Care Bill [HL] Debate
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Earl Howe
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(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, this has been a very important debate and I am sure we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for the persuasive way in which he moved his amendment. There was a lack of certainty about the scope of the Human Rights Act, arising from the YL case which decided that a private care home providing residential care services under contract to a local authority was not performing a public function and its residents were therefore excluded from the protection of the Human Rights Act.
The noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, was right to remind us that we are on Report, but I wanted to reflect on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in Committee. To an extent, it is an answer to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. What the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said is that the vulnerability of the person receiving care and the risk of abuse is the reason why he thought the law should impose duties on the provider under the Human Rights Act. In all those circumstances, it should encourage the maintenance of high standards and provide a direct remedy for the victim in appropriate cases.
In Committee, we heard from the then Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, who relied on two defences of the Government’s position. The first was—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has reminded us—that those providers of publicly arranged health and social care services, including those in the private and voluntary sectors, should consider themselves bound by the duty. I am sure that we should all consider ourselves to be bound by many things, but the fact that we consider ourselves to be so does not mean that we are bound by them.
The Government’s second defence was that the Care Quality Commission as the regulator is subject to the Human Rights Act and that may give rise to a positive obligation to ensure that individuals are protected from treatment that is contrary to their convention rights. It is a duty that falls on the CQC itself, and I remind the House that we are talking about thousands and thousands of providers of services. I do not think that it is a sufficient defence for people who are caught in a vulnerable situation. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, expressed doubts about including a private function and he pointed to a number of safeguards that already exist, including Section 6 and the CQC, but the vulnerability of so many of the people who we are concerned about seems to express a need for greater statutory provision.
I also remind noble Lords that many of the people we are talking about will move in and out of private care and public care, and at some point under this legislation will actually be in receipt of public support as well as contributing to the cost of their care. We know that when the cap comes in, people will then be entitled to public support, but that does not cover the hotel costs which are estimated at around £12,000 a year. Many people will be in receipt of public support while also having some form of private contract and top-ups, which we have discussed. It would ensure that people had a relationship both in terms of public support and a personal relationship with their private providers. For all these reasons, the argument put by the noble Lord, Lord Low, is very persuasive indeed.
In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, said that she thought that talks would be undertaken. I am not aware of those talks and certainly the Opposition have not been invited to them. I hope that the noble Earl will be able to report on what discussions have taken place. At this point, however, we should note the arguments that have been put and I have great sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Low.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe) (Con)
My Lords, noble Lords have spoken eloquently in support of these amendments and I appreciate the strength of feeling across the House. This is an important issue that is fundamentally concerned with the safeguarding of vulnerable people. While I always hesitate in the extreme to disagree with so many distinguished noble Lords, including noble and learned Lords, I have to say to the House emphatically that these amendments are neither necessary nor an appropriate way to achieve the objectives that are being sought.
As I said before on this issue, the Human Rights Act is about public functions; in other words, it is legislation that concerns the interface between the individual and the state. This philosophy underpins the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore also the Human Rights Act. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, to whom I listened with great attention, referred to the case of YL in response to my noble friend Lord Willis, and he urged that the judgment in that case should be accepted and that we should essentially move on. I respectfully agree with that, but I suggest that the key point in this context is what the previous Government did through the Health and Social Care Act 2008. The Act strengthened the regulatory powers to ensure that the Care Quality Commission can enforce regulatory requirements that are in line with the relevant provisions of the European convention, and this applies to all providers of regulated activity, which includes personal care whether publicly or privately funded.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I have just described one of those perverse consequences: that we would purport to be giving rights to people which could not be pursued before the European Court of Human Rights. If I could correct the noble Lord, I was not seeking to suggest that the previous Government had addressed the issue that I have been talking about. They addressed part of the issue in the Health and Social Care Act 2008, but there is another dimension to it, as I have said. The amendment would risk creating an asymmetry, which once again risks creating legal uncertainty and confusion.
What people using services and their families want and need is reassurance that they will be treated with care, compassion, kindness and skill. This amendment would not provide any of those things. People are not, surely, really exercised about which route of redress they have if things go wrong so long as they have one, which they do; what they expect is for things not to go wrong in the first place.
I do not accept the argument that putting this measure into legislation will deter those who abuse or neglect, or galvanise providers into preventing those things. It would not send some kind of message that should not otherwise already be amply clear to all providers of care and support: that poor-quality care is unacceptable.
