Lord Whitty
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Public Service Pensions Bill
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this also refers to administrative matters concerning particular pension schemes. The amendment would implement my noble friend Lord Hutton’s recommendation that pension policy groups should be established for each scheme at national level. To quote my noble friend’s report, he said that,
“even if all schemes have a pension board in future, there will still be a need for separate pension policy groups to consider at national level major changes to scheme rules”.
Many schemes already have such groups or bodies at national level, such as the National Health Service and Civil Service pension scheme governance groups, the teachers’ pensions committee, the Police Negotiating Board, the Firefighters’ Pension Committee and so forth. Part of the role of these groups would, as my noble friend recommended, be to ensure that information about key proposals for change and related costs are publicly available. It is very important to maintain confidence in these proposals to ensure good relations with scheme members and the smooth implementation of any changes.
My noble friend’s report also notes that these existing bodies were often established as part of the consultation and negotiation machinery for handling pensions as an element of a remuneration package, and have member and employer representation as appropriate. The appropriateness of member representation would, we hope, be taken into account if this amendment is accepted and pension groups established.
When this issue was considered in another place, the Minister replied to my honourable friend Mr Chris Leslie, who put forward a similar amendment. Mr Sajid Javid said:
“We will give further consideration as to whether it would be necessary or appropriate for the Bill to provide for a scheme-level group for the local government scheme in England and Wales”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Service Pensions Bill Committee, 22/11/12; col. 453.]
It was on the basis of that commitment by the Minister in the other place that my honourable friend withdrew his amendment.
I would like to hear from the Minister this afternoon the nature of the consideration given by the Government, which the Minister in another place committed the Government to, and why they have not brought forward their own amendment to place the position of pension policy groups in the Bill. After all, if the advisory measures that we have just passed are administrative measures and are in the Bill, these are also essentially administrative measures, as Mr Javid pointed out, and surely they should be in the Bill as well. I beg to move.
Lord Whitty
I fully support the amendment put down by the Front Bench. However, with regard to the arrangements for the Local Government Pension Scheme, would it not have been better if the Government had set out in one place the totality of the arrangements that were intended for the local government scheme, rather than attempt yet again to generalise the provisions to cover most of the public sector schemes? It is probably too late for the Government to do that; in which case, I hope that they will support my noble friend’s amendment.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I am genuinely confused. In our view, Amendment 45 establishes pension policy groups. I do not know what the noble Lord’s Amendment 46 will do that our Amendment 45 does not. What is the function of his groups that goes beyond the functions of our scheme advisory board? In tabling this amendment, we thought that we had done exactly what my colleague in another place suggested, which was to take it away and bring forward proposals that did what the noble Lord wanted. My view was that our amendment not only does what the noble Lord wants but goes rather further, in providing for the scheme advisory board to advise the responsible authority on any proposed change in the scheme regulations, not just significant changes.
Lord Whitty
“( ) Where the change is negative, the order shall specify a zero increase.”
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 48 and I support Amendments 49 and 50, which are in this group.
I appreciate that the Minister is a bit pained about this, but the need for this amendment is exactly the area to which my noble friend has just referred. There is distrust out there. In respect of this amendment, the distrust was blown out of all proportion by the sudden decision to replace RPI with CPI. I know that for those who run schemes it is quite a useful change as it has put funding on an easier basis, but for millions of pensioners it has reduced their pension expectations and caused considerable distress. What I am addressing here is the continued anxiety that the Government may once again change the terms on which it is based.
This amendment relates to the agreement to which my noble friend referred within the local government scheme between the local government unions and the LGA, which the DCLG and, by implication, the Treasury greatly welcomed. At the moment, the provision in this amendment is the understanding carried forward from the previous scheme in that agreement, which is not reflected in the Bill. Without the amendment, Clause 8 appears to allow the Treasury to change the revaluation again, more generally, from the CPI to another index that may in future be created by the Treasury. That would significantly alter the scheme costs and funding and the likely benefits for pensioners and future pensioners. The scheme design proposal in the agreement between the LGA and the trade unions clearly specifies that the revaluation of pensions shall use the CPI. In setting this revaluation, careful consideration was also given to the value of the accrual rate to be used and to the overall scheme design. In other words, it was a balanced package. The overall cost of the scheme contained that balance and should it change again, clearly those arrangements fall.
