United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Report stage & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the amendment in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, borrows much from other amendments tabled in Committee and on Report, and credit is due to the authors of those amendments.

This amendment has three purposes. The first is to take the OIM out of the CMA after six months and set it up independently, using the budget already allocated for that purpose. For appointments to the OIM the Secretary of State must consult and seek the consent of Scottish and Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.

The second purpose is enabling, not compulsory. It is to allow the OIM to become the competent body to investigate harmful and distorted subsidies and subsidy races made by any Administration within the United Kingdom that relate to harm within the United Kingdom. This can happen only after public consultation about state aid provisions, which the Government have already said will take place, and requires the consent of the devolved Administrations. The OIM will also, subject to the devolved Administrations’ agreement, be empowered to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for changes to the tests for harmful subsidies, and to its powers and functions. Finally, there is to be a general review of the competence of the OIM between three and five years after Section 30 comes into force.

The changes, following the devolved Administrations’ agreement, can be brought about by affirmative regulation. Overall, the amendment solves the problem of the unsatisfactory location of the OIM in the CMA and gives a vision for the consensual evolution of the OIM in its investigations of subsidy effects.

We have already debated, in Committee and since, why the CMA is not the right body. The mismatch stems from three sources. First, the CMA is expert in matters that are reserved, not devolved. Secondly, the CMA deals largely with disturbances to the market caused by market participants, whether that be through anti-competitive activities such as cartels, or through market concentration—which is culturally very different from looking at the actions of Administrations as they affect markets in the context of devolution. Thirdly, the tie to BEIS does not make it neutrally positioned in how it is embedded, or perceived, no matter what its objectives may be.

To some extent this proposal follows the TRA precedent of setting up in one location and spinning off, utilising whatever preliminary work has been done. Furthermore, if there is to be a body to examine subsidies —and it is an ‘if’ that can develop in the light of experience—an independent OIM, specialising in the workings of devolution, would seem the right home. As required, I give notice that it is my intention to test the opinion of the House on this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Wigley (PC) [V]]

I support this amendment, the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on these matters, and the need to have the OIM and CMA working at arm’s length. I have spoken several times on the need to have an office of the internal market that is at arm’s length from all government and is responsive to the needs and reservations of every nation—Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and, yes, England. I would prefer the OIM to be required to obtain the consent of all four nations, but I accept the wording in this amendment as a significant step in the right direction. I am very happy to support it and to vote for it if a vote is taken.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I welcome the government amendments as I would welcome any improvement, but unfortunately they do not go far enough to compensate for all the implications of the OIM being within the CMA. I shall say more on that in later groups, and I do not need to rehearse all of it now, save to say that these amendments do not sufficiently change the nature of the CMA, its culture and what it was originally set up to do, so it is no longer—or it never was—the right home for a body that has to operate with the much more sensitive and different objective of the OIM.

I recognise that requiring the CMA to support the operation of the internal market in the interests of all parts of the UK, to act even-handedly with respect to the national authorities and to recognise consumers among the other classes of interested persons all featured in debate in Committee. Indeed, I rather recognise some of the wording. Amendment 55, reflecting the balance of the panel, is also welcome. Again, I seem to recall saying similar things. But I would like the Minister to clarify one thing. I am still concerned about what is controlled by this panel amendment. If the panel size in the amendment is a minimum of three, as it is for the CMA, how can you guarantee that all those interests are represented by three? In Committee, I introduced an amendment to say that the investigating panel should be a minimum of five because I thought that that was the number of people you would need to do an investigation. So both the pool from which the investigations can be drawn and the panel need to have all these characteristics. Is that how it is going to work going forward or are we restricted to the three individuals?

Amendment 56, requiring the consent of the devolved Administrations, looks good until you get to Amendment 57 and the override of one month. While I acknowledge that that can give time for discussions or whatever else may go on, absent any other conditions or explanations of why that override has been operated, it just looks like a convenient delay that you can put up with and then have your way in the end. So I do not think that that goes far enough. As I said, I do not object to the CMA having representatives of the devolved Administrations appointed to the board, but the OIM should not be in the CMA.

[Lord Wigley (PC) [V]]

My Lords, I am glad that the Government have moved a little on matters relating to the CMA and the IOM, but it is not quite far enough. I support Amendment 54. The Government have opted to give the CMA a central role. They could have opted to use not the CMA, but a whole new body created to cover this essential work that would have fully understood the world of devolved politics. They have chosen not to do so, although, to be fair, they have certainly moved on the IOM.

