Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Merron

Committee stage
Friday 20th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Causation is denied. My noble and learned friend can read it in Hansard, and I spoke to her outside. It is a testament to her dedication that she has been following this on TV. I do not know whether that shows how poor daytime TV normally is, though those of us who were here on Wednesday will remember that your Lordships’ House is very late night TV as well.

I spoke on the amendments when we first touched on this topic in Committee, right at the beginning. As my noble friend Lady Coffey said, those amendments interrelate with what has been discussed today. The Front Bench is focused on the question of making sure that we do not end up with a situation where different citizens and residents in the United Kingdom have substantially different rights in areas as important as this. I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, said about what actually happened in the Senedd. The phrase “voting in the dark” was a stark one, which I think we ought to remember.

On the question of what the Bill actually does, I am reminded of when I studied private international law, where you have something called the characterisation question—something that lawyers often like. It basically goes like this: in order to get the answer you want, you rephrase the question to focus on the bit of the problem which you want to focus on. In this case, you ask the question, “What does this Bill do?” The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile of Berriew, rightly say, as a matter of form, that the Bill amends the criminal law and therefore is a competence of Westminster. In reality, assisted dying will not be provided by the criminal justice system. In practice, it will be provided by the health service. That is why I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said: in practice, this is a Bill which touches on health, which is a devolved competence.

That brings me to the wider and more important point. Earlier this week, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, raised Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man—the Crown dependencies—in the debate on the Crime and Policing Bill. We also learned this week that the Scottish Parliament has chosen not to proceed with the version—and it was a different version —of this Bill proposed there. If this Bill were to receive Royal Assent, we would therefore end up in a position where substantially different rights would exist for different residents and citizens in the United Kingdom.

That raises an important point of principle, on which I would be interested to hear the noble and learned Lord’s view. Does he see it as a success of devolution that, on an issue as significant as this, people living in different parts of the United Kingdom—and for the purposes of this group of amendments, Wales—might have different rights in law, or does he have a potential solution to create a situation where, as close as possible, people have the same or substantially the same rights?

I respectfully ask the Minister to respond on this point as well. Frequently, we have heard from the Front Bench the phrase, “We are neutral”—that the Government are interested only in workability and will look at these issues as and when they arise. However, this is a deep constitutional issue. The Government cannot be neutral on the point of whether they are content in principle that people in England might have different rights on assisted dying from people in Wales. The Government ought to have a stance on that fundamental constitutional position. The Government also ought to have a position on the point raised by my noble friend Lord Deben as to whether, if this Bill were to go through, with palliative care being such an important part of the overall process, they would equalise funding to make sure that residents of Wales have the same access in practice to palliative care as those of us who live in England do.

For those reasons, I look forward to the responses of both the noble and learned Lord and the Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the views that have been expressed today. As usual, I will keep my remarks to those amendments that raise significant legal, technical or operational workability concerns. I very much associate myself from these Benches with the welcome to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis. We were delighted to see her return to your Lordships’ House and look forward to hearing from her.

I turn first to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. Taken together, they would restrict eligibility for assisted dying to England only and exclude people resident in Wales, registered with a Welsh GP or who have recently moved across the border. They would remove the powers of Welsh Ministers to issue regulations and guidance and limit the commissioner’s monitoring functions to England. Individually and as a group, the amendments could have complex effects, risk significant unintended consequences and lead to a lack of clarity about eligibility and the effect of the law across the England-Wales border.

Restricting the Bill to England, as we have heard, would also create a divergence in the criminal law of England and Wales. The protections in Clause 32 would not apply in Wales and the Suicide Act 1961 would continue to apply there as it does at present. It would therefore be an offence to take steps in Wales to assist access to an assisted death in England even where lawful under the Bill in England. That would represent a significant divergence in homicide- and suicide-related offences and run counter to the current devolution settlement.

Amendment 887 would remove Clause 57(2) and (3), preventing certain provisions from extending to Scotland and Northern Ireland, including those on approved substances, advertising, and employment protections. This would risk parallel and potentially conflicting regulatory regimes; may allow advertising of services in Scotland and Northern Ireland, contrary to restrictions in England and Wales; and could leave health professionals who, for example, live in Scotland but work in England and Wales without the same employment protections as someone in England.