What I think will make much more of a difference are the stronger measures to improve care that the Government are proposing: the emphasis the CQC is placing on individual experience as opposed to paperwork, the improvements in commissioning and the safe routes for whistleblowers. We are amending the requirements that providers have to meet to enable the CQC to take effective action against providers that do not provide acceptable levels of care. With these things in place, it is my view that when things go wrong we will have a strong and effective mechanism for dealing with the situation. For all these reasons I say to the House that the amendment should be decisively and emphatically rejected.
I now turn to Amendments 138A and 138B, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Low. Their effect would be that, where a local authority delegates a function, in addition to the local authority remaining subject to all of its legal obligations in the way the function is discharged, the person authorised under the delegation would also be directly subject to those same obligations. These would include, for example, obligations arising under the Human Rights Act. The amendments are unnecessary because when it delegates its functions, Clause 75(6) is clear that the local authority remains responsible for the way that that function is discharged. The person using care and support will therefore always have a route of redress against the local authority even if the local authority has delegated the discharge of the function to a third party.
Furthermore, these amendments could prove unhelpful because, by making both the local authority and the contractor liable, they could create a lack of clarity about who is ultimately responsible for complying with the local authority’s statutory obligations when a function is delegated. We believe strongly that it must remain absolutely clear that the ultimate responsibility lies with the local authority and that it cannot absolve itself of this in any way. This is an important principle of allowing local authorities to delegate their functions and we do not want to cast any doubt on this.
The underlying intent of these amendments is unexceptionable as they are about protecting the rights of people using health and care services. However, I am absolutely and firmly resolved that these amendments will not achieve what we all want, which is that everyone receives safe, dignified and respectful care and that we must prevent abuse in the first place. With that, I can only express the hope that the noble Lord will think again and decide to withdraw Amendment 83.
Lord Warner
Before the noble Earl sits down, can he clarify something from his earlier remarks about the Human Rights Act? I ask with a certain amount of humility but also from the perspective of one of the people who wrote the Labour Party’s policy in 1996 on the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into what became the Human Rights Act in this country. When that Act was framed, the definition of a public function, or the nature of a public function, was one which did not to a great extent anticipate the move over the next 10 to 15 years in which public services would actually be undertaken and provided by private and voluntary bodies. It simply did not do that. However, the terminology was wide enough at the time to embrace an organisation like Channel 4, which had a mix of public and private functions. It was incorporated, as I recall, into that legislation on the basis of its partial role in performing public functions.
The noble Earl seems to accept that, over time, case law can change the definition of the nature of a public function. He seems to be saying that we have to plod through the courts, case by case, to change the definition. I rather lost him when he then tried to argue that you cannot do it by groups of cases, which is effectively what this amendment does. Is the noble Earl saying that the definition of the nature of a public function—in the law as it is—cannot be changed by cases and can only be changed by amending the primary legislation itself?
Earl Howe
I think that I covered that point when I said that the courts have ruled that there is no single test to determine whether a function is of a public or a private nature. They have also pointed out that there are serious dangers in trying to formulate such a test, which is what the amendment is trying to do, in its own way. If we go back to the noble Lord’s example of the 90 year-old lady in the care home and even if the Human Rights Act were to apply, it is impossible to predict the outcome of an application to a court for—let us say—an injunction to prevent her removal, because each case is fact-specific. It may be found that the lady’s human rights were not violated, but it is not possible to predict that in advance. I hope that clarifies the position and answers the noble Lord’s question.
Lord Low of Dalston
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, although it obviously leaves me a little disappointed. I do not propose to respond on Amendments 138A and 138B, because I do not propose to press them to a Division when we finally reach them. However, I should like to say something in response to what has been said about Amendment 83.
First, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, especially those who have spoken in support from all quarters of the House. It has been a high-calibre debate which does credit to a House noted for characteristically engaging in debate of a high calibre. This one was, I think, particularly authoritative. Without wishing to be invidious in any way, I particularly give thanks for the exceptionally thoughtful, careful and authoritative analysis to which we were treated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.
I also observe that we were deprived of the analysis of two of my other supporters who attached their names to the amendment, the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Lester, who were unable to be here. In those who added their names to the amendment, those who have spoken and those who would have spoken had they been here, we could not have had a more authoritative and heavyweight line-up in support of the amendment in this House.
There has been general agreement that the matter should be put beyond doubt. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out, it would actually be dangerous if we were not to do so. If I understood the noble Earl correctly, he said that we should stick with the position that was arrived at as a result of Section 145 of the Health and Social Care Act. As the noble Lord, Lord Wills, made clear, when he said that noble Lords should not pray in aid the position arrived at by the previous Government, this is unfinished business. No one can pretend that we have reached a final resolution of these matters with Section 145 of the Health and Social Care Act. That is why it is so important that we should take the opportunity presented by the Bill to take the further steps necessary to put the matter beyond doubt.
