Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Lord Waddington Excerpts

Wednesday 15th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

My Lords, I shall be brief because the argument I would have made has just been expressed much more clearly than I could have done, thanks to the legal wisdom of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. He referred to my concerns and suspicions about the use of the generic term “an Act” rather than a straightforward reference to the 1972 Act. I am concerned that there might be some sort of dog whistle motive here in that there could be an indication, for those who wish to hear it, that we might be able to disapply a particular future Act if we were to choose to dislike it. I am sure that that was not the Government’s motive. I share the scepticism of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about whether that could be the motivation, because it would be completely misleading.

Directly applicable EU laws apply in this country for as long as we do not repeal the 1972 Act. The converse is the case, of course, as the noble and learned Lord has explained. It all hangs on the 1972 Act. The present clause even refers to the definitions in the 1972 Act, so if we repealed that Act, all directly applicable laws would cease to have effect in this country and we would be leaving the European Union. Why do we not just say that?

In my heart, I would like to have no Clause 18 because in principle I do not like declaratory clauses. My head tells me that we cannot get rid of it and therefore we have to get it right. That is the case for Amendment 33.

[Lord Waddington]

There is just one little matter that puzzles me and I would be very grateful for my noble and learned friend’s help on it. If Amendment 32B is read along with Amendment 33, it seems to suggest that Amendment 33 covers all the ground in Clause 18 but merely puts it better. In fact, Amendment 33 does not address one of the matters which Clause 18 seeks to address; that is, the suggestion that EU law may be binding on us quite irrespective of any Act of Parliament. I wonder what my noble and learned friend’s answer is to that, because I do not think that his Amendment 33 covers one of the matters which Clause 18 seeks to address. The argument advanced by counsel in the metric martyrs case suggested that EU law was binding on this country quite apart from any Act of this Parliament.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I have added my name to the amendment. When I was young and at the Bar I remember that there was a High Court judge all of whose judgments were two words: “I agree”. I shall do my best to follow that admirable example as I agree with the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I want to add a couple of things. First, paragraph 114 of the Explanatory Notes refers to a case that I was in more than 30 years ago, Macarthys Ltd v Smith, in which Lord Denning set out the exact position recited in that paragraph. The Explanatory Notes recite:

“As Lord Denning noted in the case of Macarthys Ltd v. Smith … ‘Community law is part of our law by our own statute, the European Communities Act 1972. Community law is now part of our law: and whenever there is any inconsistency, Community law has priority. It is not supplanting English law. It is part of our law which overrides any other part which is inconsistent with it.’”

That is exactly what this amendment puts into statutory language. The 1972 Act, the brilliant Act, if I may say so in his presence, introduced by my noble and learned friend Lord Howe of Aberavon, is the organic Act. That Act is the parent. It is that Act which made sure that the binding force of European Community law would not be directly as a result of judgments of the Luxembourg Court but would be directly as a result of the Geoffrey Howe Act. That is what is said here. To recite further Acts which have come in afterwards by way of a list, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has indicated, is inappropriate.

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

It seems a long time since we discussed Clause 18 at Second Reading and in Committee. I would recall that it is only tenuously linked to the referendum lock clauses. It has been described as the parliamentary sovereignty clause, but it is perhaps best described, as in the words of the Bill, as a clause on the “status of EU law”. It is a declaratory provision which confirms—it does not establish—that directly applicable or directly effective EU law takes effect in the UK only as a result of an Act of Parliament. Some people do not like declaratory provisions in legislation, but the Government may certainly propose such a clause if they think it has importance in maintaining public confidence by confirming, for the first time in statute, our existing treatment of EU law within the UK’s domestic legal order. It is consistent with the decisions of our courts, notably by Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd v Smith in 1979.

Amendment 32B has not been moved, so Clause 18 is in the Bill and we have a choice between the Government’s text and the revised text proposed in Amendment 33, which refers specifically to the European Communities Act 1972 rather than to an Act of Parliament. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill state that the words,

“by virtue of an Act of Parliament”,

cover UK subordinate legislation made under Acts and also Acts and measures of the devolved legislatures in exercise of the powers conferred on them by the relevant UK primary legislation.

That is the description, but will the Minister say—this is the same point that has been broadly covered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay— whether that is the specific reason why these words were chosen in the Government’s text? As everything seems to come back to the European Communities Act 1972, would the reference to that Act in the text of the amendments not also cover subordinate legislation and Acts of the devolved legislatures? That is what has been stated and I should like the Government to confirm whether that is the case.

[Lord Waddington]

Before my noble friend sits down, does he not agree that however elegant may be the language of Amendment 33 and although it states clearly that EU law is binding in this country because of the 1972 Act, it does not scotch the proposition that EU law may be binding for other reasons. That is surely the point. It says only that EU law is binding because of that because we know it. What we want to be sure of is that the argument that EU law may be binding other than for that reason is not allowed to fly.