The consequence is that the Government lay the CMA open to criticism that it is simply unaware of the detailed issues that might concern devolved Governments. If the CMA had a nominee from each of the three devolved Governments it would avoid finding itself in a whole new world, as seen through the prism of Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast. This is an amendment to save the CMA from getting into an almighty and unnecessary tangle—or, as we would say in Welsh, since we are all quoting from Celtic languages tonight, into a smonach. I suspect that the CMA has not a clue what a smonach is; I rest my case. Amendment 59 is merely a consequential provision to deal with occasional vacancies on the CMA’s board, so I support that also.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I concur with the comments of my noble friend Lord German, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and others concerning consent and what might be termed the proper conduct of devolution. But I will limit my remarks to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, relating to the publication of decisions, to which I added my name, not for the purpose of signalling that I am satisfied with consulting rather than obtaining consent, but because I want to flag up that there must be transparency.

It is difficult to tell from provisions throughout this Bill how transparent various procedures will be, which raises my concern that they may not be very transparent at all. The internal market is a matter of significant public interest, and while individuals may not bury themselves in the minutiae, they will feel the impact. There are various organisations on the front line of helping consumers and small businesses to understand laws and their rights. Therefore, whatever the procedure, there should be publication of the proceedings that are formulating the structure of the internal market.

I have amendments on transparency elsewhere relating to the CMA and the OIM, and they are part of the same theme. If the consumer voice is to be heard and articulated by consumer organisations, access to information is paramount. Otherwise, interventions and understanding may come too late.

[Lord Wigley (PC) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on transparency, and I look forward to coming to those points later. I am pleased to speak to this group of amendments, and in particular to Amendments 30 and 64, to which I have added my name, and to Amendments 75A and 100A, which stand in my name.

Perhaps I should first make it clear that I support Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, moved by the noble Lord, Lord German, which stipulates that not only should the UK Government consult the devolved Governments but that they must obtain their consent. I would have added my name to that amendment had other colleagues not got there first. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord German, that it would be far better if we did not have these powers in the Bill at all. I also believe that the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, go to the heart of why devolution of power was made in the first place and is still very much needed.

Amendment 16 does not go as far as Amendment 15. It advocates the need to seek consent of the devolved Administrations but it does not impose a requirement to obtain that consent. Amendment 17, likewise, does not go as far as Amendment 15, in that it again requires the Government to publish the result of consultation, so the implication is that the UK Government may well consult the devolved Governments and then blithely ignore their viewpoints. There is, as the noble Lord, Lord German, implied, no earthly point in having a consultation system if the UK Government may then, willy-nilly, totally ignore the devolved Governments’ viewpoints.

I now turn to the group of amendments that relates to Clause 12. Amendment 64 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, requires the UK Government Minister, in this context, to consult and seek the consent of the devolved Governments. Likewise, Amendment 75 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, requires the Minister to consult the devolved Governments. But both these amendments give the appearance of consulting the devolved Governments but place no obligation whatever on the Minister to take any notice of the response elicited. The Minister can happily consult then blithely ignore the views of the devolved Governments. That is not good enough. Indeed, it is highly dangerous. It gives the appearance of consultation without providing the substance of a requirement to respect the outcome of any such process. In reality, this plays out a charade of having a joint approach between the four nations and provides an open road for the UK Government Minister to totally ignore the views of the devolved Governments.

My Amendment 75A simply requires the Minister, with regard to subsection (2), to consult and obtain the consent of the devolved Governments. I readily recognise that the UK Government may argue that the devolved Governments should not have a veto over the Westminster approach. That is something I recognise and respect, but the implication is that Westminster should have such a veto. In regard to devolved functions, the whole point is that the four nations should have the right to make their own policies. That is what devolution is about. The Government seem to take the Orwellian approach that all four nations are equal but one is a little bit more equal than the others.

My Amendment 100A applies the same principle to the consultation issues relating to Clause 20(7) and the need for the Minister also to obtain the consent of devolved Governments in that regard. What this comes down to, yet again, is the need to have an acceptable mechanism to resolve disagreements, to have the common frameworks to which we have resorted on so many other occasions and not to take the approach that the Government of England—which it is for the devolved function—always has the right, by dint of its respective size, to overrule the other four nations. If such a mechanism were in place, we would not have to put ourselves through the pain of raising these questions on every occasion that the issue of consultation between the Minister and the devolved authorities arises. I implore the Minister to bring forward an amendment on Report that would obviate the need for us to return to these issues, time after time. Until such a change to the Government’s approach is forthcoming, we will have no choice but to press amendments along the lines of this group at a later stage.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Wigley and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I support Amendment 11, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. Amendment 23, to which I added my name, is grouped with it. I shall be brief because we have heard many experts who know much more about the subject than I do. In any case, I think we are all on the same side in this particular debate.

