Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, I would normally apologise for not taking part in Second Reading but—how I can put this—I was enjoying my temporary retirement from the House.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

It is very nice to be back to do another Financial Services and Markets Bill. As it is the first time I have spoken, I should declare a registered interest in Fidelity National Information Services, Inc., which is a large American company that provides services and software to a wide range of financial services companies around the world.

I have tabled Amendment 26 and given notice of my intention to oppose that Clause 3 stand part of the Bill. I have also added my name to a number of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

I have another interest to declare. I lost my local bank branch in my village some years ago, and I have just been informed that the last remaining bank in my nearest town is also about to close. To visit a bank branch for me will now involve a 100-mile round trip, so I am sympathetic to the idea that we need to do something to ensure continuation of access to banking services, especially in rural areas such as mine. At the same time, I am conscious that I probably visit a bank branch less than a couple of times a year, so I understand why banks feel it necessary to close them. They are not economic. We need to find a sensible balance to this. I accept that we may need to do something, but what?

There is the old joke: “We need to do something; this is something, so let’s do it”, but Clause 3 is not even something. It is just a vague—I was going to say promise, but it is not even that—intention to do something completely unspecified at an unspecified time, or indeed times, in the future. This Government have an unfortunate track record of putting sweeping powers into legislation before deciding what they actually intend to do with them, and this is yet another example. As the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee pointed out really strongly, this is a very sweeping power with no meaningful limitations at all other than, as we have heard, the need to have regard, and only to have regard, to the independent review currently being undertaken by Richard Lloyd.

Clause 3(3), which has only examples rather than limitations, is one of the widest I have seen. It includes the express ability to make changes to any Act of Parliament, a really strong Henry VIII power. It starts by saying:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may (among other things)”


do the things listed below that. Will the Minister explain what these other things might be? Am I being old-fashioned to suggest that this is not the right way to create law? It would surely be better to wait until after the review has been undertaken, decide what is needed and then legislate—if legislation is actually necessary, since, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, says, we got these banking hubs without legislation—and have the legislation subject to proper scrutiny by Parliament, which it will not be if we go down this route.

The Minister will no doubt try to reassure us about how this power will be used. Of course I—and, I am sure, everybody else in this Room—will have complete faith that the Minister would not try to misuse the power, but he will not always be the Minister. That may be a comment that has particular resonance today. Who knows? It is even possible that this Government may not always be the Government, but this power is unlimited and will be the law for the foreseeable future. Who knows what a future Government might wish to do with such an unlimited power? Indeed, as written, they could even use it to reduce the rights of access to banking.

I have a few specific questions for the Minister. First, will he explain in more detail how the Government currently expect, subject of course to the review, to use this power? What do they expect to do with it and when? Secondly, will he explain which Acts of Parliament he has in mind that might be changed under Clause 3(3)(b) and what changes he would expect to make to them? I put on record now that if I do not get a very convincing answer as to why this wide Henry VIII power is required, I will push Amendment 26, which would remove the power to amend primary legislation, to a Division on Report.

Finally, the Explanatory Memorandum recognises that this is a broad power. It says it is “necessarily broad”. At the same time, and in contrast to that, it also seems to recognise that it is broader than really needed, as it goes on to say,

“the Government would expect to narrow it once the review has concluded”.

I am somewhat baffled by that. We are in Grand Committee now, and the timetable for the Bill seems pretty tight. Will the Minister explain how it would be possible to narrow it, given that the Bill is likely to have completed all its stages before the review is completed and they have worked out what they want to do with it? Once the Bill has become law, the power cannot be narrowed.

This is another example of the Government trying to show they are doing something before they have decided what they want to do, and therefore giving themselves inappropriately broad powers that avoid proper scrutiny when they do finally decide. It is not the right way to make laws that will outlast this Government, and I do not believe this clause should stand part of the Bill without at least very significant narrowing and safeguards.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 24 and 27 in my name. I support what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. To some extent, we are again fishing in the same constitutional pond that regulators are not Parliament. Parliament should not give away powers it cannot get back, and it should not make decisions before we know what we are deciding about.

Amendment 24 would ensure that any regulations made under this clause can only make provision that arises directly from the statutory review. A review is not a blank cheque. If Parliament asks for a review of access to banking services, the regulation-making power should be, if not confined to, at least in some way related to what the review identifies and not what a future Minister or regulator might wish to do. That is my real target. It may be that I have drafted he amendment a little too tightly but, as has been explained, this is a very open-ended power to do anything. Looked at constitutionally, the fact that the consultation has not yet been completed and assessed more than stretches proper procedure.

