(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am not aware of any specific issue with regard to the West Country but I know that efforts are certainly made to reduce the number of cases that do not go ahead on the day or very early on because of the prosecution. It is my understanding that considerable steps have been taken to improve that position.
My Lords, to what extent do the Government expect the Crown Prosecution Service to liaise with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs about decisions to prosecute? How satisfied is the noble and learned Lord about the state of liaison between the two organisations? How satisfied are the Government about the performance of the prosecuting authorities in relation to financial crime and tax evasion in particular?
My Lords, obviously where there is evidence and the tests are met, prosecutions should be brought. I do not have any specific information on the current liaison between the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. If there is anything of note I can find out about it and advise the noble Lord.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not agree that the person would become a non-departmental public body in his or her own right. My noble friend raises an important point because, as has been indicated on a range of issues, guidance will be given and criteria set. There will be a framework; there will be a responsibility for the Lord Chancellor; but the crucial point—and there is concern across the House on this—is that in individual cases there cannot be that level of interference. We believe that that is secured by the provision in Clause 4(4) that it would be unlawful for the Lord Chancellor to interfere in a way that undermined that freedom of decision-making in individual cases. More than that, other measures in the Bill provide for transparency to show that that is not being in some way undermined.
We accept entirely and welcome that the Lord Chancellor will have no power to direct or even guide the director of legal aid casework, but what about classes of case? Suppose the Lord Chancellor thought that too much legal aid was going to women who are victims of domestic violence, if we succeed in carrying the amendment that was passed earlier today all the way through. Would the Lord Chancellor be able to give guidance to the director that he ought to ease up in providing legal aid in that category of case? We have to be concerned on the broader point that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, expressed so strongly in Committee and just now.
For example, guidance will be given under Clause 9 on exceptional funding, which could relate to classes of cases, but the criteria that are set and are there in regulations will be there by secondary legislation. That can in no way be trumped. Secondary legislation will have to be approved by your Lordships' House by the affirmative procedure. That cannot be undermined or circumvented by guidance. When the regulations are eventually brought forward, we will have an opportunity to look at that. That will be the primary source and it would not be possible for the Lord Chancellor by some other means to undermine what was in the regulations. If you wish to change them, you have to come back to Parliament with further regulations and Parliament would have a further opportunity for debate.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in many cases professional advice by representation is not actually available. I have already said that I do not for a moment deny that the advice that people get in the preparation of a case is valuable—of course it is—but we get back to the issue of looking at the competing priorities for funding from a limited pot. We have said that cases involving life, liberty and homelessness are more important priorities. We are looking, too, at circumstances in which the tribunal is itself intended to be a forum in which people could much more readily access such things informally, without the need for, or recourse to, lawyers. When I was a law student, the idea was still alive and fresh. That difficult choice was made against a background where there are other sources of advice available—I shall not list them again—and in the context of a tribunal that is intended to facilitate those who do not have representation. I do not shy away from it being a difficult choice, but it was made against other competing priorities.
I was about to take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, made. We have mentioned other proposals that have been on the airwaves. A different department is responsible, but I will ensure that these concerns are drawn to the attentions of BIS, and will respond to the more specific points when it is possible to draw them to the attention of the department whose responsibility they are. I think that I am right in saying that in some cases the consultation has not been completed.
I put another question to the Minister, although I am very grateful for his answer to that one. He himself suggested that we are no longer in a golden age, if ever we were, in which tribunals were easily accessible and user friendly. Will he say whether the department has received representations and advice from the employment tribunals on this matter and, if so, what it was? Did those tribunals endorse the removal of employment cases from the scope of legal aid?
I think that I asked whether someone could come to my aid and give an answer to that question. Perhaps if I talk slowly, that may be possible. Failing which, I may be able to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Bach, if he responds to this amendment, or I will have to resort to writing to the noble Lord. Frankly, I do not know the answer, but I shall try to find it out for him.
While the Minister awaits advice, will he tell us about the processes that led to the drafting of the impact statement? A number of us have argued that there will be knock-on consequences for the public purse to the budgets of other departments and the wider economy from taking these cases out of scope. What examination have the Government made of the cost implications elsewhere for their own policies, which the Minister keeps telling us he is applying only under duress, to save money on the legal aid budget itself? The justification offered by Ministers for this is that it is essential to contribute to the reduction of the deficit, and this is how they are going to contribute to the reduction of the deficit. Many of us simply do not believe that the net effect of these policies will be to reduce the deficit—it will be to increase it. What calculations have the Government made about that?
As the noble Lord acknowledged, the question goes wider than this particular case. I remember dealing with or at least considering the matter in relation to an earlier amendment last week. While it is often said, I do not think that any substantive evidence has been given that the cost to the public purse will be greater as a result of these policies. Certainly, if part of the purpose is to ensure that the deficit was addressed, it would not make sense to rob Peter to pay Paul, or whichever way round it is. The Government’s view is that in the totality there is benefit and that this will make a significant contribution to the reduction of the deficit. I apologise to the noble Lord, but despite the extended debate I still do not have the answer to his question.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt is an important point, which has been raised before in the context of the Bill. I think that Amendments 69 and 71 in the name of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford—to which we will come, dare I say, sooner rather than later—raise the point about families of asylum seekers. I hope that when we come to that, we will have a proper debate on the important issue that my noble friend raises.
The Minister is defending the Bill’s drafting against the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in Amendment 60. Is he therefore saying that if someone is the victim of a mistake by a public authority—not a deliberate mistake or one dishonestly intended but none the less an egregious error arising from ignorance of the law, which ought to be known by the people working in the public authority—there is to be no legally aided redress for the citizen, even if the harm is considerable?
As I said to my noble friend Lord Phillips, the Bill does not include negligent actions of a public authority. I made very clear that it is intended for the serious-end range of abuse of power and the harm that results. It is not intended to include all that lies by way of negligence.
Will the noble and learned Lord consider very carefully whether he is really content that through the Bill the Government are in effect carving out a significant area of immunity for their agents where they might have acted incompetently or irresponsibly—not deliberately or dishonestly but incompetently and irresponsibly—and, in so doing, have caused considerable damage to individuals? In stipulating that legal aid should not be available to enable individuals to secure redress and damages in such a situation, surely the Government are acting to protect themselves in a way that is simply wrong when one considers what the proper relationship between the state and the individual should be.
My Lords, at the risk of repetition, I have already said that numerous routes within scope, other than a damages claim, might be open to an individual and might be even more appropriate in addressing the situation where a public authority or the state acts in a way that the individual citizen wishes to challenge. Indeed, as I have indicated, other means, such as conditional fee agreements, might also be appropriate in some cases that are not at the serious end.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI said there was no evidence of this power having been abused. Indeed, would not the noble and learned Lord agree that Prime Ministers who have attempted to string things out, who have dithered, hesitated and dragged out the life of their Governments until the last possible moment, have usually been heavily punished by the electorate for doing so?
Prime Ministers have tried to divine the times to see when would be the best time to call an election. Indeed, in an earlier debate I quoted from the book of my noble friend Lord Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical. He said about the then Prime Minister, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher:
“Her view was that a Government should always wait until the final year of the quinquennium, but once there should go as soon as it is confident it will win”.
In other words, a partisan political judgment was clearly being made. As my noble friend reminded us, in September/October 2007, Mr Gordon Brown did a calculation in the third year of that Parliament as to whether or not it would be in his party’s best interests to go to the country. There is more to this. The power that the Prime Minister is giving up as a result of this Bill, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Hennessey, at Second Reading, is important.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, said that it was not much of a power, and then he said that no Prime Minister would have a straight face in trying to reverse the situation in the future. He is absolutely right. If a fixed-term Parliament became law, it would be very difficult for someone to come before the House and say that they wanted to revert to the position where the Prime Minister could choose the date of the election because of party advantage. They would get pretty short shrift—it would be difficult to do—but no one denies that, constitutionally, it is perfectly possible. It would be perfectly proper for them to seek to do it and to argue their case. However, my point is that they should do it by proper means through primary legislation and not in the way proposed by the amendment to the Motion.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI suppose we could do what the Scottish Parliament does, which is to have no sub-division into annual Sessions within a four-year term—apparently shortly to be a five-year term in the Scottish Parliament. I think that we should either go the whole way in abolishing parliamentary Sessions and having some kind of continuing, rolling process of legislation, or have a rational, predictable, orderly division of the time available in a Parliament.
The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Grocott should not be necessary. It is clearly undesirable to legislate on internal proceedings in Parliament, but we have been driven to it by the behaviour of the coalition Government in awarding themselves a two-year Session in which they should have been able to get anything at all through. Their potential abuse of parliamentary strength has been mitigated only by their incompetence in failing to take advantage of the situation that they created for themselves. In the early months of this Session, we had almost no legislation introduced; we then had an immense amount of time spent on constitutional legislation, which the public did not want, culminating in the fiasco of the AV referendum. We now have the pause in the NHS legislation. I am given to understand that there are going to be new Bills introduced at Second Reading this summer, so that even with a two-year Session, they may run out of time to complete their programme; it really is pretty chaotic.
My noble friend does the House, and indeed Parliament, a service in drawing attention to this consideration. While I would not wish to see his amendment get on to the statute book, he very properly challenges the Government to think carefully about how they handle proceedings within this House. I do not want a written constitution but I want respect for the unwritten constitution.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for affording the House a further opportunity to consider and scrutinise this point, which, as has been indicated, he first raised in Committee. At that point I indicated that the two-year Session that we are currently in was intended as a transitional situation so that we could get into a position where we had 12-month parliamentary Sessions that fitted in, should Parliament pass a fixed-term Parliament Act.
I draw your Lordships’ attention to the Written Ministerial Statement made by my right honourable friend the Leader of the other place, Sir George Young, on 23 March. He reiterated the Government’s decision to extend the current Session of Parliament to spring 2012,
“in order to ensure a smooth transition towards five, 12-month Sessions over a Parliament, which would be a beneficial consequence of Parliament agreeing the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/3/11; col. 57WS.]
I hope that the House and the noble Lord will be assured that it is our intention that there should normally be five Sessions in a five-year Parliament. While the expectation is that future Sessions will last for 12 months, it remains inappropriate to enshrine that in statute; indeed, I think that I understood the noble Lord himself to indicate that he would prefer that working practices and conventions were not enshrined in statute. It is our intention that in future Parliaments there should be five 12-month Sessions.
In the Bill we have sought to do only what is necessary to establish fixed-term Parliaments for the United Kingdom. I am not convinced that the case has been made for legislating for the number of Sessions. The Bill does not abolish the prerogative power to prorogue Parliament, which will continue to be used to set parliamentary Sessions, nor does the Bill affect the powers of each House to adjourn. It is worth noting that the Constitution Committee has endorsed our decision not to abolish the prerogative power to prorogue.
Future Sessions after this one will last for only 12 months. The noble Lord asked me about the points that I made in Committee. When I talked about truncating this Session, that was on the basis that, as he acknowledged, when elections have been held in May or June it has been customary for that first Session to continue through to the following October or November. To have had a Queen’s Speech around now would therefore have meant truncating what had been expected at the outset.
I have made it clear that the decision to go for two years and thereafter to have 12-monthly Sessions was taken not in May last year but at a later stage. I am not aware that there was any consultation—I accept that criticism—but this was intended to be a transitional measure. By that stage, the Government’s legislative programme had been announced and it would have been very difficult if we had moved immediately to a 12-month Session for the first Session, although that could have been done if it had been thought about at the outset. I hope that the House will accept that that is the purpose of this being a two-year Session. It is not intended that this should be repeated. My right honourable friend the Leader of the other place has indicated that it would now be our intention to move to five 12-month Sessions in a Parliament.
I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Norton about this always being in the interests of Parliament. My experience in your Lordships’ House in the run-up to the most recent general election is that, with the final Session starting in November and finishing in March in order to accommodate a May election, we have tended to have a short Session that I do not believe allows proper scrutiny of legislation. This led to a very unfortunate situation in the wash-up where large parts of Bills were ditched, some of which are now on the statute book but certainly did not have the kind of scrutiny that we would normally expect. Having five 12-month Sessions will allow for proper planning of legislation. While it would be unwise to say that there will never be any kind of wash-up at the end of the final Session, one hopes that there will be far less than has been the case hitherto. One of the advantages of a fixed-term Parliament is that it will be possible to plan a legislative programme in a way that will not lead to these log-jams at the end, when much legislation is virtually nodded through.
The decision having been taken to move to fixed-term Parliaments, and since we seem—for better or worse—to have moved into a situation where elections are held in May, the Bill provides for elections in May. Therefore, it makes sense that we should have annual May-to-May Sessions. I repeat: the current two-year Session is a transition. No doubt what we gain here is that there is only a finite amount of legislative time in the Parliament as a whole if it lasts for five years. It would not be appropriate to put that in the statute. I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me an opportunity to reiterate the position and to flag up what my right honourable friend the Leader of the other place has said on this matter. With these reassurances, I hope the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat is self-evident. One might well go back to 1977 when, quite clearly to forestall losing a confidence vote, the Government of Mr James Callaghan entered into a pact rather than a formal coalition with the then Liberal Party and they were able then to win a vote of confidence. You may say it was a Government of a different nature who proceeded to govern after that day because they were engaged in a formal pact and were not a new Administration, but they were different from the Government who had existed up to that date, who had not had a formal pact with one of the opposition parties.
In the scenario that my noble friend Lord Grocott was suggesting, would it actually be necessary under the Bill for there to be a vote of confidence? If the Liberal Democrats had simply decided that they did not wish to carry on in coalition with the Conservatives and made overtures to the Labour Party, there would not have been a vote of no confidence. There would simply have been a realignment within the House of Commons. As far as I can see, the provisions of the Bill are not activated in that situation.
I apologise. I had presumed that there had been a vote of no confidence in what would then have been a Conservative minority Government if the Liberal Democrats had left it. In that case a new Government would have had to be formed and there would have to have been a vote of confidence. I am sure that a new Government formed in that way would have to have a Queen’s Speech, which would trigger a potential confidence motion, and if they won that they would continue to govern. As my noble friend said, if an Administration have the support and the confidence of a majority in the other place, they can govern. I apologise if I misinterpreted the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I presumed that there had been a motion of no confidence, and that may not have been part of the hypothesis that he put. However, the new Government would be susceptible to a vote of no confidence if they did not have a majority and could not command the confidence of the House. Therefore the procedures in this Bill would then be triggered; otherwise it is as the noble Baroness says.