There are a number of further amendments in this group concerning powers in the Bill relating to the provision of an assisted dying service in Wales; namely, Amendment 765, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, Amendment 764, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and Amendments 742, 743, 844, 903, 905 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. I bring to the attention of noble Lords that these amendments may alter or impinge on the devolution settlement. Any such changes would usually be made following consultation across the UK Government and with the Welsh Government to explore the wider implications. Further, the Senedd would be expected to consider material changes that affect devolved competence.

Amendment 762, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would require the Secretary of State to specify which organisations will provide assisted dying services in Wales, within one month of the Act passing. This raises workability concerns as it requires clarity on who provides services before key implementation decisions have been made. This could be an interference with the ability of the Welsh Ministers in the devolution settlement to exercise their powers in a devolved area. As regulations under Clause 42 are made using the affirmative procedure, this amendment would also require parliamentary debates in both Houses within one month of the Bill being enacted.

Amendment 767A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, appears to seek to limit the power of Welsh Ministers to make regulations related to private services only and would make Welsh Ministers unable to establish a publicly commissioned service. As currently drafted, the Bill leaves this as a decision for Welsh Ministers. This amendment would therefore have devolution impacts and, if passed, the Welsh Government would need to be reconsulted and the consent of the Senedd would need to be sought for this provision.

I make no comments on the other amendments in this group. As noble Lords are aware, those amendments have not had technical drafting support from officials. Therefore, any further revision and corresponding amendments may be provided to provide consistent and coherent terminology throughout the Bill.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

We all know what we are talking about here, but yes, absolutely.

This all goes back to the fundamental point of the Bill. I am addressing this point because the hypothesis is that the person has less than six months to live but, notwithstanding that, we are making sure that this particular group of people have an independent advocate. My point is simply that, if we are going to go down this road, there needs to be consistency: if they are not going to have an independent advocate, they really need to confirm it rather than merely indicate it. I apologise for my slightly loose language; the noble Baroness was quite right to pick me up on that. I hope the noble and learned Lord will consider my point as to whether “indicating” is actually the right test in subsection (2)(b)(ii) of his proposed new clause.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am most grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate on independent advocates. I will limit my comments to those amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

I turn first to Amendments 168, 300 and 553, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Without further consequential changes, Amendment 168 would result in an internal inconsistency with the framework currently set out in the Bill, which provides an independent advocate only for certain qualifying persons.

Similar concerns arise with Amendment 300, which seeks to establish a new system of advocates for disabled people. It is important to note—not just in reference to these amendments, which I heard the noble Baroness acknowledge are not quite as she might wish them to be, but in relation to the debate—that the Equality Act 2010 definition of disability is very broad. For example, it includes those with cancer. As a result, most people who are terminally ill for the purposes of the Bill would fall within that definition. That means that the amendment could apply to the majority of those seeking an assisted death.

Amendment 300 would require the independent advocate to confirm that the person has been offered

“all practicable social, medical, and palliative supports which are financially supported”.

However, there is no provision to ensure that the independent advocate would have access to the information needed to confirm this, which could make the amendment unworkable.

Amendment 553 relates to young adults aged 18 to 25. People in this cohort are legally adults, so the requirement for parental or guardian consent and to have an independent advocate may raise Article 8 ECHR issues relating to private and family life. To be lawful, these requirements would need to be objectively and reasonably justified and proportionate.

My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, the sponsor, tabled Amendments 548A, 549A and 862A to address workability issues with the current drafting of the Bill by clarifying the regulation-making powers and parliamentary procedures in Clause 22. The amendments set out when a qualifying person must be informed about independent advocate support and the circumstances in which that support must be provided.

Amendment 544A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, would create a conflict with Clause 22(3), which sets out the role of the independent advocate in providing support and advocacy to a qualifying person. The amendment would remove the definition of “qualifying person”, which would result in confusion about who is a qualifying person and the role of an independent advocate appointed to assist a person who is not a qualifying person.