Amendment 27 addresses a different but related concern. As drafted, the Bill creates machinery in which FCA rules effectively drive changes to legislation, including primary legislation. The FCA pulls the lever, the Treasury presses the button and the law moves to reflect the regulator’s rulebook. The Government will no doubt say that Parliament can always reject the regulations, but we all know how that plays out: Parliament is presented with take-it-or-leave-it unamendable statutory instruments, and if it dares to reject them, we are told we are precipitating a constitutional crisis. That is not meaningful parliamentary control.

I am not opposed to the FCA modernising rules or streamlining processes—far from it—but where those rules have the effect of altering rights or obligations that were created by Parliament, the change must meaningfully come back to Parliament. Otherwise, we risk creating a system where the regulator can, in substance, rewrite Acts of Parliament by changing its rulebook. That is not proportionate regulation; it is law-making without accountability. Again, this seems not to be the sort of thing expected under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act. These amendments do not prevent modernisation; they simply ensure that modernisation happens within a statutory framework, with Parliament retaining oversight of the rights it has created. It does not mean going into the detail, but it does mean monitoring the rights. I hope the Minister will recognise that these are modest but important constitutional guardrails.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I will begin by setting out why Clause 3 should stand part of the Bill. The way that UK citizens bank has changed significantly in recent years, with many customers choosing to use digital channels such as mobile banking. As such, we have seen many firms reviewing how best to meet these changing needs, and banks are closing branches in response.

However, for some people who require access to in-person banking services, these changes may have resulted in detriment. The Government are committed to ensuring that people who need in-person banking, including vulnerable customers and those with specific needs, can continue to access essential services. Last month, as mentioned, the Government launched an independent review into access to banking services led by Richard Lloyd, former executive director at Which? and a former board member of the FCA. I encourage noble Lords to engage with him. As they have noted, he conducts this critical work. I am glad to hear much agreement from many noble Lords today as this is a critical issue and the Government are right to be exploring it.

Clause 3 ensures that we can act swiftly and proportionately if the evidence from the Access to Banking Services review supports intervention. Once the Access to Banking Services review has concluded and made its recommendations, the Government will assess whether any further legislative change may be required. I appreciate that the power is broad and that many of the amendments in this group are aimed at scrutinising or reducing the breadth of that power. I also recognise that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has drawn Clause 3 to the attention of the House and recommended that the power be removed from the Bill. The Government have considered that report and will be responding in writing in the normal way before Report.

We accept that this is a broad power, but we consider that it is needed now so that, once the independent review reports, the Government can respond promptly and proportionately in light of the evidence and recommendations that it provides. As the review is still ongoing, it is not yet known what detriment exists, which customer segments are most affected, whether further intervention is needed or what form it should take. The Government are committed to keeping all aspects of this power under review as the independent review completes its work.

I pass on my personal welcome back to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. His comments about Ministers changing is indeed pertinent on a day such as today. I am not casting too far in the future; indeed, I keep checking my phone just to see whether I make it through Committee stage.

The noble Lord whether this power could be narrowed. I can confirm that the Government expect to narrow the power once the review has concluded in October and we have had the opportunity to consider the recommendations. This will provide further clarity on any appropriate interventions that will allow the power to be refined.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

If the review is going to be completed in October, presumably there will then be a period of time when the Government will consider it. In my experience, that usually takes several months, by which time the Bill will be law. I struggle to understand how the power can be narrowed, given that we are probably at the end of the year before proposals have come forward.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I was coming on to that point. The noble Lord asked what the power can do and how that scrutiny can take place. It allows the Government to introduce targeted secondary legislation or to confer functions on the FCA, including the power to make rules in the future. When using this power, the Treasury must have regard to the recommendation made by the Lloyd review.

