European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, also subscribed to by my noble friend Lady Bowles. The amendment is primarily a probing one, to seek clarification from the Government on what they are seeking to do here. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 states:

“No general principle of EU law is part of domestic law on or after exit day if it was not recognised as a general principle of EU law by the European Court in a case decided before exit day”.


So if one allows for the double negative, it rather suggests that, if it was a general principle of EU law that had been determined by the European Court in a case before exit day, it will continue to be part of domestic law. Having reached that point, the following paragraph says:

“There is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law”,


and that no,

“court or tribunal or other public authority may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash”—

and so forth.

I am intrigued about why, having apparently established that there is a general principle of EU law that becomes part of our domestic law, when what is given away with one hand is taken away with another, one is not allowed a remedy based on that general principle of EU law. It would be helpful if the Government could clarify that.

The matter was raised in the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, which at paragraph 117 of its report quotes Professor Alison Young, who wrote:

“Schedule 1 to the Bill makes it clear that ‘there is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law’ … This prevents claims of the nature found in Benkharbouche, where the Charter was used independently from other provisions of EU law. … But claimants will still be able to rely on general principles of EU law, which protect fundamental rights. They will not be able to use these general principles on their own, but they will still be used to interpret EU-derived law, which then in turn could be used to disapply legislation. For the claimants in Benkharbouche, the stronger remedy currently found under EU law for the protection of fundamental rights will disappear”.


Again, I seek clarification from the Government as to why they believe that these protections should disappear as currently found in EU law. Indeed, the committee in paragraph 120 concludes:

“The effects of excluding the Charter rights, retaining the ‘general principles’, but excluding rights of action based on them, are unclear … We recommend that the Government provides greater clarity on how the Bill deals with the general principles and how they will operate post-Brexit”.


I sincerely hope that the noble and learned Lord will take the opportunity when replying to the debate to respond to that recommendation from the Constitution Committee and give us a clarification.

There was also one specific point, on which I would ask for a view from the Government Front Bench. The provision in paragraph 3 is:

“No court or tribunal … may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash any enactment … because it is incompatible with any of the general principles of EU law”.


I assume that that would mean to any enactment pre exit, which could of course include an Act of the Scottish Parliament. Therefore, would the provision in paragraph 3 prevent any challenge being made to an Act of the Scottish Parliament passed before the exit day on the grounds that it was outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because it was incompatible with those general principles, but not on the grounds that it was incompatible with any other pre-exit European Union law?

In other words, if other EU law had been satisfied but there was still a problem or it was still not compatible with EU principles, would an action that had been raised before exit day on the grounds that it was incompetent have to fall because no court could make a determination of it because of this paragraph? Some clarification on this point would be welcome. It would appear that a principle is established, but not the remedy that might go with it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have a similar question for the Minister. In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1, we are told:

“There is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge any retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.


I understand why that should be so, by reference to EU law principles, because at the moment you cannot challenge, in our courts, the validity of an EU instrument; you have to go to the Court of Justice. I am not sure whether the provision in paragraph 1(1) prevents, after exit day, a challenge to a provision of retained EU law brought by reference not to EU law but to common law principles. For example, are challenges on the grounds of legal certainty, the presumption against retrospectivity, or proportionality, which has already been mentioned, prevented by paragraph 1(1)?

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 1st April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, for giving us an opportunity to revisit Clause 18.

I do not propose to repeat what I said on the previous group of amendments—which I think has been acknowledged by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—as to why the Government came to the position that they did and thought that it was better in the circumstances to include these rules in the Bill. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that I do not believe that this is a trespass into the judicial function. As I indicated earlier, I think that one of the things that have to be taken into account, given that Article 8 rights are not absolute rights, is the public interest. It is appropriate and proper that Parliament determines what the public interest is. That is what we seek to do in Clause 18. Thereafter, it is quite properly the function of the courts to apply the law, having considered all the circumstances.

In moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that this debate had a narrow focus, unlike the earlier debate that we had in Committee. Amendments 17 and 18 propose to qualify, by inserting the word “normally”, the provisions in Clause 18 that little weight—in terms of the public interest—should be given to private life, or to family life with a British or settled partner, which was formed when the person was in the United Kingdom unlawfully, or to private life formed with precarious immigration status.

In a similar vein, Amendment 19 proposes to qualify the provision made by Clause 18 for the public interest in the deportation of a foreign criminal who has not been sentenced to imprisonment of four years or more, and who seeks to prevent their deportation by relying on their private life, on their family life with a British or settled partner, or on their parental relationship with a British child or a foreign child who has been resident in the UK for seven years or more.

These amendments are not required to ensure that Clause 18 is compatible with our obligations under the European convention, or to ensure that it properly reflects judicial discretion in determining proportionality under Article 8 in individual cases. It will remain a matter for the courts to consider—not just “normally” but in every case—whether the interference in the individual’s right to respect for private and family life is justified by the relevant public interest considerations. However, the Strasbourg court has made it clear that the European Convention on Human Rights does not guarantee families a right to reside in a particular country, and has consistently recognised that the Executive enjoy a significant margin of appreciation in determining how most appropriately to control immigration.

Clause 18 seeks to reflect Strasbourg case law, which has consistently said that little weight should be placed on private or family life formed during a time when a person’s immigration status is precarious—for example, in the case of Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v the Netherlands. I fully appreciate the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that flexibility might be lost when measures are put into primary legislation, although I am not saying that it is a straitjacket. Indeed, one of the considerations that the Government had to weigh up when the decision was taken that it was better to put these matters into primary legislation was that it does not have the same flexibility as rules, given what had been said in the Upper Tribunal regarding matters which were otherwise found in the Immigration Rules. No doubt successors in office will have to keep an eye on Strasbourg jurisprudence. I recognise that it is more difficult to amend primary legislation due to the nature of the parliamentary timetable. Nevertheless, we thought that it was better to do what we did. As I indicated, what we believe we are doing with regard to the reference to “little weight” is to reflect current Strasbourg case law.

Those who enter the United Kingdom for a temporary purpose, such as work or study, can have no automatic expectation of being allowed to settle here. Any private life they develop must be seen in the context of the expectation of their returning to their country of origin. Those who form private or family life while in the United Kingdom unlawfully can have less expectation of being allowed to stay here, and still less those who commit such serious criminal offences that they fall to be deported from the United Kingdom.

As was mentioned in the speeches, the amendments reflect a concern that, if little weight is given to family or private life in these circumstances, a claim under Article 8 can never succeed. That is not the case. The fact that a private or family life has been established should be given little weight, consistent with the case law, but that does not mean no weight is given to that private or family life.

Where there are other factors to be put in the balance—such as the presence of children, disability of the partner, contribution to the community or the fact a young adult has spent over half their life in the UK and has no ties with their country of birth—these factors will all need to be weighed in the balance to decide whether it would be disproportionate to remove the person from the United Kingdom. The need to have regard to these other factors is reflected in the current family and private life Immigration Rules. The case law and Home Office guidance also make it clear that there may be other exceptional factors that need to be taken into account to ensure the decision is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

The addition of the word “normally” is therefore unnecessary, if the aim is to ensure that other relevant factors can be taken into account. It is unhelpful in that it gives no indication of the circumstances when little weight should not be given: in other words, what would be the abnormal case? It is potentially more restrictive, and arguably even incompatible with the European convention, if the implication is that normally these additional factors will not be taken into account. In fact, they should always be taken into account.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that where little weight should be given to family or private life, that does not mean no weight. In response to the specific points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I confirm that there may well be compassionate or exceptional cases where Article 8 requires weight to be given to these or other factors or Article 8 requires no deportation. I confirm that the courts must continue to apply Article 8 under the Human Rights Act and that Clause 18 does not override the dicta of the late Lord Bingham, in EB Kosovo, as to the appellate function of the courts in deciding cases under Article 8. Clause 18 enables other circumstances to be taken into account. The insertion of “normally” is neither necessary nor desirable to achieve that outcome.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to AP Herbert’s “Misleading Cases”. I well remember the series which starred Roy Dotrice, with Alastair Sim on the Bench. Looking back, it is quite possible that that is where I started in the career I eventually pursued. It was a fantastic series, well worthy of a repeat. This is not a misleading clause. It sets out what the public interest requires but it does not detract from the need for the courts to decide what Article 8 requires in a particular case. I hope that, with these reassurances, the noble Lord will agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for their support and to the noble and learned Lord the Minister, in particular, for giving the assurances I sought. I am still concerned that there remains a conflict between what I see as the absolutist language of the clause and the flexibility which the noble and learned Lord recognises that Article 8 requires by reference to the circumstances of individual cases. I fear that this clause will cause confusion and it will foster litigation. However I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 5th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I sought to try to explain that that expression of little weight was really a way of putting into statutory form what we believe is in fact the practice of courts in the cases which are here. I think it was in the case against the Netherlands; I do not know the first name involved but the other was Hoogkamer. I am sorry not to get that right. We were seeking to say that we endorse what the position of the European Court of Human Rights has been on that. Whereas under the Human Rights Act the court is asked to consider and have regard to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, what we are seeking in this is to say that we agree that the court should follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence. This has not suddenly been conjured up; it is based on what we believe the courts would do.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The difficulty with that is that the Strasbourg jurisprudence recognises that although of course little weight should be given to these factors in many cases, there will be other cases where considerable weight should be given to these factors in the individual circumstances. They may be unusual or rare cases but the Strasbourg court is not saying that it is a rule that in every case involving family or private life, little weight shall be given to these factors. The difficulty about Clause 14 is that it purports to suggest that little weight must always be given to these factors, whatever the circumstances of the case. It does not say “other than in exceptional circumstances” or “normally”; it says that little weight shall be given to these factors. If the Minister wishes to come back on Report with an amendment that recognises a degree of judicial discretion, I shall be delighted to welcome it but that is what Clause 14 says at the moment.