We have heard what the noble Earl had to say in response to the debate, but I confess that I am baffled. Between Committee and Report, the Government seem to have executed a complete volte face and completely changed their position. The position explained to us in Committee was that the Government did not believe that the amendment was necessary because the matters that it sought to put beyond doubt were already provided for. Today, the noble Earl tells us that he must urge the House to reject the amendment because the matters should not be provided for. The Government need to make up their mind what their position is.
The Minister also made the point that we should not take this step because it would deliver to service users rights over and above those available under the ECHR. I am sorry, but I simply do not understand that point. The amendment simply delivers to service users rights which are available under the Human Rights Act, which is predicated upon the ECHR. Even the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, agrees, I think, that we should put the matter beyond doubt; he just does not think that we should put it beyond doubt in this way or that the Human Rights Act should be extended this far. Having listened to all the debate, I submit that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and of course the Minister in adopting his remarks, are on their own in this matter in the House. There is general agreement not only that we should put the matter beyond doubt, but that we should put it beyond doubt in the manner which this amendment secures. Indeed, until today this agreement used to include the Government.
I think we should put the matter to rest, as the Minister has said, decisively and emphatically in the terms this amendment provides for and which the Government, until very recently, supported in substance, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes (Con)
My Lords, I particularly wish to speak on Amendments 83A and 84, but I could just as easily have spoken on any one of these amendments—there is such a big group of them—because the issue that I wish to raise is my concern over this care issue falling down between this Bill and the Children and Families Bill. The timing of these two Bills makes it very difficult unless the Minister, having heard all these debates that everyone will give now, and the comments on these issues, gives us an undertaking that he will liaise with the noble Lord, Lord Nash, and that between them they might try and sort out where it is going to go. This is what worries me: that it will end up going nowhere or come up from the noble Lord, Lord Nash, in a form that will make it too late to bring back here, unless the Minister says that he will look at everything said today and bring back an amendment—or at least accept an amendment if we could all agree on one.
So much of what has been said made sense. The comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, were fascinating, and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, put it all very clearly. The noble Baroness spoke more on issues about which I am particularly concerned. My eldest grandson is a Down’s child. His Down’s is fairly severe. He has been fortunate in having wonderful care at a Mencap home. He is 22 and this is his last year of receiving full support. He was very happy at the home for some years, until a glitch appeared in the past year. In his unit, a number of residents are put together to live a normal life and to learn how to go out and live in society. Unfortunately, a very aggressive boy was put into the group. No one knew that he was aggressive. He attacked the staff quite violently. As a result, others—I do not know whether it was just my grandson, or whether it was others as well—copied him. This is a terrible risk. If we do not supervise people and have continuing care and assessment of them, how do we know that they will not meet a violent person who behaves in this way, either deliberately or for some other reason—for example, because they are violent and cannot help trying to impose violence on everyone else? It is a real worry not only for the person but for society and the community.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, spoke about the parents who care so much. The parents of this boy are both very clever doctors. One of his siblings is just starting medicine and the other hopes to in the next year or so. So he has siblings who would be able to care if his parents die before him. However, people with Down’s syndrome can live to a considerable age. I have met people of 50 and 60 who have the syndrome. In many cases, their parents will not be alive. It is a huge responsibility to pass on to siblings. Therefore, it is important that, as far as possible, these people should be brought into society to live as normally as they can. As they grow older, they usually grow bigger and stronger. Therefore, they are more of a worry to themselves and to other people. It is terribly important that the assessment of cases for continuing care should be made, and should continue to be made—and not just at 25. If people are going to live to 50, they may need support until then.
A number of the amendments put down by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, cover that issue, but without defining it clearly. This is why I am speaking in general on the amendments in this group. It is important that this should be clear. I have added my name to an amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rix, in the Children and Families Bill. It is in response to the implication that the Government are thinking of taking out care completely: that once education finishes, nothing more will follow. That is why it is so important to be assured in this Bill that something else will follow.
My daughter tells me—and she has sent me a letter from another parent—that there is great concern that parents are not listened to nearly as much as other people are. The noble Earl’s Amendment 84 does not really cover anyone except a remote person in a local authority who will be responsible for needs. There is nothing to say that they will consult, or even consider the views of, parents or the person who is doing most of the caring for the person concerned. None of the amendments in this group quite reaches what is necessary to cover the issue. I hope that when the Minister sums up, he will give an assurance that will leave the way open for this to be considered at Third Reading. The rules on what can be brought back at Third Reading are very specific. If today we all ended up either winning or losing on some particular thing, it would not necessarily mean that we could modify it in a way that we all thought was better and brought a better answer. I support Amendment 83A and probably quite a number of others, but I will not go into the details because my argument applies both for and against so many of these amendments and I do not want to waste the House’s time by speaking more than once.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am pleased that I have been able to table amendments that significantly strengthen these important provisions, and I am grateful to noble Lords for acknowledging that. Currently, assessment under the transition provisions has to be requested and I sympathise with the concern that in some instances, people who are unaware that they can request an assessment may lose out.