I think the noble Lord made a point about what legislation could be amended. I can only answer this in part at this time: the Treasury expects to use the power if needed to amend relevant legislation, for example, financial services legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group on the subject of fraud and scams. I have also added my support to the lead amendment, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and to which she has just spoken. Most of my amendments arise, at least in part, from the abolition of the PSR and the absorption of its activities into the FCA; I will quickly run through each of them.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already explained the need for her Amendment 46, which would require the FCA to make rules to ensure that the tech or communications company on whose platform or service the fraud arises is responsible for a proportion of the cost of reimbursing the victims. Whether or not the mechanism in her amendment is the right one, the principle here is obvious. At the moment, it is the banks that must compulsorily fully refund victims of fraud. There is some sense in the banks having to reimburse victims, because almost every fraud goes through some sort of bank account to allow the fraudsters to cash out. It is clear that the mandatory reimbursement requirement has incentivised banks to do more to protect customers. However, we also know that fraud does not originate from banks’ services. According to UK Finance’s latest report, some 66% of scams arise on online services and a further 17% originate via telecoms. Let us be clear: the highest proportion of that arises on Meta platforms.

Despite voluntary charters, this is not improving at all. Your Lordships’ Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, of which I was a member, recognised this in its report nearly four years ago; if the Minister has not read it, I recommend it as some bedtime reading. It said:

“Until all fraud-enabling industries fear significant financial, legal and reputational risk for their failure to prevent fraud, they will not act”.


We were right. Nothing has changed since then to change that conclusion. If anything, matters continue to worsen as technology such as AI starts being used by criminals. It is time that the platforms were at last forced to step up and take financial responsibility for the losses that arise from their platforms, not just leaving it to the banks to pick up the full liability. I say this to the Minister: in your answer, please do not tell us that the Online Safety Act will solve this. It is too limited; it covers only directly paid-for advertising and is unlikely to make much difference.

The Government’s fraud strategy recognises all this. It says that,

“if industry partnership and market incentives alone remain insufficient to drive improvements, the Government will take legislative action within this Parliament”.

This has been going on for years. The voluntary online fraud charter was signed three years ago. Nothing material has improved. Fraud is still around 45% of all crime, and the percentage arising on tech platforms has not fallen; if anything, it has risen. The Bill is the perfect opportunity finally to take action on this and not leave it until thousands more people have fallen victim. We know that tech companies will not take action unless they have to—they continue to prove that—which is why the Government are at last taking action in respect of child protection. This is no different. It is now time to act without further delay.

My Amendment 47 would introduce a requirement for the mandatory reimbursement rules for APP fraud, which came into force in October 2024, to be reviewed after three years of operation. It is unlikely that we got everything right at the first attempt, so a review of how effective they have been in meeting their objectives of protecting consumers and incentivising the banks to improve protections—as well as, importantly, whether there have been any unintended consequences—must make sense.

I have tried to set out in the amendment—I will not go through all the detail—the key matters that were discussed when the requirement was introduced in 2022-23 as the matters that ought to be reviewed. I would have also included the tech platforms, but I did not want to duplicate the amendment that we have just discussed.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who sadly is not with us at the moment, on his Amendment 58, which would add specific fraud prevention duties on payment service providers. I also have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind his Amendment 125, which would introduce a financial fraud prevention secondary objective to the FCA, although I caveat that by saying that I am not sure that adding yet more objectives to the regulators is necessarily the right way to go.

My Amendment 59 is designed to ensure that the FCA continues to collate and to publish the fraud data that the PSR has been collating and publishing for the past few years. This has been extremely valuable. It has identified several PSPs that were clearly not taking their fraud prevention duties seriously and led to action being taken against them. The pressure of shining a light on some of the bigger players has clearly incentivised them to step up and improve their systems. The information identifies very clearly which PSPs are protecting their customers best and which are doing it worst, which is important information for consumers when choosing a bank or payment provider.

To give just one example to show the value of this reporting, the last report by the PSR identified that, for every 1 million transactions received by Guavapay, 109,744 were APP scam payments—that is more than 10%. As a result of that information, the company has been forced to close by the FCA. In the meantime, consumers would have been able to see that this was an unsafe operator if the report had been issued in a timely manner—an issue that I will come to in a second.

This reporting was started as a result of efforts by Members of the House during the passage of FSMA 2023, and it followed undertakings by the then Minister. But there are already signs that, since moving the PSR’s activities into the FCA, this has started to slip. As I said, the last report of this nature was for the period up to 7 October 2024, when the mandatory reimbursement requirement was introduced. That was not published until February 2026, some 16 months later. My amendment would add a time limit of three months for the publication of these reports. No further report has been published since, so I hope that the Minister will recognise the value of this reporting, and that he will confirm that it should continue and that this amendment—which does not create any new burdens at all but just continues the status quo—should be accepted.

