United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Tyrie and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 4th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Some very interesting points have just been made that bear serious consideration, and the concerns we have just heard are reasoned, particularly on SMEs. At the very least, the Government may wish to offer a review of the CMA’s use of these powers, after an interval, to give us the assurance that they are being proportionately deployed and to see whether they need some amendment. The argument that they were derived from legislation the purpose of which was very different is well taken and might point to further amendment.

Overall, I support the Government in what they are trying to do here, having decided to create the OIM. It is true that the powers are robust, but they will need to be. If the CMA is to be expected to offer timely and high-quality advice, it will need to secure information quickly, without being given the runaround by devolved Administrations or parts of the private sector.

The penalties proposed are a weakness, though. Crown immunity will be in play for the devolved Administrations. I would be interested to know what thought the Government have given to the penalties that can be imposed for non-compliance in those cases. Public censure might help; on the other hand, a devolved Administration standing up to nasty Westminster might win local plaudits, resulting in the opposite effect. A lot of careful thought needs to be put into this issue if these measures are to be made effective. The proposed fines on the private sector are capped at £30,000. I simply do not see that sum troubling a recalcitrant or determined large third party. Has the Minister considered larger fines in certain circumstances?

It might be helpful to make one more general point. The CMA’s existing arrangements for securing compliance and information gathering across all its other functions are manifestly inadequate, as I saw it during my time there. They should not be used as a benchmark. Incidentally, the £30,000 figure comes from the merger regime. Something has to be done. The European Commission recently fined Facebook £1.6 million for not supplying information, while the CMA recently fined Amazon £30,000 over the merger with Deliveroo for not supplying information. That should give some idea of the disparity.

In February 2019, the CMA put proposals to the Government for improvements to information-gathering powers across all its functions. First, it needs to be able to gather information from a much wider range of sources to reflect the increasingly digital nature of the information that it is trying to collect: iCloud, machine-learning algorithms and so on spring to mind. These are not at all easy to capture with existing legislation. Secondly, and even more importantly, subject to safeguards, the CMA needs a general information- gathering power outside the context of a formal investigation. I do not like giving general powers, but I think the CMA now needs this to find out what is really going on in markets and enable it to think through much better than it can at present. It needs to be able to use the full range of tools to best bear down on consumer detriment. It is struggling to do that at present, and increasingly so with the growth of rip-off culture.

When the Minister returns to his department, he will find the proposals, of which I am just touching the surface, have been fully developed by the CMA and are sitting with his officials. Will he agree to take another look at those proposals to see what might usefully be drawn from them? For improving the ones we are discussing today, quite a lot of what is in there is likely to be relevant. Will he agree to report back to the House on what he has found?

I have been following this Bill closely, particularly Part 4, which I have an interest in because of my previous job. Some very important points have been made across the Committee, not least in Monday’s relatively brief debate on Clause 28 about whether the CMA is the appropriate body in the beginning to have responsibly for these functions. Those points are sufficiently important for us to have another look at them on Report. I hope the House will find a way to enable us to do this.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, this Committee is nearing its end, apart from Part 5. I support the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, in her forensic efforts to probe the purpose of Clauses 38 to 40. I welcome my noble friend Lord Tyrie to today’s debate. Although I do not agree with him on fines or general powers, he makes a very good point about digital information. I am sorry he was not here for the debate on where the OIM sits. As he says, that is something we hope to debate again on Report.

On the plus side, these clauses give a great deal of detail. I usually complain to the Minister that EU exit Bills fail to do just that and leave too much to regulations. On the minus side, these are extremely strong powers of enforcement with very high penalties—for example, fixed fines of up to £30,000 would make many a small company bankrupt. There is no due diligence defence that I can see or provision allowing a reasonable excuse. The CMA can use its own discretion to decide whether a request for information has been complied with and can impose a financial penalty if it thinks there has been obstruction or delay. Such powers are fiercer than those of the police. The Minister will be able to tell us whether the CMA has those powers in relation to competition law and perhaps explain in each case why they are justified in the internal market Bill which, as many have said, is a little different from competition law.

Moreover, we do not know to which regulations these various measures and penalties will apply. Can the Minister kindly take us through some examples of their proposed use? He may have done this elsewhere; if so, I am sorry if I missed that. Perhaps more importantly, could he lay some sample regulations for us to review before Report, as his predecessor did so helpfully on the Bill relating to nuclear issues on EU exit?

I worry that both Houses of Parliament have been distracted by unease with Part 5 of the Bill into agreeing wide-ranging, open-ended and burdensome powers in these clauses and, for the first time, on services, the beating heart of the economies in all four nations of the UK. All this has been relatively lightly scrutinised despite our efforts, and experience shows that some nasty surprises might be in store. I am keen to work with others to minimise those while generally supporting the Bill’s direction of travel.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, once again this has been a short but important debate. I congratulate noble Lords on speaking on this. Once again, I find myself in complete agreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lady Bowles. It was good to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, whose experience is important.

During her speech, my noble friend Lady Bowles sought to characterise the difference between getting information from potential recalcitrants—people who are suspected of or known to have distorted the market—and getting information from people to create a picture of a market. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, will not mind me saying that the sort of language used about needing more sanctions and similar issues is coming from the mindset of dealing with recalcitrants. That is where the experience of the CMA has lain to date. There is a real concern that in creating this new role the culture of having to fight to get what you need is transferred into this second activity, and that is not appropriate.

I was interested to hear the point of the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, about Clause 28 and looking again at the positioning of the OIM and CMA. I would be very keen to hear what he has to say.