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

I do not agree with that. I think that the point is fully covered by the declaratory provision that the Government have put forward and the possible amendment of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Waddington]

My Lords, as usual, my noble friend Lady Falkner hit the nail absolutely on the head. One effect of the amendment would be that at every general election all parties would be asked to pledge themselves to revive the Act. That is the effect of this amendment. They will so pledge, at their peril, because, make no mistake about it, this Bill will be popular with the public as the public want more say over what is happening in Europe. The public are fed up with Parliament ceding more and more powers to Europe without any consent from the people whatever.

The only difficulty is that there will be a period at the beginning of each Parliament when the Act will not operate. That could cause difficulties and it will certainly not increase confidence in British Governments’ handling of European matters. I would have thought that that was one of the most important matters with which we are concerned in this legislation. We want to increase confidence and not destroy it. I cannot imagine anything more likely to destroy confidence than having a period at the beginning of each Parliament when the safeguard for the British people did not operate. In practice, of course, it will not happen because every single party, as a matter of self-preservation, will say, “Of course we will renew the Act”.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, I would like to follow the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, because he has been correct in what he indicated. In debates in this House, we have had a great deal of speculation because we live in a world where we cannot be sure what the future will look like. Increasingly, that is the kind of world in which we live. The noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, who has profound experience, having been, for many years, the chairman of the European scrutiny committee, is absolutely correct in what he says. We are passing legislation which is likely to be tested by coming events in future years and yet we are doing it without giving ourselves any provision for insisting on a review of what we do over the next decade or so.

I shall mention one or two of the speculations that we have discussed in these debates and not agreed upon. One is the proposition which has been advanced on several occasions by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Hannay, which is about the possibility that our representatives in Brussels ministerial meetings will find it extremely difficult to support even those things that they profoundly and sincerely believe are in the British national interest because of a fear of setting off a referendum. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, may be right in that and he may be wrong, but the only way to find that out is by experience over the next few years.

Secondly, there has been a great deal of speculation about whether there will be major new issues that might require an amendment to the treaties. Curiously, the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, hinted at one such when he talked about the possible major revisions of the European Union Stability Pact. Of course, that applies only to eurozone countries, but anyone who believes that it will have no implications for the United Kingdom must be living in a world a very long way away from the global financial world of which we are a part today.

We are talking about speculations, but that does not mean that we should not pass Acts of Parliament; it means that the case for looking at them and requiring them to be looked at is extraordinarily strong, and stronger than the case for almost any other kind of legislation that one can think of. I differ a little from the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, much as I respect him, because I can think of quite a few bits of legislation, with domestic implications, that would have gained from a sunset clause. There are one or two pieces of legislation all of us today would be only too happy to have seen off the statute book if there had been an opportunity to revisit them, which there so rarely is.

My next point is with regard to the coalition agreement. On this, I address specifically my friends in the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties. The coalition agreement, in its wisdom, made it absolutely clear that we should be willing to accept a referendum lock on major amendments to treaties. That is what it says. The major amendments to treaties that we talked about in these meetings, and here in debates in the House of Lords, have ranged from changes to the Schengen agreement, changes to the original euro agreement, and changes that might introduce a common foreign policy or a common defence policy. I freely admit that in this Chamber, we are all agreed—I congratulate the Government on persuading us on this—that there should indeed be a referendum lock on this limited number of crucial issues.

It is also clear that many Members of this Chamber are profoundly concerned, as my noble friend, Lord Taverne, pointed out, about the thought that that group of very tightly disciplined and described referenda might drift into a general practice of referenda of a kind that will destroy parliamentary government; to put it in a non-abstruse phrase: adding a kind of Berlusconi sauce to the solid pasta of British parliamentary practice. I, for one, would be most reluctant to go along that track. My noble friend Lady Falkner is quite right to draw our attention to that, but at no point does the coalition agreement come to terms with the idea that now we will be imposing every change in the passerelles to a referendum—not just an Act of Parliament but a referendum. No one in the coalition is obliged to support that because it is not part of what was agreed in that original agreement.

My third and final point is precisely the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, and my noble friend Lady Falkner and I take exactly the opposite view. It seems to me that one of the great advantages of proposing that there should be a review at the beginning of each Parliament is exactly that that will drive the debate back in the general election itself. What more democratic a structure could one choose to find, one where people would be likely to vote, likely to show an interest, likely to debate the issues before them in television, radio and in the street, than a general election? There is the fact that we would have to agree this legislation again at the beginning of each Parliament, in its very simple and short way, as has been pointed out—the statutory instrument agreed by both Houses. It would take no more than 24 hours, if one wanted to do it that way. The essential point is that no more democratic a process could be found than a general election, in which we should reach a decision on whether we want to continue with this legislation. That is far better than suddenly plucking a referendum out of the air at some point in the Parliament, when most people would be interested in other things and its salience would be low.

So on the grounds of the speculative basis on which we are passing this legislation, of extension of referenda far beyond what our Parliament would want to see and of forcing the general elections to take on a major debate of our relationship with Europe and all the trust that would flow from an election result, I believe that the case for a sunrise and sunshine amendment—I say sunshine deliberately—could not be better argued. I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and his colleagues.