The difficulty that the Minister faces is that he must recognise that there will inevitably be cases where a tribunal or a court, looking up at the facts of the case, decides that greater weight should be given to these factors. If I understood him correctly, the Minister accepted that if the court or tribunal decides in applying Article 8 that more than little weight is required to be given to these factors, then Article 8 must prevail. So Clause 14 is simply illogical and self-contradictory. It does not even achieve what the Minister says it is designed to achieve.

In introducing this group of amendments, I said that the Joint Committee on Human Rights had been unable to identify any precedent for legislation telling the courts what weight to give to relevant factors. I do not think that the Minister or indeed the noble and learned, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, with their combined expertise and experience, have pointed to any precedent upon which Clause 14 should be based. I think that this is a constitutional novelty, and we will be creating a very unfortunate precedent by telling the courts what weight to give to relevant factors, when that must depend on all the circumstances of the case.

I am sure that we will be returning to this topic on Report. I ask the Minister to reflect on this matter and to see whether it is possible to meet the concern that has been expressed today, without doing any violence to the object of Clause 14, by putting in some wording that recognises in the Bill the retention of judicial discretion in this matter. For the moment, though, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I appreciate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Singh, is making, but I ask him to reflect on the fact that the exceptions are exceptions for historical reasons of the Church of England and the Church in Wales where there is a common-law duty with regard to priests in relation to people within their parish. Quakers and the Jewish faith are included for reasons that go back centuries. Every other religion in England and Wales is treated in the same way. Even my own denomination, the Church of Scotland, is treated in the exactly same way as the Sikh faith is treated by the provisions in this Bill for the religious organisation itself to determine what its appropriate authority is.

It is quite clear from what the noble Lord has said that there is no doubt within his faith as to where that authority lies, just as in my own denomination the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland would be the obvious authority. The fact that he has been able to make very clear where that authority would lie just shows the importance of it being determined by the religion itself. I also ask him to reflect on the fact that if we included his amendment, every other faith and denomination would have to be included as well. That would be an impossible task for a Government and would take them into having to decide which the proper authority of some religions is, and I do not believe that is where the state should go.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I would just add that if the state were to conduct such an exercise and purport to decide for religious bodies what the proper religious authority is, difficult questions would arise under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 21st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for moving his amendment and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for speaking to her amendments. There is recognition on both their parts and across the Chamber of the importance to us of information which we receive from other intelligence agencies. It is often crucial, and it is important that we can reassure them of its confidentiality. We have been trying—I acknowledge that this is the spirit in which the amendments have been moved—to ensure that there is a proportionate response to ensure that the information is protected.

There is the fundamental problem that the novel application of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction, which has its origins in the intellectual property sphere of law, into the national security context has potentially been damaging to the United Kingdom's national security and international relations. As I have said, its very existence can erode the confidence of our agents and our intelligence-sharing partners that we can protect the secrets they share with us. Moreover, in the case of human agents—because it is not just information that we receive from other intelligence agencies; it is important to remember our own agents—there are real concerns of threat to life if there is a requirement to disclose. Each case that goes through the court has potential to cause damage, not just through the disclosure of sensitive information but by highlighting the risk that it could be disclosed.

In addressing the amendments moved and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I will indicate that in this sphere we believe there is a need to provide certainty and to reduce the scope for litigation. The noble Lord’s suggestion of moving to a certification model, with a narrowed definition of what qualifies as sensitive information, would allow the uncertainty and damage to remain. If we do not legislate in a way which provides sufficient clarity, we could again have the difficulty that our intelligence-sharing relationships stand at risk of deteriorating.

A certificate-only approach would only partially address the concerns of our intelligence partners and of our own agents that sensitive information is at risk of disclosure under the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. It might leave them with the fear that a certificate might not be upheld and that their material might ultimately have to be disclosed. That in itself could have a chilling effect on the activities of our intelligence services and our intelligence-sharing relationships. An absolute exemption therefore provides a clearer and neater protection for this material and more certainty for our partners and our own intelligence services.

I turn to the restriction of the statutory protection to identity, which seeks to define what might be the intelligence with national security concerns. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, illustrated this by the identity of intelligence officers, their sources and capability and to control principle material alone. We believe that is insufficient, as there is sensitive information falling outside of these two categories that also requires statutory protection. That picks up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, that this is far too narrowly defined.

Given that the work of the intelligence services is covert, a considerable amount of material would not fall into the category of identities and capabilities but the disclosure of which could nevertheless still be very damaging. Such information includes information about operations and investigations, as well as threat assessments in relation to sabotage, espionage and terrorism, assessments of vulnerabilities of critical national infrastructure or systems, military plans, weapons systems and information on the development or proliferation of nuclear weapons overseas. It may also include operational planning and intelligence reporting, as well as material relating to national security policy and intelligence policy issues and funding, and so on. I hope that giving these examples shows that it is a much broader sphere of activity than is proposed in the amendment.

Likewise, that narrow definition can also create scope for litigation about what does and does not fall within the definition—what, for example, would be meant by the “capability” of intelligence officers? These issues alone could result in lengthy litigation, all of which would divert intelligence officers from front-line duty. The model proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also allows no statutory protection for sensitive information whose disclosure could cause damage to the interests of the international relations of the United Kingdom. This point was also picked up on one of the latter amendments in the group by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. The Government need to offer protection to this category of material to ensure that our international partners remain willing to talk to us in a frank way, so that we can protect and further the United Kingdom’s interests. The mere embarrassment that would be caused from disclosure of diplomatic material would be no basis to certify. Only if material would cause damage to international relations would we be able to certify.

Diplomacy does not work if diplomats cannot talk in confidence and no Government would, or should, sacrifice the benefits which effective diplomacy can offer. As an example, vital work that is done in promoting human rights is not always done in public. Talking to international partners in confidence about their human rights record is an important part of how we seek to influence that agenda. The possibility that such discussions could be made public could have serious consequences for our ability to influence. Clearly, if international partners do not trust the United Kingdom to keep advice and assessments confidential, this could have a serious impact on the United Kingdom’s interests in the fields of human rights co-operation—as well as on consular assistance, trade and investment, and jobs, to name just a few other implications.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, proposes adding after,

“held by an intelligence service”,

the qualifier,

“where that information relates to national security or the interests of the United Kingdom”.

We do not believe that that is the right approach. The Freedom of Information Act, which I referred to earlier, does not try to exclude those agencies from the operation of the Act only in so far as they hold information relating to national security. Rather, it excludes them from the Act as a whole in recognition of the fact that, as far as the agencies are concerned, their entire function and raison d’être is to do with national security and necessarily the information they hold is connected with that. The Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 both make express provision that the heads of those organisations are to make arrangements to ensure that no information is obtained by their agency,

“except so far as is necessary for the proper discharge of its functions”.

I am concerned that adding the wording suggested might only confuse the matter and give further opportunity for unnecessary litigation. We have heard about the canteen menu, and I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, referred to someone who had slipped on the floor and wanted to sue the cleaners. I do not think those examples have so far been used in Norwich Pharmacal to get information out of the security services. If that were the issue, there are many other ways that that information could be sought. We are talking about far more serious information, and I do not think that is being challenged.

The noble Baroness said that she could not find anywhere where the Government had said what they might mean by,

“relating to an intelligence service”.

The Opposition propose removing the clauses that protect information relating to an intelligence service and information obtained from or held on behalf of one of our own intelligence services, as opposed to a foreign intelligence service, or information derived from such material. Sensitive information that would not be afforded statutory protection under these amendments includes sensitive intelligence material held by, say, the Home Office, that has been passed to it by the Security Service in support of executive action, for example, deportation on national security grounds or a TPIM notice. It would also include intelligence the Security Service shared with the police in counterterrorism operations, the disclosure of which would readily compromise those operations in either preventing a terrorist attack or bringing terrorists to justice. Work done in other government departments on national security policy and intelligence policy, which relates to the intelligence services, would not be protected if the “relating to an intelligence service” clause were removed.

The Government have reflected on the constructive analysis and considered comment in the legislative period to date. Picking up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I have no doubt that it will be considered further when this Bill goes to another place, but we have concluded, so far, that in the Norwich Pharmacal context, we need to provide absolute exemption for intelligence services information and certification for other sensitive information, the disclosure of which would be damaging to national security or international relations. Only by this can we provide the clarity required to enable the UK to protect its sensitive information in cases of third-party wrongdoing and to restore the confidence of our intelligence-sharing partners and our own security and intelligence services.

I have tried to outline some of the responses to what I appreciate are constructive approaches to what we all agree is a difficult issue. I hope I have explained why the Government resist these amendments, and I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I recognise the difficulty of defining with precision what information should be covered. I maintain the position that Clause 13(3) does not do a very good job of it. I suggest that the Minister and the Bill team would benefit considerably by having a word with the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller—although not tonight. At some stage, perhaps they could discuss a way of improving what is a very unsatisfactory Clause 13(3), but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 21st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, Article 6 has been a very good safeguard for many claimants, or people appearing before the courts, of securing a fair trial. The fact that the courts are expressly enjoined to have regard to it does mean that in particular cases, if the requirements of a fair trial lead to requirements of disclosure, when one comes to that second stage of the CMP process the court would be obliged to order disclosure. However, as I have already indicated, it may well be that in these circumstances the Government take the view that even then, disclosure could be damaging to national security, but they must bear the consequences, as set out in Clause 7(3), if they feel unable to disclose.