Amendment 553B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would place a duty on the commissioner to offer the support of an “independent disability advocate” to a disabled person as defined under Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. As mentioned previously, given the breadth of the Equality Act definition, this duty would apply to most people seeking an assisted death. The amendment is unclear about the duties, training and qualifications that would be required of them.

Amendments 191 and 195 to 199, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Frost, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Gove, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, would require the Secretary of State to establish a scheme of neutral advisers to whom a person must be directed in the situation where a registered medical practitioner is unwilling or unable to conduct a preliminary discussion. The amendments are broad, ambiguously drafted and could give rise to significant workability issues.

Amendment 196 in particular would require neutral adviser organisations to make a number of very broad declarations. For example, under the amendment, a neutral adviser must declare that they do not and will not employ

“any person who has taken part in the provision of assistance for assisted dying”.

This could result in a potentially unworkable duty, as it would require the adviser to make a declaration about current and future conduct. These broad declarations could therefore be practically unworkable and create resourcing challenges by excluding significant parts of the workforce, if interpreted broadly.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Merron

Committee stage
Friday 6th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for opening the debate on this group. He is right that we should consider carefully how the most vulnerable will be protected under this legislation. Having a multidisciplinary specialist review before a person in a care home is certified to have capacity seems an interesting and a sensible safeguard. It was not clear to me whether the five working days is from the date of the review or from the date of the findings of the review, but no doubt that could be looked at and clarified.

Of course, generally, social care is a policy area that needs attention. We know that too many older people receive inadequate care in old age, and I must say that it seemed to me that the personal experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and that of my noble friend Lord Deben can both be right. It is likely that there are excellent care homes and care homes that need improvement. I am afraid that that is probably the society we live in.

Effective communication is a challenge that older people face. This is an obstacle for the process under the Bill for assessing capacity. It therefore seems sensible for specialists to be involved when the person requesting assistance is in a care home. We also have to consider the risks of institutionalisation, which I know from experience can certainly be a factor for people in care homes. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm what the Government’s conclusions are on this proposal and its workability. Would it be prohibitively costly or could it be delivered?

On the amendment from my noble friend Lady Eaton, this additional process and heightened evidential standard for persons in care homes is a constructive and interesting suggestion. I invite the Minister to update the Committee on whether the Government have considered the two separate proposals in this group and come to a view on which would be the more workable and effective if implemented. That assessment would not only be helpful to the Committee but might enable the House in due course to make a more informed decision on the best way to improve this part of the Bill on Report. If that assessment has not yet been made, perhaps the most appropriate way forward would be for Ministers to write to the Committee to update it, at some point between now and Report.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate on assessing capacity in care homes. As noble Lords will be aware, my remarks will be limited to areas where the Government have assessed that there may be major technical or operational workability concerns.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that that will include matters relating to the ECHR. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, already picked that up in his own characteristic way, but I gently say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—I know he is aware of this because of his experience—that Government Ministers have a duty to advise your Lordships’ House of implications. As I explained in the last group, decisions on the ECHR are ultimately for Parliament. I am sorry to frustrate him with repetition, but it is appropriate to the relevant considerations. I will just ask him not to listen if he feels it is very irritating.

This may be helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, as well. Amendments 112 and 111, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, aim to strengthen safeguards for care and nursing home residents by ensuring that capacity in these cases is established through specialist clinical assessment and that capacity assessments seek to rule out reversible medical causes of impaired or fluctuating capacity. The Government consider that Amendment 111 may be inconsistent with the Mental Capacity Act’s assessment framework, which does not require enhanced assessment for certain groups. I dealt with this in more detail in the last group. By requiring expert psychiatric input before capacity is confirmed, Amendment 112 could create inconsistency with the MCA’s presumption of capacity and the principle of proportionate, decision-specific assessments.

Amendment 110A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would affect care home and nursing home residents’ capacity assessments and require expert psychiatric input before capacity is confirmed. Again, this could create inconsistency with the MCA’s presumption of capacity and the principle of proportionate, decision-specific assessments.