My Lords, I accept the offer of the noble Lord—and perhaps of the noble Baroness—to discuss this. I am more than willing to do so. However, as my noble friend Lord Tyler mentioned, certificates in relation to finance matters under the Parliament Act have never in 100 years been subject to challenge. The noble Lord, Lord Martin, says that they are different; they are certifications; they are certificates that are issued.
Regarding the other points made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that were alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, in the Anisminic case in the 1960s the courts were able to review determinations of the Foreign Compensation Commission, even though those determinations were, by statute, not to be called into question in any court of law. However, in those cases, the starting point was that, but for the ouster clause in the statute, the courts would have had jurisdiction. The courts were thus looking for clear words to exclude an otherwise existing jurisdiction.
The facts of this circumstance are different, because the courts do not have jurisdiction over internal parliamentary proceedings. The fact that the subject matter of the certificate relates to internal parliamentary proceedings that are off limits to the courts means that there will be no motivation for courts to interpret the provisions that provide that Speaker’s certificates are conclusive narrowly.
In the other case which the noble Lord mentioned, regarding Jackson v Attorney-General, two issues have perhaps been conflated. Perhaps that is where confusion has arisen. The issues were, first, whether courts can inquire into the validity of Acts of Parliament; and, secondly, whether courts can inquire into internal parliamentary proceedings. On that second issue, the House of Lords, in its judicial capacity, asserted a view that is complete orthodoxy: that the Commons Speaker had certified that the internal proceedings of Parliament leading to the Hunting Act being passed had been complied with. The House of Lords in its judicial capacity did not look behind the Speaker’s certificate and did not question the internal proceedings of Parliament. It indicated that it would not and could not look at the internal proceedings adopted in Parliament in enacting the Hunting Act 2004.
The noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, referred to the European position and mentioned the case involving Sinn Fein and Martin McGuinness. Interestingly, in the Northern Ireland High Court, it was held that the matter was not justiciable on the grounds that it fell within the exclusive cognisance of the House. It is accepted that Article 9 of the Bill of Rights does not apply to the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights. However, a case will be brought before such courts only where EU law or convention rights are engaged, respectively. The subject matter of the Bill is not in any way related to EU law. Likewise, the functions of the Commons Speaker under the Bill do not engage any convention rights. In support of this point, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has reported that the Bill did not need to be brought to the attention of either House on human rights grounds.
I should add that in the case of A v United Kingdom in 2003, the European Court of Human Rights held that Article 9 of the Bill of Rights did not violate the convention by preventing an applicant from taking defamation proceedings against an MP for words said in parliamentary proceedings. While noble Lords have raised a legitimate point, it leads to the view that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has expressed today and at Second Reading, that a Speaker’s certificate would not be challengeable in the courts. I agree with that analysis and it is no disrespect to the Clerk of the House to state that, although he advanced a different argument. The weight of evidence given to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee was such that it, too, thought that the weight of evidence was that it was highly unlikely that the certificates would be justiciable.
Important distinctions are to be made between that issue and the other concerns that have been expressed about bringing the Speaker into some political role. We have an opportunity to debate these matters further, but, in the light of my comments, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, who I once again thank for introducing this important debate, will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, this has been an outstandingly important debate about an outstandingly important subject. I hope that Ministers will study it and think very carefully about the advice that noble Lords have offered. In particular, Ministers should study the speeches of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn—two former Speakers of the House who have a wisdom to offer that the Government should certainly heed with the greatest care.
Mr Harper, the Minister, may care to reflect upon exactly why the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, said in round terms that he is wrong. She made a very important speech and, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said, it ought to make any Government stop in their tracks. She spoke about the unsuitable extension of the Speaker’s role and, in particular, the requirement of certification. We will have an opportunity to discuss that matter later this evening when we debate Amendment 50, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and my amendment to that, Amendment 51, which would delete the subsections that require Speaker’s certification—precisely because I share the noble Baroness’s view that this is a dangerous innovation.
The noble Lord, Lord Martin, floated the possibility that the act of certification by the Speaker may not in itself be a proceeding in Parliament. That perhaps could lead to it being all the more questionable in the courts, but, at all events, certification would relate to other events that have been proceedings in Parliament. We are still fairly deeply entangled.
The noble Baroness spoke about the problems of definition of a no-confidence motion and the scope for legal contention that could arise out of that. Both she and the noble Lord, Lord Martin, advised the House about how contentious the atmosphere would be in the House of Commons—the anger, the passion and the fury that would be raging around the rather solitary person, the Speaker, as he or she issued a certificate. The Speaker would of course be supported by the Clerk of the House, but, in the end, the Speaker would have to take this responsibility of adjudicating on the most intensely political issues that it is possible to imagine. Is it really wise to place the Speaker of the House of Commons in such a situation?
We need to pause and reflect, not least in the context of what both former Speakers described to us as the growing power and challenge of the judiciary to Parliament, and its growing willingness to engage in political issues in certain ways. That echoes the phrase used by the Clerk of the House, when he referred to a Supreme Court that has “not yet got its teeth into these matters”. If our Supreme Court has been relatively restrained, the European Court of Human Rights has not. As long ago as the case that occurred during the Speakership of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, when the European Court of Human Rights entertained the Sinn Fein case, it was already willing to venture into this territory. The Clerk of the House of Commons certainly offers no encouragement to believe that those courts, as time goes by, will become any less willing; indeed, he anticipates that they will be more so.
Both former Speakers and the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, drew attention to the sheer status and standing of the advice of the Clerk of the House of Commons, supported by his fellow Clerks and by other legal counsellors. This is very serious and authoritative constitutional advice. Whether or not it was brushed aside, it must be given the most serious regard. I do not for a moment suggest that the Constitution Committee did not give it that most serious consideration, but I suggest that it is also for this Committee—for the whole House—equally to ponder carefully the advice he gave.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI seem to recall in one of our earlier debates that there was a suggestion that in the 1970s Mr Harold Wilson indicated that he would not accept as a motion of no confidence motions which on some occasions hitherto had been seen as votes of no confidence. I think that that point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, not on this amendment but in a debate on an earlier amendment.
It was earlier in this debate. It has been going on for so long, it is difficult to remember. The point was that the House accepted, it appears, the redefinition that the Prime Minister had proposed to the House at that time and recognised the political circumstances in which that Labour Government had a tiny majority. It did not really have a workable majority.
Perhaps the House accepted it because it was quite clear that if the Prime Minister had decided that he was not going to go to the country it could have tabled a motion of no confidence. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Forsyth keeps coming back to what seems to be a very straightforward way of addressing this issue: that if there is any doubt, the Leader of the Opposition or someone could table a motion of no confidence. The more one thinks about it, it tends to be the motion which has no ambiguity and is very clear, about which something further might want to be said.
The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Cormack would replace the entirety of Clause 2 and therefore would not allow the provision of the trigger mechanism of a Dissolution if two-thirds of the House of Commons was voting for a Dissolution. We have had debates on this in the past but if at some date in the future, in a fixed-term Parliament, there is a consensus in the House of Commons that there should be an election—and 1951 has been identified as a possible example when this may have happened—I would rather the option remained for the Dissolution to be triggered on a cross-party, consensual basis rather than having a motion of no confidence brought forward simply to achieve a Dissolution which two-thirds of Members believe is necessary. That option is lost by my noble friend’s amendment, but it is a worthwhile provision to maintain.
On the question of what constitutes a motion of no confidence and whether it should automatically trigger an election, I recall that in our earlier debates my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth indicated that that should not necessarily be an automatic consequence. However, a consequence of the amendment is that there would be an election. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested a way round it and, in introducing his amendment, my noble friend Lord Cormack suggested that if it was after the Queen’s Speech in the first Session there could possibly be other ways.
It is important, therefore, that we reflect on circumstances in which an election should not automatically be triggered, the most obvious one being immediately after a general election when a party does not yet have the confidence of the House and there is still an opportunity for another Government to be formed. Equally—I cannot say this is a Narvik situation because it is not—there may perhaps at a time of extreme national crisis be a view that a Government should not continue and that there is a case to be made for a national Government. Indeed, it occurred to me that the Bill as drafted would provide for that. There could be a motion of no confidence and a period of time—we can debate whether or not it should be 14 days—for a new Government to be established which could in such circumstances enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons. I find my noble friend’s amendment defective in that regard because there are circumstances where the automatic triggering of a general election would not necessarily be the right way to proceed. I will not elaborate on the point about an incoming Government after an election and the fact that we do not want election after election after election.
A number of colleagues have indicated that there are problems with the amendment. As I have indicated, I do not want to take technical issues— it used to annoy me greatly in opposition if Ministers said there were technical problems—unless they are very fundamental.
On the second branch of what would constitute a vote of no confidence—namely, a Bill defined by the Prime Minister of the day as being essential to his or her Administration continuing in office—my noble friend Lord Tyler expressed scepticism; the noble Lord, Lord Martin, felt it would be unwise and was concerned about the Speaker; and my noble friend Lord Forsyth also expressed concern about that. Quite apart from trying to get a definition of what constitutes a Motion of no confidence, a Government facing a problem with their own Back-Benchers could simply decide that they would make a particular vote a matter of confidence—the black arts may well come into play—for the purpose of imposing party discipline. As we are trying to initiate a switch from the Executive to Parliament, that would be a regrettable consequence of that trigger point for a general election. Likewise, as my noble friend Lord Tyler indicated, that would be a decision of the Prime Minister and not of Parliament or the Speaker, and therefore it would be an Executive decision which, in certain circumstances, could conceivably be open to challenge.
I know my noble friend Lord Forsyth has strong reservations on fixed-term Parliaments—I probably understate his position—but he made an important point in his exchange with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. He said that the examples the noble and learned Lord was giving were not operative within the framework of a fixed-term Parliament. If that is the case and we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, the rules will change. As he pointed out, the simplest thing in these circumstances may be to say that a motion of no confidence is what it says. On what constitutes confidence or no confidence in the question of supply, my noble friend Lord Norton said in his article of 1978, Government Defeats in the House of Commons: Myth and Reality:
“The most effective means whereby the House could declare its lack of confidence would be through an explicitly-worded motion of no confidence”.
I did say that we were in listening mode—and, indeed, reading mode. That was an important point.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, spoke of his concerns about the Speaker’s certificate. I do not wish to rehearse our earlier debate; I undertook then to reflect on that. However, what I found difficult was his suggesting that the more we try to write down and define matters, the more difficult it is, yet seeming to have an objection to the Government’s position where they did not seek closely to define. That seemed to be a contradictory view. My noble and learned friend Lord Howe said that we should keep it as simple as possible. That is what we have sought to do by setting a background where it is possible to recognise a motion of no confidence rather than trying to define it. This matter has been looked at many times, including in the other place. Whenever efforts are made to bring some definition to it, other than perhaps a very simple one, one seems to conjure up more difficulties.
I said at the outset that I wanted to hear the arguments about structure and definitions. Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed a number of views. I clarify again that I shall speak with my colleagues on these matters. The principles that we wish to establish are that, within a context of having a fixed term, there should nevertheless be a mechanism to trigger an early election if there has been deadlock in the other place, if a Government lose confidence, and if no Government can be formed who maintain confidence. There is an argument for having consensus about Dissolution and proper provision being made for it, as well as for trying to minimise the potential for abuse of the trigger on the part of the Executive and to get clarity as to what constitutes a vote of confidence. There may well be circumstances in which a vote of no confidence does not necessarily have to trigger a general election. How do we clarify those circumstances in a way which is acceptable? These are the general principles and issues which I want to put flesh on. Various ways as to how we might do that have been suggested. The amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Cormack has been very helpful in suggesting one way. It has a number of problems to it, but the comments that it has triggered will help shape our thinking as we move to the next stage of the Bill.
I reflect that perhaps we have got it right because these are very complicated matters, but I undertake to give serious consideration not only to what was said in response to this amendment but also to earlier amendments and those which were heard on the second day of Committee. On that basis—
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, for these amendments. My immediate response was to share the view of my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth; that they do run a coach and possibly some horses though the Bill—although I do not agree with him that that is what should commend it. The other thing I noticed was that there was no certainty as to whether Parliament would in fact be dissolved in these circumstances. Parliament might otherwise be dissolved. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested that it would be the new Prime Minister who would trigger this. If there is a discretion, the Prime Minister taking over in circumstances that might not be propitious for his party might not necessarily exercise it. I think we are back to the situation that the Bill seeks to avoid. My noble friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, recognised that issues such as changing government policy or a very subjective view about the viability of a Parliament would put the power back into the hands of the Prime Minister that this Bill seeks to remove.
I also observe that another Prime Minister may be appointed on the grounds of death or serious illness, and I am not sure that that would necessarily be good grounds for triggering Dissolution. I simply observe that in Wales where there are fixed-term Parliaments, there have been circumstances in which the First Minister resigned and a new First Minister was appointed, and I do not remember the Labour Party clamouring for an election. When subsequently the minority Government became a coalition Government, there was no suggestion then in the context of a fixed-term Parliament that there should have been an election. Nor was there any suggestion that an election would have been appropriate following the death of Donald Dewar in 2000 or the resignation of Henry McLeish in 2001. In circumstances in which we have had fixed-term Parliaments and there has been a change of First Minister, it has not been thought appropriate that there should be an election; rather, the fixed-term Parliament has seen itself out in circumstances in which the Government have the confidence of the Parliament. That is crucial because if the Government do not have the confidence of the Parliament, the provisions elsewhere in the Bill will kick in.
I do not really understand the point about the majority falling below 10. Historically, a majority of 10 could be quite a high number. I do not believe that that would be an appropriate circumstance in which there may be Dissolution.