I finally come to Amendments 47 to 50. They relate to the second stage of the process—and I indicated before that Amendment 47 has the same considerations that I expressed with regard to Amendment 36. The aim of the provisions is to put more material before the court—not the same amount—so that cases that currently cannot be tried because they hinge on highly sensitive national security material can be heard, leading to real findings on important allegations about government action.

Where the consequences are the inclusion of the material in the case, there is no precedent for including Wiley balancing. Other CMPs that already exist and do not use it have been upheld by the courts as being fair and compliant with Article 6. The position of the Government is therefore that there is no case to include balancing of the sort that is implicit in these particular amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Owen, expressed concern about the requirement, as opposed to an obligation to consider to require, in terms of disclosure. As a Government we share that concern about this set of amendments. Amendment 49 also goes even further and provides for disclosure under the AF no. 3 principle, meaning that material can be disclosed, even if it is damaging to national security, if that is necessary for the individual to be able to instruct their special advocate. This amendment does not take full account of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tariq—and I will stand corrected by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, if I get this wrong—which held that Article 6 does not provide a uniform gisting requirement in all circumstances.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, said at paragraph 27 that,

“the balancing exercise called for in paragraph 217 of the European Court’s judgment in A v United Kingdom depends on the nature and weight of the circumstances on each side, and cases where the state is seeking to impose on the individual actual or virtual imprisonment are in a different category to the present”—

the present being an employment tribunal—

“where an individual is seeking to pursue a civil claim for discrimination against the state which is seeking to defend itself”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, went on to say at paragraph 72:

“The context will always be crucial to a resolution of questions as to where and how this balance is to be struck”.

I could not help but think of the point that the noble Lord, Lord Owen, made, that when so much has been said about judicial discretion, this is perhaps an area where there ought to be proper judicial discretion, and where an absolute requirement on the judges should not be made. Wherever it is possible to provide gists and summaries of national security-sensitive material without causing damage, they will be supplied. In those cases where Article 6 requires gisting of this type, as I have already indicated, Clause 11(5)(c) means that the court will order it.

Finally, Amendment 50, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated that he may not move, would instruct the court to ensure that any summaries only do no damage to the interests of national security,

“so far as it is possible to do so”.

I am afraid that that is a risk that the Government cannot take. We cannot say to our international partners that we will protect their information,

“so far as it is possible to do so”.

Perhaps above all, we cannot say to sources who are risking their lives for us, “We will protect your identity and, accordingly, your life and safety as far as it is possible to do so”. We do not believe that that is a risk that the Government should take and we believe that we should be categorical about it.

This set of amendments puts at risk our national security in order to hear compensation claims that can be fairly dealt with by the model set out in this regard in the Bill. The Government’s duty is to protect national security and it is not an optional duty. It is fundamental and some may say that it is our very first duty. Against that background, I very much hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, replies, it may be of assistance to the House if I seek to respond to a specific question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Owen. I am very grateful for the general support around the House for the concept of judicial discretion in this area and that CMPs should be a last resort, if they are to exist at all.

The noble Lord, Lord Owen, asked me to address Amendments 48 and 49, to which the Minister referred. I am grateful to the Minister for the very careful way in which he went through the amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, was concerned that Amendments 48 and 49 would introduce a duty to provide a summary or a gist of the material if the closed material proceeding is to be ordered. The answer is that disclosure of the summary or the gist would be required only if the Government wish to proceed with a CMP. If they do not wish to disclose the gist or the summary, which is a matter entirely for them, they do not have to do so under the amendment. There simply would be no closed material proceeding. I suggest that that is entirely appropriate if we are to have a fair balance of the interests in open justice and other competing interests. I am grateful to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, consistent with the spirit of the way in which the noble Lord moved his amendment, I shall try to be brief, but I think that it is only fair that I explain why the Government are not accepting this amendment.

It is part of the principle behind our system of government that the Executive are the guardian of the United Kingdom’s national security interest. Courts have frequently stated that the Government’s function to protect national security by claiming PII is a duty rather than an option. Correspondingly, we believe that it should be the responsibility of the Secretary of State to apply for a declaration that a closed material procedure may be used. The courts play an essential role in scrutinising the Government’s exercise of these functions, but the question of whether to claim PII, and accordingly whether to make an application for a declaration that a closed material procedure may be used, should be a question for the Government.

In practice, it is the Secretary of State who holds national security-sensitive material and is in the best position to judge the scope and nature of that material, with advice from the security and intelligence agencies. Other parties may not even be aware that the national security information exists. It will remain open to a third party to approach the Secretary of State and request an application for a CMP if they do have reason to want one. If the Secretary of State refuses, that decision could be judicially reviewed.

I accept there is an underlying concern that the Government could inappropriately use this power because there is a feeling the courts are powerless to prevent the Government claiming PII to hide something, and conversely claiming a CMP when it is to the Government’s advantage to have material before the court. I do not think this is a concern that is ever likely to be raised in practice. In the first instance, it is for the Secretary of State to instigate the CMP application or PII claim, and the power to order a CMP or to accept a PII application rests solely with the judge. The judge would be alert to any unfairness to the non-government party, and within the CMP would have the case management powers to be able to ensure that the claim is fairly heard.

That is, in summary, why we would resist the amendment, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord. If we are to have CMPs there must be equality of arms and there must be fairness, and it must be open to the applicant to apply to the judge for a CMP to be ordered. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not quite sure that I can say that we do not support the amendment and just leave it at that, as that would not be courteous to the House.

Very briefly, the Bill states that the judge must order a CMP if he considers that a party to the proceedings would be required to disclose material and that such a disclosure would be damaging to the interests of national security. The amendment would change the “must” to “may”, introducing greater judicial discretion. However, the Government do not consider that this is a necessary amendment given the narrow criteria that are set out for triggering a CMP and the other safeguards in the process.

When the Secretary of State makes an application whereby a CMP might be used, the judge needs to be satisfied of two things: first, that there is material that a party would normally be required to disclose; and, secondly and significantly, that disclosure of that material would damage national security. That is not a fig leaf, as some have described it. The judge will have the final say about whether or not those conditions are satisfied. The Secretary of State has to demonstrate that genuine damage to national security, not embarrassment, would be caused by the material being disclosed publicly; and if the judge disagrees with that assessment, he could refuse to order a CMP. Equally, if he considered that the material was not relevant to the facts of the case and the Secretary of State was therefore seeking a CMP where one was not necessary to protect material that was relevant to the case, he could refuse to order one on that basis, too. This is a significant role for the judge.

It is also important to remember that the process does not end with the court’s declaration that a CMP may be used. It is, as has been described in our previous debates, a gateway. Stage 2, set out in Clause 7, is a process whereby the special advocate can then challenge individual documents as to whether they should go into open or closed proceedings, and this is done successfully.

In those circumstances, I encourage the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, although I suspect that he is not going to do so.

[Lord Pannick]

The noble and learned Lord is very wise. If we are going to have CMPs, it should be at the discretion of the judge rather than as a matter of duty. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I indicate that, while the Government do not accept Amendments 37, 38 and 40, we do not propose to resist them at this time. There will obviously be an opportunity to reflect on them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendment 43, the effect of which would be to add the Supreme Court to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Session as the courts that would be covered by closed material proceedings in the context of this Bill.

I think that it is important that there is consistency within the hierarchy of courts covered by these provisions. As I have indicated, this amendment would add civil proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to the list of courts in the Bill in which closed material procedures under Clauses 6 to 11 may be used. At present, the only courts for which this is available are the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Session.

I understand that there might be some concerns about adding to the list. The reason for adding the reference to the Supreme Court is to seek to put beyond doubt that the Supreme Court is empowered to apply closed material procedures. It was felt that the Supreme Court was likely to be considering points of law only and the Supreme Court already has some of its own bespoke procedures where it can exceptionally exclude parties from proceedings if in the public interest. However, after the Bill was introduced, the Government became concerned that omitting the Supreme Court might be a gap in the legislation. The lower courts would be able to rely on the procedures set out in the Bill but the Supreme Court—the supervisory court for those courts—would have either no exceptional procedure or a different one.

I do not think that the Government are naive. I think that we are realistic enough to realise that once we enact this Bill, the early uses of the procedure in the High Court almost certainly will be appealed in some form or another, and it seems quite likely that at least some of these appeals will make their way to the Supreme Court. This amendment will put beyond doubt the Government’s intention that the Supreme Court should continue to have the ability to consider sensitive material and ensure that we are not left in the very unusual situation of the highest court in the land not being able to adopt the same procedures used in the lower courts.

For completeness, I should add that noble Lords may have noted that the first set of rules of court under the Bill for the High Court and the Court of Appeal in England and Wales and Northern Ireland are to be made by the Lord Chancellor. This is simply a matter of ensuring that the implementation of the CMP provisions of the Bill can occur swiftly. We do not think that the same rationale applies for the Supreme Court. The first set of rules are to be made by the president of the Supreme Court, as now.

I very much hope that the reasons for adding the Supreme Court will satisfy your Lordships’ House. We are not talking about the horizontal scope of the Bill but the vertical reach, namely the courts in the hierarchy that may hear such claims.