These designs were put forward to the employers and were agreed with the unions. There was a vote of union members and a whip around local government employers and, in the circumstances, there was overwhelming support for that agreement. The apparent ability, if we do not adopt this clause, of the Treasury to introduce changes in those arrangements and, in specific terms, to impose a decrease, in certain circumstances, in the accrued pension without consultation or agreement with those affected would seriously undermine the basis of that agreement. One of the benefits—undeserved, in one sense—of the Government’s approach to public service pensions in general was that it forced local government employers and unions to work out what they wanted for the long term. They have done so, and the Government endorsed that agreement. Part of that agreement is that there should be no such reduction and no change away from the CPI. Without provisions similar to those which my noble friend has moved and which are also included in very specific terms in this amendment, the issue of distrust will continue.
This is a relatively simple amendment, but I suspect from the puzzled look on the Minister’s face that he did not even think that the Bill, as it stood, would have allowed a negative adjustment, but it does; while the agreement between the unions and the LGA does not. I therefore hope, for clarification and for some reduction in the degree of distrust out there, that the Minister will be prepared to accept this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Whitty has reinforced the issue that I raised in the discussion of the previous amendment. The Government seem to be content to make a deal and then put only their gains in the Bill and cover everything else by declaration of intent. Revaluation is absolutely central to the maintenance particularly of a career averaging scheme. A career averaging scheme requires a structure of revaluation whereby past earnings are revalued to take account of inflation, and earnings related to earlier years of pensionable service will be subject to revaluation year on year—over a very considerable timeframe now that we are looking at a career average as opposed to a final salary scheme, where revaluation is a rather simpler process.
As it stands, the Bill makes this extraordinary statement with respect to revaluation:
“For the purposes of making such an order the Treasury may determine the change in prices or earnings in any period by reference to the general level of prices or earnings estimated in such manner as the Treasury consider appropriate”.
In other words: any way they like. It does not refer particularly to RPI or CPI; it can just be any way they think appropriate.
The amendment tabled in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Davidson would simply require the Treasury to act reasonably in determining the system of revaluation or the particular index structure that it identifies. This imports into the Bill the objective test of acting fairly. If the Treasury plans to be unreasonable and unfair, I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us. It seems to me that the very least we can ask is that the Government—not just this Government but future Administrations—should act reasonably in their selection of a particular index or revaluation scheme. That is the purpose of Amendment 49, which is grouped with the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Whitty.
Amendment 50 is, if you like, a belt-and-braces amendment. If the Minister were to accept that the Treasury will act reasonably, we would be quite happy to withdraw this amendment. If there is an arbitrary and unreasonable change in the methods of revaluation, the House has to approve such a change by an affirmative resolution. That is the sort of belt and braces standing behind this notion of reasonableness. However, if the Minister is content to say that the Treasury will act reasonably—which also imports, I am advised, the notion of acting fairly—we will be content to withdraw Amendment 50, which is there in case the Treasury is going to be unreasonable and unfair.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that. I am very glad that he is not bemused. Regrettably, his certainty and clarity in at least part of what he said does very little to assuage anxiety about the possible undermining of this scheme. Indeed, he has just said that the CPI is the preferred index at present. We have had the CPI for only 10 minutes. That reminds me of one partner in a long-standing relationship referring to the other as “my current boyfriend”. The Minister’s comments raise alarm, anxiety and uncertainty to an even greater extent than I presumed would be the case when we started this debate. I do not think that the noble Lord has answered that question.
On the question of whether past practice in the local government scheme has had a special provision for having a floor or negative valuation, certainly there has been no negative downward movement. When the new agreement was reached, the presumption was that that would not be the case in this measure either. Whether I need a clause on the front page of primary legislation is arguable. Nevertheless, it would have been helpful to seek an assurance that that understanding between the employers and the trade unions would stand. However, I will read the rest of what the noble Lord says. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Whitty
“Basis of valuation
(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Government shall establish a review body to assess the appropriateness of current methods of valuation of a pension scheme’s liabilities and assets, and, if appropriate, to recommend changes that provide a broader base of valuation.