On amendment 55A, I cannot share the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that it is somehow consistent with the principles of the Fixed-term Parliament Bill. I think it drives more than a coach and horses through the Bill. I have said on a number of occasions that the situation is open to abuse. The Prime Minister of the day could contrive Dissolution by the back door, but I do not think that we should put a red carpet down to the back door or to the front door for him to do it. There would be a degree of opprobrium attached if he was thought to be bending the rules, or indeed if he went to the country on the basis of a vote of no confidence in him that had been expressed by the House of Commons. We all know the reality of this amendment; if the Prime Minister wanted to have the date of his choosing for his party’s best advantage, it would not even need the black arts of the Whips to get his Members to turn out and vote for it. It defeats the object of a fixed-term Parliament. In these circumstances, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I was quite wrong. This has been a very zestful debate—positively sparkling. I congratulate all noble Lords who have spoken on their effervescence at this time of the night.
I tabled these amendments because I think that the Government have restricted the Bill to permitting elections to happen before the end of the fixed term in too limited a range of circumstances. I think there are circumstances in which it would be in the interests of politics and of the country that there should be an election. I apparently differ from the Government in thinking that elections are a good thing. I do not think that it is desirable to stave them off so that they can happen only once every five years, if you can get away with it. A general election is a great moment in the life of the country, and we should be willing to recognise that there will be situations in which an election would be a thoroughly positive thing that would be welcomed by the country and that would be good for our politics, for the quality of government and for our democracy. It may well be that I have not sufficiently tightly defined all these circumstances, and given that the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and the Minister have drawn attention to the palpable inadequacies of drafting in Amendment 55, I beg leave to withdraw it.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for his kind remarks. I also thank—as I have done on a number of occasions—the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, for introducing amendments that have allowed us to look at important parts of this legislation. Indeed, I thank in general all others who have contributed to our constructive debates.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked about prorogation. There is a distinction between the prerogative power of dissolution and the prerogative power of prorogation. We have identified that the prerogative power of dissolution, which this legislation seeks to remove, can be used by the Prime Minister, in advising Her Majesty, for partisan purposes. By contrast, the prerogative power of prorogation is different. It is the mechanism that is used to bring to an end a Session of Parliament and determines, subject to the carry-over procedure, when Bills have to complete their passage through both Houses so that they become law; it is also used at times in the run-up to Parliament finishing its business pending Dissolution.
An incumbent Prime Minister, even today, could prorogue Parliament to prevent the other place considering a forthcoming no-confidence motion, as happened in Canada some two or three years ago. That risk exists today but the convention is that the Government and Parliament find time to debate a motion of no confidence tabled by the Official Opposition. It is instructive that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House considered the question of prorogation as part of its examination of the Bill and decided that the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very small. It therefore concluded that Her Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament should remain.
The noble Lord raised the possibility of abuse in relation to the 14 days to frustrate these ends. It is perhaps thought that preserving the prorogation power could mean that a Prime Minister who wants a general election can, after a no-confidence motion is passed, prorogue Parliament during the 14-day Government formation period and thus deny the new Government the opportunity for a motion of confidence in them to be passed. It is highly unlikely that would happen. There are two basic scenarios. The first is that there is no obvious alternative Government and therefore nothing would be achieved by proroguing Parliament. If it was the wish of the Prime Minister of the day to go to an election, he would simply proceed to an election after the expiry of the 14 days. The second is that there are political factors, such as the Prime Minister resigning after a no-confidence motion and Her Majesty appointing a new Prime Minister. In such a scenario the outgoing Prime Minister would have agreed to resign and it is inconceivable that he or she would resign and then not allow the new Prime Minister to test the confidence of the House. Even if the new Prime Minister took office and found that, in the mean time, a prorogation had been slipped through by the outgoing Prime Minister and the House had been prorogued, he or she would be able, through the Queen, to recall Parliament under Section 1 of the Meeting of Parliament Act 1797.
These are hypothetical examples but it is right that we should examine them. The power of prorogation can still be used properly and sensibly and is not in the same category as the power of dissolution. I hope that with these reassuring words the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I draw much comfort from what the Minister has just said. Indeed, we need not be too scared of the possibility of an abuse of the power of prorogation and, subject to what my noble friends consider in the mean time, I anticipate that we will not need to return to this issue on Report.
I am grateful for what my noble and learned friend said and for the tolerance of the House. If I have been a little overzealous it was because, very shortly before the first day of Committee on the Bill, only a small handful—perhaps not more than eight—amendments had been tabled. As we have all acknowledged, this is a constitutional reforming measure of first-rate importance. We attach great importance to the role of this House as a revising Chamber and it is appropriate that we have had a good range of amendments to consider and have given the measure useful scrutiny in Committee. I apologise that the House has had to put up with the sound of my voice for far too long. However, we have done a good job, as we shall again when we get to Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sorry, but I have been very generous. It is important that we make progress.
We took the judgment that 14 days was the appropriate time to allow for another Government to be formed. I pick up on the point made by my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree, who said that more than five days might have been better in May last year. I leave that thought hanging. We have a culture here of doing it in one day, with the pantechnicons rolling up into Downing Street and furniture being taken out. That may not be healthy, particularly if we are in a situation where there may well be more elections that do not produce an outcome with an overall majority for one particular party.
The position with the devolved Administrations is not always comparable, but I simply reflect that in 1999, after the election to the Scottish Parliament, there was a situation where no party had a majority. The pressure on those of us who were negotiating to try to establish a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition was quite intense for that to be done in a relatively short period time. By the time of the 2003 Scottish election, where again there was no overall majority, there was not the same pressure. We were able to deliberate longer before finalising a coalition agreement; because of our experience in 1999, we had changed the expectation, as it were. I believe that is what would happen, as there would be a change of expectation and there would not be the same level of pressure to rush into an agreement. As my noble friend Lord Newton indicated, places like Germany seem to take a bit longer than we do without necessarily causing great upheavals there.
That is why we took the view that 14 days was right. It is not just 14 days to establish a Government but 14 days during which a new Government would have to be established and a vote of confidence in that Government to have been passed by the other place. Therefore, it is not simply the formation of a Government. It could well be that during that period of time it became blindingly obvious to everyone that no Government would be formed. In those circumstances the sensible thing might be to have a dissolution motion, agreed by all parties, so that an election could be triggered rather than waiting the 14 days. Equally, if a new Government were formed very promptly, we would not have to wait 14 days either for that period of relative uncertainty, as it was described, to be over.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, who is no longer in his place, pointed out, in 1979 there was a period of five weeks before the Government were defeated. The point I would make is that, in trying to arrive at the 14 days, we wanted to look at the fact that there was a period then, and there would also have to be an election period after it. We did not want to make it too long, but equally we felt that too short a period might not allow the appropriate level of time. A balance has to be struck. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, whose Constitution Committee did not make a political judgment; nevertheless its constitutional judgment was that the Government got it right constitutionally in allowing a period of 14 days.
A similar amendment was considered in the other place, where I think it was defeated overwhelmingly. Indeed, Mr Chris Bryant indicated that he was very much with the government Front Bench on the matter. I think that the amendment would lead to restoring the power of the Prime Minister to trigger a general election when he or she wished it to happen through a vote of no confidence. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, expressed concern that even with the 14 days that could happen. I believe it could happen even more easily with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. That would drive a coach and horses through the principle of having a fixed-term Parliament and taking away the power from the Executive. Therefore I urge him to withdraw his amendment.
Will the noble and learned Lord tell the Committee whether he intends to take away the subsection in order to redraft it to eliminate the ambiguities which expert academic commentators have drawn attention to and which I think are significant?
I apologise to the noble Lord, as I think that was his very first point, which was also picked up in the report of the Constitution Committee. In the light of that, we have considered the wording and we do not believe that it leads to ambiguity. We are not looking to a situation where there is, as it were, an investiture or a notional vote on whether someone should be recommended to Her Majesty the Queen to be Prime Minister; a Government would have to be formed. However, in the light of his comments and those of the Constitution Committee, I am willing to look again to see whether the matter can be even further clarified. However, having considered it at some length, we think that the wording actually says what it means on the face of the Bill. Nevertheless, I undertake to consider the point that the noble Lord made.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for his willingness to look again to see whether the drafting could be clarified. I think that is important.
The debate that we have just had shows that this question of whether there should be a 14-day provision following a vote of no confidence is a subject that has been very well worth our while to consider. The Minister denied that the provision is a contrivance, but if it is not that in itself, it is the product of a contrivance—a contrivance to keep the coalition in place for the longest possible time. On this policy of fixed-term Parliaments, the more we examine it in this Committee, the more we realise that there are much greater difficulties attaching to what appeared to be a simple and beguiling proposition than were recognised at the outset by the framers of manifestos in various political parties and by Ministers as they prepared this Bill.
The noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Norton of Louth, underscored how, among the risks contained in the provisions in Clause 2, there is the risk that the provisions will, perversely, serve to protect the position of the Government. I acquit the coalition of having that motive, perhaps, but that may be the consequence of the provision. The noble Lord, Lord Newton, was of course right to remind us that politics does not stand still and that we may well continue to see rather different electoral outcomes from those that we were accustomed to seeing in past decades. The constitution, of course, always needs to respond flexibly, pragmatically and appropriately. That is one great virtue of not having a written constitution and one reason why I worry that this Government are so keen to write into statute great chunks of a new constitution. That is a difficult thing to get right; it may well be impossible.
My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and my noble friend Lord Grocott described graphically the absurdities that would have occurred had this Bill been on the statute book in 1979, or indeed in 1940, with the undignified and chaotic situation that that would have produced in Parliament.
On 1940, let me just be clear that these provisions would never have been engaged then, as Mr Chamberlain did not lose a vote. He decided to resign and the King, no doubt on the recommendation of the outgoing Prime Minister, asked Mr Churchill to form a Government. The provisions in the Bill would not have come into play.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the effect of my amendment would be to remove the provision for “resetting the clock”, as the phrase goes. If the amendment were incorporated into the Bill, and were there to be an early general election under either of the two provisions in Clause 2, that early general election would not be followed by a new full fixed term of the subsequent Parliament. Only the balance of the term left over from the previous Parliament would be served by the new Parliament, and a general election would take place at the end of five years—or, if at Report we adopt a four-year fixed term, at the end of four years—as established before the early general election took place.
The provision for resetting the clock is an important element in the Bill and we should have the opportunity to think about it in Committee. I understand that in Sweden, if an early general election is called, the electoral cycle none the less remains unaltered; they have the provision that I am proposing in the Bill. Of course, Parliament legislated that there should be four-year fixed terms for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. That legislation provides for the possibility of an exceptional early election but does not provide that the clock is reset in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and one might say that sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander.
If we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, why do we not have genuine fixed terms? That would enable the benefit of the discipline of fixed terms to be fully experienced and everyone would know where they stood. It would remove the incentive for a Government to contrive an early general election by, for example, engineering a vote of no confidence in themselves. The requirement would be less significant if in due course the House approves one of the amendments that provides that only the Leader of the Opposition may table a Motion of no confidence, but without that amendment we must recognise that there is a possibility, and it could be an attractive one, for the Government to engineer such a Motion in order to achieve an early general election. It would discourage the parties from colluding to take advantage of the two-thirds provision for an early general election, and would lead to the benefits of full five-year terms being more surely secured, as no doubt the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster and Lord Butler of Brockwell, would wish. It would keep the rhythm of the boundary reviews in sync with the electoral cycle, the importance of which the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, stressed in our previous debate.
When Mr Harper, the Minister, gave evidence to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, he was rather equivocal on this point—he simply said that it was a judgment issue whether or not the provision for resetting the clock should be built into the legislation. He said,
“on balance we have taken the view that resetting the clock is the right one”—
that is, the right decision. Once again, as with the issue of judgment as to whether the fixed term should be for four years or five, the coalition’s judgments just happen to favour its own interests in staying in office. Again, I ask the Minister whether the Government have any better reason for having incorporated the provision for resetting the clock in the event of an exceptional early general election.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, for the amendment. I was initially puzzled about its effect, which would be that it would provide that the next scheduled election was not held following an early general election under Clause 2. This gives me an opportunity to say something about subsections (3) and (4), as he has indicated that with this amendment he is seeking to ensure that the clock is not reset. His closing remarks indicated that this is a matter not of high principle but of judgment.
Subsections (3) and (4) of the clause provide that, where an early election occurs, the polling date for the next election will be the first Thursday in May in the fifth year of Parliament, unless the early election falls on a date before the first Thursday in May, in which case the length of the ensuing Parliament will be calculated as four years from the next first Thursday in May. That will deliver certainty as to when the next election will be, but—this is a crucial point—it also gives the incoming Government as close to a five-year term as possible. It eliminates the need for the electorate to return to the polls in quick succession, as the clock is effectively reset.
The Constitution Committee examined this aspect of the Bill. In its report it concluded that if there is an early general election, a Government elected at that poll should have a full term, or as near a full term as possible, in which to develop their policies and take their legislative programme through Parliament.
Some noble Lords may nevertheless have the concerns expressed by the noble Lord about the term of the Parliament after an early election. I know that some consider that it would be preferable for an early election not to affect the date of the ordinarily scheduled election, but that could well mean that a Parliament was given only a relatively short period of time. It may be that a Government would be elected with a substantial majority, and it would be difficult to explain to an electorate in these circumstances why it would be necessary to return so quickly when it might appear that a Government had been elected relatively recently with a mandate. They might be surprised and somewhat confused by that approach.
Not to allow an incoming Government to serve a full term would lead to a system with potentially two types of Government: those entitled to a full term to implement their policies, and those who would have to make do with the time left to them before the next scheduled election. That could also alter the nature of the elections themselves. Why should the mandate provided at one election be any different from the mandate provided at another?
I note the points made about the devolved Administrations in both Scotland and Wales. There is a difference; I think that the Northern Ireland Assembly is much more akin to what is proposed in the Bill. It is also the case that, given the proportional systems that are in place for elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, it is unlikely that you are going to get a Government elected with a large single-party mandate. If a party had not been elected with such a mandate, people would not think it so odd that it did not have a full term.
We gave consideration to this matter, but the balance comes down in favour of resetting the clock. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his amendment. It has been an opportunity for us to air this important aspect of the Bill. I hope that he will agree that there is merit in resetting the clock and, on that basis, will withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the Government’s case slightly more fully than the debate at Second Reading gave him the opportunity to do. After all the excitement of the previous debate, the House has not been particularly zestful about embarking on an exhaustive debate on this topic, but this provision in the Bill is significant and it is right that the House has received the explanation that the Minister has given.
