Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

Having considered the approach of the courts to appeals decisions in competition cases under similar legislative frameworks, the Government are confident that the courts will have no problem in finding that appeals on the merits relating to penalties must be restricted to challenges about the penalty itself and will not be extended to any earlier breach decisions. Appeals against all other digital markets decisions will be under judicial review principles. I hope that this provides reassurance to noble Lords that there is little risk of “bleed back”.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Does the Minister not agree that since, with a merits appeal, a fine could be reduced to nugatory amounts, that what would be considered equivalent to a full merits review of the substantive decision?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

That would be in respect only of the fine itself. Any other element of the decision, such as the imposition of new conduct requirements or other actions taken to correct anti-competitive effects in the market, would stand and would have been standing throughout the appeal in any event.

I turn to Motion B, which addresses Amendments 12 and 13, on the countervailing benefits exemption, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch. The amendment looks to revert the clause back to its original wording of

“the conduct is indispensable ... to … those benefits”.

The Government’s revised wording, which replaces “indispensable”, does not change the effect of the clause. It still requires the same high threshold to be met and has the same safeguards. To qualify for the exemption, SMS firms must establish that all the criteria are met. There must be no other reasonable, practicable way to achieve the same benefits to consumers with a less anti-competitive effect. I hope that noble Lords feel reassured that the Government’s drafting maintains the same robust threshold and keeps consumers at the heart of the pro-competition regime.

Your Lordships will remember Amendment 38, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, which sought to place in the Bill a 40-day timeframe for the Secretary of State’s approval of CMA guidance. The Government listened carefully to concerns led by my noble friend relating to a risk of delay in the digital markets regime. We are absolutely committed to getting this regime up and running to start fixing competition problems and deliver greater consumer benefit.

To reinforce this commitment, the Government have tabled Amendment 38A in lieu. This takes the spirit of my noble friend’s amendment and merely adjusts the time limit to working days to align with other timelines in the Bill. It also asks for reasons if guidance is not approved within the time limit. I hope that this provides reassurances to noble Lords about our commitment to the digital markets regime. I thank my noble friend for championing this matter in earlier debates and for his support for the amendment in lieu.

Once again, I thank noble Lords for their contributions during the Bill’s passage and I look forward to others during this debate. Across this House, we are all committed to making the DMCC Bill the best and most effective legislation it can be. I therefore invite noble Lords to agree the government Motions before them. I beg to move.

Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I am going to play the role of Little Sir Echo here. I hope that the unanimity expressed so far will send a strong message to my noble friend the Minister. I support Amendment 16 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to which I have added my name, and Amendments 17, 53 and 54. I note my interests as declared at the start of Committee.

As I made clear in my remarks on Second Reading, we must, throughout the consideration of the Bill, steadfastly avoid importing anything into the CMA and DMU procedures that would allow the platforms to deploy delaying tactics and tie up the regulators in endless legal knots. Long legal wrangling will destroy the very essence of the Bill, and it is not mere speculation to suggest that this might happen. As we have seen elsewhere in the world, and indeed in publishers’ own existing dealings with the platforms, we do not need to gaze into a crystal ball; we can, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, put it the other day, read the book.

In that light, as we have heard consistently this afternoon, I fear that the government amendments made in the other place, requiring the conduct requirements and PCIs to be proportionate rather than appropriate, do just that. They impose significant restrictions on the work of the CMA and, as an extremely helpful briefing—which I think all Members have had—from Which? put it, produce “a legal quagmire” that would allow the unaccountable platforms

“with their vast legal budgets … to push back against each and every decision the regulator takes”.

It is simply counterintuitive to the design of the flexible and participatory framework the legislation portends. As my noble friend Lady Stowell said, it certainly makes me very nervous.