(2) The review body shall report within 18 months of the passing of this Act.”
Lord Whitty
My Lords, unfortunately, I have lost my notes at this point. I would describe this amendment as a probing amendment but it is actually more of a kite-flyer. It raises a very basic issue about how pensions are valued.
At the moment, certainly in relation to the local government scheme and probably others, a pension scheme has to be revalued every three years, which is a fairly substantial exercise based on all sorts of actuarial presumptions working out the value of the current assets, the value of future flows into and out of the scheme, and making an estimation of the future liabilities of the scheme. Those future liabilities can stretch over 80 years or so for future pensioners and, depending on the nature of the scheme, their dependants. Given that, it is important that it is properly reflected in the way in which that evaluation is carried out.
Lord Flight
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Perhaps I might suggest that the real cause of the trouble is the IFRS accounting standards that require companies to disclose pension liabilities discounted at government gilt yields. That, in turn, has made companies pay contributions to cover the resulting alleged deficits. As the noble Lord points out, that has led companies to close their final salary schemes and to the false rate of interest resulting from QE. However, the real problem has been the uncritical acceptance by Governments of both persuasions of what I believe to be profoundly wrong IFRS accounting standards.
Lord Whitty
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. I had not expected to agree with him this afternoon, particularly on subsequent amendments, but I agree with him on that issue. It is important to recognise that the acceptance of those accountancy standards is causing the problem. That is why the noble Lord, Lord MacGregor, in the speech to which I referred, suggested that the Bank of England, government actuaries and the accounting profession sat down and looked at those assumptions. Slightly more tangentially, the Treasury Select Committee in another place has also touched on this point.
I am suggesting that the Government take the initiative whereby, once the Bill is passed by this House in whatever form, they set up a review looking at whether the present conventions and the way in which these public service pensions are assessed are correct—although there is a wider application—and whether we are getting a seriously misleading impression that has a detrimental effect. As the noble Lord said, there has been a devastating effect on large numbers of private sector providers.
The amendment would have no effect on the rest of the Bill but would give the Government a lever to look at the issue again and provide for expert assessment, which, given that the newly formed schemes are not coming in until 2014, could come into place before the first revaluation of those schemes. I hope that the Government will take this matter seriously and have a look at it. I certainly hope that the House and anyone involved in looking at public and private pension schemes will recognise that this is a serious problem. I beg to move.
Lord Newby
My Lords, perhaps I might start by saying that the Government take the issue seriously, and it clearly is serious. However, I wish to set out the ways in which different public servants’ pension schemes are, and will be, valued when the Bill comes into effect.
As noble Lords are aware, the majority of the main public service schemes are unfunded. There is no pot of assets that can be valued; future benefit payments are paid out of general tax revenue. They need to be valued in a different way from funded schemes. It is important that these schemes are valued to ensure that contributions paid reflect the costs of employing staff. The Government therefore carry out valuations of unfunded pension schemes to determine the level of contributions. This is done using a number of assumptions and methodologies that adapt to changing circumstances and improvements in the method. These valuations will also be used to set the level of the employer cost cap. The assumptions used in these valuations take account of the risk profile faced by government in providing pension benefits. The valuations can therefore be different from those used by typical private sector funded schemes, where the primary purpose of valuations is to provide security to member benefits.
However, the Local Government Pension Scheme is in a different position. As has been discussed, it is a funded scheme, with benefits paid out of one of 89 different LGPS funds in England and Wales. These funds, as we have discussed many times in our consideration of the Bill, are individually managed. Valuations of the funds perform a similar function to those in unfunded schemes by assessing whether fund assets will be sufficient to meet liabilities and setting the contribution rates to be paid into the funds. This valuation process is managed at the local level and is dealt with in greater detail in Clause 12.
The amendment would place a statutory obligation on the Government to appoint a body to carry out a review of the way in which valuations are carried out in the public service schemes. This is unnecessary for either the funded or unfunded schemes. Under Clause 10, Treasury directions will set out the details of how valuations of unfunded schemes will be carried out. The Treasury will be obliged to consult the Government Actuary before these directions are made to ensure that they are fit for purpose. The Treasury has also committed to involving other stakeholders, such as public service employers, scheme actuaries and trade unions, when considering the approach to valuations.