If passed, each of these amendments would lead to a difference in treatment between care home and nursing home residents and all other citizens in assessments for assisted dying. That difference in treatment—the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, may wish to close his ears at this point—could give rise to challenge under the ECHR, particularly Article 8, which refers to respect for private and family life, and Article 14, which concerns the prohibition of discrimination. The differences in treatment would need to be justified, necessary and proportionate.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Merron

Committee stage
Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to two fundamental question: first, who should have the legal right to assistance under this Bill and, secondly, who should not. They are both important questions. We have heard concerns about eligibility throughout the discussion in Committee. In particular, the question of whether the person must be in pain to access assistance has been a point of contention. I think that will come up in the next group, on motivation.

I hope all noble Lords across the Committee will agree that the Bill needs sufficient safeguards to ensure that those asking for an assisted death meet three conditions: first, that they have sufficient reason to do so; secondly, that they have the mental capacity to do so; and, thirdly, that they are fully aware of what they are asking for. If any one of those conditions is not met then someone should not be able to ask for an assisted death on their part. That is because the Bill is generally—intentionally, as I understand it from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton—a tightly drawn proposal. Therefore, it would not be right for the Bill to become law without its provisions tightly defining assistance in line with Parliament’s intentions. I know that reports of incidents in other countries where people have used assisted dying services to end their lives for reasons other than terminal illness are concerning. Therefore, I understand the reasons why the various noble Lords have put forward the amendments in this group.

I will pick up a couple of the amendments. Amendment 28, from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, seeks to ensure that people who seek assistance are not doing so out of financial difficulties. As I understand the course of the debates, that does not run contrary to the underlying principle set out by the noble and learned Lord, so I hope he will be able to explain how protections for those in financial difficulty would function under the Bill. Can we strengthen its provisions to ensure that those in financial difficulty who are also terminally ill are not choosing to end their life mainly because of their financial circumstances?

I also highlight Amendment 39, from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, which would require a heightened evidential standard for those living in care homes and nursing homes. We know from events not only but perhaps in particular during the pandemic that those living in care homes and nursing homes are particularly vulnerable. They can be taken advantage of, so I understand the noble Baroness’s motivation in probing the noble and learned Lord on whether there are sufficient protections for vulnerable residents of care homes. Amendment 38, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, focuses on another particularly vulnerable group: those with certain mental health conditions.

The impetus of this legislation is concern for those who seek an assisted death because they are considered to be in distress or in pain and vulnerable. But in legislating for that vulnerable group, it is important that we do not unintentionally endanger other vulnerable people and groups. I therefore look forward not only to the contribution from the Minister, but to the reply from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, particularly on whether, going forward, we will receive amendments from him on a rolling basis. That would help not only those on the Committee but on the Front Bench to plan our work.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. As I have said previously, I will limit any detailed comments to amendments about which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns. To that point, I would like to clarify for the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that that does include interaction with other legislation, on account of the Government’s clear duty to the statute book. I heard the noble Baroness make a request for government engagement. Should Parliament choose to pass the Bill, we will work with stakeholders to design a robust and effective service, but in the meantime, engagement is a matter for the sponsor.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Merron

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I can be extremely brief, because of the confirmation given by the noble and learned Lord and also knowing that the substantive issues of domestic abuse, interpreters and various other matters will be dealt with in their appropriate place.

At the risk of underlining my reputation as a legal geek, I invite the noble and learned Lord’s attention to his Amendment 350, and in particular the Member’s Explanatory Statement. I understand the amendment, but I do not understand the statement. The amendment leaves out from “to” to end of the line and inserts “section 12(4) and (7)”, which are about “sharing of specialists’ opinions”. The Explanatory Statement says:

“This is a drafting change (consequential on subsection (4) being added to clause 12)”.


Now, Clause 12 already has a subsection (4), and the noble and learned Lord’s amendments to Clause 12 are to subsections (5) and (8). I do not know whether the Explanatory Statement has confused me and in fact the change is not consequential on a new subsection (4) being added but just stands in and of itself. It may be that I am confused unnecessarily, but if the noble and learned Lord could just clear up that minor point, I would be grateful.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, shall be brief. All but three of the amendments in this group have been tabled by the Bill’s sponsor and, as has been discussed, they make a series of drafting changes to the Bill, including making sure that terms are consistent throughout and removing ambiguity and duplication.