If my amendments were incorporated, however, they would provide greater certainty. The Minister seemed to suggest that there would be greater certainty if we had a resetting of the clock. There would be greater certainty about the duration of a Parliament if we did not have that provision, but I do not want to quibble. I also accept his point about proportional representation making a difference. I am grateful to him for correcting my appreciation of the position in Northern Ireland.
I agree that, on balance, it is better to include the provision to reset the clock. One could make a reasonable case for not including that provision, or for not applying it, if the early general election were to occur in the first half of a fixed term of Parliament. It might be accepted that, if there was more than half of the fixed term still to go, it would be sufficient and the benefits of discouraging early elections would be felt. However, I certainly agree that if there were an early general election later in the Parliament, it would not make sense not to start a new fixed term. If we were to elect a new Government, they would need a decent span of time in which to govern. I also do not think that the need to have two general elections in rapid succession would be well received by voters if this was the only reason why there had to be another election. I am glad that we have been able to look at this issue and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI appreciate the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, about the lateness of the hour. I always understood that this evening’s proceedings were going to go late. We tried to accommodate that by finishing somewhat earlier last time. Nevertheless, it is an important point, as he indicated, that there will be the opportunity at a later stage with a subsequent amendment to perhaps explore this further, including the point raised by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth.
The effect of the amendment would be to require the Speaker to issue two certificates before an early election is triggered on account of a no-confidence vote. The clause already provides for the Speaker certifying that there has been a no-confidence Motion, and a Motion of no confidence in the Government during the ensuing 14-day period. The amendment, as moved by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, would require an additional, earlier certificate issued in advance of a debate as to whether the Motion is to be regarded as a Motion of no confidence.
This again arises out of the concern that the House of Commons may not always know whether it is voting on a Motion of no confidence. It is highly unlikely that the House of Commons, in its ordinary business, would pass a resolution which was perhaps contrary to a matter of policy and the wishes of the Government of the day, but a matter on which no one had ever actually thought that there was any great store set, and then at the end of the 14-day period the Speaker unexpectedly issues a certificate. I have heard that concern expressed but it is not a realistic scenario.
The point was made that my honourable friend Mr Mark Harper indicated that in all likelihood a future no-confidence Motion would not only take the form that it did when a Motion was last passed but also, in the event of it happening, the Speaker of the House of Commons would be able to inform Members before they vote. For example, if it was on an amendment to the Queen’s Speech, the Speaker would inform Members of the House of Commons before the vote that, in the event of the Motion being passed, the Speaker would regard it as a no-confidence Motion for the purposes of Clause 2.
That is a simple and straightforward process. The Speaker advises the House of Commons on other procedural matters before it. I understand the point that has been made and, clearly as I indicated in my introductory remarks to the previous set of amendments, we will reflect on all these points. Yet we find it difficult to accept that there should be an additional layer of complexity to the process. One wonders how much time there would be to allow such a certificate to be issued if it was a pressing debate. It would be regrettable if such a debate was somewhat held up while the Speaker was engaged in the process of considering whether a certificate should be issued and that is then done.
We share the goal behind the noble Lord’s amendment—that the Commons should be well informed before it votes on confidence matters. The idea of an ambush is unfounded but I hear what the noble Lord says with regard to trying to import that greater degree of certainty. It is an issue to which we will return, one we will certainly reflect on and one we will perhaps have a wider debate on—perhaps with more participants—in the subsequent Amendment 51. On that basis, for the moment I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. Perhaps when we come to the later debate, we will address the questions that my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth has also raised.
I thank both the Minister and the Committee and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have indicated that we will move towards a May Queen’s Speech. There is a legislative programme and I do not think the number of Bills in this first Session matches the numbers in some of the first Sessions of the previous Administration. This Bill is not yet on the statute book but if it is passed, I believe that we will see a much more orderly planned programme than I have seen since I came into this House, certainly in the final Session.
My Lords, this has been a better debate than it looked like being. We were not exactly playing to a packed House at the beginning but more and more noble Lords have stood up and made short speeches that have been to the point and very interesting. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for his support. At least, I think I had his support for the amendment. If so, that was quite something because I, like other noble Lords, hold his views on the constitution and constitutional reform in the very greatest respect. He is quite right to press the Government to provide an evidential base in support of the propositions they put to the House in their legislation. I do not think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was able to respond with the evidence that the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, sought.
My observation is a little bit like his: I simply do not see it as being the reality that politicians plan systematically. They talk endlessly about strategies, but I have yet to see a politician who is capable of developing and sustaining a strategy over a year, let alone four years. It is wholly unlikely that the culture and work and behaviour patterns of either House of Parliament would be so dramatically changed as a consequence of knowing that the span of this Parliament was to be fixed for five years. Politicians improvise, and it is greatly to their credit that they do so—they need to. It is part of their responsibility to be responsive to public opinion and the shifts and tides of opinion and events; they are not good politicians if they are not. That is not to disparage or to criticise them. I would have a horror of a Government who were so tunnel-visioned and so rigid that they set themselves a five-year plan at the outset of a Parliament and determined to stick to it. It does not seem to correspond with political human nature, and it is an entirely spurious justification for introducing fixed-term Parliaments.
One has only to look at the ad-hocery that we have seen in this first year of the coalition Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, suggested. We have seen this Government attempt to get away with establishing a requirement for a 55 per cent vote to have an early general election. It was like a leak except that it was brazenly published in the interesting work of autobiography, memoir, history, political science or whatever it is by Mr David Laws, who candidly acknowledged—my noble friend Lord Hunt quoted from this interesting volume—the unembarrassed, shameless and self-interested calculation on the part of Mr Stunell for Liberal Democrats and Mr Osborne for the Conservatives. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, supported by my noble friend Lord Grocott, reminded us that we have a responsibility when we address questions of constitutional reform not to dress up our views and even our calculations of party political interest in high-flown constitutional sentiment—I suppose the term is not to be hypocritical. My noble friend is quite right that we are all susceptible to that temptation. It may well be that, from his vantage point there in the corner, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, is better able to spot when that aberration, that corruption, is occurring than many of us who are more impulsive participants. He was perfectly right. I suspect that I am simply too naive to make an effective calculation of party political interest. In a rather old-fashioned way, I think that it is our job to try to get all this right.
I dispute the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, that my amendment would drive a coach and horses through the principle of a fixed-term Parliament, because it proposes a fixed term within a tolerance of one year. It is a fixed term with a sensible flexibility. It is a compromise, but there are many compromises already in the legislation. The Government have introduced what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was candid enough to refer to as escape hatches. If the Government can introduce escape hatches, is it not in order or appropriate for us to amend this legislation to provide some pragmatic flexibility to enable the term of the Parliament to run between four and five years? That is a compromise between a fully fixed-term Parliament and the situation that we have at the moment where it is open to the Prime Minister, answerable to no one, to determine the date of the election. I believe that, previously, the date was for the Cabinet to determine. It was Lloyd George as Prime Minister who took it upon himself, on his own single initiative, to exercise the prerogative power, as one could term it, to call upon Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament.
What I am proposing lies somewhere between the two extremes. In reality, when you are legislating on most matters, you need to provide for a sensible degree of flexibility so that in practice people can carry things forward in a realistic way. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, said that it would undermine one of the great benefits of the Bill as she sees it; the requirement of the Prime Minister and the Government to face the electors on a pre-determined date. The proposal does compromise on that, but it still means that there will be a pre-determined date in the fifth year of the Parliament. I think public opinion would find that quite acceptable.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, absolutely rightly said that in this Committee we are all being driven to tinker with a fundamentally misconceived policy. I agree with him; I do not support fixed-term Parliaments. But we are, as the previous Prime Minister Mr Blair used to say, where we are. The Bill has received its Second Reading. It is not for us to seek to overturn the principle of the Bill that there should be fixed-term Parliaments. It is for us to limit the damage that this legislation may cause. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested that perhaps the least bad way forward would be to legislate for this Parliament alone and to drop the idea of having fixed-term Parliaments after the expiry of this Parliament. I suggest that it would be deplorable to legislate to rescue the coalition from its political difficulties; to provide some sort of lifeline to coalition partners who do not agree with each other and do not trust each other and have asked Parliament to bail them out of that predicament. That would not be a proper way for Parliament to spend its time. On the other hand, I am tempted to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it is less bad to do that than to saddle our country and our constitution with fixed-term Parliaments in perpetuity or until Parliament decides that it was not a good idea after all and therefore we should undo the legislation.
The debate on this amendment is really an amuse bouche before the important debate on Amendment 11 which we will have next week. That will be the debate on whether we should amend the Bill to provide for a fixed-term Parliament of four years in clear-cut fashion and without the compromise and flexibility that I have suggested. That is the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, my noble friend Lord Bach and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. That will be a major debate.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I join those who have indicated that this has been a very good debate. The House has had the benefit of the experience of many people, from academia and from the other place, who have taken part in votes of confidence—or no confidence—in times past. I certainly wish to join many of your Lordships who have expressed their congratulations to my noble friend Lord Cormack on a notable and distinguished maiden speech. He said that he had been in favour in principle in fixed-term Parliaments for some time. I think that I would describe his speech as that of a critical friend. I served in the other place with my noble friend, I think on a sub-committee of the Administration and Accommodation Committee, which he chaired. Perhaps its most significant task when I was on it was to identify those who would appear in the painting of the House of Commons in session in about 1985 or 1986. That chairmanship was just part of the contribution which my noble friend gave to the other place, not only a concern for its fabric, but a concern for, and a passionate commitment to, its workings. That is the experience that he brings to this place and we look forward to his contributions in the future.
Congratulations are also in order to the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy. Although he said that he was a former Whip, I understand that he has recently been appointed to the Whips’ Bench opposite and I congratulate him on that very rapid rise, which no doubt reflects his abilities as a Whip. That is meant to be a compliment.
We have heard a variety of views, from those who are opposed in principle to this, through to those who are very supportive of it and to those who are supportive of it, but want to see things done in different ways. There are those who have indicated that they do not wish any change whatever. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, indicated a level of satisfaction with a constitution that he did not think needed changing. My noble and learned friend Lord Howe expressed the view that he was getting somewhat sceptical about constitutional change, but I am grateful to a number of my noble friends who indicated their support in principle. My noble friend Lady Stowell indicated that it was not necessarily a silver bullet, but nevertheless was an important contribution to try to revitalise our political system.
My noble friend Lord Dobbs had a slightly interesting, but very practical, explanation as to why he supported this, not least in terms of party finance. That may not seem the most obvious reason why one would support it, but for those of us who think back to the debates we had on the Parliamentary Voting Systems and Constituencies Bill, the point was made on more than one occasion that political parties oil the wheel of democracy and my noble friend made an important point. Certainly, under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, there is a regulation of national campaign spending for 12 months before the actual date of poll. Therefore, it is probably preferable that the parties can have a fixed idea of when that is likely to be, rather than have to guess.
This is important because it lends that stability. It particularly lends stability, as my noble friend Lord Marks said, on occasions when there is a coalition Government. It allows Governments and Parliaments to plan for the long term. I take issue with those who say that it does not give the Prime Minister an advantage. Our late colleague Lord Holme of Cheltenham, who chaired the Constitution Select Committee with distinction at one point, asked as long ago as 1991, in words which my noble friend quoted, what people would think about,
“a race in which the Prime Minister is allowed to approach it with his running shoes in one hand and his starting pistol in the other”.—[Official Report, 22/ 5/1991; col. 245.]
The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, although opposed to what is happening and sceptical about the arguments about the Prime Minister, also made the point about the Prime Minister being able to use Dissolution as a threat. It is not only about occasions when Dissolution has been sought by a Prime Minister, it is often about occasions when it was not sought, but was there nevertheless.
I disagree with those who think that this is a shift to the Executive. I believe that neutralising the threat that the Prime Minister has to hang Dissolution over his Back-Benchers may indeed strengthen Back-Benchers, rather than weaken them. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, and my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising, took the view that the Bill does not do what I claim it does; namely, that we believe it should transfer power from the Executive to Parliament.
I noted that the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, acknowledged that it was the Prime Minister giving up a prerogative that he has had the power to exercise for many years. I certainly agree with my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising that the objective must be to shift power from the Executive to Parliament. That is why I believe the Bill helps. This is a Bill that gives Parliament, not the Prime Minister or the Executive, the opportunity to decide when there should be an early general election. That is because of the flexibility, which I will come back to. No longer will the Executive be able to use the threat of a Dissolution against Parliament or their own Back-Benchers.
It is worth remembering that there have quite properly been references to the report of our own Constitution Select Committee. I also remind the House that the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee of the other place, in its report on the Bill, said:
“It is questionable whether a Prime Minister should be able to use his position in government to give him and his party an electoral advantage by choosing to hold the next general election to a schedule that best suits him. We therefore acknowledge the principle behind the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill”.
My noble friend Lord Norton asked about public demand. I am the first to say that it is not the question that comes up first at hustings. I am sure it was not the issue that lost the Labour Party the election last May. However, as the Constitution Select Committee report points out, the issue has been on the constitutional reform agenda for the past 20 years. The report refers to a report from the Institute for Public Policy Research in 1991; a commitment in the Labour Party manifesto in 1992; Private Members’ Bills, which have been referred to, in 2001 and 2008; Liberal Democrat policy documents; and the Liberal Democrat manifestos of 1992 and 1997. As my noble friend Lady Stowell indicated, an opinion poll from 2009—at the height of the expenses scandal—showed considerable public support for the idea of a fixed-term Parliament. As far back as 1998, Professor Blackburn, giving evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in the other place, gave an argument as to why a fixed-term Parliament should be an issue that the committee might look at. He said:
“But if I could finally select just one reform of election law which does carry popular backing and probably also substantial parliamentary support. This is our system of General Election timing which is an extremely important matter in electioneering terms and which clearly operates to the advantage of the government of the day … The trick is to avoid those times when you are unpopular so far as you can. I believe this Committee”—
that is, the Home Affairs Select Committee—
“should examine the case for fixed intervals between general elections”.
