UK-US Trade Deal Negotiating Objectives

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I agree with my noble friend that the Asian market is very important. I mentioned Japan earlier, which he will know is very much on the agenda. There is, of course, more to do in Asia, but I go back to the statistic that I gave earlier: we intend, over the next three years, to cover 80% of our trade deals. That, I would argue, is a very good start. It is right that we are starting not just with the EU but also with the US. It is on the basis that the US, clearly, is on our side: it wants to secure a deal as well.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I must comment on the comparative tone of the two Statements we have had on the negotiations with the European Union and the United States. The announcement on the relations with the EU insisted several times that we expected the European Union to treat us as a sovereign equal. Can the Minister assure us that we will similarly expect the United States to treat us as a sovereign equal? The phrasing was, instead, that the United States is our closest ally, which I think is code for saying, “We expect them to be nice to us because they like us.” Is it not more likely that, in trade issues, the United States will be as transactional as the European Union is likely to be? I remember during a conference on transatlantic trade some years ago a Democratic Congressman saying to me, “People of my district are entirely in favour of free trade provided they do not have to accept any more imports”. That is the problem right there.

One of the biggest consultations on future trade relations for Britain was the balance of competences exercise during the coalition on the relations between the UK and the EU. The overwhelming sense from the returns, including those from the Scotch Whisky Association, whose director at that point was David Frost, was that the balance of competences between the EU and the UK suited our industry and our services very well. The Conservative part of the coalition, by and large, wished to ignore that consultation and carry on.

I also note that on digital regulation, we now

“have the opportunity to help shape global rules through ambitious digital trade provisions.”

That means we clearly expect to share in shaping US regulations in the way that we do not think we can in the EU. Can the noble Lord explain that contradiction?