The Government are neutral on all the policy choices reflected in these amendments, as they are on the Bill as a whole, but have as usual provided drafting support to make the Bill legally workable. As a part of the discussion today, it is of course for the sponsor and for Parliament to determine whether any of the amendments that the sponsor has chosen to table have changed the intent of amendments that were debated in the other place.

Amendment 7 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seeks to amend Amendment 6 by changing a reference in Clause 1(2)(b) from “a preliminary discussion” to “their first preliminary discussion”. It does not make any wider changes to the Bill to provide for more than one preliminary discussion to take place, so this may lead to uncertainty. As with all amendments that have not had technical input from the Government, noble Lords may wish to note that the current drafting of this amendment may require further consideration to make it fully workable, effective and enforceable.

Amendments 8 and 9, on which I raise no major workability issues, appear to be trying to achieve the same purpose as Amendment 6, tabled by the Bill’s sponsor. But I would note that Amendments 8 and 9 have not had the technical drafting support from officials and therefore may not be fully workable, effective and enforceable.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right; on that point they do change the policy intention. I am grateful. I would welcome the thoughts of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, on that.

Finally, in the absence of my noble friend Lord Howe, I have been asked on his behalf to formally speak on his Amendments 301A and 305A. In speaking to those amendments, I want to highlight the threshold which is set for determining whether an individual is in England and Wales at the time of the first assessment. I hope the noble and learned Lord will be able to pick up this point.

As the Bill is drafted, the question as to whether somebody is ordinarily resident in England and Wales rests on what is called the

“opinion of the coordinating doctor”.

My concern is that an opinion without any further evidential requirement may be too low a bar, particularly given the need to guard against the risk of what has been called death tourism. In other parts of the Bill, the noble and learned Lord has used the word “satisfied”, and I think we would agree that that entails a higher evidential bar than merely “opinion”—indeed, that is also higher than “believes” or “reasonably believes”. “Satisfied” is a higher standard. When the noble and learned Lord replies, can he use that opportunity to explain why the test here is only “opinion” and not “satisfied”, as that test is used in other parts of the Bill?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate on the issue of residency and eligibility criteria. As I have already made clear and will now repeat, I will confine my comments to amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

First, I turn to the amendments which narrow the residence criteria in respect of eligibility for assistance under the Bill. Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would change the residence criteria for assistance under the Bill from requiring a person to be “ordinarily resident” to “permanently resident”. Unlike “ordinarily resident”, “permanently resident” does not have a set definition in the context of UK immigration law. It is possible that it would be taken as referring only to those who have citizenship or indefinite leave to remain, which is a much narrower scope than the current wording of “ordinarily resident”.

Similarly, Amendments 23, 309, 300A and 306A would restrict access to assisted dying support to British citizens or people with indefinite leave to remain. This may result in migrants on long-term work or study visas who have resided in England and Wales for longer than 12 months being denied access to an assisted death, thereby potentially giving rise to indirect discrimination based on race. These amendments may be subject to challenge under Article 14 of the ECHR when read with Article 8, on the basis that this may amount to unjustified discrimination. This differential treatment would require an objective and reasonable justification.

In addition, under various international agreements, the UK has an obligation not to discriminate against EU, EEA and Swiss nationals on the basis of nationality, although the agreements do not prevent restrictions on the basis of residency. Since these amendments would prevent individuals from those countries from accessing these services on an equal basis to UK citizens in the same circumstances, they are likely to be contrary to the UK’s international obligations under those agreements.

Amendments 11A, 258A, 306B and 449A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seek to change the residency requirement from “ordinarily resident” to “domiciled”. These amendments would add complexity and potential uncertainty to the eligibility requirements. “Domiciled” refers to the determination of a person’s permanent home largely for tax purposes, meaning that a person can be domiciled in a place without being resident there. It is not a familiar concept in domestic law outside of taxation, so it is unclear how it would apply in this context. Further elaboration in guidance would be needed to make these amendments workable. It is also unclear what practical impact this change would have when the Bill would still require people to be physically present in England and Wales in respect of the steps under Clauses 8, 10, 11 and 19.

