Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Livermore

Report stage
Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, this large group includes a number of the Government’s proposed amendments to the Bill. I begin by responding to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which is intended to ensure that there is transparency about the Bank’s use of the new mechanism. It does this by creating a requirement for the Bank to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within 28 days on certain matters where a recapitalisation payment is made, and for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay these reports in Parliament.

I assure noble Lords that the Government recognise absolutely the importance of transparency and accountability regarding the new mechanism and appreciate the strength of feeling in the House. The debates at Second Reading and in Committee were helpful and constructive and have informed the Government’s approach. The Government therefore agree that there should be an explicit requirement for the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor when it uses the new mechanism. To that end, government Amendment 8 means that the Bank of England must report to the Chancellor about the use of the mechanism in any circumstances where it is used.

The Government’s amendment outlines two elements to reporting. First, it would require the Bank of England to produce a final report at a time to be specified by the Treasury. This is intended to be a comprehensive account of the use of the new mechanism and to include an assessment of the relative costs to insolvency. Secondly, the amendment would require the Bank to provide an interim report within three months of using the mechanism in the event that a final report has not been provided within that time. This would ensure a prompt initial public justification for the use of the new mechanism, even if further details would follow later.

Government Amendment 14 would require the code of practice to include guidance on what should be included in the reports. Taking these points together, the Government’s approach has a broadly similar intent to that of the noble Lord’s amendment. However, there are some points of detail where the Government have taken a different approach in order to avoid unintended consequences. In particular, while recognising the importance of clear reporting arrangements, the Government believe that it is critical that the timing and content of any reports do not complicate a successful resolution.

I would highlight two challenges with the approach set out in Amendment 5 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government believe that requiring an initial report as soon as 28 days after using the mechanism is likely to be too soon. As noble Lords know, the complexity of firm failures mean that they may not always be fully resolved within a short period of time. This is particularly the case when using the bridge bank tool, which is anticipated to be an interim step before an eventual sale. It is possible that a resolution process remains ongoing 28 days following a firm failure. It is therefore important that sufficient time is allowed so that the Bank can focus on its primary function of maintaining financial stability through managing the failure of the firm, before turning to the process of reporting. The Government therefore believe that providing an interim report within three months is a more proportionate approach to take, allowing the Bank more time to ensure that an interim report is as meaningful as possible while still ensuring that the Chancellor and Parliament are updated on use of the mechanism in short order.

This takes me to my second point, which is that disclosing certain information too early in the resolution process, especially information relating to the relative costs of different options such as insolvency, risks complicating a resolution because such information is either incomplete or highly sensitive. Regarding the noble Lord’s proposal to require an initial report to disclose certain costs, it is worth noting that when conducting the resolution conditions assessment, the Bank of England would make an assessment of the costs that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may incur if the firm was placed into insolvency. However, by virtue of necessity, this would be only an initial assessment based on the information available at the time. It is therefore important that the Bank of England’s assessment of relative costs is reported on only once the resolution is fully complete. This will ensure that the Treasury, Parliament and industry are provided with a comprehensive and accurate account.

In addition, if the firm was in a bridge bank, as it may well be after just 28 days, the early disclosure of this interim financial information could complicate negotiations regarding a sale, especially if it was subsequently revised. It may also be market sensitive and increase speculation about the failed firm during a period of heightened sensitivity. Ultimately, therefore, the Government see risks in requiring the Bank to report too early and in too much detail during a highly unpredictable and sensitive situation. This is in part why the existing reporting provisions within the Banking Act in relation to resolution require reports as soon as reasonably practicable only after a year has passed.

The Government have sought to reconcile these different issues in our proposed amendment, while recognising the important substantive point of principle raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government have proposed an interim report to be provided within three months. While it is possible that a resolution process may not have concluded by this point, as the FSCS is likely to levy firms within this timeframe, it seems reasonable to expect the Bank to provide a public justification of the decision to use the new mechanism by this point. I note that, alongside the notification requirement covered in government Amendment 10, which I will turn to shortly, this will ensure that the Treasury and Parliament have a prompt explanation of why resolution has been undertaken.

