House of Lords Reform

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to participate in this important and timely debate. I am not sure whether I am at an advantage or a disadvantage, but I do not have the sense of déjà vu that the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, just commented on, alongside a number of other noble Lords. This is my first debate on Lords reform.

Many of today’s interventions, and many comments in the public sphere, focus on the size of the House. I accept that size is an important question and that, in particular, our size relative to the other place may contribute to negative perceptions. However, we should not allow perceptions to take over reality, and we should not lose sight of what that reality is. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, put it, we are a full-time House made up of part-time Members. Moreover, the fact that we have careers outside the House is crucial to our ability to discharge our core constitutional function, which is to provide supervision and scrutiny through expertise and experience. So yes, there seems to be a public perception about there being too many of us, but let us not frame the debate about Lords reform in a way that amplifies that perception. Let us not accept it, at least without some context, and certainly let us avoid the pejorative comparisons that are often made.

There is a separate question that is even more important than size. How far can a Government go in changing the composition of the House without undermining its legitimacy? In theory, there are no set limits to the number of new Peers that a Prime Minister can appoint; by the same theory, a new Government could come in and fundamentally alter the composition of the House. Lloyd George famously threatened to do so. If that threat ever came to pass, this House would lose its legitimacy almost immediately.

The British constitution has various examples of things that can happen in theory but just do not happen in practice, of powers that are subject to few or almost no limits in theory, but that are in practice limited by constitutional conventions, political self-restraint and past practice—even where that past practice does not have the legal force of a binding precedent.

Using the very helpful data dashboard produced by the Library, I had a look at the most recent practice. In the 1990s, the average number of peerages created per year was 34. In the 2000s, it was 24. It was 31 in the 2010s and in the current decade it is so far 38. I am one of the beneficiaries of the largesse of this decade. Prime Minister Blair appointed about 36 Peers per year. Prime Minister Cameron appointed about 39 per year, and Prime Minister Johnson appointed about 35 per year. If one factors in the size of the House, which of course varied under these premierships, the average impact ratio—if we can call it that—of each of these PMs on the composition of the House ranged from 3% to 5% a year. Of course there were years, typically at the beginning of a Parliament, where most of the appointments would have been made.

The decision that had the biggest impact on the composition of the House was the removal of the hereditary Peers in the first term of the Blair Government, but that removal, as we have heard, was not done unilaterally by the Government of the day. There was a compromise to ensure wider political support. This suggests that it would be very unwise for the Government to dig in their heels on the hereditary Peers Bill without seeking to secure all-party support and without striking some compromise.

It is not difficult to see what that compromise might look like. The noble Lord, Lord Jay, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Newby, alluded to the possibility of at least some hereditary peerages being transformed into life peerages. There was also considerable support—perhaps even overwhelming support—for the proposals contained in the Burns report and the proposals made by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. Why not build on that consensus?

What must be avoided is a situation in which the expulsion of 92 Peers is done in a fractious way and is followed by the appointment of very large numbers of new Peers, perhaps also in order to fill the vacuum created by the introduction of a retirement age. If this is the direction of travel, I am afraid that any improvement in public perception deriving from a reduction in size would be far outweighed by the perception that our composition has been so fundamentally altered by one Government that we can no longer be credible as a Chamber of wise and independent counsel and scrutiny.

Sudan

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Friday 13th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, for tabling this debate and for his insightful remarks in opening it. I welcome the appointment of a UK special envoy on Sudan.

Based on various reports, the UN’s position is that the consent of the Sudanese Government is required for the delivery of humanitarian relief to Sudan, including to parts of Sudan not controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces. The same position was taken in the Syrian context, where the UN and some humanitarian organisations said that the consent of the Assad regime was a legal prerequisite for humanitarian supplies. Together with other international legal experts and practitioners, including Judge Richard Goldstone, former judge Bruno Simma and former president of the ECHR Sir Nicolas Bratza, I was a signatory of a letter which explained why this position is not correct as a matter of law and that cross-border humanitarian aid into Syria in that case is lawful, even without the consent of the host Government.

