Superannuation Bill
Debate between Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Baroness Drake
Baroness Drake
If I might concur with my noble friend Lord McKenzie, given a sunrise provision with a life of three years and a reading of the amendment which seems to suggest that there can be unlimited occasions on which it can be extended, that does not seem much of a concession—if I may presume, having not been in Grand Committee before. Even listening to the Minister’s argument that there is a need for a fallback position, surely that is still taking the need for it to an extreme extent, because if there were to be a human rights challenge from one or more of the unions I am sure that it would manifest itself very quickly. I cannot see them waiting indefinitely or until thousands of people are made redundant before they would make such a challenge.
I remain extremely concerned that this seems a very open-ended provision, even allowing for the argument put about the need for the Government to have a fallback position in the event of a legal challenge. If I were a trade union negotiator, I would feel very anxious about the integrity of the negotiating process on an ongoing basis if there were such an unlimited sunrise provision.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My Lords, there were two questions which I will take. One was the question that was rightly raised—I thank the noble Lord for reminding me—of scrutiny only by the other place. The second is on the justification for three years, which might be extended.
On the first, noble Lords will recall that there was some debate in the other place on whether this should be considered a money Bill, because it involves public expenditure. The justification for scrutiny only by the other House is that changes made by order under the Bill could have a direct impact on public expenditure, for example by changing the level of the caps as provided for under Clause 2 or by reviving the powers to impose caps under Clause 2 using the powers in Clause 3(4). These seem to the Government to attract Commons financial privilege. It is therefore entirely defensible for the Bill to have been drafted to allow scrutiny of these delegated powers in that House and not this one.
On the three-year time limit, it is not simply a question of when a judicial or a legal challenge might be mounted; it is a question of how long it might take for a process of appeal—for a legal challenge—to be worked through. I am sure that noble Lords who have been involved in trade union negotiations will recall how lengthy litigation can be as one moves from lower courts to higher courts and, when human rights considerations are at stake, even occasionally appealing to the European Court of Human Rights. The only reason why the three years is there—and why there is a permissible clause for extension by order each time, which has to be laid before the House for six months at a time—is for the extreme case that such successive appeals might be taken in an extended judicial process to try to prevent a compensation scheme being implemented.
I am willing to take this back to see whether it is possible to squeeze the three-year extension any further, but we are playing, as we can, with making the workable scheme possible. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord may be willing to accept the government amendments as they stand.