Turning to the funded schemes, the Bill already provides for a greater level of scrutiny of LGPS fund valuations. Clause 12 specifies that employer contributions to these funds must be sufficient to ensure the solvency of the funds, which is an existing feature of the regulations. The clause also requires that contributions are set at a level that will ensure the long-term cost efficiency of the scheme. This is a new provision, which aims to prevent employers deferring the payment of any costs needed to meet the long-term liabilities. The clause will ensure that local fund managers take this approach. It requires an independent review of each fund’s valuation and the employer contribution rates that result from it. These reviews will result in a report covering all the LGPS funds, which will be made public.
The Government intend to publish a single report for the local government scheme in England and Wales. This will allow straightforward comparisons to be made across each of the 89 funds in the scheme. This new and enhanced level of scrutiny will provide a consistent basis for assessing the assets and liabilities of all LGPS funds, improving their transparency and management of these funds.
In addition, the scheme advisory board proposed by Amendment 45, which we have just debated, may also oversee and advise on the management of pension funds in the local government schemes. These boards will play a role in ensuring that the schemes—and individual LGPS funds—are well managed. As such, there will be an ongoing role for pension boards in the scrutiny of pension fund management and valuations.
Under the existing provisions in the Bill, there are a number of ways in which we can achieve what the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, seeks to achieve. I will go away and look again to make sure that I am not missing anything or whether we do need a belt and braces. I am not sure that we would do it in the way that the noble Lord suggests and I am not sure that we need to do it, but this is definitely a serious issue. The Government want to make sure that nothing in the Bill means that we cannot take that initiative if we decide to do so anyway. I will go away and look at it again. If I think there is anything further that I can usefully say, I will write to the noble Lord, but I am not absolutely guaranteeing the letter.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister. I am glad that the Government see this as a serious issue and I am grateful to him for setting out what will be the procedure and structure of valuation in the future, specifically for the LGPS and more generally. I should have said at the beginning that my comments were primarily related to funded schemes, but of course post-2014 will bring a lot of the other public service schemes closer to being fully funded schemes—not quite in most cases. This means that the ratio between liabilities and assets and their correct valuation will be an important issue for all funded defined benefits schemes.
My amendment was intended to allow the Government at some future stage to look at the way in which these schemes would in future be assessed. I do not disagree with the mechanism but, as the noble Lord, Lord Flight, says, some of the presumptions and the passive acceptance of the accounting conventions could mean that the schemes looked seriously underfunded when in practice they were not. There may be other problems with the conventions and it would be wise for the Government to undertake this review whether or not it is seen as part of this Bill. I think it is something that the Government need to deal with.
I am grateful to the Minister for indicating that he is prepared to look at this again, and I think that in some contexts the Government will need to do so. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Donaghy has identified a considerable problem with cost control as expressed in Clause 10—the valuations section of the cost control part of the Bill. My noble friend’s amendment is very direct and clear with respect to the Treasury directions that she would like to see. My Amendment 63 takes a somewhat more ameliorative and subdued approach to dealing with this problem. However, it would ensure that Treasury directions are tailored to each local government fund and would therefore be much more accurate, rather than the possibility of a single set of directions being expected to apply to 89 local government funds which have significantly different characteristics. After all, each local government fund has its own assets and investment strategy. Different employers are involved and, crucially, most of the funds have different demographics. This means that each valuation needs to take into account the individual characteristics of those funds.
Considerable concern has been expressed about Clause 10 by well informed persons who are much better informed than me. For example, Alison Hamilton, the chair of the local government committee of the Association of Consulting Actuaries, said:
“Clause 10 certainly gives me cause for concern. … It is very important that the valuation takes account of the local demographics, and the local investment of the assets backing those pension funds. I attended a meeting where the Bill team tried to give some sort of reassurance that the valuation would be carried out as a one-size-fits-all under Treasury directions. That was not intended for the local government pension scheme. I would like the Committee to explore that and get something drafted”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Service Pensions Bill Committee, 6/11/12; col. 169.]