The key point is that introducing the concept of proportionality is, frankly, totally otiose, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, put it so well, as proportionality is already tested by judicial review—something the CMA itself has already reiterated. The courts, in this novel area of legislation, will rely on Parliament clearly to state its intentions. Introducing the concept of proportionality not only is unnecessary but in fact muddies the waters and creates confusion that will be mercilessly used by the platforms. It certainly does not produce clarity. The Government really must think again.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I do not know whether I am the sole dissenting voice—I do not think I am—but I want to make one preliminary point. I never thought I would make a point in defence of lawyers, but not all legal challenge or scrutiny will necessarily be wrong as this Bill proceeds or as the CMA takes its decisions. It is extremely important that we bear in mind, as we will come on to later on in the Bill, that we need to have a sense of balance about all this, so that we do not allow quite reasonable discontent with some of the shocking practices we have seen from platforms to lead us to a place that we might subsequently regret and which could lead to injustices or damage to British interests through loss of innovation or inward investment.

I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said. It seemed to boil down to very few things. Are convention rights engaged? They probably are, or if they are not then they will be. Even if they are not, the courts will find a way of getting them in eventually. If they are, what have the Government added? That is why I think I might be with the amenders here. I think very little, if anything at all, has been added. Was this a piece of window dressing, supplied by the Government to satisfy the intense lobbying that has taken place, particularly of No. 10? It had a whiff of that about it for me when I first saw it—I see one or two nods of assent. If it is, I am particularly wary of this change, which is what leads me to think that the amenders might be right. If it is more than this—if something very substantive has been added—then I think we would all like to hear from the Minister what exactly it is that, as a result of the adding of “proportionality”, will be considered for legal scrutiny when this Bill is on the statute book.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will briefly intervene. I have not signed the amendments but I am rather supportive of what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said in support of his amendment.

In thinking about this, among other thing I had the benefit of seeing a letter that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the department sent to my friends in another place, Robert Buckland and Damian Collins, after Report in the Commons; other noble Lords may have seen it. In that letter, he set out why he was building proportionality into Clause 19. He said:

“Our intention for this amendment is to allow a firm to appeal a decision by arguing that the DMU made public law errors in its consideration of proportionality under normal JR principles—without establishing that their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights are engaged”,


for example, the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. So that would not bring convention rights on board. The letter continues: “For example”— it is always helpful to have an example—

“the firm could argue that the DMU failed to take a relevant consideration into account, made a material error of fact or otherwise acted unreasonably”—

so JR principles—

“when deciding against an intervention that would have been less burdensome on the firm while still achieving the same outcome”.

So the outcome has to be achieved, but is it proportionate to impose this particular conduct requirement or pro-competitive intervention?

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[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am happy to provide that information in the form of a letter, and I will leave it at that for now.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Perhaps I could answer the question: the CMA never has scope to act disproportionately in law.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

In respect of my noble friend Lord Vaizey’s concern that proportionality will affect how the CAT conducts an appeal, the retention of judicial review in Clause 103 will still apply to the CAT, which will still have to conduct an appeal when a firm raises non-ECHR proportionality arguments in a JR style. It will not become a full merits appeal.

Amendments 33 and 52, from my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, also remove the statutory requirement for proportionality but, in doing so, create greater impacts on the regime. Amendment 33 would remove the obligation on the CMA to set out, in its conduct requirement notice, the objective in relation to which it must consider proportionality. However, this is a key feature for setting a conduct requirement and it is important to include it in the notice for both the SMS firm and third parties.

Amendment 52, by removing Clause 46(1)(b), would reduce the Bill’s clarity that the primary objective of PCIs is to address competition problems. It is important that the Bill is clear on the objective that PCIs must pursue. Additionally, proportionality provisions will ensure that the CMA addresses its objectives without placing unnecessary burdens on firms and harming consumers.

I turn to my noble friend Lady Stowell’s Amendments 17 and 54. As she set out in her explanatory statement, these amendments seek to clarify that the use of “proportionate” does not create a novel legal standard. The amendment would state that it is defined in accordance with prevailing public law standards. Of course, I agree with her that it is important to be clear about what we expect from the CMA and concur with the spirit of her amendments. However, I hope my explanation of this provision as currently drafted will satisfy my noble friend’s concerns.

