Care Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Warner
Main Page: Lord Warner (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Warner's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI rise as a member of the Joint Select Committee to strongly support the amendment. I shall not go over the previous legal history, or repeat what I said in Committee, other than to emphasise a particular aspect of the case to which I drew attention then. That case related to an elderly woman in her 90s who was resident in a private care home and was totally self-funded. She had been a resident for some time and had the temerity to air her views on assisted dying, which did not please some of the home’s staff. She did not seek anybody’s help to commit suicide; she just expressed her views. The home’s management gave her four weeks’ notice to leave the home as a result. When her son raised the issue of her rights under the Human Rights Act with legal counsel, the opinion he was given was that she lacked protection under that Act because she was not in receipt of a service from a body providing a function of a public nature as her placement was neither publicly provided nor in a publicly funded home.
As a member of the Joint Select Committee I raised this matter when we were looking at the Bill and, after deliberation, the committee was unanimous in recommending that the Bill should be amended to clarify matters. This is what the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Low, does. It covers all users of a regulated social care service. It is clear that there are differences of legal opinion on this matter when particular cases are raised. I consider that as parliamentarians, it is our duty to put the matter beyond doubt and provide self-funders with the legal certainty that other elderly people may have when they are in receipt of either domiciliary or residential care.
One of the most important new points that has been made on this issue since we debated it before was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, when he said that courts will notice if we do not take this opportunity to amend and clarify this legislation. That means that we cannot—as one of my children would say—faff around any longer on this issue. We have to make a decision; the amendment makes that decision, and we should all support it. Frankly, the Government should stop the legal equivalent of counting how many angels can be put on the head of a pin and accept the legal certainty that the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Low, provides. They should be supporting people who are paying their own way by funding their care, not the reverse. There will be a lot more of them in the future so let us provide that protection now.
My Lords, I share, of course, the concern of all noble Lords that we should take all reasonable steps to protect vulnerable people who receive social care in whatever circumstances. I enter this debate for the first time with considerable trepidation, having regard to the great distinction of those, both present and absent, who support this amendment. I have to express some real doubts about it.
As far as I am aware this is the first time an attempt has been made to include, within the scope of the Human Rights Act, what may be a purely private function. Those who receive care may not be overly concerned with whether it is being provided by a public authority, a private provider, or in some hybrid arrangement. Nevertheless, this amendment is in effect extending the scope of the convention beyond the terms of the Human Rights Act.
It is important to consider what protection would be available anyway, in the absence of this amendment. If a poor standard of care is provided to an individual, it is likely that the provider will be in breach of an express term of any contract or in breach of a term implied by the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. There will almost certainly be a claim in tort, probably relying on the tort of negligence. There is, of course, a further safeguard in relation to all providers of publicly arranged care, in that all such providers have a duty imposed by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, at least following what I would submit was the closing of the YL loophole by Section 145 of the Health and Social Care Act. The CQC, as a regulator and a public authority, is subject to the convention.
However, the amendment would, as I understand it, purport to provide some additional remedy; presumably some award of damages. The noble Lord should be aware of the relatively limited scope of damages awards under the Human Rights Act. As Lord Bingham said in the Greenfield case in 2005,
“the 1998 Act is not a tort statute. Its objects are different and broader. Even in a case where a finding of violation is not judged to afford the applicant just satisfaction, such a finding will be an important part of his remedy and an important vindication of the right he has asserted. Damages need not ordinarily be awarded to encourage high standards of compliance by member states, since they are already bound in international law to perform their duties under the Convention in good faith, although it may be different if there is felt to be a need to encourage compliance by individual officials or classes of official”.
The House of Lords also emphasised that the Human Rights Act was not to be regarded as a panacea. Indeed, Lord Bingham went on in Greenfield to say that the purpose of the Act,
“was not to give victims better remedies at home than they could recover in Strasbourg”.
However, that would be the position here if this amendment was passed. My conclusion is that the amendment amounts to an illegitimate extension of the Human Rights Act and would not, in reality, provide any significant extra protection for those who, quite understandably, we wish to protect.
The future of the Human Rights Act will have to await the outcome of the next election. However, amending the Act, which is what in effect this will do, would be inappropriate and, I have to say, unnecessary.
I am sorry that I did not answer the question adequately for the noble and learned Lord. My response is that actually the Human Rights Act remedies, which I endeavoured to deal with in my remarks, would not of themselves provide the sort of remedy that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, had in mind. As was outlined by Lord Bingham in the Greenfield case, the remedies are in fact very limited, very often amounting to a decision that there has been a violation, rather than the sort of practical remedy that I understand the noble Lord to have in mind. That is my response.