I listened to and take on board the criticisms regarding the lack of pre-legislative scrutiny. As I think I indicated when we dealt with the previous Bill, it is very difficult to have pre-legislative scrutiny of a Bill in a first Session. Noble Lords will remember that the original proposal was to have a binding resolution. That was not proceeded with. It was suggested by some of those who have contributed to the debate that it was questionable whether it would be binding. I certainly do not accept the view that was put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Elystan-Morgan, that the simplest thing would be for the Prime Minister to make a declaration. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, then qualified that by saying, “unless in exceptional circumstances we could not go on to 7 May 2015”. That is the point. It would continue the possible uncertainty. One of the reasons for legislating is to make it clear that that would be the position: there will be an election on 7 May 2015, unless the trigger mechanisms come into play.
I am trying to cover quite a lot of ground. I hope that I can do justice to the many important contributions that were made during the debate.
I welcome the fact that the Constitution Committee will look at the process for constitutional reform. It occurred to me that if a Parliament could not do much in the way of legislation in its first Session—it is not just constitutional Bills that call for pre-legislative scrutiny—there would not be much time to do much business at all, particularly since a four-year fixed term of Parliament has also been advocated. There will always be that tension as regards legislation that is introduced in the first year of a Parliament. We look forward to the Constitution Committee’s report on the process that it will recommend for constitutional legislation.
I had not anticipated my noble friend Lord Dobbs asking why the election should be held in May as opposed to June or October. The simple answer is that the most recent elections have been held in May, with the exception of the 2001 election when the foot and mouth epidemic occurred. There is always a difficulty with finding other times that do not clash with traditional holiday periods. However, my noble friend has posed an important challenge and we want to reflect on it. I also note that the annual canvass to update the electoral register takes place in October in Great Britain, so that may not be an appropriate time to place yet a further burden on electoral registration officers.
The noble Baroness, Lady Gould, asked whether there could be an extension of the two months beyond the extension. The answer to that is no. My noble friend Lord Rennard asked about primary legislation in this context. I believe that it is appropriate to introduce the relevant measure by order as the latter would have to be passed by both Houses. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, asked what we anticipate might happen. I have asked myself that question. I am not sure that I have an answer but I think that one could anticipate receiving a lot of criticism if one was seen to be making provision for the Government to extend their life, not to shorten it. I have no doubt that if we did not have this measure something would happen that no one could have foreseen and we would wish that we had had it. In the case of the Scottish Parliament, the Presiding Officer has the power to vary the election date by one month either way and I think that in the case of the National Assembly for Wales, the Secretary of State has the power to vary the date by a short period either way—although I cannot remember exactly by how much. The measure that we are discussing has been informed by those practices.
My noble friend Lord Norton asked why Clause 2(2)(a) refers to “a motion” whereas Clause 2(2)(b) refers to “any motion”. I think that “any motion” was chosen because it is followed by,
“expressing confidence in any Government”.
It is clearly a drafting preference. We think that “any motion” or “a motion” would have the same effect. I shall certainly contemplate that matter further, but I think that it is a drafting preference rather than having any significant constitutional importance.
The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, referred to resetting the clock. If there has been an election and a Government have been returned with a substantial majority and a mandate, they should have the opportunity to see that through for a full term. If the clock was not reset, the electorate might find it odd if, having returned a Government with a significant majority, they were then asked some 12 months later to vote again.
I have noted the points made about parliamentary privilege, which the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, raised, as did my noble friend Lord Cormack. I am sure that we will want to look at that issue in Committee but I certainly share the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that the provisions here would ensure that the courts would not interfere in what we believe is very much the space of Parliament.
The key issue is whether Parliaments should last for four or five years. As my noble friend Lord Rennard indicated, there is no absolutely right or wrong answer in that regard—it is a judgment. I indicated that the longer period allows the electorate to make its judgment—my noble friend Lord Marks commented on this—on the policies of a Government as they are seen to be working out in detail over time. I also believe that it allows a Government and Parliament longer to plan their activities. I cannot accept the argument that inevitably the situation has arisen under our present system whereby the fifth year has tended to be a bit of a lame-duck year and that that would necessarily follow if we had fixed-term Parliaments. As has been pointed out by a number of contributors, the fifth year has tended to be a lame-duck year because the Government in office did not think that they could win by cutting and running after four years. Therefore, it has been against a background where they have probably been at a disadvantage anyway.
The point was made by my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart and by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, and I think indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—although I think he was arguing this point in the context of arguing against a five-year term—that the final year, even though it would not be under the same sort of handicap as perhaps 1976-77 or 2009-10, nevertheless would be under a handicap. Even under a fixed-term Parliament, there would be the looming shadow of the forthcoming election. The last year is not as effective a year as the earlier years of a Parliament. That is why I believe that it would be the same in the fourth year of a four-year fixed-term Parliament or the fifth year of a five-year fixed-term Parliament. A four-year fixed-term Parliament therefore would only really allow three years for the Government to put a substantial part of their programme through. I have no doubt whatsoever we will come back to this.
I also just want to say one point. I cannot wholly accept that under a five-year term accountability disappears in the fifth year. I think those of us who have fought elections and have been elected know only too well as the election comes up accountability is a very, very strong thing indeed. When one is about to go and face one’s constituents accountability is very effective.
Another key issue, to which I am sure we will return in later stages of the Bill, is the mechanism. I absolutely endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said about there being a spectrum from total flexibility, which you might say we have got at the moment with an end point, a maximum turn with total flexibility and on to rigidity. I do not think that anyone was arguing in this debate for total rigidity. There is a consensus among supporters of the fixed-term Parliament over there being some degree of flexibility; if there is a political imperative or the Government completely fail there must be a mechanism for triggering an election. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said that the Constitution Committee broadly endorsed the two mechanisms for triggering an election set out in the Bill but I have listened to the concerns that have been raised. A number of historic examples have been given but it is always difficult to say what would have happened in the past under a future system. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, acknowledged this. Edward Heath in 1974 obviously wanted a dissolution. The Opposition would have agreed and they would have got the two-thirds majority for an election. Likewise, the position in 1924 was also raised by, I think, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon in an intervention on my opening speech.
In January 1924 the Conservative Government resigned after a defeat on the Queen’s Speech address but that did not trigger a general election. It actually triggered the formation of Ramsay MacDonald’s Administration. The draft Cabinet manual which was published in December last year indicates that at the moment the convention is that the Prime Minister either advises Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament or the Government resign and a new Government from the existing Chamber can be found, as indeed happened in, I think, January 1924.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am not sure whether the noble Lord is advocating that kind of threshold.
As I have indicated, one of the most convincing reasons for not having voter turnout thresholds is that, in a referendum which poses a yes/no question, the turnout threshold effectively makes every abstention a no vote. Under the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, there might still be this effect because abstentions could mean that a majority yes vote might not be upheld. People might abstain from voting in a referendum for any number of reasons, including apathy and ambivalence. Given that the electorate as defined would also include the dead, by definition such people would not be able to vote. [Laughter.] Noble Lords may laugh, but that is the case. People with double registration, who would be allowed to vote only once, would also be included in the definition of the electorate. Under the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, abstentions could mean that a yes vote may not be upheld.
The turnout threshold could incentivise people who favour a no vote to stay at home rather than to vote. The honourable Member Mr Mark Durkan of the SDLP made an interesting speech in the other place last night. He made the case that, in some of the referendums held in the Republic of Ireland, one of the campaign slogans was, “If you do not know, vote no”. He said that if this threshold amendment was to be passed, the message would be, “If you do not know, stay at home”. One of the many admirable things about our political culture in this country is that parties unite to encourage people to vote. Indeed, when my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury proposed an amendment that the various authorities—the Electoral Commission, the counting officers and registration officers—should encourage participation, it was accepted on all sides of the Chamber. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, subscribed—and no doubt he continues to subscribe—to the principle and the objective that people should be encouraged to turn out to vote. The effect of the amendment could be to encourage people to stay at home or not to bother. “Stay at home on 5 May” is not, I hope, a message that any noble Lord wishes to hear at the hustings in the referendum.
My Lords, this is the Lords consideration of Commons amendments. There will be time for noble Lords to make their points in the debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, should be allowed to finish his speech.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis is not down simply to mathematics. The principle at the core of this part of the Bill is to ensure the equality of the ballot, which all of us hold very dear indeed and which is not a purely mathematical thing. One elects one’s representative to sit in the other place and, by doing that, contributes to what the Government of this United Kingdom will be. There is a merit in that vote having equal value in all parts of our United Kingdom.
Even on his own basis—that numerical equality is the only thing that really counts—the Minister is under an illusion in supposing that, by achieving numerical equality between constituencies in Swansea and Aberdeen, he necessarily creates votes of equal value. The value of votes will also depend on registration, turnout and marginality in particular constituencies. He is pursuing a chimera in this respect, while at the same time ignoring that the basis of parliamentary representation in the United Kingdom has historically been that constituencies should be expressive of communities. Communities in Swansea and Aberdeen are, of course, of equal value, but the design of their parliamentary representation should reflect their particular characters.
My Lords, we have rehearsed the arguments before about matters such as turnout, on which, I accept, the Government cannot legislate—and turnout will have an effect—but on the morning of the election before anyone has turned out, at least what we are seeking to do gives a greater likelihood of equality before factors such as turnout come into effect. It does not say much for the quality of the value of a vote if, before you have even gone to the polls, an imbalance is already implicit in the system.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendments 16B, 16C, 16E and 16F are intended to substitute for the optional preference AV system the obligatory preference AV system. We touched upon this issue in an earlier debate, and on the first day in Committee my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours spoke very powerfully indeed on this topic. I none the less ask your Lordships’ indulgence to permit me to say a very few words about this because it is an issue of prime importance in this Bill.
My amendments, if they are technically valid, would replace the Queensland system, which is what the Government are proposing in the Bill, with the Australian federal system, and there is a very important difference. If you are voting in an Australian federal election to the Australian House of Representatives, you are required to vote for all the candidates on the ballot paper in the order of your preference. If you fail to do so, your vote is invalid. In the optional preference version of AV that applies in Queensland, you do not need to vote in order of preference for all the candidates; you may, if you prefer, vote for only one candidate. It is quite instructive to see what has happened in Australia over the years. The system that now operates in Queensland was introduced in 1992. Initially, when that was done, very few voters failed to express all their preferences in rank order, as had been their tradition—only about 20 per cent, initially. However, as time went by, more and more of them realised that they did not need to cast all these preference votes and they stopped doing so in very considerable numbers.
The turning point came in 2001, as my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours told the House in Committee, when the Australian Labor Party ran a “just one vote” campaign, because it had realised that it was more likely to be in the interests of their candidates that they should discourage people from exercising all the preferences that they might. To concentrate all their votes on one candidate is termed “plumping”, a term originally coined in 19th century England when elections to school boards were introduced. Under that system, an elector was permitted to exercise perhaps 20 votes—a vote for every member of the school board—but they were allowed to cast all their votes for the same candidate. The object of that provision was to try to ensure that representatives of Christian minorities were represented on school boards. However, what actually happened in practice, very interestingly, was that it was organised that people would plump or concentrate their votes in support of women candidates, because it was felt to be desirable that women should serve on school boards. That plumping was very beneficial to the feminist cause in the 1880s and thereabouts. The term has been borrowed in Queensland.
The result of the practice of plumping in Queensland, as we are told by the academic authority of Messrs Rallings and Thrasher from the University of Plymouth, is that in 2009, 63 per cent of those who turned out at the state elections in Queensland voted for just one candidate—and, in some constituencies, the proportion was as high as 73 per cent. Even when the political parties urged their supporters to use their preference votes in the manner associated with AV, they did so decreasingly. For example, the Greens urged their voters to exercise all preference votes, and to exercise their second preference in support of Labor, but very large numbers—46 per cent—of those who gave their first preference to the Greens did not do so; they made no other choice. We have seen the same effect in the London mayoral elections, where there is a modified version of AV in the supplementary vote system. A significant percentage—perhaps one in five voters—vote for only one candidate.
I am not a supporter of AV, but if the proponents of AV want to see the benefits that they profess that AV would confer, I suggest that they would do better to have the proper AV system—the obligatory preference system—rather than the one that is being proposed in this Bill. If we have only optional preference voting under AV in this country, it will rapidly turn into a pretty close replica of the first past the post system. People will scratch their heads and ask why on earth they have been through all this palaver, why we have had a referendum, and why—if they did so—they have voted for an alternative vote system that turns out to be remarkably similar to the first past the post system that they have rejected. This needs very careful thought, and it is not too late for the Government to give it that thought. I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, would provide that, under the alternative vote system, voters would be required to express a preference for every candidate standing at the election. As he indicated in moving his amendment, we had some debate on a related issue earlier in the evening. In the Bill as drafted, by contrast, voters may express a preference for as few or as many candidates as they wish—indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, observed, even just for one. We believe that this approach gives maximum choice to voters. We would not support a system where voters were required to express preferences for all the candidates standing at the election.
In Committee, my noble friend the Leader of the House explained that the Government believe that the optional preferential form of the alternative vote system is the right form of AV to be put before the people. There is a genuine issue here and a genuine debate, but we believe that for elections to the other place, if voters are to be able to express preferences, it is only right that they should be able to express as many or as few preferences as they choose; their ability to limit their preferences should not be constrained in the way that the noble Lord suggests.
Furthermore, the optional preferential form of the alternative vote avoids putting voters in the position where they are obliged to vote positively and to give a preference for political parties that may be wholly distasteful to them, such as those on the extremes of politics. Indeed, it is not impossible that people might be dissuaded from casting a vote at all if they felt that they had to go to the ballot box and put a number beside a party that they found extremely abhorrent. That would be the opposite of what those who support the alternative vote would say is the aim of using it as the system for electing Members to the House of Commons.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, mentioned Australia. In those elections where a compulsory form of AV is used, voters must indicate an order of preference for every candidate on the ballot paper, as he described, in order for their vote to be valid at all. The noble Lord’s amendment does not specify what would happen if a voter did not express a preference for all candidates. Would that vote be declared invalid? It is not clear what would happen in those circumstances. There is a danger, of course, that it could risk disfranchising voters who did not wish to express a preference for all candidates standing at the election. Against that background, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, says from a sedentary position that it is right. Be that as it may, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, prefaced his remarks by saying that he did not support the compulsory system and preferred the optional preferential system. If we believe that that is a better system than the compulsory system, I think that that is what we should stick with. If it is the case that there is not another national legislature that does it, so be it—we are devising a system for the House of Commons.