Secondly, the Government’s amendment means that the Bank of England must provide a separate final report, in the event that this has not already been provided within three months of using the mechanism. This final report is where the Bank would outline its assessment of the relative costs of different options. This reflects the points that I have already made, namely that the Government believe that the key reporting obligation should fall once the resolution process has concluded. This reduces the risk that disclosure frustrates that process and ensures that any report can be meaningful.

To support this approach, the Government have also tabled an amendment requiring guidance on the content of such reports to be included in the code of practice. This will ensure that there is clear public understanding of the key issues that any interim or final report is expected to cover. As I have noted, both interim and final reports would be expected to provide a justification for the use of the mechanism, and as set out in the current draft of the code of practice, the final report would need to set out an assessment of the costs if the firm had entered insolvency. The current draft updates to the code of practice also make clear that the Government expect to require the Bank of England to provide an explanation of why ancillary costs were considered reasonable and prudent.

I am grateful for the helpful engagement that I have had with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who has rightly emphasised the importance of the Bank of England providing a comparison of the expected and actual costs in its final reports. I am happy to reassure the noble Lord that the Government intend to request that the Bank of England include this in final reports and will ensure that the final updates to the code of practice reflect this.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has also tabled Amendment 9 to require the Bank to produce a report three months after the resolved firm has been sold or otherwise closed. I understand that the intent of this similarly reflects a desire to ensure that the Bank of England is compelled to report after a resolution process has fully concluded and provide an assessment of how the expected impacts of its actions compared to the actual events that took place in resolution. The Government of course appreciate the importance of the Bank of England reporting promptly. Reflecting on the noble Lord’s proposal, the Government intend to further update the code of practice to make clear that, where feasible and appropriate, the Treasury would expect the Bank of England to report soon after the sale or closure of the resolved firm.

The Government believe that it would be preferable not to put this expectation into legislation. This reflects the point I have already made: that the Bank of England should be required to provide final reports with the more detailed assessments only at the appropriate moment. While the Government do expect, as I have said, the Bank of England to be in the position to report soon after the end of the resolution process, this cannot always be guaranteed. For example, in the case of selling a firm, it may not have been possible in all cases to complete the full post-resolution independent valuation process within three months of a sale. I believe the Government’s approach still captures the intent of the noble Lord’s amendment, which is to ensure that full reports following the conclusion of a resolution process are presented expediently, with some discretion for the Treasury to ensure that reports are still provided only at the right moment.

I hope that, taken together, the Government’s amendments address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and the content of reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the specific additional point raised by the noble Lord’s Amendment 9, I agree of course with his intention and I will be happy to update the code of practice to this effect. However, the Government believe it would be preferable not to put this into legislation. I would be happy to consider this matter further and discuss it with my honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, but I cannot give any firm additional commitments at this stage.

Turning to government Amendment 10, on notifying Parliament when using the power, I note that both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the Government tabled similar amendments on the theme of parliamentary scrutiny. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this issue and for her engagement on the matter; I am especially grateful to her for agreeing to withdraw her original amendment. The Government’s amendment reflects the point made by noble Lords in Grand Committee concerning parliamentary notification and the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House as a result of passing the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.

Building on that innovation in parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, the Government’s amendment seeks to harness the role played by that committee, as well as the Treasury Select Committee. It requires the Bank of England to notify the chairs of both committees as soon as reasonably practicable after the new mechanism under the Bill has been used. It includes provisions to future-proof this requirement following use of the new mechanism, such that if the names or functions of those committees change, the requirement for the Bank of England to notify the relevant committees by which those functions are exercisable would still stand.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has rightly argued that the Government’s amendment requires some tweaking, in particular to refer to the Financial Services Regulation Committee in the House of Lords by name. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this to my attention, and I note her amendments to the Government’s amendment—Amendments 11, 12 and 13—which attempt to address this point. I am of course very happy to agree to those amendments being made.