Amendment 64 would reverse the deletion of Clause 72 from FSMA 2023—it was the clause that introduced the requirement to introduce a mandatory reimbursement requirement. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government explain that this is being removed because it has already happened. But Clause 72 does not only introduce the requirement; subsection (9) also includes the ability

“to vary or revoke a relevant requirement”

or

“to impose further relevant requirements”.

So I am not sure that deleting it in full works—that is something to look at. Most importantly, can the Minister confirm that the mandatory reimbursement requirement is intended to continue, even if reviewed and amended in the future—particularly in relation to tech companies, which we have talked about—and that this Bill is not intended to change anything in that respect?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, for reasons that will become apparent, I start by referring to my register of interests, including my shareholding in Meta.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend noble Lord Holmes, who is absent, for bringing forward this important group of amendments. I am sorry that this debate is so late and that the Grand Committee is so thin under the new five-hour arrangements—of which I am not a fan—because, collectively, these amendments raise an important and timely point. As online retail platforms and digital marketplaces become more popular and AI makes fraud easier, there has been a concurrent increase in the risk that people face from online fraud, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

We have seen concerning figures suggesting that Facebook Marketplace is now the single most scammed UK consumer platform. Very large sums are stolen through it every day in the UK, and a very high proportion of UK purchase fraud begins there. We have also seen banks such as Santander taking active steps to block suspected Marketplace transfers to protect customers. Those examples raise very important questions: how easy is it for consumers to obtain redress when they are defrauded in this way? Who holds ultimate responsibility when a fraud is facilitated through an online platform, and how can the regulatory framework ensure that the firms best placed to prevent the fraud have a real incentive to do so? It is also important to consider how changes can be made without introducing new rafts of regulation that put up costs and prices.

Banks and payment service providers have significant responsibilities, and rightly so. They process the payment, have duties to their customers, and have tools available to detect and prevent suspicious transactions. Yet they are often not the place where the fraud originated, and may see only the final payment instruction, by which point much of the harm has already been set in motion. By contrast, technology companies and online marketplaces may be much closer to the source of the problem. They host the listings, provide the communications infrastructure, enable the interaction between buyer and seller, and in many cases have access to data which could help identify suspicious behaviour before money ever leaves a consumer’s account.

Amendment 46 is based on the principle that fraud should be paid for by those best placed to prevent it, not simply those who happen to process the payment at the end of the chain. If platforms know that they may share liability where fraud is facilitated through their systems, they will have a much stronger incentive to identify fraudulent listings, remove scam accounts, improve verification, share data and co-operate with banks and regulators, and indeed help consumers to avoid fraud, as we can do a lot ourselves as consumers. This is not about saying that technology firms should always be liable in every case, nor is it about absolving banks of responsibility. Yet it recognises that the current model may place too much of the burden on one part of the system, while allowing other actors, including very large and profitable tech companies, to avoid the financial consequences of fraud which often begins on their platforms.

The goal should be to stop fraud before it happens, which means better consumer warnings, transaction monitoring, real-time data sharing, and use of technology by all relevant firms. It also means transparency. If particular platforms, channels or types of transaction are consistently associated with fraud, that information should be visible. Sunlight is an important tool of accountability, which is why Amendment 59 is valuable in principle. As the experienced noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has explained, regular publication of data on APP fraud performance, including where fraud originates, would help Parliament, regulators, firms and consumers to understand the real shape of the problem. It would put pressure on firms whose systems are repeatedly linked to fraud to improve their performance.

Before we take a definitive view on these amendments, I would be grateful if the Minister could address several questions. First, what is the Government’s view on the principle of shared liability for APP fraud across the wider ecosystem, including technology companies and online marketplaces? Secondly, is there a place for greater transparency on APP fraud performance? Thirdly, what discussions have the Government had with tech platforms about fraud originating on their services, and what more does the Minister believe those firms should be required to do? Fourthly, does the Minister accept that online platforms should have stronger incentives to prevent fraud where they host the marketplace, the listing or the communication through which the scam takes place? Finally, how do the Government envisage tackling this problem? Do they have plans to introduce legislation on this issue, or do they believe that changes within the existing framework will be sufficient?

APP fraud causes real harm to individuals, families and businesses. It can undermine confidence in digital payments and online commerce, which is increasingly the direction of travel. It also imposes costs on the wider financial system. I recognise that this may go even wider than our Bill, but this is an important group and I look forward to the Minister’s responses, and to seeing how we can improve this important area.