Concern was also expressed in Committee that in the future the reference to “relevant civil proceedings” to which there could be an extension by order could include inquests and fatal accident inquiries. That was not the Government’s policy, as we made clear in our response to the Green Paper consultation. We had brought forward a Bill we believed would not allow any Government to add inquests to the definition of relevant civil proceedings now or in the future, but we were grateful to the Delegated Powers Committee’s consideration and we took on board its comments.

Likewise, the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights also made comments regarding this order. I understand that the remaining concerns are to ensure that closed material proceedings should be used only when absolutely necessary and in a narrow and targeted context. It is for this reason that the Government have tabled an amendment to remove the order-making power completely; in other words, removing Clause 11(2) to 11(4).

I can assure your Lordships that this decision has not been taken lightly. Parliament has legislated for CMPs no fewer than 14 times over the past 10 years. It is conceivable that national security material may become relevant in contexts other than the narrow ones listed in the Bill. The impact of cases not being heard is felt by not only the Government but claimants, whose cases can be severely delayed. Nevertheless, the Government understand the importance of the issue. This amendment will set to rest any fears raised by the Joint Committee that the order-making power could have been misused or that this clause would open the door to commonplace use of CMPs. It will also put beyond any doubt that inquests are beyond the scope of the Bill.

My noble friend the Duke of Montrose has tabled an amendment to require the consent of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive for the Secretary of State to make an order to amend the definition of civil proceedings. The Government are committed to properly respecting the devolution settlements, but if the amendments to delete the order-making power altogether are carried, my noble friend’s amendment would not be necessary. I hope that this also satisfies the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others that takes forward the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the Minister for confirming that the Government are proposing the deletion of Clause 11(2) and the order-making power.

I have a concern about Amendment 43, which includes the Supreme Court in the list of courts that will have power to make a CMP. Given the role of the Supreme Court as the final court of appeal in this jurisdiction, it is highly undesirable that it should decide points of law of public importance in judgments that the public and lawyers generally cannot see.

I do not intend to divide the House on Amendment 43. Given the amendments supported by the House earlier this evening, I would understand that the Supreme Court would have ample discretion to decide whether or not it is appropriate for it as the final court of appeal to order a CMP, and no doubt it would wish to take into account the undesirability, if so perceived, of the Supreme Court issuing judgments that, at least in part, the public and lawyers generally would not be able to see. However, I raise that concern.

[The Duke of Montrose]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for the way in which he presented his amendments. As he notified the House earlier, if his Amendment 59 is approved, my Amendment 60 will become superfluous. I raise the point that without Amendment 59, there would be a very real danger that anything that the Secretary of State had decided to amend by order in the Scottish courts would be seen as meddling in the affairs of the Scottish legal system. At present, there is nothing more likely to inflame the amour propre of the Scots than actions such as this.

The possibility of this problem was drawn to my attention by the Law Society of Scotland. If Amendment 59 is adopted, we will have a much clearer and more workable piece of legislation than one that is likely to cause controversy. If by any chance it is not carried, I will still wish to bring my amendment forward.

The Bill appears to be walking a fine line on what might be termed issues that might require a legislative consent Motion in the Scottish Parliament and those that would not. Even now, Clause 6(7)(c) of the Bill gives powers to the Court of Session. I understand that early in Committee it was briefly drawn to the attention of the Justice Committee in Edinburgh. Can my noble and learned friend tell the House whether this question of a legislative consent Motion has finally and satisfactorily been resolved?

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I think that my noble friend has an amendment later where we can explore this more fully. It is the case that special advocates could be engaged both at the second stage, when individual pieces of evidence are being considered, and, by virtue of Clause 10(4), at the application stage.

I will finish my point on Clause 11(5). Nothing in Clauses 6 to 11 should be read as requiring a court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In that respect it could be said that Article 6 trumps the provisions expressly set out in Clauses 6 to11.

My noble friend expressed a recognisable concern that national security today might involve serious crime or international relations tomorrow. It is very clear that not only will it not, but that international relations and criminal activity have been considered and rejected for the purposes of closed material proceedings in civil cases. The Bill deliberately omits other aspects of the public interest from CMP clauses, such as international relations and the prevention of detection of crime, even though these categories are included in existing statutory CMPs. I hope that that gives the assurance that it is certainly the intention of the Government that there should not be definition creep, as it were.

My noble friend asked about Pepper v Hart, as did the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. It is not only when European Union issues are involved but when there is doubt in a court case about the interpretation of any primary legislation that the parties can resort to statements made in Parliament that should throw light on the interpretation. So this is not limited to an EU context. We cannot dictate to the courts how to apply Pepper v Hart, but doubtless, in future, parties to litigation will be able to read what I am saying today at the Dispatch Box and, if pertinent, advance cases to the court on that basis.

I have an embarras de richesses.

[Lord Pannick]

Can the Minister confirm that the concept of national security under the Bill is deliberately intended to be narrower than the other concepts included in the Bill? I have in mind Clause 5(5), which appears to contrast the concept of national security with the broader concepts of public interest, the prevention or detection of serious crime and the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. It appears from Clause 5(5) that those are distinct matters. National security is a much narrower concept, and similarly Clause 13(5) appears to contrast the concept of national security with the concept of the interests of the international relations of the United Kingdom. I understood the noble and learned Lord to confirm that those other concepts were not within the concept of national security.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, for the purpose of closed material proceedings and what we are dealing with here, national security is the specific concept, although it is not defined in the Bill. As I indicated, the Green Paper suggested that it might go wider to include some of the matters that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised, but we have quite clearly indicated that that will not be the case in matters of national security. I give way to my noble friend who I understand was a counsel in Pepper v Hart.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. The purpose of the new clause before Clause 6, and the detail that is set out in Amendment 39, is that it is an attempt—with the very considerable assistance, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, of the legal advisers to the Joint Committee—to set out in statutory form the common law position. That is its purpose; but I emphasise that PII is not a procedure that requires disclosure. It is distinct, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lester, says, from the issues that we will be discussing on Norwich Pharmacal where the concern is that if the judge makes an order, there must be disclosure.

My fundamental objection to Clause 6, and the reason I support these amendments, is that under subsection (5) the Secretary of State, before he decides whether to make an application for a closed material procedure, must first consider whether to make a claim for PII. So the obligation is on the Minister to consider whether to apply for PII or not. That is all to the good. However, if a closed material procedure application is made by the Secretary of State—or indeed by anybody else—Clause 6(3) provides that,

“the court must ignore … the fact that that there would be no requirement to disclose if … the material were withheld on grounds of public interest immunity”.

As I understand Clause 6, the judge is obliged to ignore the possibility of PII. I take the view that, just as the Minister ought to consider whether PII provides a satisfactory means of resolving the conflict between security and fairness before he applies for a closed material procedure, equally, the judge should have to consider that.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

The noble Lord made the same point at Second Reading. Perhaps I might explain how subsections (2) and (3) interact. I understand the point that he is making but it is not as fundamental as he represents it. If I have got that wrong, I apologise. He will realise that under subsection (3) the court has to decide,

“whether a party to the proceedings would be required to disclose material”.

That relates back to the first leg of the two conditions that must be satisfied in subsection (2)—namely, that in paragraph (a). The point is that the judge cannot say, “You wouldn’t have been required to disclose this because it could have been dealt with by PII”. This provision tries to ensure that, if you did not have PII, there would nevertheless be an obligation to disclose evidence under, I think, Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. I hope that explains why this is not a matter of principle but one that indicates what might otherwise be required to be disclosed.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, who is characteristically very helpful on these matters. However, I hope he will accept that it is absolutely vital, in a matter of such importance and sensitivity, that we make it very clear in the legislation that the judge, when asked to decide whether to go into a closed material procedure—in which he will decide the case by reference to evidence that has not been seen by one side—will do so only if he is satisfied that there is no other lawful, proper means of resolving the question. If the Minister is telling me that the Government’s intention is that the judge should first ask himself whether the problem can be resolved by, for example, gisting or redacting the material or by some other means, or that the judge has a power to say to himself, “This material is really not very important in determining the case. Therefore, I do not need to go into a closed material procedure”, I would be very relieved and satisfied.

I ask the noble and learned Lord to reflect on this point. The issue is not really about the proper interpretation of the very difficult words in Clause 2. The question is one of principle, about what we seek to achieve. For the reasons that I have sought to identify, I hope that the Committee and the noble and learned Lord will agree that we should end up in a position whereby the clause states unambiguously that—given the disadvantages that it inevitably involves and the unsatisfactory nature of such a procedure—a closed material procedure, although it may be needed in exceptional cases, should be adopted only if there is no other fair and proper procedure that can be adopted, and if that is the view of the judge who is hearing the case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Of course, it has been Ministers who have asserted PII, and I think that is what we expect the Minister to do: to give consideration to whether that would be appropriate in this particular case before considering an application for closed material procedures.

We do not find an exhaustive proceeding of PII satisfactory because, where it is obvious from the outset that the Government would be claiming PII, and national security counts for the overwhelming majority of relevant material, why go through the PII exercise before applying to the court for a declaration that closed material procedure can be used? That may be the kind of case that the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, was talking about. As I have indicated, the Government’s proceedings specifically include a duty to consider it. However, Mr David Anderson QC in his evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights said that the termination could be made without conducting a whole PII. He said that,

“if the exercise is plainly going to be futile, I do not think legislation should require it to be performed”.