Both these amendments address the concern within the nuclear industry and within the communities in which they are located at the possible, perhaps unintended, consequences for the nuclear industry arising from Brexit. My own interest arises not so much from the fact that my physics degree at Manchester University many moons ago had a large element of nuclear physics in it. Fusion, incidentally, was around at that time as well. The ZETA project was the bright new hope that we are still waiting for. My interest more directly arises from the fact that my home county of Gwynedd has two nuclear installations at Trawsfynydd, the decommissioning of which is still in progress 20 years on, and at Wylfa, which is awaiting the go-ahead for new reactors. Indeed, Trawsfynydd has also been identified as a possible location for a new generation of mini-reactors if these are given the go-ahead. I hope that the uncertainty arising out of the Euratom question does not in any way undermine those projects.

Many associated with these plants are very anxious to know that the co-operation across Europe from which they benefit, and sometimes on which they actually depend, will not be undermined in any way by Brexit. They and the whole industry have a right to know exactly where they stand, and I hope that the Government will be in a position to tell us.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I am in favour of this group of amendments. Amendment 39, in my name, follows the position that I suggested at Second Reading. The Euratom treaty is a separate treaty and can be separately amended. It provides options for Euratom other than being part of an all-in-one main deal. There is no doubt in my mind—and I have had reason to look at quite a lot of the EU treaties—that Article 106a, which imports various aspects from the main EU treaties, nevertheless restricts it again in the second paragraph by saying that wherever the EU is mentioned it means Euratom and wherever it mentions treaties it means the Euratom treaty. So I believe that they stand alone. My point also deals later on with some of the entanglements, but some of them go in the sense that the two treaties stand alone. If we were left with any parts of the institutions, again, it would be in a very narrow focus, as has already been explained.

My amendment would not stop this Bill giving the Government the power to trigger Article 50 by way of Article 106a, if that power exists in the Bill, but would delay triggering it at least until the Government lay their final draft of the arrangements for leaving the EU before Parliament. By that stage, I hope that the Government would have settled the institutional arrangements for managing the new partnership with the EU.

It may be that at that stage Euratom could slot conveniently into those arrangements and that Euratom would be part of the deal. It could also be that a suitable transition arrangement would be to stay in Euratom a bit longer at least until the UK had substituted all its arrangements at international level. Or it could even be that a UK position outside the EU but inside Euratom could be an agreed way forward in the longer term, with a Euratom treaty change—and there are good reasons for changing that treaty, given international developments.

Noble Lords could ask why some special arrangement should be made for Euratom when there are many other compelling industry problems. One reason is simply that we have the opportunity because there is the separate treaty. The second and compelling reason already alluded to by other noble Lords is that while loss of trading arrangements in other sectors is economically damaging, it will still be possible to buy things—at a price. But outside Euratom, without a replacement agreement, international trade in fissile material and various other products would be illegal. So exiting Euratom and following up with a subsequent free trade agreement is not a viable option. Nor is crashing out without an agreement.

Presently, there are some 13 EU countries in the UK supply chain of fissile materials, and a similar number in other third countries. As we have heard, some of those will be for medical use and cancer treatments, and others for nuclear reactors with some 20% of our electricity generation being from nuclear. Then there is a whole industry of nuclear components, repairs and auxiliary products, and other more remote industries such as automobile, aeronautics, mining and petroleum, that would be affected. Euratom is a key player in research, including fusion. It is the vehicle for the UK’s participation. Keeping some kind of “same as in” arrangement is important for research both at our atomic energy establishments and at our universities.

Modification of institutional arrangements and Commission permissions will be needed whether we are in or out of Euratom because all EU countries will have to have permission in order to trade with us. Nothing should be dismissed prematurely. Euratom operates on a far more intergovernmental arrangement than the EU, which therefore makes looking for an intergovernmental solution conceivable. The role of the Parliament is smaller—for example, seeking opinion rather than requiring consent—and there are provisions for consulting national parliaments. That could provide openings for negotiating new arrangements.

Finally, not many cases have gone to the European Court on Euratom issues. I found a 2011 post-doctoral paper in the German Law Journal that had managed to unearth only 30 cases that had ever gone to the ECJ, compared with around 700 cases annually for the court. Of those 30, only 15 were Commission versus member-state cases. Most notably, in contrast to the EU treaties, expansion of competence and cross-sectoral applications have not happened under the Euratom treaty to any great extent. For example, when the Commission tried to apply civil rules to the decommissioning of UK submarine nuclear reactors and submarine repair, the court found in favour of the UK on the basis that the matter came under security and defence. The court resisted extending the judgment to civilian aspects, although they clearly existed.

We will never escape the effects of some jurisprudence that comes from the European Court because it governs interpretations that the EU will apply to our new relationship. But Euratom is one area where the court is hardly interfering and could be tolerated for longer, at least in transition. So I urge the Government to think seriously about the additional flexibility that the separate Euratom treaty offers. It would be not only the UK that wished to get some kind of regularisation of the arrangements—but in this we can give ourselves, as of right and under our control, more time, more options and more security.

European Union: United Kingdom Renegotiation

Debate between Lord Wigley and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Thursday 4th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has been trying to get in for some time.