Amendments 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96, 98, 102, 103, 106, 108 and 113 remove the need to request the assessment. I have also tabled Amendments 85, 95, 99 and 104. They will replace provision that local authorities may assess a child, a child’s carer or a young carer when it appears to them that it will be of significant benefit to the individual to assess and where they are likely to have needs once they turn 18, with a duty that a local authority must assess in these circumstances.
Amendments 110 and 111 reflect an amendment to the young carer’s amendment to the Children and Families Bill. This is an example of the detailed work undertaken to ensure that the two Bills work together. I want to reassure my noble friend Lady Gardner in that context that we have done a great deal of work over the summer to make sure that that is indeed the case. Amendments 83A, 84A, 89A, 93A, 94A and 94B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, reflect concern that a local authority may leave it too late to carry out an assessment. I need to be very clear about this. The amendments I have tabled place a duty on local authorities that they must assess at the time where it appears to them that there is likely to be a need when the young person turns 18, and it is of significant benefit to that individual to assess at that time. My noble friend Lady Gardner was worried that the government amendments might not be sufficiently precise or prescriptive. The clauses are formulated in this way precisely so that assessments happen at the right time, whether that is before or after the age of 14, depending on the individual. The Bill approaches transition planning with a firm focus on assessing at the right time for the individual by the new duty to assess where it would be of significant benefit to the individual. I am not persuaded that the interests of young people are best served by prescribing when assessment should take place.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I understand what the noble Earl is saying: it is difficult to prescribe in legislation. However, does he take the point that experience suggests that in the main assessments do not take place early enough, so when the young person is a little older it is often too late to put in the necessary arrangements? Behind the stricture of saying that it should be done at that age lies a real concern about how it works out in practice.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I accept that that is a problem in many cases and it needs to be addressed. It should be addressed satisfactorily by the government amendments in combination with guidance, which I am about to refer to.
To prescribe the age thresholds proposed would run the risk of failing young people and their families by creating a system that is run according to the age of an individual, rather than according to what is best for the individual at a given time in their life. I remain absolutely committed to ensuring that the question of when to assess a child, carer or parent carer is further addressed in guidance. This will do justice to the broad range of needs and circumstances of young people and their families at the point of transition. Guidance will be developed with the involvement of stakeholders.
“(2) A local authority may combine a child’s needs assessment or young carer’s assessment with an assessment it is carrying out (whether or not under this Part) in relation to another person only if the consent condition is met in relation to the child to whom the child’s needs or young carer’s assessment relates and—
(a) where the combination would include an assessment relating to another child, the consent condition is met in relation to that other child;(b) where the combination would include an assessment relating to an adult, the adult agrees.(3) A local authority may combine a child’s carer’s assessment with an assessment it is carrying out (whether or not under this Part) in relation to another person only if the adult to whom the child’s carer’s assessment relates agrees and—
(a) where the combination would include an assessment relating to another adult, that other adult agrees, and(b) where the combination would include an assessment relating to a child, the consent condition is met in relation to that child.(3A) The consent condition is met in relation to a child if—
(a) the child has capacity or is competent to agree to the assessments being combined and does so agree, or(b) the child lacks capacity or is not competent so to agree but the local authority is satisfied that combining the assessments would be in the child’s best interests.”
“Independent advocacy support: involvement in assessments, plans etc.
(1) This section applies where a local authority is required by a relevant provision to involve an individual in its exercise of a function.
(2) The authority must, if the condition in subsection (4) is met, arrange for a person who is independent of the authority (an “independent advocate”) to be available to represent and support the individual for the purpose of facilitating the individual’s involvement; but see subsection (5).