My Lords, just to clarify matters, if this lady had been covered by the Human Rights Act, the son would have been able to take legal action to try to prevent the home removing her. The mischief that was being committed was the forcible removal of a woman in her 90s from the place that she had lived in for a very long time. What the Human Rights Act—as I understand it; I am not a lawyer—would have provided protection for was the ability of a relative to seek protection from the courts that this home, in taking that action, was actually in breach of the Human Rights Act. I do not think that the noble Lord’s suggested remedies would have helped in this case or any other like it.
While I am on my feet, I say to the noble Lord that this Act changes the position anyway, because that lady, or a similar person in the future, might well have come up against the cap on her privately funded care and her care would then be paid for by the state, which would be performing a public function—or a function of a public nature—in paying for her care in that private provision. This Act changes the dimension from the past as well.
My Lords, I do not know whether I am permitted to speak again since we are on Report but perhaps I might just say for clarification that in my opinion the analysis by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, of the reach of the Human Rights Act is entirely accurate. We have had a number of cases, in both the House of Lords Appellate Committee and the Supreme Court, dealing with the kind of problem where people say that they are losing their home because of steps being taken to remove them from premises that they occupy. It is that reach and the uncertainty that has been drawn attention to, where some people have the protection and some do not, that causes real problems.
My Lords, I have just described one of those perverse consequences: that we would purport to be giving rights to people which could not be pursued before the European Court of Human Rights. If I could correct the noble Lord, I was not seeking to suggest that the previous Government had addressed the issue that I have been talking about. They addressed part of the issue in the Health and Social Care Act 2008, but there is another dimension to it, as I have said. The amendment would risk creating an asymmetry, which once again risks creating legal uncertainty and confusion.
What people using services and their families want and need is reassurance that they will be treated with care, compassion, kindness and skill. This amendment would not provide any of those things. People are not, surely, really exercised about which route of redress they have if things go wrong so long as they have one, which they do; what they expect is for things not to go wrong in the first place.
I do not accept the argument that putting this measure into legislation will deter those who abuse or neglect, or galvanise providers into preventing those things. It would not send some kind of message that should not otherwise already be amply clear to all providers of care and support: that poor-quality care is unacceptable.
What I think will make much more of a difference are the stronger measures to improve care that the Government are proposing: the emphasis the CQC is placing on individual experience as opposed to paperwork, the improvements in commissioning and the safe routes for whistleblowers. We are amending the requirements that providers have to meet to enable the CQC to take effective action against providers that do not provide acceptable levels of care. With these things in place, it is my view that when things go wrong we will have a strong and effective mechanism for dealing with the situation. For all these reasons I say to the House that the amendment should be decisively and emphatically rejected.
I now turn to Amendments 138A and 138B, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Low. Their effect would be that, where a local authority delegates a function, in addition to the local authority remaining subject to all of its legal obligations in the way the function is discharged, the person authorised under the delegation would also be directly subject to those same obligations. These would include, for example, obligations arising under the Human Rights Act. The amendments are unnecessary because when it delegates its functions, Clause 75(6) is clear that the local authority remains responsible for the way that that function is discharged. The person using care and support will therefore always have a route of redress against the local authority even if the local authority has delegated the discharge of the function to a third party.
Furthermore, these amendments could prove unhelpful because, by making both the local authority and the contractor liable, they could create a lack of clarity about who is ultimately responsible for complying with the local authority’s statutory obligations when a function is delegated. We believe strongly that it must remain absolutely clear that the ultimate responsibility lies with the local authority and that it cannot absolve itself of this in any way. This is an important principle of allowing local authorities to delegate their functions and we do not want to cast any doubt on this.
The underlying intent of these amendments is unexceptionable as they are about protecting the rights of people using health and care services. However, I am absolutely and firmly resolved that these amendments will not achieve what we all want, which is that everyone receives safe, dignified and respectful care and that we must prevent abuse in the first place. With that, I can only express the hope that the noble Lord will think again and decide to withdraw Amendment 83.
Before the noble Earl sits down, can he clarify something from his earlier remarks about the Human Rights Act? I ask with a certain amount of humility but also from the perspective of one of the people who wrote the Labour Party’s policy in 1996 on the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into what became the Human Rights Act in this country. When that Act was framed, the definition of a public function, or the nature of a public function, was one which did not to a great extent anticipate the move over the next 10 to 15 years in which public services would actually be undertaken and provided by private and voluntary bodies. It simply did not do that. However, the terminology was wide enough at the time to embrace an organisation like Channel 4, which had a mix of public and private functions. It was incorporated, as I recall, into that legislation on the basis of its partial role in performing public functions.
