnt from recent history that when a country with such a range of religious and ethnic identities emerges from a bloody war, communities can be slow to trust each other again. In this regard, will the Minister tell us what lessons she draws from the experience of Syria’s neighbour Iraq, where the disbanding of the Ba’ath Party and its associated structures contributed to the challenges that that country faced in the immediate post-war period? Will the Minister also explain the Government’s assessment of the scale of post-conflict planning by partners in the international community currently under way and what role our Government play in facilitating that? Will the Minister also assure the House that in the Government’s conversations with the Syrian national council and with our allies, they are making the case for the importance of a peace conference which genuinely involves all parts of Syria’s diverse society?

Thirdly, I turn to the issues around humanitarian assistance. We strongly welcome the Government’s humanitarian funding for the Syrian people, but I am sure the Minister accepts that Britain alone cannot take on the burden of upscaling the humanitarian response in Syria in the wake of a peace agreement. It is vital that the Foreign Secretary delivers on the pledge he made at the G8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting he chaired, when he said that his priority was,

“ensuring that donors who generously pledged their support at the Kuwait conference fulfil their commitments”.

What are the Government doing to ensure that all those commitments from different countries are turned into payments to help rebuild Syria? I finish by asking the Minister for a final assurance: that before any decision to loosen the EU arms embargo is taken, she or a colleague will come in advance to this House and make the case for doing so?

Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, for a provocative and quite brilliant contribution today. It makes me wish I had heard all his contributions over the previous 25 years or so. I offer him my best wishes for the future.

There was a time when the ambition to make progress in disarmament was considered a sign of naivety in international affairs. I am pleased to say, as this excellent debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has demonstrated, that this is no longer true and that the commitment to multilateral disarmament is shared by those of all parties and no party.

This is as true internationally as it is of the debate in Britain. To quote President Obama, the ambition,

“to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”,

has in the past few years come to enjoy support from American Administrations, both Republican and Democrat, Presidents of the Soviet Union and of Russia and the Global Zero campaign’s advocates, who include a roll call of distinguished figures from dozens of countries.

It is worth reminding ourselves why multilateral disarmament is so vital to the world’s safety and security. First, the end of the Cold War marked the expiry of Cold War security doctrines that relied so heavily on nuclear weapons, in particular the American-Soviet deterrence doctrines. Deterrence of course remains crucial, but relying excessively on nuclear weapons to do the deterring is not only more hazardous, but less effective in a world where the threats we face are changing in character, where states still threaten but, increasingly, not only states threaten.

Secondly, the international community’s commitment to multilateral disarmament is the corollary of its determination to prevent nuclear proliferation. Maintaining minimally sufficient arsenals, inside an international legal framework that has verified constraints on nuclear weapons, is the only way to combine national security needs with a minimisation of the risks of proliferation. Reversing our reliance on nuclear weapons globally is integral to preventing their proliferation into dangerous hands. However, there is a moral pressure point here, too. If we demand that states without nuclear weapons commit to never having them, possessor states have a duty and self-interest to take the necessary steps towards co-ordinated disarmament. It is the bargain at the heart of the non-proliferation treaty, and as concerns about North Korea, Iran and nuclear terrorism increase, its logic becomes more, not less, compelling.

Over the past 25 years, I am proud to say that Britain has been a leader both in its own unilateral actions and internationally. We have eliminated two complete weapons systems. We are the only possessor country to have a deterrent based on just one system. We have reduced the number of warheads by 75% since the end of the Cold War, so that we now have less than 1% of the global stockpile. We have led the way on nuclear security through our global threat reduction programme, which has helped nearly 20 beneficiary countries so far. We are world leaders in innovation in the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles and in proposals such as a generalisable nuclear fuel guarantee. I pay tribute to this Government for continuing our leadership on reducing dependence on nuclear weapons with their decision to reduce the number of operational warheads and reducing our overall stockpile.

That is a strong moral lead, and it puts the UK in a position to be a demandeur with our allies and beyond, and to make real and continuing progress in multilateral disarmament. As Malcolm Rifkind said last year at the Munich Security Conference, momentum is everything. 2009-10 was, as many speakers have said, in many respects a period of optimism. There was the innovation of the nuclear security summit cycle; a new START treaty and the NPT Review Conference in 2010. However, that momentum has now stalled. Optimism about further progress in US-Russia disarmament discussions is hard to find. Progress on the outcomes of the 2010 NPT conference has been limited at best. The attention of the possessor states is rightly focused on the dangers posed by Iran, North Korea and others, but the price has been a further detachment between the twin goals of non-proliferation and multilateral disarmament. Meanwhile, there is the continuing backdrop of China, India and Pakistan focusing more on expanding and modernising their nuclear weapons capacity than seeking to limit it.

It is not our responsibility alone to prioritise regaining this momentum, but it is our responsibility. With the start of the second term of President Obama’s Administration, we have a chance to try to restore American focus on this issue, too.