[Lord Pannick]

I ask the noble and learned Lord whether he agrees with the evidence that Mr Anderson gave in answer to a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, when he said:

“The closed material procedure is a weapon that could usefully be added to a judge’s armoury, but it should be for the judge to decide on the fairest way to dispose of a case”.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is important that we have moved on to Clause 9, covering exceptional funding, because this has been discussed in earlier amendments. Amendment 91, moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, would allow the director to fund excluded cases where he or she determines that it is generally in the interests of justice to do so. I am sure that Members of the Committee will readily acknowledge and appreciate that in this context, the phrase “interests of justice” is capable of wide interpretation. The amendment would create a power, which I am sure is its intention, that is considerably broader than the one currently being proposed in Clause 9 as it stands. It is right that there should be an exceptional funding scheme and that it should provide a potential safety net for the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights of access to justice, and we believe that Clause 9 achieves that important end. Exceptional funding determinations under Clause 9(3) will be made in accordance with the factors that the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case.

Following on from that and looking at the jurisprudence, in considering whether legal aid should be provided in an individual case, the kind of factors that the director will need to take into account include: the importance of the issues to the individual concerned and the nature of the rights at stake; the complexity of the case; the capacity of the individual to represent themselves effectively; and alternative means of securing access to justice. These factors are broadly similar to the considerations that the Legal Services Commission currently takes into account in criminal proceedings where it is in the interests of justice for legal representation to be provided. I would suggest that our exceptional funding provisions are likely to meet the concerns of noble Lords in civil cases where, for example, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged. Indeed, in moving his amendment, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford accepted that there is substantial case law from Strasbourg in relation to family law and he almost seemed to acknowledge himself that there was a potential for very many cases indeed to qualify under the exceptional funding provisions as set out in the Bill. However, we believe that the insertion of the general phrase “interests of justice” would be open to very broad interpretation and would risk undermining the approach, scope and rationale for making changes to the legal aid system.

It has been acknowledged that Amendment 91A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, covers similar territory in that it would allow the director to make exceptional case determinations when it was appropriate to do so against specified criteria. As with Amendment 91, the potential ambit of this is extremely broad, and certain elements would be open to very wide interpretation. Again, however, I believe it is worth noting that many of the factors listed in the amendment, such as,

“the client’s vulnerability … the client’s capacity to represent themself … and … the availability of alternative sources of”,

funding will form at least part of the test for exceptional funding where Article 6 is engaged.

Amendment 91A also specifically refers to clients under the age of 18. In considering whether an individual case meets ECHR exceptional funding criteria, the director would be obliged to consider the ability of the client to present their own case, having regard to the complexity and importance of the issues in terms of what is at stake. Where a child brings an action without a litigation friend, that would be a relevant factor in deciding whether or not they have the ability to present their own case. In the end, the factors I have indicated will be taken into account by the director in deciding whether the absence of legal aid would mean that it was practically impossible for the applicant to present their case or would lead to an obvious unfairness in the proceedings.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether legal aid would apply to advice and assistance. The answer is that in principle it could do so to the extent that it would avoid the breach of an individual’s rights under, for example, Article 6. Amendment 92 raises the issue of the chief coroner—

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, in relation to Amendment 91, does the noble and learned Lord accept that Clause 9(3) as currently drafted will require the director to spend much of his or her time making determinations as to the scope and application of convention rights rather than focusing on the easier question of whether or not the interests of justice require legal aid? I would suggest to the noble and learned Lord that there is a real danger of satellite litigation as to whether or not convention rights or EU rights are in fact breached. Would it not be much more sensible and efficient, and much less expensive, to leave the director to focus on what he or she will be good at, which is asking whether the interests of justice require legal aid?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As ever the noble Lord puts a seductive argument, but there is a certain advantage in the director being required to have regard to convention rights because, if the test was the wider one of the undefined interests of justice, I am not sure whether that would lead to any less satellite litigation; it is possible that it could lead to more. He says that it would be easier, but when faced with that test without any guidance—with the exception of a certain amount of specificity set out in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach—there would not be any real steer for the director if that is all he is to be left with when making decisions.

[Lord Pannick]

It would be very difficult to challenge a director’s decision as to whether the interests of justice are met because it is a subjective test. If the test, as under Clause 9(3), is hard-edged—that is, whether there is a breach of the convention—it is much easier to bring a legal claim in that respect.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Having a definition which in these circumstances would be so broad—which I think the noble Lord is saying is a merit of it—opens up vast scope, as I said in response to my noble friend Lord Thomas.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I stand to be corrected, but as far as I am aware it is a novel approach. Not only could it lapse and be put in suspension; it could be revived, lapse again and be revived again. We are not switching on and off light bulbs. There are quite important issues here and I am not sure that these procedures are designed to give them proper weight. That is why we argue that primary legislation should be the way of dealing with the issue, if it is felt that the provisions for a fixed-term Parliament are not working and should not be the basis for the future.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting debate and for the support that has been expressed on all sides of the House. My answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is that we are dealing with an exceptional Bill which is being brought forward by the coalition Government to deal with a particular short-term political problem. In the light of that, we should think very carefully before we embody on the statute book, as a permanent measure introducing permanent constitutional change, a measure which has at best a short-term political purpose.

I respect the views expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Marks, and by the Minister. I respect their views because they and the Liberal Democrats strongly believe in fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. However, their difficulty is that large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches do not agree with fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. They are rightly concerned about the constitutional implications of such a measure, as so eloquently expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton and Lord Cormack, in this debate. They are particularly concerned about this matter in the absence of any public consultation on this issue, in the absence of any pre-legislative scrutiny and given the lack of any evidential basis for the new constitutional principles we are about to enact.

The inescapable reality is that the Government and large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches are supporting the Bill not because they believe in the constitutional principle but because it is part of the coalition agreement, and it is part of the coalition agreement because of the political needs of this coalition Government to remain together for five years. I repeat: I do not deprecate that; it is a perfectly proper political position to adopt as a basis for legislation which applies to this Parliament. However, it is not an acceptable basis for general constitutional change, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has pointed out.

The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, asked whether under the amendments a future Parliament could approve a resolution at any time during that Parliament. The answer is yes, and the reason the amendment is so drafted is that it would be inappropriate to limit the events and the circumstances that may occur during a future Parliament. It is quite possible that a coalition Government might be formed part of the way through a future Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the Minister were concerned about the Parliament Act, but of course a future Parliament could at any time enact primary legislation on this subject.

The Minister asked a fair question—all his questions were fair, of course, but he asked me to address this one in my reply—about how this will work in the future. My belief, my expectation, is that no future Government will want to apply the provisions in this Bill as they are unless there is another coalition Government with similar political demands to this one. I hope and expect that after the next general election, if there is a desire in principle for fixed-term Parliaments, the relevant responsible Government will bring forward new primary legislation that will be based upon proper consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny and in the light of experience.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, we have once again had a spirited and interesting debate with a number of important points made. It is also obvious that some of the issues raised went beyond the question of a referendum and into some of the detail of the different constitutional reforms that have either been debated and passed or are about to come down the track.

Perhaps I might start by taking issue with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on a couple of the points which he made at the outset. He said that he hoped that never again would he hear that the Prime Minister was surrendering power or determining the date of the election. While it is the case that the Prime Minister and the Government are, in this Bill, putting forward a date for an election as being the first Thursday in May 2015, and while I hope that the Bill will be passed with that in it, that in itself means that the Prime Minister has surrendered a power because it is not possible—

[Lord Pannick]

He has chosen it.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

He has actually put it to Parliament for it to support. Parliament will have had to vote that through, as is quite clear because we have other amendments coming down to change that date. Unless circumstances arise that would trigger the mechanisms in Clause 2, the Prime Minister of the day will not have the opportunity to seek Dissolution when it might seem opportune other than to have the election on the date set down in the Bill. He will have surrendered that power.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Monday 14th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the amendment is entirely consequential on the amendment to Clause 11 that was carried on Report last Wednesday. It is a tidying-up amendment. I hope that it is entirely uncontroversial.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, this is a consequential tidying-up amendment following the amendment that was passed last week. We had a good debate on the issues. The House made its decision and we share the concern that any statutory provision should be technically effective. The Government are considering the way forward on this issue. We will set out our plans when the Bill returns to the other place tomorrow and your Lordships' amendments are considered. On that basis, the Government do not object to the amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I beg to move.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Perhaps I can answer the noble Lord before I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

That leads to the kind of inequality about which I think that there is serious concern around the House. The reason why the Government have come forward with the 5 per cent margin is that we believe that the core principle of equality of value—one vote, one value—is of the utmost importance. Although we acknowledge and make provision for room for the Boundary Commission to go either side of that principle of one vote, one value, to try to bring in some of the other flexibilities—although it is always good to be thought to be flexible—will take us back to the situation under the present Boundary Commission rules, where there is greater diversion from the norm.

[Lord Pannick]

Does the Minister recognise that there is concern on all sides of the House about the excessive rigidity of the Government's proposals? If the amendment is not acceptable—I understand what the noble and learned Lord says—will he at least consider bringing back to the House an amendment which says something to the effect that the Boundary Commission should have discretion outside the 5 per cent principle either way if it considers that there are exceptional circumstances for a particular constituency?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Tempting though it is to accede to that immediately, I cannot, standing here today, give that undertaking to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Pannick]

I am not asking the Minister to agree to it; I am asking whether he is prepared to consider it seriously and bring it back to the House.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I perhaps misunderstood what I was being asked to do. I thought that I was being asked to give a commitment to bring back an amendment, which I cannot do. The force of argument on all sides of the House is considerable and I have no doubt that the comments made on this matter will be considered. I do not want to make a commitment which I cannot deliver, but I can honestly say that I will ensure that the forceful comments that have been made from all sides of the House on this point will be acknowledged.