My Lords, I think that it is clearly implicit in my amendments that, if people did not use all their preferences, their vote would be invalid, as is the case in federal elections in Australia. The noble and learned Lord rejects what I suggest; be it on his own head. If Ministers in the Government wish to make a botch of their attempt at electoral reform, so be it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has, as the noble Lord, Lord Neill of Bladen, has indicated, proposed an amendment which would take out the option of the alternative vote in a referendum and ask whether the system should be changed and a different system of electing MPs be introduced at the next general election. As the noble Lord said, a variety of different systems have been suggested.
I do not believe for a moment that this would lead to any clear outcome, even if this was the question that was asked. The public might reasonably be confused. What other system of elected MPs would be introduced? What kind of campaign would take place where perhaps a variety of different systems were being canvassed? How would the campaigns in this referendum marshal their arguments and present their case? You would get differing factions, with those who might want a single transferable vote, those who want the supplementary system and those who want the alternative vote. It would result in more questions being asked than answers being provided.
However, I can see that the main point that the noble Lord is trying to make is that there should be further thought on the system, if any, that should replace first past the post. I always find it touching when noble Lords opposite make speeches which appear to have the best interests of the Liberal Democrats at heart. It is very moving but, frankly, those who think that somehow the outcome of the negotiations might have been different were not actually there. Even to mention the possibility of the 1922 Committee being invited to endorse the single transferable vote only needs to be stated to show how unlikely an event that would have been.
Is it not a grievance to the Conservative Party that it can win more votes across the country, particularly in England, and still not be able to form a Government? Is the solution to its problem not then a system of proportional representation?
The noble Lord invited me to look to the best interests of the Liberal Democrats. I would not tread anywhere on looking at what might be considered the best interests of the Conservative Party.
If the referendum was on the question proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and if the answer was yes, what would then be the follow-on from that? Would the Government propose a system that would have to be debated by Parliament? My noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree made a good point that you can ask the public if they want a change and if, they say yes, you then leave it to politicians to foist upon them what that change might be. Even if it was a question of, “Vote yes and we will set up a committee”, that is not really an appealing slogan on which to have a referendum campaign. Voters could reasonably claim that they had been cut out of a significant decision.
In moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said two things: that Parliament would take the final decision and that, inevitably, the next general election in 2015 would be fought on a different system from first past the post. Yet nowhere can Parliament be mandated to pass a Bill to make it an Act. We all know that a change in the electoral system would require primary legislation for it to come into law. If the voters have voted yes to wanting a change, what guarantee will there be that both Houses of Parliament would then manage to coalesce around what that particular change might be? It could be the worst of all worlds, with people voting for change and then finding that politicians have frustrated the change that they seek.
As has been made clear on a number of occasions, the attraction of the approach taken in this Bill is its clarity. We set out how the alternative vote system would work, as comprehensively done in Clause 9 and Schedule 10. Any questions about how optional preferential AV works can be resolved by looking at the Bill. That would not be the case with the noble Lord’s amendment. I urge him to withdraw his amendment and, if he seeks to push it to a vote, I invite noble Lords to vote it down.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend has a great talent for a kind of lateral thinking that is always fruitful in our debates. His point is a little wide of the amendment; I must reprove him to that extent. However, it would be rather curious if we were to be presented with legislation that proposed that in elections for police commissioners, police officers should not be entitled to play a part or exercise any persuasive powers.
I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and highlighted some interesting aspects. I suspect that parts of the 1983 legislation have not been visited for some time. To take the general point, I am not aware of any moves afoot to review electoral law in this way, but I am sure that those in the responsible department will take note of what is said with regard to the generality.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, referred to this disparagingly as a cut-and-paste job. The schedule seeks to ensure that as far as practically possible, the existing rules governing the registration for and the conduct of parliamentary elections should apply in the case of the referendum. As is very obvious, in order to take account of this, there have had to be changes in terminology. For example, it would not make sense to have references to candidates when there are no candidates in a referendum. To do that, people had to go right through.
I was asked whether this section of the 1983 Act would be considered for revision in future. We will want to look at that, but it is right that we base the referendum on the rules that we know. If I had come to the House with subtle changes, I would have had a difficult job trying to explain them, and no doubt some noble Lords would have thought that a great conspiracy was afoot. In future, we will be happy to review the provisions, but I cannot honestly say that it will be done quickly—certainly not in time for Report. However, I do not think that that was what was asked: I think that the request was to look at this more generally.
I will respond to specific points. I do not have the information about whether there have been any convictions under Section 61 of the Representation of the People Act. That is a matter for the courts and I am advised that the information is not collected centrally. The provision with regard to voting on one’s own behalf or by proxy, to which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, drew attention, is intended to cover the situation where one can vote on one’s own behalf and also by proxy on someone else’s behalf, but one cannot vote twice on one’s own behalf.
That brings us to the question of postal votes. There is a danger of Members of the Committee getting into their anecdotage. The noble Lord, Lord Maxton, asked whether, if you have a postal vote in one place but are registered in another, as Members of Parliament have been, you could vote in another place even if the postal vote had been issued. I know the answer because in the 1989 European elections I had a postal vote in the Highlands and Islands constituency, for which I was a Member of Parliament, and I was living in London. Local elections were on the same day and it took me a long time to persuade the polling clerk not to issue me with a ballot paper for the European elections because I had already voted and it would have been an offence to vote again—whereas I did want to vote in the local elections. I do not know how I knew about it, but I did. Perhaps it is important, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, pointed out, that the information should be in the material that will go out to those who receive a postal vote that they may not vote more than once.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing his amendments. I have a simple question. Why are they being added now when I think a number of amendments were added at the latter stage in the Commons proceedings on the Bill? Was this something that was omitted or has it just been thought up? I am talking about Amendments 122F, 122H and 122K, which all refer to the same thing. I can see its importance and we do not oppose it, but why does it appear now when everything else in Schedule 5 was there at the time of the proceedings in another place?
If the noble and learned Lord does not have the answer by the time I sit down, he can write to me. This seems quite important so I am interested to know why it was not added before.
Let me provide a little more time for officials to advise the noble and learned Lord. I should be grateful if he would advise the House on the means of communication whereby these minor, technical but none the less significant changes will be communicated to those whose duty it is to carry out the relevant functions. How much complexity is there in that and will training be needed? How will the system ensure that all those who need to know about these changes being made at a late stage actually know, given the short-ish interval between enactment and the date of the referendum?
My Lords, I understand that through scrutiny of the legislation it was noticed that these points needed to be added to the Bill. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, the schedules are combination schedules. He referred to training. What was going to happen would happen anyway. For the sake of argument, if it was an election to the Welsh National Assembly, now that there is a combined election it would bite on both ballots. In that regard the chief counting officer is responsible for the referendum and there is communication there. My information is that these points have already been communicated to administrators who have commented on the provision. As I said when I moved the amendment, the Electoral Commission and the Association of Electoral Administrators have already confirmed that they are content with the amendments. In other words, it is very much into the system already and I am confident that they will be well communicated.
I certainly undertake to come back and give some clarification to the noble Baroness and many others who are interested in this matter. I confirm what I said yesterday to the noble Lord, Lord Maxton—that it is intended that the result of the Scottish election should be declared ahead of that of the referendum. As I also indicated, it took some time to put together a Government in Scotland on the previous three occasions. Nevertheless, it is intended that that election should be the priority.
The combined rules in the Bill require all ballot papers to be separated for each of the three polls before the verification process can commence. Even if there are two polls, it still has to be verified that ballot papers have not been put in the wrong box. There are also provisions which require all ballot papers for each of the three polls to be verified before any of the counts can conclude. This ensures that all ballot papers will be accounted for and included in the appropriate count. If people cast their vote, it is important that it is then counted.
In that connection, I would be most grateful if the noble and learned Lord would deal with one other point: the position of the Government—on which we disagree with them—that the results of the referendum should not be declared constituency by constituency. What aspects of the arrangements for the count set out in the schedule are designed to ensure that it will not be possible for party agents and others who are present at the count, for very valid reasons, to make a pretty shrewd assessment of the sizes of the piles of ballot papers and to estimate the result constituency by constituency? What safeguards are built in to prevent that?
My Lords, I never cease to be amazed at the ingenuity of observers at counts in trying to work out what is going on. Even in European elections in the past where ballot papers have been verified on the Thursday night with the count deferred until the Sunday—and, in the case of the Highlands and Islands, the Monday—some people have still managed to have a pretty shrewd idea of the results. It might be asking the impossible, no matter what was put into statute.
A number of important questions have been asked. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, asked about the separate registers. There will be two registers, but an accounting officer, who has most experience of local circumstances, can decide to merge them. If, for example, he or she is aware that in a particular area some voters would be on one register but not on the other, they may choose to have one register. Each elector is marked to show which election he or she can vote in.
The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, asked about the definition of the area of control of a presiding officer. The area of control is not covered by the Bill. The Electoral Commission feels that that would be better dealt with in guidance, as with all previous elections. That goes also for mobile hoardings. I am sure that those of us who have fought elections or been agents in them will recall that opposing parties or campaigns are not usually slow to object or make representations if they feel that some trickery is up whereby messages are being obscured by the other side. The Bill says “inside and outside” polling stations. I do not think that a 40-tonne truck will be able necessarily to obscure a notice inside a polling station.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps I may first respond to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport. I hope he would not expect the Government to give directions to the Boundary Commissions, and I indicate that the Bill provides that the Boundary Commissions,
“shall take such steps as they see fit to inform people in the constituency—
(a) of the effect of the proposed recommendations and”—
to ensure that—
“a copy of the recommendations is open to inspection at a specified place within the constituency”—
that is unless, of course, no change is recommended for the constituency—
“(b) that representations with respect to the proposed recommendations may be made to the Commission during a specified period of 12 weeks”.
The provisions of this Bill are a bit different from those of the past. The 1986 legislation made a stipulation with regard to newspaper advertisements, and that is not in this Bill. We are leaving that to the discretion of the Boundary Commission. When I was replying to an amendment moved on Wednesday by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, who was talking about online advertising, I indicated that again it was a matter for the Boundary Commissions. However, as there had been use of online advertising for the purposes of the Boundary Commissions’ work during the last general review, I have every confidence that it will be done again. I am sure there is no way in which the Boundary Commission is going to have a perfunctory regard in ensuring that the proposals are widely publicised. All parts of the House—it should be a matter not just for Government but for Parliament—should be confident that the commissions will continue to adhere to the highest standards that they have shown in the past, irrespective of seeking representations that will strengthen their recommendations. There is a high level of expectation there, and I do not think there has ever been any suggestion that the Boundary Commissions have not lived up to that.
With regard to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes—
There will be a difference in the way that the Boundary Commission operates in future, because it is going to have to reduce the number of constituencies from 650 to 600, if that provision stays in the Bill, and it is also going to have to make the quota of 76,000 a paramount consideration. Those two factors are going to constrain it in new ways. I am sure, as the noble and learned Lord suggests, it will wish to be thorough in its consultation, but the question of what it may see fit by way of publicity and consultation, given the pressures it is going to be under, and the pressures of time as well, will depend to an extent on the standard and expectation that the Government express. That is why I hope we shall hear from the noble and learned Lord a sentiment very vigorously expressed, that he would expect no less of the Boundary Commission than the utmost thoroughness of engagement to ensure that every one of our citizens is aware of the proposals that would affect their constituencies and genuinely have the opportunity to make their representation should they wish to make them.
It is not just a matter of Ministers expecting it because Parliament would expect a degree of engagement. I am in little doubt that good publicity will be given to the issue, because I the political parties have a role to play, as we have acknowledged. As I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, when he proposed that representations should be published online within 24 hours, we would want carefully to consider that before Report. I raised a number of practical issues, but acknowledged that we are living in an age when online communication is probably the norm rather than the exception.
The noble and learned Lord says he is going to frame an amendment—effectively, to produce a new clause to replace Clause 12. Will he consider including wording that really indicates unambiguously the demanding expectation that the Government and Parliament will have for the Boundary Commissioners in this regard?
I am not sure that legislation is the proper place to express exhortation, but I have no doubt that the four Boundary Commissions will be looking at the debates in your Lordships’ House, as indeed in the other place. They will have heard the reasonable expectations with regard to publicity of their recommendations.
I will say to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that perhaps it was a matter of controversy in some of our earlier debates, but one of the reasons why, for example, the British Academy report welcomed some of the features of the Bill with regard to the rules was the clear hierarchy we have laid down and which has not previously been the case. Therefore, I hope that the concern expressed by the former Secretary of State, Bruce Millan, will not arise in this particular case.
For completeness, I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that, as I indicated earlier, it is the case, as stated in new subsection (3) proposed in Clause 12 (1):
“Where a Boundary Commission revise any proposed recommendations after publicising them”,
subsection (1), which contains the publicity part, would apply to the revised proposals, but it does not apply to any proposals that are revised for a second time. I give this for completeness.
My Lords, if the number of parliamentary constituencies in Wales is to be reduced, it must inevitably follow that the boundaries of constituencies for the Welsh Assembly and the boundaries of constituencies in Wales for this Parliament will no longer be aligned. I do not think that it would be right for us to seek to reduce the number of constituencies that return Members to the Welsh Assembly, but I think we should appreciate that, if we are going to legislate to cause these boundaries to cease to be coterminous and to diverge, problems will arise and damage will be done politically.