These amendments assume that there is a single public law definition of proportionality, when there is not. However, proportionality is also not a novel concept for either the CMA or the domestic courts to apply. There is domestic case law about how proportionality requirements have been interpreted. We expect that the CMA, the CAT and courts would follow the broad approach set out in the Bank Mellat 2 case, which considered proportionality in relation to the application of ECHR rights, as well as fundamental rights at common law. This is relevant when considering whether an infringement of a qualified ECHR right and/or a fundamental common-law right is justified. Noble Lords with an interest in this area will be familiar with the four-limb test set out by Lords Sumption and Reed. Previously, our domestic courts applied a separate, but broadly similar, test when considering proportionality under EU law.

In the event of an appeal against CMA interventions, it is the role of the courts to provide a definitive interpretation of the legislation, but they will likely give a certain amount of deference to the CMA as the expert regulator. When an intervention has engaged A1P1, there would be a clear link with the approach of the domestic courts to the ECHR proportionality requirements that I have already discussed. In the rare situation when an intervention did not engage A1P1, it seems logical that the courts would take an approach consistent with how they approach digital markets cases which do engage A1P1, although this could involve some modifications on a case-by-case basis.

The basic requirements of proportionality—that it balances private interests adversely affected against the public interests that the measure seeks to achieve—is well understood. As such, I hope my noble friend can appreciate that although I agree with the spirit of her amendments, in practice I do not believe they would provide the clarity they seek.

Amendments 220 and 222 from my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance on how the appeals standard for financial penalties, proportionality and countervailing benefits exemption would operate. The amendments set out that the CMA could not impose conduct requirements, pro-competition interventions or financial penalties before this guidance was published.

I thank my noble friend for these amendments. He should be pleased to hear that the CMA will, as part of its approach to implementing the regime, produce guidance outlining its approach to delivering the regime before it is implemented. We expect this guidance to include the CMA’s approach to proportionality and the countervailing benefits exemption. The Secretary of State will have oversight of the CMA’s approach through the approval of that guidance. The Government feel that this approach strikes the right balance between maintaining the independence of the CMA and the CAT, and providing appropriate government oversight and clarity about how the regime will work. Suitable guidance will already be in place before the regime commences; as such, these amendments are not required.

I hope this has helped to address the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friends Lady Stowell of Beeston and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and that, as a consequence, they feel able to withdraw, or not to press, their amendments.

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[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I strongly support the intentions of this part of the Bill. What the Government are attempting to do must be right. Relative inaction on mergers by leading regulators around the world has contributed to the problems that we are now trying to address with the creation of the DMU. Killer acquisitions are a serious and enduring problem in this market.

My view is that the CMA, among other regulators, probably could and should have acted earlier. It is worth pausing for a moment to consider why it did not. One reason is a lack of boldness; a reluctance to take risks by taking action with its existing powers; a fear of losing. Although we are empowering it a good deal through the DMU, it is important to bear in mind that, unless we secure a change of mindset in the CMA, I am not sure that we will get the benefits that we are hoping for from this Bill—certainly not all of them.

A second reason why a good number of the big regulators did not intervene earlier derives from the intellectual history of the current legislation, which is similar all around the world. Over the last 30 years, in the post-Cold War world, almost all the major jurisdictions, and a lot of minor ones, put on the statute book very similar legislation. About 150 jurisdictions have done so, based on a set of ideas often summarised as the Chicago school, although it is rather a caricature, which believed that there would be no need for such an interventionist approach because it would be difficult for any platform to sustain for long a dominant position, and another technological change would supplant them. That may yet turn out to be the case, with AI and new generations of technology.