I hope that the Government’s approach across all the issues debated in this group demonstrates that the issue of accountability to Parliament is being taken seriously, ensuring that there will be transparency in use of the new mechanism. In particular, I hope that the Government’s amendments on the new reporting requirements address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and content of the reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the basis of these points, I hope noble Lords will be able to support both the Government’s amendments and those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and the Minister for his constructive approach to it. I take on board everything he said about Amendment 5, which is why, as I have already indicated, I do not intend to push it to a vote.

However, I take issue with the Minister’s thinking it is appropriate that the relative costs of the recapitalisation process versus the insolvency process are looked at only after the event, at the very end of the process. It is quite important that we see why the Bank made decision it made at the time it made it, and that it has not reverse-engineered the results and facts to justify what it did. So I am not totally sure that I fully agree with the Minister on that point. Be that as it may, I am not going to push Amendment 5, because Amendment 8, along with the code of practice, covers most of what is needed.

However, as to Amendment 9, I am afraid that I did not hear anything particularly new there. The Minister has confirmed that his intention is that the reporting should cover the final result of the resolution process, which, as I say, could be a number of years later—but that is not what government amendment 8 says. The amendment specifically refers to

“the exercise of the power to”

recapitalise and

“the stabilisation power and stabilisation option to which”

it

“relates”.

It does not refer anywhere to what happens at the end. It is all very well saying that it might go in the code of practice and that there is an expectation that this will happen, but this is a really important issue.

We must know what actually happened, to be able to see how that compares with what we were told was going to happen, and to be able to learn the lessons arising from that. With the best will in the world, it may not be the Minister who is at the Treasury whenever this is used. I absolutely believe and trust that he would do exactly the right thing, but whoever comes next might not. It is important that this is in the Bill.

I am afraid that I intend to divide the House when the time comes, but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, seeks to give the Financial Services Compensation Scheme rights with respect to the recapitalisation payment, in the event that the firm in resolution is subsequently placed into insolvency or wound up, by then requiring it to be treated as a debt. It also seeks to grant the Financial Services Compensation Scheme super-preferred status in the creditor hierarchy with respect to that debt, enabling it to recover that claim in an insolvency process before other unsecured creditors, uncovered depositors and shareholders.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for the constructive engagement that I have had with him on this matter prior to this debate, and I am especially grateful for his time and expertise on it. I assure him that my officials and I have spent considerable time considering the concerns that he raises, and I shall set out the Government’s position.

The Government’s concern about the amendment is that it could frustrate the primary intention of the Bill to achieve recapitalisation in a way that restores financial stability and, as such, could potentially result in the resolution failing. The Government’s view is that the amendment could create uncertainty as to how such a payment would be perceived by the market when a firm was operating, rather than only in the unlikely circumstance of the firm winding up.

The effect of the amendment would be to create a shadow claim on the recapitalisation. Potential purchasers, investors and unsecured lenders to the firm would be aware that in the event of insolvency a new debt would materialise above them in the creditor hierarchy. Indeed, the shadow claim would follow the firm in perpetuity for as long as it was a going concern, even after the resolution was complete and the firm had been sold to a buyer.

It would also follow the firm even where the original shareholders and creditors were no longer involved with the business, creating a series of risks. That raises a number of potential issues. First, it could inhibit the sale of the firm in resolution. While the insolvency position would not be a primary consideration for potential buyers, it would naturally be part of the potential purchaser’s due diligence to understand the risk to its investment in a subsequent failure. That risk may be substantially greater with the existence of this debt, which may in turn impact potential interest in purchasing the firm and any purchase price.

Secondly, both while the firm was in the bridge bank and once it had been sold, current and potential future creditors and investors in the firm could be deterred from investing in and engaging with the firm for similar reasons. That would frustrate a key goal of the resolution, which is to maintain continuity. For example, uncovered depositors would have an additional incentive to withdraw deposits as they may perceive a potential risk to the seniority of their claim in insolvency. Thirdly, it could potentially undermine restoring market confidence in the resolved firm.

As a result of the issues that I have outlined, the amendment could make it more expensive to run the firm, putting it at a competitive disadvantage. It may perpetuate the circumstances that the resolution is intended to address; namely, uncertainty around how and to whom potential future losses would fall. It may also make it difficult to secure the agreement of directors, who may not be comfortable running a firm under such a shadow while it was in a bridge bank.