My noble friend reminded us that last week we considered two amendments on this issue. One proposed a phased reduction in the number of parliamentary constituencies in Wales and the other proposed that the reduction should be delayed until such time as the people of Wales had voted to have primary law-making powers transferred to the Welsh Assembly. Both would be helpful mitigating amendments, but let us recall, in the mean time, that the Welsh Assembly, unlike the Scottish Parliament, does not have primary law-making powers and that policy for Wales is made, on a very large scale, in the Westminster Parliament. There is a block grant which transfers resources from London to Cardiff. Home affairs, criminal justice, social security, pensions and, of course, defence, foreign policy and very major areas of policy are determined still for Wales by the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
It follows from that that it is a responsibility of Members of Parliament representing Welsh constituencies at Westminster to work in close relationship with their colleagues who are Assembly Members in Cardiff. They need to be able to talk to each other about the interests of the constituents that they jointly serve. The needs of Wales need to be represented by Welsh Members of Parliament at Westminster and as things are, they are well represented by Members of Parliament of all parties at Westminster. It is easier for them to do that job because the constituencies of Welsh MPs are the same as the constituencies of Welsh Assembly Members. When that ceases to be the case, it will be far more difficult for Welsh MPs and Welsh Assembly Members to work closely and effectively together in the interests of their shared constituents. There will overlapping of boundaries. There will be cases in which Welsh Members of Parliament will have to try to represent, at one and the same time, the interests of two Welsh Assembly constituencies which may not be in agreement about what it is that they would like their champion in the House of Commons to be arguing for. There will be a muddying and a blurring of responsibility. It will be more difficult for people to do their job.
Of course, the noble and learned Lord, like others in the Chamber, is very well aware of the experience in Scotland. I see that my noble friend Lord Foulkes is not here, but my noble friends Lord McAvoy and Lady Liddell are well able to testify that, whatever the merits may have been of the redrawing of constituency boundaries in Scotland, it cannot have been made easier for an appropriate collaboration to take place between Members of the Scottish Parliament and Members of the Westminster Parliament. This is one reason—there are other powerful reasons—why I believe that it is undesirable to reduce the number of constituencies in Wales, or, if the number of constituencies in Wales is to be reduced, we should do it at a gradual pace. The service that their elected representatives are able to give to their constituents will be impaired if we lose the existing alignment of boundaries.
My Lords, as has been indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, one of the purposes of this clause is to ensure that the number of seats in the Welsh Assembly is not reduced as a result of the proposed reduction in the number of United Kingdom Parliamentary seats at Westminster. Indeed, a similar end was procured in relation to Scotland through primary legislation in 2004. I am not sure whether it was when the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, was Secretary of State, but if it was not, she probably instigated it, and it was to secure the size of the Scottish Parliament, notwithstanding the significant reduction in the number of Scottish seats at Westminster. I am pleased to have heard the noble Lord confirm that he has no objection to that part of this clause.
The noble Lord did inquire, however, about the transitional provisions and took the opportunity to raise again the issues which were pretty thoroughly debated one day last week—I cannot remember which day it was; possibly Wednesday night. We had a thorough debate and I do not propose to go into all the arguments again. Suffice to say that it is the case that, even now, the Welsh Assembly has powers given to it under framework powers in primary legislation, or under legislative competence orders, to promote measures in the Welsh Assembly. As I indicated on that occasion, the underlying principle of the Bill is to ensure equality of constituencies throughout the United Kingdom and I have still not been given any answer as to why a seat in Cardiff should be smaller than a seat in Belfast, Edinburgh or Birmingham. I do not think that we can pursue that matter much further this evening.
The transitional provisions are intended to deal with interim boundary reviews which have already been begun by the Boundary Commission for Wales and have not been completed or have not yet been implemented at the time when Part 2 of the Bill comes into force. The commission will be able to decide whether to continue with any reviews which it has in hand but the consequence of continuing with any reviews would be that, in practice, they would apply only to the boundaries of Assembly constituencies.
The transitional provisions also provide that, where the commission has already delivered a report recommending alterations to constituencies before Part 2 of the Bill comes into force, but there has not yet been any order giving effect to the recommendations, an order must be laid in Parliament in accordance with the previous requirements. Such an order would therefore affect the Assembly constituencies and, where appropriate, Assembly electoral regions, but would not have any effect on parliamentary constituencies, which, of course, would be the subject of the boundary review, which is the substance of Part 2 of the Bill. I hope that that explanation will satisfy the noble Lord. I beg to move that Clause 13 stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, we all accept that it is desirable in any case to improve electoral registration, but I take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Newton, in what he said in relation to the Bill. Happily and conveniently, the Committee accepted the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Rooker, and there is therefore flexibility on the date of the referendum on electoral change, and there is no technical problem standing in the way of acceptance of the amendment of my noble friend.
Whatever view we take about the desirability of the forthcoming referendum—I favour a referendum on the question of electoral change—or whatever view we take on whether or not it is desirable to switch from first past the post to the alternative vote, although I prefer to keep first past the post, we can all agree that we want full participation by the people of this country in the referendum. We want its result not only to be legally binding but to have moral force. It will not have moral force if it is mired by a low turnout among those who are already registered. It will have less moral force if, unfortunately, it is conducted on a register which is demonstrably incomplete and inaccurate.
If there is to be an important moment in the national life in consideration of a major constitutional change, we should expect the Electoral Commission to take every reasonable step to ensure that there is a high level of registration. It is then for the campaigning groups to do all they can to ensure that there is a high turnout. This can be done and it should be done. The decision taken by the people at the referendum will have a greater validity. It will be more convincing if it takes place on the basis of fuller registration.
It is timely to have a drive for improved registration because we know that local authorities will have fewer resources in years to come, and that in the next few months they will perhaps still have the resources to mount the drive to improve electoral registration. We also know that given the housing benefit changes that are due to come in, more people may be obliged to move home. We will see more people coming off existing electoral registers and perhaps not getting on to new electoral registers. Before we see the full unfortunate consequences of those benefit changes, we should have a drive to improve electoral registration. It would be particularly timely and appropriate for that to take place in the next few months, certainly to ensure that we have the most complete and accurate electoral register possible when the referendum takes place, and as an investment in the electoral register for future elections.
For all those reasons, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Bach.
My Lords, this amendment, as has been made clear, concerns the commencement of the provisions relating to the referendum in the Bill. Part 1 provides among other things for the referendum on the alternative vote, for the entitlement to vote in the referendum and for conduct of the referendum. The proposal in the amendment is that the provisions should,
“not come into force until the Electoral Commission has certified that every local authority has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the electoral register is as complete and accurate as possible”.
It will come as no surprise that the Government wish to resist the amendment. To be fair, it is a variation on a number of the amendments debated earlier in Committee, when debating Part 2, on whether the Boundary Commission’s review should commence until the Electoral Commission had certified that every local authority had taken all reasonable steps. We believe that the amendment would cause a serious risk of delaying the referendum.
Reference has been made to the successful amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. Before that debate, I was detained by severe weather and was unable to get to the House, but I have noted what was said and I heard the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, say on other occasions that his intention was not to rule out 5 May, but to provide a lifeboat, whereas this amendment would, to all intents and purposes, rule out 5 May. In fact, the delay could be so substantial, perhaps even indefinite, if the relevant certification could not be provided, that the lifeboat might even be sunk before it was launched. I cannot understand why we should put ourselves in a position whereby perhaps one local authority electoral registration officer was somehow holding back and the Electoral Commission could not provide the required certification.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I start by indicating to the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, that in the days when I had to attend economics lectures from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, I also had to read Richard Lipsey’s Positive Economics. I hope he will take it in the spirit that it is intended when I say that I find the noble Lord’s contributions much more engaging than what I recall of his textbook.
The amendment would allow the Boundary Commission to decide, in particular instances, that the factors in rule 5 are so important that it should override the preceding rules. It has been evident from the debates that we have had so far that the core principle of this part of the Bill is to ensure that votes cast across the country have an equal weight. The best way to achieve this is to ensure that there is broad equality in the number of registered voters in each constituency. The principle of parity must be paramount.
In introducing his amendment, the noble Lord said that there was consensus in the Committee on the principle of equity, although he indicated that there was no consensus on the 5 per cent or 10 per cent variation from the electoral quota figure. I pay tribute to the noble Lord’s ingenuity for coming forward with this amendment. He claims that it is a very narrow exemption but, while ostensibly reasonable, the amendment would undermine the principle of parity that we have said ought to be paramount by allowing other factors to take precedence over the equal weighting of votes. This could, and almost certainly would, perpetuate a situation in which constituencies can be of very different sizes, and votes cast in one part of the country can have a very different weight from those cast in another.
The amendment would override rule 2(1), so it would not just be a question of a debate about a 5 per cent or 10 per cent variation. Indeed, by that rule being overridden, the variation could be sizeable indeed. Existing differences in constituency size matter. There is a 41 per cent difference between Manchester Central, with 85,522 electors in 2009, and Glasgow North, with 50,588 electors in 2009. That means that 10 voters in Glasgow North have the same weight as 17 voters in Manchester Central. Frankly, that simply cannot be right.
One of the reasons why we are still here in this Committee on the 13th day is that the Government persist in the illusion that if they equalise the number of electors in every constituency, desirable of course though that is in principle, that will produce votes of equal value. The reality is that differential turnout and differential marginality mean that votes in different constituencies will continue to have different values. If the coalition really wanted to achieve votes of equal value, it would have put an alternative option on the referendum for people to vote for proportional representation. Why did the Government not do that?
Obviously the noble Lord is right to the extent that differential turnout has an effect on the value of votes, but the Bill at least gets everyone to the same starting point. The argument that seems to be coming from the noble Lord is that somehow or other you can have an equal starting point that would then be compounded by differential turnout, making the situation even worse. That is what I find unacceptable.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI would be very grateful if the Minister could give the House his response to the following observation made by Dr Lewis Baston in Democratic Audit: January 2011 on this issue of the splitting of wards:
“It is probably impossible to implement a 5 per cent rule without splitting wards between constituencies, something which the Boundary Commissions currently avoid doing because of the potential for voter confusion and highly artificial constituency boundaries, not to mention causing headaches for the organisation of all political parties. … The worst-affected areas are those where wards have large electorates, such as the English metropolitan boroughs, most of Scotland and some unitary authorities and London boroughs. A rigid 10 per cent rule might still involve a few isolated cases of ward-splitting, but it is likely to be very uncommon in comparison with a 5 per cent rule”.
Is there not a lot of very good sense in that?
As my noble friend Lord Rennard said, there is no limit to the number of special cases. If we move without any other limitation to a 20 per cent band rather than a 10 per cent band, we are moving away from the basic principle of equal value. Broadly speaking, we have followed the provisions of the 1986 Act with regard to local authority boundaries, and while we are keen to avoid being too prescriptive on this issue, there may be some merit in placing a discretionary consideration of wards in the Bill. We certainly want to consider further the elements of these amendments that concern the use of wards. Other amendments have been tabled with regard to wards by the noble Lords, Lord Lipsey and Lord Foulkes, and my noble friends Lord Rennard and Lord Tyler. We want to consider, therefore, the use of wards and to bring back a fully considered response on that on Report since it is an important point. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
The amendment would restrict the Boundary Commission in drawing up new constituency boundaries by a series of provisions specifying that constituency boundaries may not cross certain local authority or European constituency boundaries. I noted that, when moving his amendment, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, reiterated that he and his colleagues recognised the need for greater equality but seek to put that restriction on to the Boundary Commission in its recommendations.
The Bill provides for the Boundary Commission to take into account local government boundaries, as well as local ties, although that has not been acknowledged in some contributions. As we have said on more than one occasion, that is subject to the principle of equality. We believe that the details of how it does that should be a matter for the Boundary Commission. Just to clarify, a government amendment to the definition of local government boundaries was made in the other place. I re-emphasise that it means that the Boundary Commissions may take unitary authority boundaries into account.
It has been made clear in several contributions, not least that of my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree but also that of the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, that even under the existing arrangements the Boundary Commission has not exactly achieved what in some people's view might be perfection. The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, talked about Hamilton being split into two. Even before the current split, there was a previous split between Hamilton North and Bellshill and Hamilton South. An important point, which was made by my noble friend Lord Newton and alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hughes of Stretford, is that local government is not the sole challenge that Members of Parliament have to deal with. There are health boards, primary healthcare trusts and police divisions. It would be a nightmare, if not an impossibility, to try to ensure that the Member of Parliament had to deal with only one each of police, health and local authorities.
As we mentioned in debates on previous groups, we have sought generally to follow the 1986 Act provisions on local authority boundaries. We want the Boundary Commissions to have flexibility to take account of specific circumstances, but we also recognise that there is some merit in placing discretionary consideration in the hands of the Boundary Commission, including with regard to wards, about which I will say more in a moment.
In its fifth general report, the Boundary Commission for England noted that,
“some wards on the outskirts of towns contained very different communities. For instance, there were occasions where the majority of the electorate of the ward were urban dwellers residing in a very small area of the ward on the edge of a town. However, the small remainder of the ward’s electorate was made up of those living in rural communities some distance from the town”.
That is why we believe there is a reasonable case in certain circumstances for the Boundary Commission to have discretion to split them and why there should not be a prohibition, which would be the effect of at least four of the provisions of the composite amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord.
I repeat that we seek—and this is enshrined in the Bill—to ensure one value for one vote, not to draw up constituencies to suit the administrative convenience of Members of Parliament. I cannot accept that, as the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, proposed, it is somehow impossible for a Member of Parliament to discharge his or her functions if his or her constituency includes more than one local authority. My noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree made that abundantly clear.
I am not saying that. I am certain that the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, represented his constituents entirely admirably. I am objecting to the thrust of reform that makes it far more likely that local authorities will be fragmented and that constituencies will consist of more, rather than fewer, local authorities, which must be calculated to make it harder for all concerned—Members of Parliament, other elected members and constituents.
I listened to the noble Lord’s speech, and he gave the very clear impression that that was challenging in the extreme. As my noble friend said, there were three local authorities in the constituency that he represented. The constituency that I represented contained two local authorities. On the basis of the figures that I gave in a previous debate, by my calculation 187 Members of Parliament represent constituencies that have more than one metropolitan or non-metropolitan district boundary. I believe that it is more than possible to do an adequate job of representing one's constituents where there is more than one local authority in a constituency.
We do not believe that we should be tying the hands of the Boundary Commission in a way that prevents it from recommending the best solutions for electors simply for the convenience of Members of the other place. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hughes and Lady Farrington, about the importance of local constituency parties. They of course have an important role in oiling the wheels of our democracy, but I do not think that their interests should be elevated above those of individual constituents.