There are of course policy or operational reasons that may require humanitarian agencies to co-ordinate with the authorities that are in effective control of a particular area and sometimes with the officially recognised Government, even if it is not in control of that area. However, the position that consent is legally required is fundamentally misconceived and has a very practical impact on the ground.

The Human Rights Watch briefing that we all received says that both parties—but particularly the SAF—are responsible for wilfully obstructing aid, including to areas controlled by the RSF. Professor de Waal, who was referred to earlier and with whom I had a very informative exchange before the debate, estimates that 90% of the hungriest people in Sudan are in areas controlled by the RSF. Of course, if SAF consent is required, all it needs to do to obstruct aid to those areas is to say no.

The Minister mentioned that the SAF is being urged to remove all restrictions on aid, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, said, more is needed. The SAF is under an obligation to facilitate humanitarian relief. If it does not comply with that obligation, sanctions should be imposed.

Britain, under different Governments—Labour to coalition to Conservative—supported the more controversial principle that it is permissible in some cases to use military force to alleviate humanitarian suffering. That was the legal basis on which we relied for the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. It would be inconsistent with that settled position that different Governments have taken if the view were now taken that the peaceful provision of humanitarian assistance always requires the consent of the host state.

Can the Minister please confirm that the position of the British Government remains that in the extreme circumstances of humanitarian suffering that we are seeing in Sudan, international law does not require the consent of the host Government to the peaceful provision of essential humanitarian assistance by the UN and other international humanitarian agencies? Can he also reassure the House that the Government will advocate this position robustly at the UN, including in two weeks from now, when General al-Burhan is expected in New York?

I too echo the various comments made on the significant shortfall that has arisen on the UN Sudan appeal. It should also be noted that the appeal is seeking only $2.7 billion for Sudan for 2024. That sum is grossly inadequate. By comparison, the appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territories is $3.4 billion. Of course, it is a very dramatic situation in Gaza, too, but Sudan is a much bigger area with a bigger population. If one looks at the IPC map of that region, one sees that Sudan is surrounded by countries that are themselves in extreme food crisis or food emergency—so classified as 3 or 4 on the IPC scale. Unless a much larger operation is mounted—something similar to Operation Lifeline Sudan in the 1990s—the situation will get much worse and the predictions being made of millions of people losing their lives will, tragically, come to pass. Can the Minister please tell us whether the Government agree that a much bigger operation is needed, and inform us on what steps the Government propose to take to support the development of a large-scale civilian protection operation?

Finally, I refer to the role of the UAE in this conflict —a number of noble Lords have made similar points, including the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Bellingham, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds.

The UN panel of experts reported in January 2024 that the RSF has managed to upgrade its weaponry to include drones and anti-aircraft weapons. Human Rights Watch has referred to various reports of deliveries by the UAE of weapons to the RSF via Chad. The panel found reports of UAE deliveries to the RSF to be credible. In the light of that, it is important for us to know what assessment the Government make of those very serious allegations against the UAE, which is obviously a partner of the UK. If the UAE is delivering weapons, in breach of an embargo, to the RSF, an organisation which is responsible for some of the gravest violations of IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities, this would be a very serious development and one which I imagine would have an impact on decisions on arms exports from the UK to the UAE. Will the Government update the House on their latest assessment of that situation, and of the role of the UAE in providing support to the RSF?

On a final note, I noticed that the portfolio of the Minister’s predecessor as Minister for Africa included north Africa and the Middle East. That allocation of responsibility made a lot of sense in the context of the Sudan crisis, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, brought into sharp relief. The Horn of Africa and Sudan are becoming geopolitically part of the wider Middle East. One solution would be for the Minister’s portfolio to be expanded. If that cannot be arranged, does he agree that it is crucial for the Middle East to be very much part of the diplomatic efforts on Sudan? There is simply no solution to this crisis that does not involve Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.