In addition, existing legislation means that instruments may currently be classified only as common equity tier 1, the highest form of capital, if they are not subject to any arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that enhances the seniority of claims in insolvency or liquidation. The noble Lord’s amendment would mean that a capital injection arising from a recapitalisation payment under the Bill may not count as the highest form of capital, as it creates a seniorised claim for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in the event of a subsequent insolvency. That brings into doubt whether it would have the desired effect of restoring market confidence in the firm.

Overall, the effect of granting the Financial Services Compensation Scheme a super-preferred claim over the recapitalisation payment, even if only at the point of insolvency, would be to increase the risk of the resolution not achieving its objectives. Therefore, while the Government absolutely understand the noble Lord’s concerns, we have concluded, for the reasons I have outlined, that the amendment may end up doing more harm than good.

I appreciate that this is a matter that the noble Lord feels extremely strongly about, but I hope this explanation has provided some clarity over the risks attached to the amendment and that as a result he feels able to withdraw it.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this short debate. It is a fairly nerdy and technical subject, and the Minister has just described very well why it is a complicated situation. I am sorry that he was unable to say that the Government would keep it under review —to keep an eye on the situation—because there is a problem. This process could lead to creditors being preferred unreasonably over the FSCS money in some circumstances, and that is not desirable. It comes back to some of the moral hazard points that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, made earlier as well, albeit in a different context, so I am sorry that the Minister was unable to say anything on that front.

I agree with the Minister that it is complicated and that there probably are unintended consequences to my amendment. I again urge him to keep this under review and to look at whether anything might be done on it under the code of conduct. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Independent School Fees: VAT

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Livermore

Monday 21st October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

The answer to the noble Lord’s question is no, because the assumptions underlying that report are incorrect. We expect that a large number of private schools will take steps to absorb a significant proportion of this VAT liability, so the majority of that fee will not be passed through.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, 3,000 military families take advantage of the continuing education allowance and send their children to private school. In previous answers, the Minister has said that no decision will be taken on how the impact of the VAT rise will be dealt with for those families until the spending review. The Armed Forces are facing a retention crisis, as is well known. Why does the Minister think that leaving those families with this level of uncertainty is going to help with that retention?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

The core answer to the noble Lord’s question is that very many private schools will take steps to absorb a proportion, if not all, of the new VAT liability, so there may actually be no increase in fees in such circumstances, which is why it is right that we leave it until the spending review. It is worth pointing out that very many military personnel send their children to state schools and want them to benefit from the improvements that will happen in those schools.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Livermore

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am about to write to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on the matter that he raises in his Amendment 17, following a commitment that I gave on the first day in Committee. I will also happily reflect any points raised in this debate in that letter, if helpful. In the meantime, I will set out some of the content of that letter, while providing some additional clarity on the points he raises. Again, I hear the request for worked examples that we discussed on day one.

The Bill extends the role of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to include providing funds at the Bank of England’s request, which the Bank of England could then use to recapitalise the firm in question. As I have set out previously, the intention would be to achieve that recapitalisation by injecting equity into the failed firm, helping to restore it to viability. In the event that the Bank of England places the failed firm into a bridge bank, the Bank of England would become the sole shareholder for that bridge bank.

It is therefore possible that the Bank of England would receive recoveries in a subsequent winding-up of the bridge bank if all other claims were met, reflecting its position in the creditor hierarchy as a shareholder. The Bill provides for any such recoveries to be returned to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The Government consider this to be an appropriate method for dealing with funds used in a resolution and in keeping with the existing principles of the creditor hierarchy. I note four further important points.

First, by ensuring an injection of equity, it achieves the core purpose of the new mechanism, which is to restore the firm to solvency. By contrast, if such a payment were classified as debt—even if that had a more favourable ranking in the creditor hierarchy— there is a risk that it would not restore the firm to the necessary level of balance-sheet health.