(3) The relevant provisions are—
(a) section 9(5)(a) and (b) (carrying out needs assessment);(b) section 10(7)(a) (carrying out carer’s assessment);(c) section 25(3)(a) and (b) (preparing care and support plan);(d) section 25(4)(a) and (b) (preparing support plan);(e) section 27(2)(b)(i) and (ii) (revising care and support plan);(f) section 27(3)(b)(i) and (ii) (revising support plan);(g) section 59(2)(a) and (b) (carrying out child’s needs assessment);(h) section 61(3)(a) (carrying out child’s carer’s assessment);(i) section 64(3)(a) and (b) (carrying out young carer’s assessment).(4) The condition is that the local authority considers that, were an independent advocate not to be available, the individual would experience substantial difficulty in doing one or more of the following—
(a) understanding relevant information;(b) retaining that information;(c) using or weighing that information as part of the process of being involved;(d) communicating the individual’s views, wishes or feelings (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).(5) The duty under subsection (2) does not apply if the local authority is satisfied that there is a person—
(a) who would be an appropriate person to represent and support the individual for the purpose of facilitating the individual’s involvement, and(b) who is not engaged in providing care or treatment for the individual in a professional capacity or for remuneration.(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), a person is not to be regarded as an appropriate person unless—
(a) where the individual has capacity or is competent to consent to being represented and supported by that person, the individual does so consent, or(b) where the individual lacks capacity or is not competent so to consent, the local authority is satisfied that being represented and supported by that person would be in the individual’s best interests.(7) Regulations may make provision in connection with the making of arrangements under subsection (2); the regulations may in particular—
(a) specify requirements that must be met for a person to be independent for the purposes of subsection (2);(b) specify matters to which a local authority must have regard in deciding whether an individual would experience substantial difficulty of the kind mentioned in subsection (4);(c) specify circumstances in which the exception in subsection (5) does not apply;(d) make provision as to the manner in which independent advocates are to perform their functions;(e) specify circumstances in which, if an assessment under this Part is combined with an assessment under this Part that relates to another person, each person may or must be represented and supported by the same independent advocate or by different independent advocates;(f) provide that an independent advocate may, in such circumstances or subject to such conditions as may be specified, examine and take copies of relevant records relating to the individual.(8) This section does not restrict the provision that may be made under any other provision of this Act.
(9) “Relevant record” means—
(a) a health record (within the meaning given in section 68 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (as read with section 69 of that Act)), (b) a record of, or held by, a local authority and compiled in connection with a function under this Part or a social services function (within the meaning given in section 1A of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970),(c) a record held by a person registered under Part 2 of the Care Standards Act 2000 or Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, or(d) a record of such other description as may be specified in the regulations.”
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, it occurs to me that the problem has been created by the use of the word “fraudulent”. It tends to suggest that the word “otherwise” is in some way connected with that. I wonder whether one could not take out that whole phrase in brackets. The idea is that, because of some mistake, something extra has been paid out. Ordinarily, it might be perfectly all right to recover that. You do not need to look into the detail of why it was wrong. The person in question—vulnerable people particularly, and those who are not so vulnerable, more recently arrived—may fall into error. The error may result in extra payments out by the local authority which, in ordinary circumstances, it should be able to recover. “Fraudulently” gives an idea of people trying to put something over on someone, and “otherwise” tends to be coloured by the same adverb. Perhaps this problem could be dealt with in that way.
Earl Howe
My Lords, we agree with the general view expressed by noble Lords that we must ensure that vulnerable elderly people are protected and are not discouraged from seeking help when they need it. However, I do not agree with the conclusions reached by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and I regret to have to say that the manner in which he has expressed his concerns risks causing unnecessary worry to people who need care and support. Let me be clear: this power is not there to punish people, as the noble Lord put it, and should be used by local authorities only as a last resort, as I shall explain. Its purpose is to ensure that any charges that should have been paid can subsequently be recovered. It is not to penalise people unduly. But neither should the system reward mistakes or prevent unpaid charges being recovered. This would not only undermine the principle of personal responsibility, it could also result in local authorities having less money to provide care and support to those who need it the most. In practice, it means in some cases a licence to subsidise the better off at the expense of the worse off. Is that really what the noble Lord wants? The use of this power is to recover a debt and is not intended to imply a judgment about the person’s culpability. It does not look for the mens rea; it exists to ensure only that charges not paid can be recovered, as the equivalent current powers do now.
The principle of this provision is not new; the power is 60 years old. The noble Lord likes to make out that we are doing something radically new, but that is not the case. We recognise that there may be a number of reasons why someone has not paid the full amount of the charges due to the local authority, including misrepresentations of their assets which were entirely unintentional. But even where the reason is an accident or a mistake, local authorities still suffer a loss and must be able to recover that loss if there is no other means of doing so. This is public money.