What needs to be done? I think the challenges lie in four different areas, and I ask for the Minister’s view on the Government’s plans in each. First, we need to restore energy to building the architecture of treaties and regimes that breed confidence, and that attempt to bring as many states as possible into the net of international legal obligations around nuclear weapons, nuclear material and nuclear security.

Specifically, we have slightly less than two years to show concrete progress on the range of commitments under the NPT Treaty before the 2014 PrepCom meeting. What are the UK’s priorities? The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty still awaits the signatures of eight countries that hold nuclear technology. Key to this is the United States. President Obama has said that he will pursue ratification with the Senate. Can the Minister reassure us that we are using our relationship with the White House and State Department to ensure that he lives up to this commitment?

I also ask the Minister for her assessment of the prospects of two other initiatives. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, mentioned, the postponement of the Helsinki conference for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons suggests bleak prospects, but I hope that she can provide some silver lining. What are the prospects for the elusive fissile material cut-off treaty? They should have improved since President Obama reversed the Americans’ long-standing problem with verification methods. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, pointed out, Pakistan is a stumbling block here. Will the Minister say what pressure is being brought to bear on the Pakistani Government?

Secondly, we need to continue momentum in measures to increase nuclear security. This is crucial to confidence-building, perhaps more than anything else, and is key to unlocking progress on both the non-proliferation and the disarmament fronts. The nuclear security summits cycle has been one of the best developments in recent years. The summits have led to important first steps in areas such as safe disposal of highly enriched uranium. Britain has led the way in this area—in research work, in international assistance to other states, and in transparency by opening up to review missions from the IAEA. Will the Minister confirm that the UK is on course to meet its commitments for the next nuclear security summit in Holland and outline its agenda for that summit?

Thirdly, we need to build on the real achievements of the START treaty signed in 2010 by Russia and the USA in significantly reducing the numbers of deployed strategic warheads and missile launchers, and in achieving some progress on monitoring and inspections. That treaty looked for a while as though it would be the prelude to further milestones on US-Russia co-operation on disarmament. As many speakers have said, sadly, that has not materialised. What does the Minister think is a realistic ambition for phase 2 of the START process? How can the UK play a supporting role in helping to bring that about?

There is one area in particular where I believe there exists widespread support for a major breakthrough; namely, the goal of NATO and Russia removing all tactical nuclear weapons from combat bases on the European continent. Attachments to legacies of the Cold War with little or no credible deterrence capability drains valuable resources from an alliance facing up to new kinds of threats, such as those potentially in north Africa. The Global Zero Commission, which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, along with Malcolm Rifkind, David Miliband and others, has supported so vigorously, has called for the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe to be the next disarmament priority. Do the Government share that view?

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

I am listening very closely to the noble Lord’s setting out of the policy of the Opposition. Given that the British nuclear deterrent, as has already been pointed out, is about the smallest of any of the nuclear powers, does he believe that the next step for this country would be to look again at continuous-at-sea?

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

The noble Baroness has interrupted just as I was about to come to that issue. There are also issues around Britain’s own deterrent which have been widely discussed today. We must ensure that disarmament activity is conducted in a transparent and verifiable manner. That is why the previous Government initiated their work with Norway on verifiable warhead dismantlement, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and hosted the first P5 consultations on disarmament in London in September 2009. The dangers of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and insecurity around nuclear materials should make us more determined than ever to achieve co-ordinated disarmament but they also continue to justify our retention of the minimum capacity needed to achieve our deterrence objectives. Coming to the noble Baroness’s point, we in this party have said that we are open to examining any new evidence since our review of Britain’s nuclear weapons arsenal in 2006 and we will consider its findings alongside other studies, such as the cross-party BASIC Trident Commission, which is chaired by my noble friend Lord Browne, to see if there are credible alternatives.

In our view, that examination should have two priorities—capability and cost. With that in mind, we look forward to the publication of the Trident Alternatives Review, which Danny Alexander tantalisingly said this week,

“will set out a clear, credible, compelling, set of arguments for alternatives”.

He flagged up that there may be seven or eight alternatives in the mix. Will the Minister clarify how open her part of the Government is to the alternatives that might arise from that?

Lastly, there is a group of more conceptual although equally crucial issues around the doctrines that make up our security concepts. I appreciate that there are limits to what the Minister can say on UK thinking on these issues but perhaps she will say whether the Government are alive to making progress on defence concepts that are less dependent on nuclear weapons and whether NATO is planning to address this issue in any way.

John F Kennedy remarked:

“The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution”.

He also said:

“Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment … The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us”.

That was more than 50 years ago at a time in history that now seems a world away. But it was a time that was, if anything, more ordered in terms of nuclear security than the one we live in now. The nuclear era in the wake of the Cold War is much more hazardous and more economically burdensome. The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons may seem a dim prospect at the moment. But just as the difficulty of preventing nuclear proliferation should inspire us to redouble our efforts to contain the spread of nuclear technology, so the difficulty of maintaining momentum on multilateral disarmament should inspire us to be leaders among nuclear weapons states in the future.