Secondly, I note that the primary intention in deploying resolution tools using the new mechanism would be to sell the firm. It is therefore the Government’s expectation that a sale should be the outcome in the majority of cases, rather than placing the firm into insolvency and winding it up from a bridge bank.

Thirdly, I point out that, if the firm entered insolvency from a bridge bank and there were still eligible depositors, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme would pay compensation to those depositors and take on their position in the creditor hierarchy, as it usually does. That of course is the right approach, ensuring depositors maintain their super-preferred status in an insolvency. It is important to note that changes to the creditor hierarchy must be considered carefully to ensure there is clarity for investors and market participants as to how they would be treated in a failure scenario. Treating the funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme as a debt only at the point of winding up the firm, and not prior to that, might create uncertainty as to its interaction with insolvency law more broadly.

Finally, I note that the super-preferred status in the creditor hierarchy that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme currently enjoys in insolvency reflects a different set of objectives. In those circumstances, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme is standing in the shoes of depositors and that preferred status is seeking to protect depositors’ interests. That is different to the intent of the mechanism delivered by the Bill, which is to provide a source of resolution funding to recapitalise a failing firm.

I appreciate the Committee’s interest in what is a technical but important matter. I hope that I have been able to clarify the intent of the Bill and that the noble Lord is able to withdraw his amendment as a result.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I understand what the Minister says about the equity of the original shareholders being effectively written down to zero, but what happens with, for example, lenders who are transferred into the bridge bank? It cannot be right that they probably lose everything in the event of an insolvency situation, but if the FSCS, via the Bank of England, has injected a load of money into the failing bank and it then goes into insolvency, there is more money there and therefore those lenders will receive a share of their cash, if there is enough, which they would have lost in an insolvency situation. However, the FSCS gets nothing back because there is nothing to recoup as it has gone to the lenders. In effect, in certain circumstances the lenders to the failing bank may be bailed out by the FSCS through the Bank of England. That does not seem right to me. Those lenders took a risk in the first instance that was not predicated on being bailed out. I think there is something here that needs to be followed up. Have I got that right?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

In the letter I will write, we will set out exactly what would happen in the example that the noble Lord gives.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I thank the Minister for that explanation and look forward to receiving the letter with the details and, I hope, a detailed worked example. However, an issue remains. The principle must be that a recapitalisation of the bank by the FSCS will not, in effect, bail out the existing shareholders—which it seems it does not do—or existing creditors, with the exception of the depositors, who are protected separately. There is something that needs looking at quite carefully here. I think we will come back to this on Report, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The noble Lord has just confirmed the point that we talked about in Amendment 17, that there are situations where the use of the recapitalisation payment can, in effect, bail out some types of creditors. Indeed, he referred to unprotected deposits as being one area that might make sense. This is quite complex and I suspect that when we have seen the worked examples and so on, there is going to be more to discuss. Would he be prepared to meet with officials and Members of the Committee to go through these things prior to Report, so that we can make sure that we all really understand in what circumstances that that could happen and in what circumstances it cannot?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

Yes, absolutely; I will very happily meet. I will write a letter setting this out in greater detail, provide the worked examples, and then perhaps we can meet on that basis.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Livermore

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Just to clarify, is there anything in the Bill that changes the effect on shareholders and creditors compared with if it had been done by just the bail-in approach?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I am told that the answer to that is no.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I note that this amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is one of several concerning whether Treasury consent is needed when the Bank of England is exercising its powers—in this case, when the mechanism is used more than once for a particular institution.

Addressing the specific case of the amendment, although I think we can agree that it would usually be desirable to have to use the mechanism only once in respect of a particular institution, this may not always be the case. As an example, if a failed bank is transferred to a bridge bank, there is a risk of further deterioration in its balance sheet over time. It is foreseeable that, if that were the case, the Bank of England may need to use the mechanism again in order to recapitalise the institution; this would allow the Bank of England to maintain confidence in the firm, promoting financial stability.

The Government believe that it is important for the Bank of England to have reasonable flexibility to do so, reflecting that the full implications of a bank failure are hard to anticipate in advance. In addition, if further approvals are required, this may undermine market confidence in the original resolution action given that such approvals cannot be presumed in advance.