One of the objectives of the Bill is to make access to care and support easier and more focused on people with care and support needs and their families. We expect local authorities to help and support people with care and support needs, discussing any concerns they have and providing advice and assistance as appropriate. This would include advice to help people understand the process of financial assessment and their responsibility to disclose financial assets. I absolutely fail to see why the noble Lord thinks it is socially just to allow people who misrepresent or fail to disclose their assets, whether intentionally or not, to receive more than their fair share of financial support. I reiterate that to do so would reduce the resources available to other people with care and support needs. That is what his prescription amounts to. I am concerned that this amendment would risk making it much easier for people to take advantage of the system and avoid charges and subsequent legal action. What the noble Lord is suggesting is that people could be as careless as they liked when filling out the form. Is that what he wants? The high evidential burden that local authorities would have to meet to recover debts risks making this power largely useless in practice. It would leave local authorities facing costly and uncertain legal action if they chose to pursue the matter.
Let me be clear on another point. A local authority should not, as a matter of course, use these powers to recover debts without first having discussed other options with the individual concerned. In most cases, especially those where the failure to pay the correct charges was inadvertent, there would be other simpler routes to follow, such as agreeing a repayment plan which allows for recovery over time in a way that is manageable. The noble Lord suggests that local authorities may exercise these powers in a way that will drive people out of their own homes. Quite aside from the fact that we have no evidence that local authorities behave in that way and have used their existing powers like that, I have to say that I find that assertion particularly unconvincing.
Local authorities are bound by the public law principle of acting reasonably at all times and must act in accordance with human rights legislation, as well as the well-being principle, which we have already debated. That alone should prevent a local authority using this power to force someone out of their home. The noble Lord is stretching our credulity if he is asking us to imagine a set of circumstances in which a court would make an order in favour of a local authority knowingly to evict a person from their home in this kind of situation. It would be counterproductive in the extreme. Should there be any possibility of this happening, we would use statutory guidance to make the position clear. Indeed, where I do think further action is needed is in the form of guidance. We will use statutory guidance under the Bill to set out the steps that we expect local authorities to take. For example, we would expect a local authority to discuss the situation with the cared-for person and their family when appropriate to establish what, if anything, is owed to the local authority; if there is a debt, to establish whether it is appropriate to recover it, because the local authority does not have to recover it—it can choose not to do so; and, lastly, if money needs to be recovered, to find an affordable way for the money to be repaid. As I have said, whether or not the person could have been reasonably aware of something that needed to be included in the financial assessment is one of the factors that the local authority should consider when deciding whether it is appropriate to recover a debt.
We plan to engage with local authorities in the wider sector on what happens at present and how this could be improved. I accept the need for effective communication about financial assessment and the recovery of charges. This highlights the importance of high quality information and advice, including financial advice, which was debated last week, and the importance of the new duties we are placing on local authorities in this regard. Should mistakes be made, people will not be criminalised, nor will any punitive charges be imposed, but ultimately it is right that mistakes are rectified so that individuals do not benefit from any errors they make, whether they were intentional or not. Neither local authorities nor those who rely on their services should be disadvantaged, but the amendment as it stands runs the risk of failing on all these counts.
I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that the debt recovery power, while to be used only as a last resort, remains important. There is nothing that people should fear from its use. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, on reflection and at this late time, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 122 in my name. This requires the Secretary of State to publish a review of the working of Part 1 and its funding before Clause 15 is brought into operation.
I have tabled this amendment because of my continuing concern that the Government are sleepwalking into the introduction of the new arrangements in this Bill without adequate funding provision and they do not really appreciate the parlous state of adult social care funding. I think my noble friend was being rather generous in his remarks. The situation is very bad. I have a cutting about the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s report into home care, published last week, in which the commission made it clear that council cuts could be affecting the human rights of older people. This is a serious situation.
People are very supportive of the basic architecture of the Dilnot and the Law Commission’s proposals enshrined in this Bill, and are very supportive of the Government bringing this Bill forward, but they simply do not believe that the funding is in place effectively to implement the Bill’s good intentions. They remain unconvinced by the Government’s assurances on funding and I think this is hardly surprising because the Government’s social care funding strategy seems almost designed to confuse. We have Eric Pickles signing up to quite swingeing cuts to local authority grants which inevitably reduces social care funding substantially. We then see Health Secretaries having to scrabble around to slip NHS cheques to local government to mitigate some of the Pickles cuts. Of course I do not want to be ungenerous to Health Secretaries, and these cheques are better than nothing, but they do not make good the shrinking base budget of adult social care that has been taking place over many years.
People like to claim and use bits of the Dilnot commission’s report that they favour and fancy. I would like to draw attention to pages 14 and 15, where we said:
“We know that the funding of social care for older people has not kept pace with that of the NHS. In the 15 years from 1994-95 to 2009-10, real spending on adult social care increased by around 70% for older people while, over the same period, real spending in the NHS has risen by almost 110%”.