I will next turn to Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Baroness Merron

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, this is the first debate in Committee on this important Bill so I hope that the Committee will allow me to take a minute or two to set out the approach of the Official Opposition. As my noble friend Lord Kamall and I said at Second Reading, the Official Opposition have no collective view on this Bill. Although each Member of the Opposition Front Bench will have their own view on the Bill, we will support noble Lords across the House in their scrutiny of the Bill. We will also table a small number of additional amendments where we feel that parts of the Bill need probing further. We will not seek to delay the passage of the Bill, nor will we seek to hold up progress in Committee. Instead, we will seriously engage in detailed scrutiny of the Bill so that we can collectively deliver the best possible piece of legislation.

In that regard, I respectfully pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for demonstrating his openness to improving the Bill already by tabling amendments that we hope to get to today and which reflect concerns that have been raised by noble Lords. I speak for all my colleagues on the Opposition Front Bench when I say that I look forward to working with him to ensure that we send a better Bill back to the other place.

The amendments in this group relate to the territorial extent of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Coffey is seeking to remove references to Wales in the Bill so that it would apply only to England. While I am not entirely persuaded that making this an England-only Bill is necessary per se, these amendments raise important questions about devolution. The core question for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is why the Bill does not apply to the whole of the United Kingdom on the one hand or only to England on the other.

At the heart of this is, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said—although various Acts of Parliament may put us to sleep, a speech by the noble and learned Lord never does; I was listening very carefully—that these amendments speak to the devolution settlement that we work with and the inconsistencies and confusions of that settlement. The noble and learned Lord used the word “complexity”. It is extremely complex. In this area, we have the problem that criminal law is not devolved to Wales whereas health is devolved. To pick up the point made by the noble and learned Lord, with which I respectfully agree, declaring the appropriate interest, Wales should not be regarded as inferior to Scotland. That is a point of general application.

The Scottish Parliament, as noble Lords know, is currently considering its own legislation on this topic. I hope that noble Lords have picked up that the Scottish Bill is significantly different in key ways—most markedly in the definition of terminal illness. In Scotland, it lacks the “six months to live” test which, whatever view we take, is at the heart of the Bill before us. The definition of terminal illness in the Scottish Bill is:

“For the purposes of this Act, a person is terminally ill if they have an advanced and progressive disease, illness or condition from which they are unable to recover and that can reasonably be expected to cause their premature death”.


I am not quite sure about “premature” in that context in all cases, but that is what the text says.

Leaving aside the point that those resident in one part of the United Kingdom will therefore have different rights to assistance under the law from those in another region of the United Kingdom should both Bills pass, I see the point that my noble friend Lady Coffey is making. If the people of Scotland may choose whether to have a law for terminally ill adults who wish to end their lives, why—I ask rhetorically, so to speak, looking forward to the response of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—should people in Wales not have the same choice? This is the key question that the noble and learned Lord has been presented with by this group of amendments.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the opening comments of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, which were helpful. I thank noble Lords for this debate.

I want to set out some points about the role of government Ministers. As noble Lords are well aware, the Government remain neutral on the principle of assisted dying and on the passage of this Bill. Whether the law in this area should change is absolutely and rightly a matter for Parliament. I and my noble friend Lady Levitt will speak in Committee as government Ministers responsible for ensuring that the Bill, if passed, is legally robust, effective and workable. To that end, I will not be providing a government view on the merits of proposed changes. Those are rightly a matter for noble Lords to decide. Throughout Committee, my remarks will focus only on amendments where the Government have significant workability concerns. I hope that this will be of assistance to noble Lords in their consideration of amendments. Where no comment is made, any workability concerns are less significant. The Government are unable to confirm at this stage that the current drafting of those amendments is fully workable, effective or enforceable.

Turning to the amendments in this group—