However, I note a few important pieces of context to this broader position. First, as required by statute, the Treasury is always consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions assessment. In practice, there is also frequent and ongoing dialogue between the authorities. Therefore, the Government are confident that there are proper and robust channels by which it could raise concerns if it had any.

Secondly, given that the new mechanism is ultimately funded by industry, we would expect the Bank of England to consult the Prudential Regulation Authority on any additional request to use the new mechanism. This is important as the Prudential Regulation Authority determines what is considered affordable to be levied on the sector in any given year.

Finally, if additional use of the mechanism had implications for public funds, such as requiring use of the National Loans Fund, provision of this additional funding would be subject to Treasury consent. Overall, the Government believe that this strikes the right balance in preserving the Bank of England’s freedom of action while ensuring the appropriate level of Treasury input into decision-making.

I hope that this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and respectfully ask that she withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The one thing the Minister did not cover there was the question of whether, on a second or subsequent recapitalisation payment, the Bank would have to look again at whether the insolvency route is the one it should go down, rather than a secondary payment.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

It would always look at the situation at the time and make each individual decision on that basis.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

It would always do so or it would always have to do so?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

It would always have to do so.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Okay.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I turn first to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which seeks to ensure consideration is given to a clawback of executive pay and bonuses from a failed firm before using the new mechanism. I note that while the bank resolution regime does not set out powers allowing the Bank of England to claw back money from shareholders or management, it does provide an extensive and proportionate set of powers to the Bank of England to impose consequences on the shareholders and management of a failed firm in resolution.

First, on placing a firm in resolution, we expect that any existing shareholder equity would be cancelled or transferred. This is an important principle that ensures the firm’s owners must bear losses in the case of failure. In many circumstances, this will affect directors and management who hold shares or other instruments of the failed firm.

In addition, the Bank of England has the power to remove or vary the contract of service of its directors or senior managers. The Bank of England exercises its discretion in deciding whether to use this power. However, as set out in the Government’s code of practice, the Bank of England generally expects to remove senior management considered responsible for the failure of the firm and to appoint new senior management as necessary.

Finally, as reflected in the code of practice, it is a key principle of the resolution regime that natural and legal persons should be made liable under the civil or criminal law in the UK for their responsibility for the failure of the institution. This is delivered by Section 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which provides for a criminal offence where a senior manager of a bank has taken a decision which caused the failure of a financial institution, if the conduct of the senior manager

“falls far below what could reasonably be expected of”

someone in their position. Overall, this ensures that, as appropriate in the circumstances, there are material consequences for shareholders and senior management when a firm goes into resolution.

More broadly, I can further reassure the noble Lord that the Government recognise the importance of high standards in financial services regulation. The senior managers and certification regime supports high standards by ensuring individual accountability for senior individuals within firms, and by promoting high standards of conduct and governance. The Prudential Regulation Authority sets rules on remuneration and applies these to medium-sized and large banks, ensuring they are proportionate, and there are clear requirements in the PRA’s rules for firms to ensure they have policies on malus and clawback in place to align management incentives with that of the bank.

I should also note the intention of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to ascertain under what circumstances the Bank of England may be able to recover all or part of remuneration to management and shareholders, or require a shareholder to cover all or part of the recapitalisation costs. If recoveries were made from management or shareholders of the failed firm, the amendment would make it clear that these types of remuneration could count towards these recoveries.

I hope I have addressed the broader point about the treatment of shareholders and former management in my earlier remarks. As a point of detail, I would add that the Government expect any recoveries not otherwise specified in the clause to be covered already by the catch-all phrase “or otherwise” at the end of proposed new subsection (2)(a). I hope that addresses the points raised and I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I think the Minister has answered the point about management, and I recognise that the words “or otherwise” are at the end of the new subsection. Where I am not sure that he has answered the point is on the inappropriate dividends paid to shareholders beforehand—the Thames Water situation, and how that would be dealt with. Just saying that the equity would be written down makes no difference; in this situation, the equity is already worthless. We are talking about recouping the costs of the recapitalisation rather than the fact that the worthless company is worthless.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I have managed to get through several groups without promising to write, but on this occasion I will write to the noble Lord.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I fully understand the substantial focus on the reporting requirements that will apply when the new mechanism is used. I shall start by addressing Amendment 12 on this point, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