We showed in this report that in the four years to 2010, demand outstripped expenditure by about 9%. We went on to say that in the future this approach to funding was going to need to change. It has changed, but not quite as we had expected or intended.
Adult social care will start the next financial year with a base budget about £3 billion lower in real terms than in 2010. So the base budget for social care is underfunded. That is where we start from. Most of the discussion that has taken place about the implementation of the Bill takes no account of the base budget deficit from which we are starting. That deficit is due only to get worse because there is another set of proposals under the DCLG settlement in Spending Review 2013 for another 2.3% cut in the budgets of local councils, which can only take even more money out of the local government budget for adult social care.
I have no doubt that the noble Earl will say much the same thing as he did in Committee about the Government’s proposal for a £3.8 billion pooled budget for 2015-16 to join up health and social care services. I welcome that. Most people welcome that. However, as the Minister acknowledged in Committee, only half of that £3.8 billion is new money, and only half of the new money will be paid upfront to local authorities as they start to implement the proposals under the scheme. The assurance that that new money will be in place takes no account of the further reduction of 2.3% that I mentioned in the spending of local councils in 2015-16.
We have a situation where the base budget is highly deficient, further cuts are coming out of local government expenditure by councils, which can only have a further impact on that base budget in 2015-16, when the new legislation is due to be implemented, and we have no guarantee that the lion’s share of that £3.8 billion pooled budget will be in the hands of councils when they start to implement the scheme. That is not a situation to fuel people outside with confidence that they will have successful implementation of the legislation.
The Government can protest as much as they like but, at the end of the day, we need public documentation —preferably, I would say, by someone as independent as the OBR, but I would even settle for the Institute for Fiscal Studies. If I cannot have that, I would settle for legislation requiring the Secretary of State to put some of that information in the public arena and before Parliament before the Bill is put into full operation. People who are to implement it and the public need far more convincing than they have received so far that all will be well financially, to give people a reasonable chance to implement this highly desirable, on the whole, well constructed Bill, successfully when the time comes.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I have listened with care to noble Lords as they have introduced their respective amendments and I am confident that we can all agree that the issues that they raise are vital to the successful implementation of government policy and are essential parts of good policy-making. Let me first address the questions about the cost and funding of these reforms. We have taken and will continue to take a robust, evidence-based approach to assessing the cost of the reforms. We are working closely with local authorities to help them to understand the costs at a local level, and we will use this knowledge to refine our national modelling further. Funding of care and support, including the reforms in Part 1, will be reviewed regularly as part of the spending review process, and the core elements of the capped-costs system will be reviewed within each five-year period.
Turning to the specific issue of the short and long-term costs of the national eligibility threshold, I can assure noble Lords that we have published an impact assessment fully setting up the costs and benefits of the policy. We have comprehensively assessed and funded those provisions. We have published impact assessments for all elements of the Bill and, in line with the Government’s approach to all new burdens on local authorities, those costs were fully funded in this year’s spending round. Those estimates are based on the best available evidence in the area. They have been produced in co-operation with academic experts and officials from across government.
“(aa) if, immediately before being detained, the person concerned was ordinarily resident in Wales, for the area in Wales in which he was ordinarily resident; or”
Baroness Wheeler
My Lords, we fully support my noble friend in his valiant efforts once again to try to get this important issue on mental health aftercare sorted out. We recognise the Government’s concession in removing “the” from subsection (5)(a), but my noble friend is right that there still remains the very real risk that leaving the rest of the subsection in place could lead to local authorities arguing that,
“a need arising from or related to a mental disorder”,
was the requirement only to provide psychiatric, medical and follow-up services.
The statutory definition of aftercare services in the Bill is confusing because it separates out the needs arising from the person’s mental disorder from the need to reduce the risk of deterioration in the person’s condition and the risk of readmission to hospital. My noble friend’s amendment would instead define aftercare services as those services that reduce the risk of deterioration in the person’s mental condition and the likelihood of the person requiring readmission to hospital.
It is right that the definition of aftercare services focuses on reducing the likelihood of hospital readmission and does not lead to confusion or legal disputes about a local authority’s role in this or what services should be provided under Section 117 of the Mental Health Act. It is also right that aftercare continues to be viewed as a comprehensive range of generic services across healthcare, social care and other services such as suitable accommodation and community support.
Amendment 128A is a compromise offered by my noble friend that I hope the Government will take up because, as he said, he would prefer to delete Clause 5 entirely, so that the current position in relation to Section 117 remains unchanged. Mind, the mental health and disability committee of the Law Society and the Mental Health Lawyers Association all consider that the best way to avoid confusion over the definition of aftercare is to remove Clause 71(5)(a) altogether.
