Queen’s Speech

Lord Wood of Anfield Excerpts

Thursday 17th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wood of Anfield]

My Lords, I, too, thank FCO and MoD staff around the world for their extraordinary service and dedication. I know from my own time as an adviser in the previous Government that their professionalism, discretion and judgment are huge assets to this country in good as well as difficult times.

When the Prime Minister and his team came to power two years ago, they made it clear that their foreign policy would not be driven by any doctrine or philosophy. Instead, the Foreign Secretary pledged to be hard-headed and pragmatic. Not for him were wild fancies of reform of the architecture of international institutions, or visions of the future of Europe or the Atlantic alliance. Instead, the direction of foreign policy has, at most, been characterised by certain themes: taking emerging nations seriously rather than the traditional preoccupation with the troika of Europe, the Middle East and the USA; putting Britain’s commercial interests at the heart of foreign policy; and focusing on building up a portfolio of strong bilateral relationships rather than investing in multilateralism.

Many observers will support these themes and may have sympathy for underpromising on the vision front when it comes to foreign policy. But the modesty of the Government’s overall approach to foreign policy has, I fear, become a liability rather than an asset. Although muddling through may have been an adequate approach in normal times, it is an approach that looks rudderless in the times of extraordinary and unexpected changes that we are living through.

We are living in times where Europe finds itself in a protracted economic crisis that has become a political crisis, in which democracy and growth have been weakened while austerity and anti-political sentiment have strengthened. The Arab world has seen an uprising against non-democratic regimes—a popular rejection of the false choice between radical Islamism on the one hand and stability based on repression on the other. Yet there is continuing uncertainty about what comes next. We have witnessed the death of bin Laden, widespread war-weariness in response to the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, a shift in American priorities to trans-Pacific rather than transatlantic relations and, recently, Brazil overtaking Britain as the sixth-largest economy in the world.

These are dramatic changes in the landscape and Britain has a reasonable expectation to know the Government’s strategy in response to them. Where do they see Britain’s place in this changing world? Where should we concentrate our efforts and where should we be less engaged? You would be hard pushed to find their answers. It is one thing to boast the absence of doctrine and quite another to lack coherence. Yet that is what the respected Atlantic Council earlier this week concluded about this Government’s foreign policy. It said that the,

“coalition government has yet to develop a coherent strategic vision for the United Kingdom’s role in a changing global landscape”.

It went on that,

“British foreign policy vision and strategy remain unclear,”

and,

“threatens to leave London isolated”.

There is no better example of that than the Government’s approach to defence. Their 2010 strategic defence and security review failed to provide any genuine strategic rethinking of Britain’s role in the world and did not survive its first contact with reality. It delivered aircraft carriers without aircraft—an extraordinary outcome that the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, described as,

“little more use than a pub with no beer”.

It made our Libyan operations dependent on a frigate planned to be cut and Tornado jets set to be reduced. It was characterised by a rapid lunge for savings rather than a considered review of strategy, and the recent U-turn on the Joint Strike Fighter—reinstating a Conservative cut to the procurement plan inherited from Labour—shows what happens when decisions are taken too quickly and ends are not supported by means.

When it comes to European matters, I confess initially to having been baffled by what exactly the Government thought they were doing. There have been consistencies, in particular the Conservative part of the coalition’s determination to plunge cavalierly into isolation within Europe. It began back in opposition days when, as is now widely known, David Cameron made a deal with his Eurosceptic—more accurately, Euroseparatist—Back-Benchers to pull the Conservative Party out of the mainstream centre-right grouping in order to form a new grouping of what might politely be called maverick parties further to the right. The result has been diplomatic isolation of the Conservative Party in Europe.

Late last year came the decision to pull out of participation in the process of drawing up a new fiscal compact. British business was crying out for influence at a time of economic turmoil but the Prime Minister once again chose isolation. He said that he could not receive guarantees on behalf of the City of London but then walked away, ensuring his inability to protect its or any other British interests in the continuing series of monthly discussions that followed. He apparently thought that fellow non-euro countries would join him—they did not. He then claimed that he had managed the extraordinary achievement of vetoing a treaty before it had even been written. The Deputy Prime Minister disagreed, saying:

“The language gets confusing. Veto suggests something was stopped. It was not stopped”.