The Government agree that, should the new mechanism be used, it is right for there to be a reporting mechanism to hold the Bank of England to account for its decisions, and that this should encompass estimates of the costs of different options. However, the Government intend to achieve the principles of scrutiny and transparency in a different way; namely, through the existing requirements placed on the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009. As set out in their response to the consultation, it is the Government’s intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism. The Government have committed to updating their code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used; I can re-confirm that the Government intend to include in the code confirmation that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England will be required to disclose the estimated costs that were considered as part of these reports.

The Government consider that using the code of practice is an appropriate approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill. The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this is important to ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools. The Government believe that amendments to the code of practice are more likely to be successful in achieving this outcome. As I committed at Second Reading, the Government will share drafts of these updates to the code of practice as soon as is practicable and will provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them.

I acknowledge the further amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—Amendment 24—which would make such reports available to Parliament when the new mechanism was used to facilitate a transfer to another buyer. It is the Government’s clear intention that any such reports required under the Banking Act, following the use of the mechanism, will be made public and laid before Parliament. The Government would not make reports public only if there were clear public interest grounds not to do so, such as commercial confidentiality reasons. This may particularly be the case when exercising the power to sell a failing bank to a commercial buyer. While such cases would hopefully be limited, it is important that they are allowed for.

I appreciate the intent of Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which would require the Bank of England to report to the Treasury more swiftly than under the current requirements. The use of resolution powers is complex; in some cases, the Bank of England may be executing a resolution over a long period, particularly when placing a firm into a bridge bank. It is therefore sensible for the Bank of England to report a reasonable period of time after exercising its powers, ensuring that its report provides a full and meaningful assessment. On reporting more broadly, I repeat the points made in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

Finally, Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the Chancellor to assess in the light of the Bill the appropriateness of the thresholds used by the Bank of England to determine which firms are required to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, known as MREL. As before, I should start by noting that the Government recognise the important role played by smaller and specialist banks in supporting the UK economy. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Baroness at Second Reading.

The Government have carefully considered the perspective of such banks in developing the mechanism in the Bill, which is intended to be a proportionate solution. On MREL, the Bank of England is responsible for determining MREL requirements for individual firms within a framework set out in legislation; that is an important principle, as the resolution authority, the Bank of England, is ultimately best placed to judge what resources banks should hold so that they can fail safely. I point out to the noble Baroness that, as set out in the Government’s consultation response, the Bank of England has committed to consider the potential case for changes to its indicative thresholds. Specifically, it has noted that it will consider whether any changes are appropriate in light of this Bill and other wider developments.

I hope that these points provide reassurance to noble Lords. On that basis, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I will ask the Minister for one point of clarification. He referred to the reports under the Banking Act that will be provided as covering the costs and expenses. I do not think that he talked about the comparison with the counterfactual of the costs of insolvency, which is a critical aspect of this. Would those reports cover that?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

If the noble Lord does not mind, I shall add that to the letter to him.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate and apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for failing to thank her beforehand for signing her name to my amendment.

A number of points were raised. The noble Baroness was right when she discussed the timings. They were put in as a starting point; I would be very happy to look at what is appropriate. I still think that we need to beef up the reporting clauses in the Bill. I am encouraged by what the Minister said about the reports that exist being laid before Parliament, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to, there is more to do on the timings.

There is some merit in trying to put in the Bill at least some minimum requirements on what those reports should include. That will be important because, although I acknowledge what the Minister said about the code, we will not see it before Report. If we were able to see the proposed changes to the code before Report we might be able to take a different view. It happens quite regularly that we are told that something will be in a code of conduct, a future statutory instrument or whatever else, but we do not see it before we have to make the decisions on the amendments themselves. In the absence of that, I feel that we will probably want to come back to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.