Similar concerns have been expressed by the National Association of Pension Funds. I will not repeat what it said as it echoes what was said by Ms Hamilton.
When faced with this argument in the other place, the Government acknowledged that there was merit in it and stated that the Treasury would,
“take into account the individual nuances and features of the various … schemes”,—[Official Report, Commons, Public Service Pensions Bill Committee, 13/11/12; col. 347.]
when setting directions. They felt that the clause already allows enough flexibility for directions to take account of the differences between schemes. However, our amendment simply states what the Government’s intention apparently is—that the Treasury directions should not be based on, or be rigidly bound by, but should take into account,
“the individual nature of each of the different funded schemes”.
That is in accord not only with what is obviously sensible practice, according to the views of experts, but with what Ministers claimed in another place was their intention.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I strongly support Amendment 62 and the other amendments that have been spoken to. I have a simple amendment in this group—Amendment 64. Clause 10(4) states:
“Treasury directions … variations and revocations … may only be made after the Treasury has consulted the Government Actuary”.
My amendment probably reflects my general suspicion of the Treasury, which is deplorable, as the Minister is indicating. Nevertheless it is shared by many in the pensions industry and beyond. I would have thought that it should be agreed with the Government Actuary’s Department that the Treasury or that department should come to an accommodation on what the basis for the variations, revocations and directions should be.
I accepted the Government’s argument that in relation to other sorts of consultation—for example, consultation with stakeholders—regrettably, agreement, or certainly consensus, is not usually the outcome. However, as regards an issue relating to the basis of valuation between the Treasury and the Government’s own actuary, surely the Bill should state that those provisions are agreed rather than that the Treasury may act after what may be quite a superficial consultation with the GAD. I hope that that was the Government’s intention anyway but I wish to make the position clear through my amendment. I hope that the Government will agree to it.
Lord Newby
My Lords, the Bill makes provision for pension scheme valuations across all the public service schemes. These will be carried out in accordance with Treasury directions to ensure that valuations are carried out on a clear and consistent basis.
Amendments 62 and 63 seek to clarify how Clause 10 will apply to the valuation of the individual funds in the local government pension scheme or to disapply the provisions of the clause to those valuations. The Government are well aware of the concerns referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and other noble Lords who have spoken, that this clause will be used by the Treasury to impose inappropriate valuation assumptions on individual LGPS funds. The amendments would ensure that this could not happen by removing these funds’ valuations from the scope of the clause or requiring the Treasury to take account of the nature of individual funds when making directions.
I hope that I can reassure noble Lords that these amendments are not necessary. First, the Government have no intention of making directions relating to the valuations of individual LGPS funds. This commitment has already been made in this House and in the policy paper published by the Treasury in November 2012, copies of which are in the Library. Secondly, Clause 10 needs to be read in the light of the Bill as a whole. It is clearly intended to deal with valuation at the scheme level, as can be seen from Clause 12, which makes provision for valuations at the level of individual pension funds. While that clause would provide for greater oversight of the local fund valuations, it will not mandate how they are to be carried out. Accordingly, we do not think that Amendment 63 is necessary.
In relation to the Local Government Pension Scheme, Clause 10 will be used only—I repeat, only—to set directions of how the model fund, an aggregation of the scheme costs at the national level, will be valued. We need to do that for the operation of the cost-control mechanism at a scheme level in LGPS but it will not directly affect the contributions paid into individual funds.
Turning to Amendment 64, Clause 10 already requires that the Government consult with the Government Actuary before making directions on scheme valuations. That amendment would add an additional requirement that the Government Actuary agrees the directions rather than just being consulted. The intention is to ensure that these directions form a sound basis for the scheme valuations and the Government, of course, support this aim. However, the Government cannot accept this amendment, as it does not achieve this aim and has unwelcome consequences.
The aim of the Government Actuary’s Department is to be,
“a highly valued principal provider of actuarial analysis and advice to all parts of the UK Government and other relevant UK and overseas public bodies”.