The noble Earl seems to accept that, over time, case law can change the definition of the nature of a public function. He seems to be saying that we have to plod through the courts, case by case, to change the definition. I rather lost him when he then tried to argue that you cannot do it by groups of cases, which is effectively what this amendment does. Is the noble Earl saying that the definition of the nature of a public function—in the law as it is—cannot be changed by cases and can only be changed by amending the primary legislation itself?
I think that I covered that point when I said that the courts have ruled that there is no single test to determine whether a function is of a public or a private nature. They have also pointed out that there are serious dangers in trying to formulate such a test, which is what the amendment is trying to do, in its own way. If we go back to the noble Lord’s example of the 90 year-old lady in the care home and even if the Human Rights Act were to apply, it is impossible to predict the outcome of an application to a court for—let us say—an injunction to prevent her removal, because each case is fact-specific. It may be found that the lady’s human rights were not violated, but it is not possible to predict that in advance. I hope that clarifies the position and answers the noble Lord’s question.
My Lords, as I said on Monday, the principles which underpin this Bill are widely supported, although recent revelations around deferred payments have put a considerable damper on that. We have been concerned in our debates mostly with trying to improve the Bill. A major feature of discussions has been the capacity of local authorities to do what is required, including responsibilities around assessment, providing information, preventing needs for care and support, promotion of integration, provision of information and support, direct payments, promotion of diversity and quality in the provision of services, and dealing with provider failure. Another concern has been about the amount of resources that will be available to make the Bill effective—the more so when one considers the number of self-funders who will in the end receive support as a result of the introduction of the cap.
This is done in the context of a very tight funding situation for health and care generally. The Minister will be aware of reports from both the King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust, and, more recently, from the NHS Confederation, which talked of the problems in healthcare and of there being basically no growth in real-terms funding in the next few years, together with a big increase in demand.
This is matched, and more so, by the additional costs which it is clear will fall to local authorities to meet the extra care responsibilities that they have been given. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill are rather disarming. They state:
“Most of the costs to the public sector associated with Part 1”—
which is what we are discussing—
“arise from introducing and funding a cap on care costs and from the proposed increase to the capital threshold. These are partly offset by consequential reduction in costs of attendance allowance and disability living allowance”.
The Minister cannot be in ignorance of the widespread concern among local authorities that, in essence, the Bill places many additional financial responsibilities on local authorities for which they have little confidence they will receive proper support from the Government. Let me give one example. We know that the settlement for 2013 provided £335 million so that councils can prepare for reforms in the system of social care funding, including the introduction of a cap, and a universal offer of deferred payment agreements from April 2015—this was in the guidance issued by CLG. That money was intended to cover assessment and reviews, capital investment in systems, capacity-building in individual councils, information and advice, and introduction of deferred payments from April 2015. However, my understanding from the Local Government Association is that that £335 million was not new money; indeed, it was top-sliced from the local government settlement. So the cost associated with funding reform should be seen as a new burden and funded as such. If that is only associated with the introduction—essentially with helping local authorities prepare for the provisions in this Bill—how much more will the additional funding responsibilities be when it is actually up and running?
There is widespread concern and doubt about local authorities’ capacity to set up the infrastructure to do the job, but the funding issue is even more important. That is why my Amendment 121 suggests that the Secretary of State asks the Office for Budget Responsibility to complete a review of the funding of social care that assesses the adequacy of current public funding of these services, the proposals for the funding of provisions in this Act, the implications of the Act and its funding for the NHS over the next five years and in particular the short- and long-term costs of setting the eligibility criteria at the level set out in the regulations.
The Office for Budget Responsibility has been established and we see many uses for it. This would be a very good way of getting an impartial view of the future costs resulting from the Care Bill and of the likely consequences for local authorities and the Bill’s funding. In the spirit of harmony and consensus which has prevailed over much of our discussions, I think it would be very good if the Government agreed to do this. It would provide us with a very good foundation and also help in taking forward the Bill and in terms of local authorities’ actual ability to implement the provisions. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 122 in my name. This requires the Secretary of State to publish a review of the working of Part 1 and its funding before Clause 15 is brought into operation.
I have tabled this amendment because of my continuing concern that the Government are sleepwalking into the introduction of the new arrangements in this Bill without adequate funding provision and they do not really appreciate the parlous state of adult social care funding. I think my noble friend was being rather generous in his remarks. The situation is very bad. I have a cutting about the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s report into home care, published last week, in which the commission made it clear that council cuts could be affecting the human rights of older people. This is a serious situation.