Indeed, it was not: something that walked, talked and smelt like a treaty got signed earlier this year by euro countries whom it affected. Non-euro countries that stayed in and ratified the arrangement without being affected by its terms got the right to attend and participate in some of the eurozone meetings on wider issues of competitiveness and institutional arrangements. Britain is not there. The Prime Minister’s team said, “Ah, but by not signing this ‘non-treaty’, we ensured that it would not be justiciable in the European Court”—except that they had not. Article 8 of the new treaty made clear that the ECJ’s rulings on issues brought to it under the treaty would be binding. The whole episode has been a mess, a sacrifice of British influence for the sake of keeping the Conservative Party from splitting at the seams.

Not content with institutional isolation on an unprecedented scale, recent months have seen the Government develop a penchant for diplomatic isolation inside the EU as well. The Prime Minister twice declined to meet—even informally—with Mr Hollande, first in Paris and then in London. Instead, Mr Cameron took the unusual step of endorsing Mr Hollande’s opponent, President Sarkozy, in Le Figaro. That approach caused consternation not just in France but in the ranks of our own Foreign Office. One senior diplomat told the Daily Mail:

“We put all the chips on one card and it turned out not to be the ace … It was an error of judgment and not what was advised”.

What is the Government’s approach to the current crisis of the euro? On Sunday, George Osborne angrily warned of the self-fulfilling dangers of speculating about the demise of the euro. Today his boss, the Prime Minister, said it was time for leaders of the euro to make up or break up. Which is it? Is the Government’s policy that the euro should survive, or that it might be better if it breaks up? The Government want us to believe that the problem of the euro lies in the design and policies of the euro area alone. We all know that there are problems galore in that area, but the Government want us to believe that it is just their problem and theirs to sort out. The British public, however, as well as the electorates of France and elsewhere, know that there is a second element to Europe’s economic crisis: the failure of a politics of austerity of which the Government are a champion, not simply a spectator.

Rather than continue this mixture of thinly veiled Schadenfreude, issuing dramatic ultimatums to Merkel, Hollande and others from the sidelines and calling those who disagree with government policies dangerous, does not the Minister agree that the Prime Minister would be better advised to engage in helping to find a solution to this crisis, and at least contemplate the possibility that his approach to recovery through austerity is just not working?

Finally on Europe, in the gracious Speech, the Government outlined their plans to approve Croatia’s entry into the EU and to remove future UK liabilities for European bailouts. We will work constructively with the Government when we see those Bills, but is the Minister confident that his own party’s Back-Benchers will do likewise? Given his party’s record on rebellions over Europe, including what I believe was the largest post-war Commons Back-Bench rebellion, is he 100% sure that there is not trouble ahead for his Government from those who see even the slightest treaty change as reason either to say no or to demand a referendum?

I turn to the Middle East, where the most pressing and worrying issue is the continuing oppression and violence in Syria. We have supported the Government’s approach since violence began last year, including their support for the Annan peace plan, but it is difficult to view the continuing cocktail of oppression by the Assad regime, inter-ethnic violence, recurrent terrorist attacks, and, just last weekend, spillover of violence into northern Lebanon, with anything other than serious pessimism. Does the Minister remain confident that the existing approach of the international community will achieve any success in limiting the violence and halting the spread of the conflict?

When it comes to Israel-Palestine, I am pleased to say that all sides of the House share the ambition of helping to secure a universally recognised Israeli state living alongside a sovereign and viable Palestinian state. That outcome can be achieved only through a negotiated settlement between the parties involved. Although the region is no nearer either peace or even a peace process than it was two years ago, the international community has a role beyond simply being interested spectators. We must continue to condemn the appalling rocket attacks from Gaza, and at the same time continue to call on Israel to cease settlement building on Palestinian land. We must also, in an atmosphere where militants committed to violence threaten to attract support away from moderates committed to peace, do what we can to strengthen the hands of the moderates. In that context, we felt it right last year to support the recognition of Palestine in the context of its application to join UNESCO. Does the Minister continue to think that the Government’s refusal to recognise Palestine was correct, and can he clarify whether he speaks for both parties in the coalition if he answers that it was?