The highly valuable, actuarial advice that it provides is independent and professional and this aim would be compromised by the amendment. If this change were made, the Government Actuary’s decisions would inevitably influence the policy on valuations and he could come under pressure to determine elements of the directions themselves. This would fundamentally compromise his position as a truly independent adviser. This is not an outcome which anyone, including the Government Actuary, wants to see.
Amendment 65 highlights the importance of Treasury directions that will be made under Clause 10. These directions will set out the detail of how valuations of public service pension schemes should be carried out. Everybody has agreed that these valuations are of vital importance given their implications on both employer contributions and the employer cost cap. As such, all scheme stakeholders will need to be involved as the valuations are developed. However, the statutory consultation requirement that would be imposed by this amendment is unnecessary. I can reassure the Committee that we will seek to discuss these directions as they are developed. All stakeholders, including scheme managers, their actuaries, pension boards, and member representatives, will be given the opportunity to participate in this process.
I hope this reassures the noble Baroness that the consultation of scheme managers and pension boards that she has proposed will be carried out without the need for Amendment 65 and that she will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Whitty
“( ) This section does not apply to the fund valuations of the Local Government Pension Scheme.”
Lord Whitty
My Lords, Amendments 66 and 70 propose the exclusion of LGPS funds from the aspects of the Bill covered by Clauses 10 and 11 because those aspects are primarily related to the unfunded schemes. Clause 10 attempts to impose criteria commonly determined by the Treasury on valuations of all schemes covered by the Bill. Amendment 66 will clarify that Clause 10 is intended to apply to scheme level valuations only, thus preventing future misunderstandings, particularly in relation to the 89 different local government schemes. Without the amendment, there is a lack of clarity around the impact of fund valuations which are included in the Treasury’s scope within Clause 10. This lack of clarity surrounds the apparent inclusion of both local fund valuations and the national, notional model fund valuation under the control of Treasury regulations.
Individual fund valuations are currently undertaken by fund actuaries under parameters set out in different scheme regulations and assumptions are agreed with the individual fund. It would be a marked change if such valuations were to come directly under Treasury control. If it is intended to include only the notional model fund in the Treasury’s scope, this clause will need to be amended to prevent any further misunderstandings. There are concerns that the assumptions, data and models to be used as directed by the Treasury would not reflect what is currently being used at fund level, thus also undermining the validity of national modelling of costs. The easiest way out of this dilemma is to exclude the LGPS from the operation of those aspects of Clause 10.
Clause 11, which we will discuss later, covers the employment cost cap. The LGA and the trade unions involved in local government believe that this clause should be amended so that we again embed the agreement, reached by employers, unions and Governments, for a separate cost-management process. That agreement ensures that the principal stakeholders of the scheme are responsible for the control of cost management. There is concern that, as it stands, Clause 11 gives the Treasury discretion over how the cost cap is set. This could mean that there would be nothing to prevent the Treasury setting the cap in such a way that it would be easily exceeded, resulting in an increase of employee—and probably employer—contributions or a decrease in benefits. Amendment 70 would make this clear because it would exclude the funded local government pension schemes and funds from the effects of this clause and would better reflect the agreement, supported by the Government, that exists within the LGPS scheme. I beg to move.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I will start with Amendment 66. As previously discussed, the Bill makes provision for pension scheme valuations to be carried out in accordance with Treasury directions. This amendment seeks to clarify that the clause does not apply to valuations of the Local Government Pension Scheme. It would ensure that Treasury directions on valuations would not affect these valuations, which are carried out at the local level. In that respect, it would have a very similar effect to Amendment 62.
The arguments discussed under that amendment also apply here and Amendment 66 is unnecessary. I hope that the Government’s previous commitments, which I have just repeated, have made that clear. The Government simply do not intend to make directions affecting the valuations of individual LGPS funds. Alternative provisions for oversight of these valuations are made elsewhere in the Bill. The amendment is not needed.