I do not want to follow down the path of anecdotage, but the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, mentioned the number of party fundraising events at this time in Scotland that are focused on Burns suppers. I had the great pleasure of attending a Liberal Democrat Burns supper in South Edinburgh, which has already reorganised itself to take account of the changes in the boundaries and the disjunction between Scottish parliamentary boundaries and Westminster boundaries. I do not really want to hear more of the Burns supper adventures of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am certain that I have already given that explanation, but I am more than happy to repeat it. The judgment was that in order to get the Boundary Commission reports by 1 October 2013, 1 December 2010 was the date that was necessary to give the Boundary Commissions their starting point: the raw figures from which they must work. October 2013 was chosen because it is approximately 18 months before what would be the general election in May 2015. I cannot remember which noble Lord it was—it might even have been the noble Lord, Lord Howarth—but someone certainly made comments in debates earlier about the importance for local parties selecting candidates to adjust to new boundaries. Eighteen months was thought to be sufficient time to allow that to happen. That is the judgment that has been made. It will be pretty challenging. I do not think anyone has denied that. Indeed, noble Lords opposite have commented that it will be a very challenging task for the Boundary Commissions to have their respective reports published by October 2013, but that is why we have chosen that date.
Why should not the Boundary Commissions, as they work towards a review to be completed by 1 October 2013, take, as the relevant date for the register, 1 December 2012?
You have to have a fixed date in order to be able to produce the draft recommended constituency boundaries and have an opportunity for consultation. The work has to start very soon to be able to do that. If you start to import new figures two years down the line, it is practically not possible to do that. It comes down to sheer practicality. You cannot do that and have that all in place by 2013.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI perhaps misunderstood what I was being asked to do. I thought that I was being asked to give a commitment to bring back an amendment, which I cannot do. The force of argument on all sides of the House is considerable and I have no doubt that the comments made on this matter will be considered. I do not want to make a commitment which I cannot deliver, but I can honestly say that I will ensure that the forceful comments that have been made from all sides of the House on this point will be acknowledged.
I could give some examples where the present system does not deliver on the principle of not crossing county boundaries, and how I believe that under what we propose, the ward system will, for the most part, be upheld in England. I am not sure that I can elaborate much further. I say to my noble friend Lord Crickhowell that if similar arguments apply in the rest of the United Kingdom, they will apply in Wales. Under what my noble friend proposes, the number of Members from Wales would not increase. I do not think that he was arguing that, but much of the argument in Wales has focused on the number. I would not want the House to be given the impression that somehow my noble friend's amendment would increase the number of Members from Wales.
I have tried to be helpful. We believe that we have imported flexibility, but important contributions have been made to the debate, and we are honour bound to consider them. I also make very clear that I do not want to be misunderstood as making a commitment that I may not be in a position to honour.
I am tempted to be encouraged by the tone of the response from the noble and learned Lord, but I fear that I cannot derive the comfort that I hoped to obtain from the paraphrasical content of what he said. I press him a little more, because I think that there is quite a wide consensus on this around the House—I may overstate the case where Conservative Peers are concerned. We are not alone on these Benches in asking the Minister to consider that an excessively rigid insistence on electoral parity on a fixed arithmetical quota with the minimal latitude of only 5 per cent either side of the norm of 75,800 electors to a constituency will preclude appropriate weight being given to factors that everyone recognises as significant: local ties, geography, community, history and, very importantly, the relationship between parliamentary constituency structures and the structures of local government.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberWith respect, I think that the point that the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, made was whether Ministers have such discretion. It is certainly my understanding that the power is not intended to be discretionary. The intention is that, if a boundary commission wants a modification, Ministers will be obliged to incorporate that modification in laying the Order in Council. The two new subsections (5A) and (5B) need to be taken together. New subsection (5B) describes the circumstances in which a modification would be made.
As I have indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and indeed to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I will read this again. I have done so already and I am satisfied that there is no malign intent that would oblige Ministers to follow a request from one of the Boundary Commissions, but I am willing to give it further reconsideration and others will no doubt look at it and read it.
I am looking at the Explanatory Notes to Clause 10 of the Bill. It seems to be very clear that discretion is left to the Secretary of State in laying,
“before Parliament a draft of an Order in Council for giving effect to the recommendations in the boundary reports”,
to accept or not to accept the modifications that the Boundary Commission may wish.
That is perhaps a good reason for us to examine it again. I have indicated what the intention is and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, for flagging this up. It will give us an opportunity to be satisfied that the wording reflects the intention.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI cannot accept that. If you were to have a longer period, that would lead to greater disruption, but you have to take into account the five-year period and the fact that in reviews after the first one the Boundary Commission has the discretion to take into account any inconveniences attendant on the change, even allowing for the 5 per cent variation. Therefore, I do not believe that it leads to the same degree of upheaval.
I cannot accept the premise that the noble Lords, Lord Howarth and Lord Martin, mentioned that this is somehow a recipe for one-term Members of Parliament. I do not think that that stands up.
Even if the Minister is right that five-yearly reviews will not necessarily lead to the major redrawing of boundaries in every case, how can it be good for Parliament if Members of Parliament are continuously distracted by these reviews and feel that they are existing on shifting sands? I do not think that that will help them to do their job better.
The contributions that we have heard from a number of former Members of Parliament indicate that, notwithstanding what was happening, they continued to apply themselves with considerable and utmost diligence to the task in hand representing the constituents who elected them in the constituency for which they were elected at the previous election. As my noble friend Lord Maclennan said, his constituency was increased by some 25 per cent and he accommodated that. I recall the effort that he made to address the needs of those new constituents. Even under the present system, new boundaries are drawn and come into effect at a general election. Anyone who wishes to see their current MP can readily find out who he or she is if they do not know, and indeed they do so. At an election they will know who the candidates are and will choose how to cast their votes. The two matters are separate for electors. As I indicated, the important principle here is fairness to electors. On that basis, I encourage the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
I have no hesitation in welcoming such a proposal. It does not run counter to the other data matching that we are proposing or the roadshows on individual registration. I am sure that the very constructive suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, will be taken into account.
My noble friend Lord Rooker makes an excellent point. Will the Minister be kind enough to tell the House what view the Government take as to the likelihood of sufficient resources being available to electoral registration officers in local authorities?
As I have said, we are committed to undertaking the pilot schemes and, if they have proved their worth, rolling them out. I would not make that commitment unless we believed that the resources were there to do that.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord rightly reminds me that I am speaking on behalf of the coalition Government, and I reiterate that we have not done any political modelling on the possible political outcome of a House of Commons of 600.
I am not sure that I will ever be able to answer all the points.
The noble and learned Lord has dismissed suggestions as to why the Government might have alighted on the figure of 600 parliamentary constituencies. He has explained why they did not make that choice, but what is the rationale for that figure?
I thank the noble Lord for that question, because he has illustrated that if he had not intervened I might have reached that point by now. I hope noble Lords will allow me to answer that important point, which was made by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. I hope to respond to these points as we proceed.
The noble Lord, Lord Wills, has made an ambitious attempt to balance the effect of almost every electoral procedure against every other one. His amendment asks us to wait longer to turn the Bill from a Bill that is workable and achievable into a deeply analysed but almost impossible one that would then have to be taken forward. As I have said, our objectives are clear and we believe that they are attainable. We want one elector to have one vote throughout the United Kingdom. By contrast, the amendment promises a comprehensive overhaul of the whole system that we are considering, including the maintenance of the union and the relationship between the two Houses of Parliament that might produce a magic number of electors and the optimum constituency size.
The current rules by which the Boundary Commission carries out its work have not been considered by a committee since the 1940s. They have been changed on a number of occasions since then by the decision of Parliament through legislation. There is a clear precedent for adjusting boundary rules in the light of experience. The changes have included important elements, such as a longer period of reviews of 10 to 15 years rather than three to seven years. It was right for a Speaker’s Conference to determine the basis for boundary reviews when that happened for the first time back in the 1940s. When the Boundary Commission has asked in its reports for the rules to be made more coherent, Parliament has not asked a conference, a committee or an inquiry to consider what an independent—I stress independent—Boundary Commission has asked for. It is right for the debate to take place in Parliament. Even the 1944 Speaker’s Conference recommended that electoral equality across the constituencies of the United Kingdom should be an overriding principle. We should allow the Boundary Commission to commence that work without delay.
On Second Reading my noble friend noted the dangers of a perfectionist approach, which perhaps is the approach summed up in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, when he said:
“The Bill is not a panacea. It is not some holy grail in the scripture of political re-engagement, but it is a good start”.—[Official Report, 15/11/10; col. 594.].
Again I say to noble Lords opposite that it is a great pity they did not start the process when they were given such a long opportunity to do so. The point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, that there is no perfection of fairness; one person’s fairness may be seen as another’s unfairness. I believe that the Bill, by establishing one vote of equal value across the country, goes a long way to getting a better perception and reality of fairness. I would add that the British Academy report found that the new rules set out in the Bill,
“are a very substantial improvement on those currently implemented”,
and that,
“they have a clear hierarchy and are not contradictory”.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked how the figure of 600 was reached. We have never suggested that there was anything magical or ideal about a House of Commons of 600 any more than the current size of 650 is ideal. It is flawed legislation that has allowed the size of the House of Commons to creep up over time.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am only indicating that it could be a circumstance in which the Electoral Commission may take that view. All the problems that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, identified may well have been addressed, but there may be a recalcitrant council somewhere in the country which, for one reason or another, has not done that.
I remind the Committee that electoral registration officers are under a statutory duty to compile and maintain comprehensive and accurate electoral registers. It is not as if it is a voluntary activity; there is an obligation on local authorities to compile as best they can comprehensive and accurate electoral registers. As was commented on earlier, the Electoral Commission’s report on performance standards for electoral registration officers in Great Britain, published in March, showed that just under 96 per cent of electoral registration officers met the completeness and accuracy of electoral registration records standard this year.
I salute what Glasgow has done—the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, mentioned this—and that should be the model. It is important that we have as accurate and comprehensive registers as possible. It is worth reminding the Committee that another report of the Electoral Commission, The Completeness and Accuracy of Electoral Registers in Great Britain, also published in March, stated that the UK’s registration rate of 91 to 92 per cent compared well with other countries. I am sure that that touches on the question of notional registration, which I am sure we will debate further when we come to Amendment 89C—I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for advance notice of it. The 91 to 92 per cent figure for completeness is derived from the 2000 census, but it is an approximate measure. It could not form the basis of a boundary review as it does not provide sufficiently robust data to give confidence for something such as a boundary review. However, I take the noble Lord’s point and I shall carefully look at his amendment before we come to debate it.
Is the noble and learned Lord saying that this reforming Government are really satisfied that the present condition of electoral registers will do, that they are as complete and accurate as they need to be, and that it is therefore perfectly acceptable to go ahead with the boundary reforms on the timescale that is written into the Bill? Is he really saying that we can be complacent and be satisfied with the state of affairs that we have at the moment, particularly in the light of what my noble friend said about Bradford?
I am rather disappointed because I have tried my best to listen to what noble Lords have said, and I rather regret that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, did not listen to me at the very outset when I said that I hoped that there was common ground in our not being satisfied that people who are eligible to be on the electoral roll are not. That should concern noble Lords in all parts of the Chamber. I apologise if I did not make that clear enough to the noble Lord.
Is the Minister saying that he is happy for the legislation to proceed on the basis of the present condition of electoral registers?
I am saying that I do not believe that it is an either/or. The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, mentioned the previous Labour Government. I think it is fair to say that 3.5 million people have not suddenly disappeared from the electoral register since 5 May 2010. Indeed, the figures which the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, gave related to mid-2008. It is a problem that occurred under the previous Administration; it is a problem which we must address. It is not as if we are sitting back; we are being far from complacent. The noble Lord, Lord Soley, said that there should be some leadership. I indicate to him and to the Committee that a pilot will be launched for local authorities to compare the electoral register against public databases to identify people who are not currently on the register.
There are other things, such as the door-to-door canvass, which has been referred to, and the importance of going back to contact people who have not responded, which there is an obligation to do. It is important that councils use their own data, such as council tax data. Some do and I understand that some do not, but it is important that they use that data. There ought to be other data. We are looking at using public databases to identify people not currently on the register—for example, the national insurance and DVLA databases. Those are the pilots that we want to set up.
(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberThis is the third time the noble and learned Lord has put forward the claim that the coalition exists to provide stability for this country. Why, then, this Maoist approach to the British constitution?
As I do not recognise the allegation that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, has made, I am not really in a position to answer. The noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has identified that these two are linked together. He went on to argue that it was not the Liberal Democrats who got the better of the deal. He made the point that if there is a no vote in the referendum, the boundary proposals still go through. If there was a no vote—as I hope not, and our parties in the collation are agreed about what the outcome of the referendum should be—as a Liberal Democrat, I do not think I could ignore the view of the people. It would be wrong. If the people vote no, I expect that my colleagues will accept it.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a point about fairness and the equality of constituencies. He said that that is a Conservative principle, and I am sure he would claim that it is not unique to the Conservative Party because the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, endorsed it, and I have no difficulty in accepting that as a principle. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord McNally has said on a number of occasions, this Bill is about fair votes and fair boundaries. It shows that the two are, in fact, linked. It shows how the two will be linked because it will shape the way in which the other place will be elected in 2015.
I recall very clearly that when we discussed this in the debate on the Motion tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on hybridity, the very clear advice we got from the Clerk was that there was no issue of hybridity, which is the other side of the same coin to which the noble Lord, Lord Soley, was referring.
I appreciate the Minister’s courtesy to me and to the House as a whole. He just said that he personally believes in the principle of numerical equality between constituencies. As the former Member of Parliament for Orkney and Shetland, does he now hold that that principle ought to apply to Orkney and Shetland and that they should be subordinated to it?
For good reasons, which the Bill addresses, there are exceptions. There are only two, and I do not want to take up the time of the House, although we will, no doubt, have plenty of opportunity at a later stage to explain why in these two limited cases, which by any stretch of anyone’s imagination are different from any other part of the United Kingdom, an exception has to be made. Two out of 600 does not really depart from the principle of fairness that I illustrated.