We recognise the continuing threat that Iran’s policy towards its nuclear programme poses to Israel and to the wider region. That policy must change, and the Government’s support for strict sanctions on the regime is entirely right and welcome. However, will the Government clarify whether Britain is seeking to postpone an EU ban on insurance for ships carrying Iranian oil, as has been reported recently? Perhaps the Minister would also clarify what is the UK government’s agenda for the P5+1 talks with Iran in Baghdad next week?

In Afghanistan Britain has nearly 10,000 troops actively engaged, and our gratitude to them for their extraordinary bravery and sacrifice cannot be repeated often enough. Again, we welcome the fact that a cross-party consensus, even in the most trying and difficult times, has been maintained. Progress has been made, in particular with the growth in the size of the Afghan national army, but, as ever, serious challenges remain, and as NATO nations’ attention turns to exit dates and the logistics of winding down their military commitment, the nature of those challenges is changing.

While we support the Government’s actions in Afghanistan, I confess to having concerns that the Prime Minister’s commitment to making it his “number one priority” is slightly at odds with the fact that it is nearly a year since he made a parliamentary Statement about it. First, the NATO summit in Chicago takes place next week and, in light of recent announcements by the Australian Government, the incoming French President and President Obama, one key issue for Britain must surely be to ensure that NATO brings order to bear on individual countries’ dates for withdrawing their forces. Secondly, Chicago must provide greater clarity about the status of forces agreement between Afghanistan and those forces remaining in the country after 2014. Thirdly, there are widespread concerns that insufficient international diplomatic efforts are being applied to the task of achieving a lasting political settlement in Afghanistan. It is a subject we have heard little on from this Government, and there is no standing process in place to reassure Afghans and the wider region that it is the focus of the international community’s attention. We know from experience in Iraq of the dangers of not planning sufficiently for building a lasting peace. There can be no basic stability in Afghanistan without serious work to build self-sufficient political processes.

My colleague and noble friend Lady Kinnock will address issues around development policy and Africa later. I would like to finish by looking at the issue of the Government’s approach to multilateralism. It is fair to characterise the UK’s approach to engaging with the wider world as bilateralism writ large. With economic as well as strategic interests in mind, it has picked a selection of countries and focused its diplomatic and commercial efforts on building better links with them. It is an approach captured in the beautifully vague phrase in the gracious Speech that the Government will build relations with the emerging powers. However, where does this leave the Government’s approach to multilateral institutions? The challenges we face as a country—climate change, global economic instability, terrorism, food and water supply issues, and a gradual, cumulative shift in wealth and power to the east and south—do not observe geographical borders. We are moving from a world where military, diplomatic and economic power is no longer concentrated in one or maybe two great powers but is becoming de-aligned, fragmented and uncertain. These are challenges to which bilateralism writ large cannot provide an adequate response.

This is why the case for multilateralism embedded in strong international institutions and based on consent in the international community is so strong—and so much in our national interest. Yet multilateralism is not in great shape at the moment: Doha has been stalled for years; the international climate change agreements are making inadequate progress to meet the scale of the challenge we face; prospects for an arms trade treaty do not look very promising; and the G8 and G20’s response to continuing economic uncertainty in the last two years has hardly encouraged faith in those forums’ capacity to mount a fight-back against collapsing growth, fragile banks and low confidence. This is a time for Britain to lead in helping to restore faith in multilateral institutions, but the Government are showing no leadership whatever at the multilateral level. I would struggle to find any even semi-seasoned observers of the Government’s foreign policy to tell us what their plan of action is for the upcoming G8 summit, let alone what they want to achieve when the UK takes over the chairmanship in 2013. I know that June is next month rather than this, and so a long way off, but I have not got the first clue what Britain wants out of the G20 meeting in 32 days at Los Cabos.

The Government may eschew doctrines as flights of utopian fancy, but sometimes doctrines are revealed by silences rather than speeches. The Government’s continuing failure to take multilateralism seriously is not the hallmark of realpolitik but a failure to take a hard-headed, long-term view of the British national interest. Oscillating between isolationism and rhetorical bursts from the sidelines does not add up to a foreign policy. If the goal is, as it should be, to serve our strategic and economic interests by building stronger institutions and more effective rules in the international arena, foreign policy must be much more than simply an occasional opportunity to seek domestic political advantage at home.