I hope that the Minister will have some good news for my noble friend and for other Lords who, too, are very frustrated that the mental health aftercare issue has not been laid to rest in the way we thought it had under our discussions as far back as on the Health and Social Care Bill.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I first would like to echo the comments made by my noble friend Lady Northover during Committee, when she paid tribute to the excellent work of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, in the mental health field.
I think we can all agree that setting out a definition of mental health aftercare in legislation is important. A clear legal definition will mean that the scope of aftercare will no longer be entirely open to interpretation by the courts, whose views have varied over time. The question is what that definition should be. As updated by government Amendments 129, 130 and 131, our proposed definition contains a carefully framed duty that reflects the Government's policy on the appropriate scope of the duty to provide free aftercare services for a very small group of patients who have been detained for treatment under certain sections of the Mental Health Act. It has carefully drawn limits because the Government do not consider that it would be appropriate for the Mental Health Act to impose a duty on local authorities to commission services that are based on needs which neither arise from, nor are related to, a mental disorder.
Therefore we believe that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, goes too far and would create an inequity between this group of people and others with equivalent needs for care and support who are not eligible for free aftercare, either because they have been detained under other provisions of the Act or not detained at all. They will be means tested and will have to meet eligibility criteria for the social care part of their aftercare package, so may not receive any social care from the local authority. In addition, with an ageing population, local authorities will have to be able to differentiate “mental health aftercare” in order to know when the “aftercare” finishes and ongoing support for other reasons begins.
The noble Lord suggested that the case of Mwanza was not a stable basis for primary legislation. He said that it is, after all, only one case. There is a bit of a misunderstanding around this. The Mwanza case merely triggered a debate; the issue is whether the definition is a good idea and, if so, how it can most helpfully be drafted. The Government’s definition of mental health aftercare services builds on the definition recommended by the Law Commission. The Government accepted the recommendation of the Law Commission as a sensible starting point, but we have gone further. We propose a wider definition than that suggested by the Law Commission, including that Section 117 services may relate to as well as just arise from the person’s mental disorder, and that the aftercare should prevent deterioration as well as readmission to hospital.
Because our definition is more precise, I feel that it will be more helpful than the noble Lord’s in ensuring that clinical commissioning groups, local health boards and both English and Welsh local authorities more easily agree on the aftercare services to be provided, so that these services can be put in place promptly.
I reassure the House that the definition we are now considering is the result of extensive consultation. In consequence, we have added a positive objective to prevent deterioration as well as preventing readmission to hospital, and have further changed the clause to remove the definite article when referring to “the mental disorder”, for which the noble Lord made the case in Committee. This is intended to remove any doubt about our intention that the scope of aftercare covers more than just one form of mental disorder, and is not necessarily limited to the specific disorder or disorders for which a person was previously detained under the Act and which gave rise to the right to aftercare.
Baroness Masham of Ilton
My Lords, what will happen to the protection of the public from those who have schizophrenia?
Earl Howe
My Lords, the protection of the public is of great importance, as I need hardly say; but we are dealing here with quite a narrow point of definition about who should be entitled to free mental health aftercare. To expand the scope of that definition to include others would not be fair on many people, which is why I have argued that I believe we have positioned the definition in the right way. The noble Baroness’s question is a very relevant one in the broader context of how we look after those with mental illness, but I would like to think that this amendment should not affect her concern one way or another.
Lord Patel of Bradford
My Lords, I am clearly disappointed at the response. I was expecting at least a halfway point at which we could meet and perhaps change the definition once again. I will not detain the House for very long. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, very clearly and succinctly put the benefits of Section 117 and the joint working that takes place. That is probably the only piece of legislation that has encouraged joint working really well and has worked.
The noble Earl talked about the Government’s definition, and that is what it is: a Department of Health definition. However, it does not ride with everybody else out there. Everybody that I have spoken to clearly says that this is the wrong way. I fear that the department has got itself in a corner because it has accepted the Law Commission’s recommendation on this point. It did not accept the other three recommendations, which clearly shows, to me, that the Law Commission does not understand Section 117 services properly. Although the department has accepted this recommendation, I think it has realised that the basis on which it has done so is not appropriate; the case is unique and unrepresentative.
We have talked about inequity. These people have their liberty taken away: they are locked up against their will. They have been in and out of mental health services; they have had a raw deal. That is why they are there. This is a reciprocal duty on behalf of society to make sure that we give them free aftercare services. Yes, other patients may not get that, but this group of patients is extremely vulnerable. There is also the issue of public safety. We should give them the services they require.
I could go on, but I will not. I am really disappointed. This matter deserves that the House makes its views known, so I want to test the opinion of the House.