I could give some examples where the present system does not deliver on the principle of not crossing county boundaries, and how I believe that under what we propose, the ward system will, for the most part, be upheld in England. I am not sure that I can elaborate much further. I say to my noble friend Lord Crickhowell that if similar arguments apply in the rest of the United Kingdom, they will apply in Wales. Under what my noble friend proposes, the number of Members from Wales would not increase. I do not think that he was arguing that, but much of the argument in Wales has focused on the number. I would not want the House to be given the impression that somehow my noble friend's amendment would increase the number of Members from Wales.

I have tried to be helpful. We believe that we have imported flexibility, but important contributions have been made to the debate, and we are honour bound to consider them. I also make very clear that I do not want to be misunderstood as making a commitment that I may not be in a position to honour.

Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Monday 25th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I support the amendments, in particular Amendment 20A. The Treasury has no interest whatever in controlling expenditure on legal advice and legal representation; its only interest is to ensure that the assets are not used for terrorist purposes. It is important that the uninhibited right to seek legal advice and to obtain legal representation is stated clearly in the Bill and that it is not left to Treasury concession.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for dealing with licensing, which was an important part of our deliberations in Committee. Amendments 19, 20 and 20A would write expressly into the Bill a duty on the Treasury, if requested, to issue licences to allow the designated person and his dependants to access sufficient funds and economic resources to meet reasonable living costs and to pay for legal representation. In the case of living-costs licences, the amendment would place a duty on the Treasury to deal with applications urgently.

As my noble friend made clear, the amendments reflect concern that the Bill does not include a sufficiently clear obligation on the Treasury to issue licences for these purposes and that designated persons and their families are reliant on the good faith or good practice of the Treasury to grant such authorisations. I recognise the concerns that have prompted the amendments. It goes without saying that a designated person must be in a position at the earliest possible opportunity to access funds to meet his or her and their dependants’ living costs and to be able to pay for legal advice and representation in relation to their designation.

However, we do not think that to include in the legislation an obligation to issue such licences is necessary, since the obligation already exists by virtue of the Treasury’s duty to act in compliance with the Human Rights Act. Under Section 6(1) of that Act it would be unlawful if the Treasury acted in a way which is incompatible with a convention right. So, in response to the point made by my noble friend, it is not a question of acting with good grace but of acting under a requirement—an obligation—on the Treasury. It means that the Treasury must issue any licence that may be required to ensure that the affected person’s convention rights are not unlawfully infringed by the imposition of an asset freeze.

In order to secure compliance with this obligation on the Treasury, it routinely issues licences immediately on designation so that designated persons from the outset have access to frozen funds, including all social security benefits to which they are entitled, to meet their day-to-day living expenses. There is no requirement that such licences be requested by the designated person; they are issued automatically as a matter of course. The licences that the Treasury issues are broad and do not restrict the designated person’s access to funds necessary to meet only reasonable living costs. The only controls imposed are those necessary to protect against the risk of funds being diverted to terrorism.

In addition, a designated person or any other affected party may request a licence at any time if access to funds or economic resources is required which is not already authorised under the terms of a licence issued immediately upon designation. The Treasury’s practice is to treat any request for such licences as a matter of priority and, in particular, to deal urgently with requests where the failure to act quickly would result in hardship to the designated person or their family. It is therefore not necessary to impose an express duty on the Treasury to treat such applications as a matter of urgency as the Treasury already has a legal obligation to act in a way which is compatible with the affected person’s convention rights, and it is accordingly the Treasury’s established practice to do so.

My noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, attested to the importance of legal expenses. Again, the Treasury is obliged by virtue of human rights law to ensure that it does not act in a way that would impede an affected person’s access to legal representation. To ensure this, there is already in place a general licence permitting the Legal Services Commission to pay legal aid funds to solicitors representing those designated persons who are eligible for legal aid. In addition, the Treasury will ensure that an additional general licence will be issued which authorises third parties to meet the legal expenses of designated persons by paying their lawyers.

There is an overriding obligation on the Treasury to issue licences for legal expenses. Therefore, again, it is not necessary to write such a duty into the Bill. I assure my noble friend and your Lordships’ House that the absence of such an express duty would in no way prevent an affected person from challenging the Treasury in circumstances where a Minister decided to impose a particular condition in a licence, delayed issuing the licence or refused to issue it at all. I repeat to my noble friend that this is not simply a matter of Treasury practice, but of the Treasury honouring the legal obligations upon it.

[Lord Pannick]

If I understood him correctly, the Minister mentioned legal aid for the designated person and allowing third parties to fund legal representation for that person. My concern is when the designated person has assets of his own which he wishes to spend on his legal representation. I should like to have an assurance that the Treasury will allow the designated person to use as much of his own legal resources as he thinks appropriate in his own legal defence provided that the payment, as Amendment 20A states, is to,

“a person subject to regulation as a legally qualified person”.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I said that in addition to a general licence which already exists with regard to the Legal Services Commission paying legal aid funds to solicitors representing designated persons who are eligible for legal aid, the Treasury will ensure that an additional general licence will be issued which authorises a third party to meet the legal expenses of designated persons by paying their lawyers.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised the issue of whether the person’s own assets might then be used. That would be distinctive from a general licence which, by definition, cannot relate to that of an individual. As I indicated earlier, licences issued in respect of individuals are intended to impose controls that are necessary to protect against the risk of the funds being diverted to terrorism. That is the test. Therefore, an application for a licence—it would have to be a licence for an individual with regard to his own individual circumstances and not a general licence to which I have already referred—would have to be looked at by the Treasury against that test to ensure that that there was not a diversion of funds to terrorism.

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry to test the Minister's patience, but if I understand him—please correct me if I am wrong—he is saying that there may be circumstances in which the Treasury would restrict the amount of money that the person who is designated—his own money—may be able to use for his own legal representation. If I understand the Minister correctly, that is because of the risk of the money being diverted to terrorism. But surely, if the money is going to a person who is regulated as a legally qualified person, the Treasury would have to suspect that a solicitor or barrister is involved, in some way, in terrorism. That is a very serious matter that should be taken up with the proper regulatory authorities and not be the subject of restricting the designated person from obtaining the legal representation that he seeks.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in principle, it would be possible to allow people to spend their own funds on legal expenses. It does not detract from the possibility of a licence being issued, but there are practical reasons why it is not possible to allow frozen funds to be used to pay legal expenses. For example, there would be circumstances where banks would be put in a position of having to determine whether a particular transaction was for legal expenses or not. The Treasury allows this matter to be dealt with by way of licence with the appropriate conditions attached. That would be the way to deal with an individual licence on an individual application and a person seeking to use his own funds as opposed to and distinct from the general licence that exists for legal aid, which I have indicated would be issued with regard to the third-party circumstances that we have already discussed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I can almost hear the noble Lord advancing that case. The Government’s position is simply that it is possible to make a distinction where there was a challenge to the listing in the Kadi case. It is not a position that we would wish to concede; it is on all fours with the circumstances that would arise in an asset-freezing case.

Should the courts decide that AF (No. 3) applies to asset-freezing cases, any court rules that cut across this would be read down to ensure compatibility with the ruling. Therefore, it would not be necessary to amend the legislation. In any event, it would be premature to prejudge such a determination by the courts and now to require the disclosure of sensitive information that could damage national security or the detection or prevention of crime.

The question is how best to deal with a situation where the applicability of AF (No. 3) principles is not given and is uncertain. Advocates of the amendment argue that we must remove the uncertainty by giving the Government specific obligations in this statute in the terms of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As I believe is abundantly clear, the Government’s approach is different. As I said in Committee, and as the Prime Minister announced in July, the Government will review the whole matter of the use of intelligence material in judicial proceedings and will issue a Green Paper next year. I say in response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, that the intention is for the Green Paper to be published in the summer of next year. In response to his second question, this will allow time for a judgment to be handed down in the lead case—the employment tribunal case of Tariq—in relation to whether AF (No. 3) applies more widely than stringent control orders. I understand that that case will be heard by the Supreme Court in January and we expect a judgment in the spring. It would be wrong to pre-empt the Green Paper, although there will obviously be an opportunity for reflection on that judgment before the Green Paper is published.

It would also be wrong to adopt a piecemeal approach to this important issue. As we have heard eloquently expressed in the debate this evening, the issue of special advocates and the use of intelligence material cuts across a number of areas. If we try to address these important issues in an ad hoc way in individual pieces of legislation dealing with different aspects, we risk ending up with different requirements in different pieces of legislation. I know that that is not what many noble Lords wish to happen in this area of legislation. They want to see greater coherence and consolidation, not fragmentation and a piecemeal approach. I could not have agreed more with my noble friend Lord Lester when he said that this matter will not go away. The Government readily recognise that. As I indicated, our commitment is to address the issue. The fact that we are willing to do that is a testament to the importance that we attach to it.