Amendment 70 seeks to provide a specific exclusion for the LGPS from the employer cost-cap provisions in Clause 11. A robust cost-control mechanism, on a statutory basis, is still required for the LGPS, even though it is a funded scheme. Clause 11 should apply to the LGPS, as with any other scheme. The Government have had extensive discussions with the Local Government Association and the local government trade unions on this issue. As a result of these discussions, and to reflect the unique position of the LGPS as a funded scheme, the Government will give additional flexibility to the LGA and the trade unions in the management of scheme costs. The full details of these additional flexibilities will be finalised in consultation with key stakeholders and then enacted via the Treasury directions made under this clause and in the scheme regulations.
However, it is vital that the Government maintain a statutory backstop to provide reassurance to the taxpayer that action will always be taken if the cost of the scheme becomes unsustainable. This backstop, which will sit behind the cost-control arrangements that I have described, will apply in the same way as in other schemes. If the costs of accruing LGPS benefits, as measured at a national level by the GAD’s model fund, rise or fall by more than two percentage points, action will be required to bring costs back to the level of the cap, as in any other scheme. The requirement to consult on the action to be taken, with a view to reaching agreement, will apply as in any other scheme. If agreement cannot be reached, scheme regulations will set out a default action to be taken, as in any other scheme.
The cost-control mechanism is a key part of delivering good and sustainable pensions that will last for a generation. Without it, there is a risk that costs will once again spiral out of control and leave us with the choice of looking for higher contributions from, and lower benefits for, members or shunting the extra costs unfairly onto the taxpayer. Given these considerations, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw or not move both amendments.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, as regards Amendment 66, I am pleased that the Government are prepared to be explicit in their assurances that they do not intend to set directions in relation to individual local government funds. If I understood the Minister clearly, the situation is to some extent similar to that in Amendment 62. A statement that “the Government do not intend” is not a copper-bottomed guarantee, as we know. Nevertheless, I suspect that it is as far as we will get in our consideration of the Bill, and I therefore thank him for that.
As regards Clause 11 on the employer cap, it is clear that in whatever circumstances there needs to be cost control. The point that I am making is that within the local government schemes it is the responsibility of their governance to ensure that cost control applies. There is a Treasury engagement with the national notional scheme and other provisions oblige the Treasury to ensure that the schemes do not get out of control, as the Minister indicated. In fact, the local government scheme has not got out of control. There have been occasions when individual funds’ investment policies have been less than ideal, which have led to short-term problems, but in no period has the local government scheme, which has operated for decades, got out of control.
Given the ongoing governance of individual schemes and the new provisions that we have just agreed in relation to the national scheme, there is little likelihood of the scheme getting out of control in any case. It is therefore otiose for the Treasury to be able to impose individual employer contribution caps in the crude way in which it may need to do so in relation to unfunded schemes that have historically—on the odd occasion and possibly now—got out of control. I regret that the Government do not recognise that. We will discuss employer caps in more general terms in a moment, but I should have thought that it would be less trouble to the Treasury, and would make it clearer that the responsibility to ensure that cost controls operate rests fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the stakeholders in the local government schemes, if they were exempted from the ability of the Treasury to impose its own cost controls.
However, that is clearly not the road that the Government are prepared to go down. I will therefore not press Amendment 70 and beg leave to withdraw Amendment 66.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot really support the noble Lord, Lord Flight, in these measures. I point out to him that they are internally inconsistent and, indeed, contradictory. On the one hand, Amendment 71A effectively removes all responsibility from the Government in relation to any potential, unlikely though it may be, default on the Local Government Pension Scheme.
Lord Flight
That amendment is intended to remove any financial liability, not to remove any obligation to get it dealt with.
Lord Whitty
Just so, my Lords, but the legitimacy of the Government being able to lay down the detailed criteria which his other amendments and indeed many of the Government’s stipulations in the Bill provide in relation to the local government scheme relies on the fact that everybody assumes that the local government scheme has the Government as its underwriter of last resort and that therefore that underwriter has the right to intervene in what is otherwise the equivalent of a private scheme between private institutions; namely, local government and private trade unions. They are not central government creatures. They have certain statutory responsibilities but they are separate entities. Therefore, the legitimacy of the Treasury in any sense making directions, stipulations and interventions, as the Bill provides and as the noble Lord’s other amendments would consolidate or take further, depends, so far as concerns the local government scheme, on that implicit underwriting. It is hoped that it would never be called upon. Nevertheless, it is there in the background. The situation in relation to the other schemes is different, but Amendment 71A relates specifically to the local government scheme and I think that it is contradictory to everything else that the noble Lord was advocating and much of what the Minister is advocating.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Flight, about the need to keep the ballooning cost of public sector pension schemes under control. That is one of the key features of this Bill. The challenge, which I will come to in a minute, is that it is not straightforward, or indeed possible, to turn the tap off in pensions as you can in some other areas of expenditure.