People are very supportive of the basic architecture of the Dilnot and the Law Commission’s proposals enshrined in this Bill, and are very supportive of the Government bringing this Bill forward, but they simply do not believe that the funding is in place effectively to implement the Bill’s good intentions. They remain unconvinced by the Government’s assurances on funding and I think this is hardly surprising because the Government’s social care funding strategy seems almost designed to confuse. We have Eric Pickles signing up to quite swingeing cuts to local authority grants which inevitably reduces social care funding substantially. We then see Health Secretaries having to scrabble around to slip NHS cheques to local government to mitigate some of the Pickles cuts. Of course I do not want to be ungenerous to Health Secretaries, and these cheques are better than nothing, but they do not make good the shrinking base budget of adult social care that has been taking place over many years.
People like to claim and use bits of the Dilnot commission’s report that they favour and fancy. I would like to draw attention to pages 14 and 15, where we said:
“We know that the funding of social care for older people has not kept pace with that of the NHS. In the 15 years from 1994-95 to 2009-10, real spending on adult social care increased by around 70% for older people while, over the same period, real spending in the NHS has risen by almost 110%”.
We showed in this report that in the four years to 2010, demand outstripped expenditure by about 9%. We went on to say that in the future this approach to funding was going to need to change. It has changed, but not quite as we had expected or intended.
Adult social care will start the next financial year with a base budget about £3 billion lower in real terms than in 2010. So the base budget for social care is underfunded. That is where we start from. Most of the discussion that has taken place about the implementation of the Bill takes no account of the base budget deficit from which we are starting. That deficit is due only to get worse because there is another set of proposals under the DCLG settlement in Spending Review 2013 for another 2.3% cut in the budgets of local councils, which can only take even more money out of the local government budget for adult social care.
I have no doubt that the noble Earl will say much the same thing as he did in Committee about the Government’s proposal for a £3.8 billion pooled budget for 2015-16 to join up health and social care services. I welcome that. Most people welcome that. However, as the Minister acknowledged in Committee, only half of that £3.8 billion is new money, and only half of the new money will be paid upfront to local authorities as they start to implement the proposals under the scheme. The assurance that that new money will be in place takes no account of the further reduction of 2.3% that I mentioned in the spending of local councils in 2015-16.
We have a situation where the base budget is highly deficient, further cuts are coming out of local government expenditure by councils, which can only have a further impact on that base budget in 2015-16, when the new legislation is due to be implemented, and we have no guarantee that the lion’s share of that £3.8 billion pooled budget will be in the hands of councils when they start to implement the scheme. That is not a situation to fuel people outside with confidence that they will have successful implementation of the legislation.
The Government can protest as much as they like but, at the end of the day, we need public documentation —preferably, I would say, by someone as independent as the OBR, but I would even settle for the Institute for Fiscal Studies. If I cannot have that, I would settle for legislation requiring the Secretary of State to put some of that information in the public arena and before Parliament before the Bill is put into full operation. People who are to implement it and the public need far more convincing than they have received so far that all will be well financially, to give people a reasonable chance to implement this highly desirable, on the whole, well constructed Bill, successfully when the time comes.
My Lords, I have listened with care to noble Lords as they have introduced their respective amendments and I am confident that we can all agree that the issues that they raise are vital to the successful implementation of government policy and are essential parts of good policy-making. Let me first address the questions about the cost and funding of these reforms. We have taken and will continue to take a robust, evidence-based approach to assessing the cost of the reforms. We are working closely with local authorities to help them to understand the costs at a local level, and we will use this knowledge to refine our national modelling further. Funding of care and support, including the reforms in Part 1, will be reviewed regularly as part of the spending review process, and the core elements of the capped-costs system will be reviewed within each five-year period.
Turning to the specific issue of the short and long-term costs of the national eligibility threshold, I can assure noble Lords that we have published an impact assessment fully setting up the costs and benefits of the policy. We have comprehensively assessed and funded those provisions. We have published impact assessments for all elements of the Bill and, in line with the Government’s approach to all new burdens on local authorities, those costs were fully funded in this year’s spending round. Those estimates are based on the best available evidence in the area. They have been produced in co-operation with academic experts and officials from across government.
I am not going to detain the House. I remain unconvinced about the direction of travel that we are taking and I learnt long ago in Richmond House not to believe everything I was assured of which came to me in my Red Box. I hope that the Minister is right, but I have a terrible feeling that I shall be saying, “I told you so” in a few years’ time.