The Green Paper will aim to develop a framework for ensuring full judicial and non-judicial scrutiny of intelligence and wider national security activities in line with the Government’s commitment to individual rights, to the rule of law and to properly protecting national security. It will need to address concerns about the United Kingdom’s ability to protect intelligence material, including that shared by foreign partners, and to bring forward proposals to reconcile the evolving legal position—duly informed, as it will be, by Strasbourg and Supreme Court rulings—with modern intelligence practices. We will try to ensure such a coherent and consistent approach. I hope that noble Lords will welcome and support that approach and see it as a recognition not just of how important this issue is but also of just how difficult it can be to reconcile two very important but at times competing requirements. Although I recognise that noble Lords have raised necessary and important issues with this amendment, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw it.

Amendment 24 would amend Civil Procedure Rule 79.2. That rule requires the court, when dealing with certain cases, to read the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules—in other words, to deal with cases justly in a way that is compatible with the requirement to ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest, while ensuring that it has the material available to properly determine the proceedings. This relates to a similar range of arguments to those that we have just gone through. It comes from a belief that the ruling in AF (No. 3) should apply to challenges to designations under the Bill.

For two reasons, I do not believe that the amendment is necessary. As I have already made clear—I shall not rehearse the reasons again—the Government do not accept that AF (No. 3) applies to asset-freezing challenges. It is for the court to decide the ambit of AF (No. 3) on a case-by-case basis. Even if ultimately the court found that AF (No 3) applied to challenges to asset-freezing decisions, we do not think that there would necessarily be a conflict between the disclosure requirements of AF (No. 3) and the public interest requirement of Rule 79.2 of the court rules. Rule 79.23 makes it clear that the public interest provision is without prejudice to the need for the court to satisfy itself that the material available to it enables it properly to determine the proceedings. Furthermore, as I have indicated, Section 67(6) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which is imported into this Bill, simply states:

“Nothing in this section, or in rules of court made under it, is to be read as requiring the court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention”.

In short, the Government do not believe that Rule 79.2 would cut across any fairness obligation required by the court to meet Article 6. It is an important reminder of the need to deal carefully with sensitive material but it does not constrict the proper determination of the proceedings.

I recognise that serious and important issues have been raised. I have sought to address, although I suspect that I have not done so fully, the concerns expressed by noble Lords. We hope that this will be considered fully. My noble friend Lord Lester mentioned the special advocates, as did the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who expressed his views very robustly. There will be an opportunity to deal with that in the context of a Green Paper, which will be a way to move forward in a coherent rather than a piecemeal manner. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in the debate for the support that they have given these amendments and to the Minister for his detailed response. I sympathise with the noble and learned Lord because, with his brief, he faces the substantial difficulties of inviting the House to accept that the legal position is not as it has been stated by the European Court of Human Rights in the A case, by the Appellate Committee of this House in AF (No. 3), by the Supreme Court in Ahmed and by the European Court of Justice in the Kadi case. For all those judges essentially to agree that basic fairness is required when the Government impose a substantial detriment, whether a control order, asset freezing or something similar, on a person—and I forgot to mention the Court of Appeal in Bank Mellat—poses a certain difficulty for the Government. As we are all rightly concerned about saving public money, I respectfully suggest to the Government that it would be a considerable waste of public money to litigate again the question whether the AF principles apply in the context of asset freezing.

The noble and learned Lord mentioned the pending case of Tariq in the Supreme Court, which is concerned with whether the AF principles apply in an employment context. The case concerns alleged race discrimination. Whatever the Supreme Court decides in that case, it is most unlikely to throw any light on the issue that we are debating here and it is most unlikely to conflict with what has been said previously.

Having made all those points, I recognise that we shall not take this matter further today. I hope that the Government will reflect on what has been said—not by me but by other noble Lords who have spoken—that they will reflect on the range of judgments that have been given and that they will recognise that, if they want to impose orders of this sort, they have to comply with basic principles of fairness that involve telling the person concerned why, in essence, the detriment is being imposed on them. I have no doubt at all that the House will return to this matter on a future occasion, if not future occasions. For today, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 6th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I acknowledge that point. My understanding is that if a person other than the designated person had suffered loss as a result of a decision of the Treasury, it would be possible for them to raise an action. I will get further information to confirm that to my noble friend, but the person whose designation is being challenged—the designated person—would have a forum and an opportunity in that context to seek damages. It may also, in some circumstances, be open to a person to claim damages under the Human Rights Act if the particular circumstances so arose, and therefore we not believe that any further provision for compensation is necessary.

The purpose of Amendment 52 would appear to be to increase the protection from prosecution given to a person complying with the provisions of Part 1 of the Bill. It would achieve that by specifying that no person complying with Part 1 was liable to court action as a result of such compliance. Again, the intention behind this is understandable, and we recognise that the rationale is to provide that additional protection from claims made against persons—it could be, for example, bank employees who have quite dutifully acted in compliance with the requirement under Part 1 of the Bill. However, we do not believe that the proposed clause is necessary. It is already a defence to claim that a person was acting in compliance with a lawful requirement, and the Government believe that this principle is sufficiently well established that the drafting of the Bill does not need to be amended. In fact, the basic principle is already there, and we do not need to add to it; indeed, it is often the case that when you add to something that is already well established in principle, you sometimes can give rise to questions about the extent of the principle. We believe that that principle is there, and it is well established. Accordingly, the amendment is not necessary. In the circumstances, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

I would like clarification in relation to compensation. As I understood the Minister, he suggests that Amendment 57, giving the court the power to make such order as is considered appropriate, would be broad enough to empower the court to award compensation to the affected individual who had been designated. Is the Minister saying that this provision is broad enough and is intended to overturn the general principle of English administrative law—and, I presume, Scottish administrative law—that the law does not normally provide compensation for those who have suffered direct loss as the result of invalid administrative action? One normally needs to show some tort, a misfeasance—that either the official knew that what he was doing had no lawful basis or he was at least reckless. If it is the intention to give the court a power to grant compensation simply for the invalid nature of the designation, would it not be better to say so expressly in the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, Amendment 70 from my noble friend Lady Hamwee raises some important points about the use of special advocates and disclosure, as has been reflected in the speeches in this—albeit short—debate.

Amendment 70 relates to the supplementary provisions in relation to anyone wishing to challenge an asset-freezing decision. Clause 23(4), which the amendment seeks to delete, applies the procedures to be followed in determining an application made to the court for a Treasury decision to be set aside. The provisions of subsection (4) require the maker of the rules of court to have regard both to the need for a proper review of the decision that is subject to challenge and to the need to ensure that disclosures are not made where to do so would be contrary to the public interest such as—to give the most obvious example—for reasons of national security.

As asset-freezing proceedings relate to issues of national security, some cases will inevitably involve the use of sensitive, or closed, material such as intelligence material that it would not be in the public interest to disclose to the individual concerned. However, I emphasise that the starting point must be that the individual is given as much information as possible, subject only to the legitimate public interest concern. However, the provisions in Clause 23 ensure that closed material can also be used in court proceedings through the special advocate system, which is the system that Amendment 70 seeks to restrict but which nevertheless should, we believe, be part of the system that is used.

The special advocate system and the disclosure procedure are designed to ensure procedural justice for individuals in admittedly difficult circumstances in which in the public interest material cannot be disclosed to them. The special advocate, who is a specially cleared lawyer, will take instructions from the individual and will then have access to the closed material. Without this subsection, the court might not be able to appoint a special advocate, whose role would be to argue for more information to be disclosed to the individual and also, in effect, to mount a challenge against the Treasury decision involving closed information.

As this debate reflects, as other exchanges have reflected and indeed as court cases reflect, the Government recognise that a range of concerns have been expressed about the special advocate system. I assure the Committee that the Government are committed to meeting our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights with respect to a right to a fair trial and we believe that the special advocate system is part of the process. I can advise the Committee that there will be an opportunity to raise the concerns that this amendment is aimed at more widely during a consultation on a government Green Paper on the use of sensitive information in judicial proceedings. That Green Paper will aim to develop a framework for ensuring appropriate judicial and non-judicial scrutiny of intelligence and security activities in line with the Government’s commitment to individual rights, the rule of law and properly protecting national security. It is anticipated that that Green Paper will be published next year.

Ultimately, we must constantly strive to secure in a modern legal framework the best balance between the interests of justice and the interests of security. We referred earlier to the case in which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, represented the successful appellants. I indicated to him that that case obviously related to control orders and that the Government do not necessarily accept a read-across. I think he will understand why we are not in a position to make that read-across. I pointed out to him in an earlier exchange that fact and context are important in these circumstances. However, I reiterate what I said earlier: our starting point is that, so far as is consistent with the legitimate interests of national security, we should advise persons subject to a designation order what the grounds of that order are.

I acknowledge that this is a difficult and sensitive matter. I have indicated that we want to look at this whole issue next year on the basis of a Green Paper but, for the purposes of the present Bill and this amendment, we believe that it would be a mistake and not necessarily in the interests of the person who is subject to designation for this subsection to be removed. Controversial though the special advocate’s role may be, we nevertheless believe that it will be necessary in dealing with appeals or indeed judicial reviews that may arise under these provisions.

[Lord Pannick]

Can we be clear about this? Although the Government have introduced a very welcome right of appeal for persons who are designated, the Minister is telling the Committee that there may be cases where an individual is told absolutely nothing about the reasons for his designation and he will be left to rely on the special advocate, to whom he cannot talk and who cannot take instructions from him. Is that the Government’s position?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As I believe I indicated when I started to address this matter, the starting point is that the individual should be given as much information as possible, subject to a legitimate public interest concern. That is our position. We would wish to give as much information as possible, subject to the important question of where there may be legitimate national security reasons for not going beyond a particular area. Clearly, a special advocate can argue that that is insufficient. One of the duties of a special advocate is perhaps to challenge the Treasury about whether more information should be made available. Indeed, as court cases show, the courts look at this matter very seriously. However, in terms of the amendment, we believe it is important that the role of the special advocate is in place; otherwise, the amount of protection available to the person who is the subject of a designation order may be reduced.

Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 6th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

This has been a useful debate. There has been a general welcome from all sides of the Committee for the Government’s amendments, which introduce an appeal mechanism rather than judicial review for the core designation or decisions to vary or revoke.

Perhaps I could give some of the underlying rationale for the amendments. As introduced, Clauses 22 to 23 set out a procedure for review by the courts of any decisions taken by the Treasury under the powers provided in the Bill, including decisions to make, vary or revoke a designation, decisions in relation to licences issued or applied for, decisions whether to publicise the freeze generally or limit the scope of the publication for reasons of national security or justice and decisions whether to request or disclose information.

A number of noble Lords raised this matter at Second Reading. There were calls to amend the procedure for challenging asset-freezing decisions through the courts from a judicial review to an appeal. It perhaps answers some of the points made by my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lady Noakes, to which I shall return in more detail, to say that we still believe that judicial review can be a very flexible tool, allowing differing degrees of intensity of scrutiny depending on circumstances and the impact of the decision in question on the individual concerned. In its report prior to Second Reading, the Constitution Committee acknowledged as a result of various court judgments the intensity with which courts scrutinise control orders where the legislation provides for a review applying judicial review principles. That is broadly equivalent to an appeal. Such an in-depth judicial review has been shown to be an effective safeguard in these cases.

Nevertheless, the Government believe that a similar full merits review should be adopted for court scrutiny of asset-freezing designations; that is, decisions to impose, to vary or to renew asset freezes. We believe it because, due to the lack of case law in this area, there is no certainty that the court would choose to undertake such a rigorous judicial review procedure—I think that that is the sense of the comments that were made at Second Reading. We have responded by tabling amendments to introduce an appeal mechanism for asset-freezing designation decisions, spelling out that we would expect a full merits-based review of such decisions to be undertaken by the court. Such an appeal would require both parties to provide the material underlying their case to the court, which would then conduct that full merits-based review of the designation decision, taking all evidence and substituting its own decision if necessary. This level of scrutiny is appropriate for designation decisions, because it is the core decision that will most affect the designated person’s human rights.

Perhaps I may respond to one or two of the specific questions asked in this regard. My noble friend Lady Noakes asked whether it was just a right of appeal at one level. As with appeals generally, it will be possible for appeals to proceed along the normal route, either through the English system or the Scottish system, and ultimately, if it is appropriate, to the Supreme Court.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked about expedition. He made the point that the provision applies to interim orders. By virtue of that, there would be an expectation that the courts would respond. Indeed, there have been a number of cases where the courts have shown an ability to respond with expedition. That is certainly what we would anticipate if an appeal was brought. On the question on disclosure posed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it is clear from the terms of the Bill that provision and reference is made to the rules of court with regard to the special advocate system. It is therefore envisaged that the rules of court should provide for that system. There is a later amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee on which we might be able to discuss this in greater detail.

My noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lady Noakes both raised other decisions where the position would remain as one of judicial review rather than appeal. The Government’s position on that, as for other decisions concerning implementation of the freeze, is that these are not as fundamental to the citizen as the original decision to impose the freeze. That includes the granting of specific licences and the publicity of the fact of a designation. It is certainly our view that maintaining a standard judicial review is appropriate in these cases. I certainly recognise the concerns raised by my noble friend Lady Noakes about judicial review but, as I have said, the courts have already shown, certainly in relation to decisions on control orders, an ability to mount a very rigorous review indeed. These decisions are, however, more administrative in their nature and do not require the same in-depth consideration as a decision to impose an asset freeze. Nevertheless, we anticipate that judicial review of these decisions would include proper scrutiny of the material on which the Treasury decision is made and that the court would have the power to consider further information if it believed that to be necessary. Ultimately, it will be a matter for the courts to decide on the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied, depending on the decision in question.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked whether the court would be able to substitute its own terms if, for example, that was with regard to a licence. The court has discretion to give whatever relief is appropriate; we certainly believe that that could include amending the terms of a licence.

The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York raised the issue of people being subject to freezes for 30 days without access to funds and legal expenses. The point about that is that we provide licences. A general licence is given at the point where people are designated to ensure that they indeed have access to funds for living and legal expenses. This will be the subject of a set of amendments later in our proceedings. People do not need to go to a court to be able to access that legal aid funding.

Perhaps I might specifically refer to Amendments 5 and 6 and the consequential amendments, which would limit the period for which the Treasury could make asset-freezing designations to 30 days, so that any freeze going beyond 30 days would require confirmation by the High Court. This in many ways reflects some of our debate on the first set of amendments—not only the points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, but the general issue of the balance between the decisions of the Executive and those of the judiciary. Perhaps not surprisingly, I endorse what was said by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who indicated the importance of separating executive decisions from a robust review of those decisions by the judiciary. Indeed, that point was acknowledged by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova. He indicated that that was the former Government’s view, which they maintain. It is, quite clearly, a matter of important debate and, as my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill indicated, these matters are complex. Ultimately, however, Ministers have the responsibility for national security and our accountability as Ministers is not only to Parliament, which is an important accountability, but to the courts. We believe that we have introduced a robust form of review, if those affected by designation wish to pursue it.

Unlike control orders, asset freezing is not only used against people in the United Kingdom who cannot be prosecuted or deported. In fact, only around 10 per cent of asset-freezing cases involve people who are in the UK or hold funds here and are not being prosecuted for terrorist offences. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, indicated that he thought that those who were subject to designation should also be prosecuted. I asked how many people who have been subject to asset freezes have been prosecuted. I was advised that 21 individuals in the UK have been convicted for terrorism offences. Six people within the UK have not been prosecuted. I also asked how many persons outwith the UK have been subject to designation for asset freezing; the answer is 36, of which 22 are entities and 14 are individuals. It would not be possible to prosecute them. Nevertheless, consistent with our obligations under the United Nations Security Council resolution and the importance attached to disrupting terrorism by freezing assets, it is important that we have been able to designate in those cases in which it would not be possible to bring prosecutions.

In that small number of important cases in which individuals have not been prosecuted and are within the UK, we believe that the opportunities that are open now through a full form of appeal are appropriate. It would not be appropriate to have a mandatory form of court decision-making, but there is a robust avenue for those who have been designated and wish to challenge that in the courts. In that way, we have strengthened judicial safeguards for asset freezing. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment and that the Committee will be minded in due course to support the amendments that have been tabled by the Government.

[Lord Pannick]

Do the Government accept, on special advocates, that the AF case would apply in this context, as it does in the context of control orders, and that it would be necessary for them to disclose at least the gist of the allegations against the individual concerned?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am very sympathetic to the amendment for two reasons. First, it seems to me right and proper to allow a person to use as much of their financial resources as they see fit to pay for legal advice and assistance. To impose restrictions on them in that respect is simply to interfere with the administration of justice. Secondly, I cannot see that the Treasury has any interest whatever in preventing a person using their own funds to pay for legal advice and assistance. The Treasury’s only legitimate interest is in preventing the use of the funds for the purposes of terrorism. If the money is being paid to someone who is regulated by the Law Society or the Bar Council—I appreciate that the amendment may need some tinkering to cover those points—I cannot see that the Treasury can have any legitimate concern as to the improper use of the money for purposes associated with terrorism. If the Minister takes a different view and there is evidence to suggest that persons who are regulated by the Law Society or the Bar Council are or may be acting improperly in this respect, please will he tell the House and explain what steps the Government are taking to draw such concerns to the attention of the proper regulatory authorities?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this is an important amendment, and one that is somewhat foreshadowed by the comments of the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York when we debated an earlier set of amendments. The effect of the amendment would be that any payments the purpose of which was to pay legal expenses of a designated person would not require a licence. As a result, the Treasury would have no oversight of such payments.

It is important to emphasise that that would include payments not just directly to solicitors and law firms but to designated persons themselves if the purpose were to pay legal expenses. This could include payments made by one designated person to another if the first designated person had access to free funds.

I understand the legitimate concerns that have prompted the amendment. I emphasise without equivocation that a designated person must be in a position at the earliest possible opportunity to challenge a designation or any other related decision made by the Treasury under the Bill, but I believe that the existing licensing scheme meets this requirement. Licences already provide a controlled mechanism whereby designated persons can be provided with funds to pay for legal representation with adequate conditions in place to control the risk of funds being diverted to support terrorism. A designated person or any other affected party may also request a licence at any time.

Moreover, the Treasury has issued a general licence that applies to all designated persons to enable eligible legal aid payments to be made. I give the assurance that that will be replicated once the Bill is enacted. That general licence ensures that a designated person will have immediate access to legal representation where they qualify for legal aid. Any other party may request a licence at any time to pay for a designated person's legal expenses. I emphasise that the general presumption is that where a licence is requested to pay for legal costs, it will be granted.

The Government believe that this is the proper and effective way to deal with the provision of funds in relation to legal services provided both by the state, under the legal aid system, and by other persons. It does not and is not intended to impede a designated person's ability to access justice, which we think is very important, but it also ensures that the Treasury can maintain oversight of a designated person's expenditure. I hope that, against that background and with that reassurance, the noble Baroness will be willing to withdraw her amendment.