I think everybody agrees that the cost cap is one of the key elements of these reforms and in order for it to be credible and robust we must ensure that costs will always be adjusted if the cap is breached. This can be done in a number of ways. While it would be preferable if all stakeholders were agreed on the way to do it, we have to allow for the possibility that agreement might not be reached. Clause 11 therefore specifies that scheme regulations must set out the steps to be taken to achieve the target cost if there is no agreement; there simply has to be a default adjustment.
The amendment seeks to strengthen this requirement by specifying that this element of scheme regulations must be in accordance with guidelines provided by the Treasury. This would ensure that the default action mandated in scheme regulations would be more consistent across schemes. I understand my noble friend’s intention in this amendment but it is simply unnecessary. Clause 3 sets out that the majority of scheme regulations made under the Bill require the consent of the Treasury before they are made. This requirement for Treasury approval will provide the assurances my noble friend is seeking because it covers the cost cap. He said in relation more generally to the cap that, for all the schemes, cash flow was more important than theoretical deficits and surpluses. At one level it is, but valuations of the theoretical surpluses or deficits are needed in the unfunded schemes because we have to plan how the Government will meet the cash-flow costs of the schemes over a long period going forward.
The intention behind Amendments 67B, 69B and 118A is to allow pensions already in payment to be altered, should action to adjust the costs of the pension schemes be required as a result of the employer cost-cap mechanism. In theory, this is one of the ways in which you constrain the costs. Unfortunately for the noble Lord, the Government cannot accept these amendments. Amendment 67B would allow pensioners’ accrued benefits to be reduced to reduce the cost of the scheme. As the Government have made clear, both in this House and in the other place, we are committed to protecting accrued benefits. Indeed, I hope to bring forward amendments on Report which entrench that view.
There are also significant legal hurdles to altering pensions in payment. In law, pensions in payment are owned by pensioners in exactly the same way as other possessions. Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects these possessions from any interference by the Government that is not only lawful but proportionate. We agree with that provision. Any Government attempting to alter pensions in payment would face a serious risk of legal challenge from pensioners arguing that their possessions should not be taken away in favour of protecting active members in employment from cost control. This would make it very hard for this amendment to work in practice even if we thought it was a good idea, which, sadly for the noble Lord, we do not.
Legal difficulties aside, it is right that those benefits that have already been paid for cannot be reduced. The ability to provide retrospective changes of this nature would mean significant uncertainty for all members of the schemes and potentially destroy any trust in them.
Lord Newby
I will be very happy to write to the noble Baroness about it but the whole purpose of the cost cap is to ensure that we do not get into that mess. Given the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, in this area, I am very reassured by his confidence that the local government schemes will not get into this mess. The reason why the cost cap covers local government schemes is that, however unlikely it is, we feel that we need a method of dealing with them in this extremely unlikely eventuality.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I think we all hope that it is an extremely unlikely eventuality and I genuinely believe that it is an extremely unlikely eventuality. Standing behind this is a slightly theological but nevertheless psychologically important matter. I suspect you cannot find it anywhere in statute but, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, says, the ultimate responsibility of any failure of a local government scheme would rest, in some context or other, on taxpayers, and it therefore becomes the Government’s responsibility. I hope that the noble Lord can write to me as well, and perhaps to other colleagues in the House. I expect it will be quite a difficult letter to write.
Lord Newby
We look forward to that intellectual exercise. I think that I had just about dealt with Amendment 71A. Amendment 118A, to my mind, is grouped with Amendments 67B and 69A. They all relate to the same point about being able to constrain payments. All the considerations that apply to Amendment 67B and 69A apply to Amendment 118A as well.