However, we now know that it has not been successful with the existing range of platforms; they have been around for a long time, and we have ample evidence of abuse of market position by some of them. That is why we need to qualify the Chicago school approach in our minds. We need the people who run our competition regulators to shed what may be a lifetime of acceptance of some of their reflexes in respect of these big deals. They should start to challenge far more, and be far less accepting of, the tenets of the Chicago school.

Perhaps I could summarise my position overall by saying that I am sympathetic to all the clauses that have been tabled, but Ministers will need to reassure us that their intentions for these clauses really will be delivered by what is in the Bill at the moment. I myself am not sure that it is enough. There may be merit in some or all of the amendments in achieving what the Government themselves say they want to do.

[Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks just made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, about recognising how important it is that we embolden the CMA to tackle these merger issues. I do not have anything like the expertise in detailed drafting that my noble friend Lord Lansley has just demonstrated, but I encourage the Government to listen carefully to his advice and review the drafting. We should see if we cannot come together with a solution on Report that achieves what I think we are all trying to achieve here.

I would also like to briefly correct the record. On Monday, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, I said that all the companies had appealed their designation of the DMA. Much to my amusement, Google was very swift to email me on Tuesday morning to tell me no, it was very keen to collaborate, so I would hate that to become a considered fact of this Committee—I owe Google that.

I support the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I point out to the Committee that it is actually a very small amendment. The CMA told us in one of its briefings last week that it could undertake only two SMS investigations at any one time. We should recognise that it is a very minor amendment meaning that, while the CMA is investigating two entities, those two entities will be required to report. We should accept that that is a very small improvement that we should encourage the Government to accept.

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[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As I said, I am very happy to carry on with this; there is a sense of rounding up the usual suspects otherwise.

Amendment 60 from my noble friend Lord Lansley is intended to give the CMA jurisdiction to intervene in a merger when an SMS firm seeks to remove or absorb a smaller firm that could reasonably be expected to compete with it in future. I agree that it is important to ensure that the CMA can act against harmful mergers, including so-called killer acquisitions. I reassure my noble friend that the CMA can and does do so under the current legislative framework.

When reviewing a merger, the CMA can already consider whether it removes a potential future competitor. This can be seen in the Meta/Giphy case where, in its forward-looking assessment, the CMA found that the merger removed Giphy as a potential challenger and consequently ordered Meta to sell Giphy. The decision was upheld by the CAT, which I hope and think shows that the CMA has the necessary legislative cover.

It has been suggested that the CMA and other regulators have not scrutinised mergers by large digital firms enough in the past. However, since the Furman review, the CMA has undertaken a comprehensive review of its merger assessment guidelines and updated them in 2021 to ensure that they more clearly reflect the CMA’s current thinking and practice on digital markets, drawing on conclusions from expert reports, analysis and cases.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Before the Minister leaves that point, and further to the discussion we have had about the importance of the CMA taking advantage of its powers, is he able to signal that he is sympathetic to the approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, will take later on with her proposal to give Parliament much greater powers of scrutiny of the CMA, to give us a better prospect that the CMA will continue with its more activist approach to dealing with these mergers? The risk for all of us is that there is a boost in activity for a period, with this legislation and the focus and attention that we all are giving this issue, but that, over time, the CMA slips back to the very comfort zone-oriented place it seemed to be in when it implemented a number of its statutory obligations in the past.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for raising that point. He has alluded a number of times during our conversations to ensuring that the working culture within the CMA is suitably postured to deal with a fast-moving regime. I can indicate that I certainly have sympathy with the intent of enhancing the accountability both to Parliament and government of the CMA—with this and other ends in mind, but to ensure that it remains assiduous in its identification of opportunities to intervene.

The Bill will enhance the CMA’s ability to act to prevent harmful mergers by SMS firms. The reporting requirement will improve the transparency of merger activity in digital markets. Additionally, Clause 127 in Part 2 and Schedule 4 will introduce a new acquirer-focused jurisdiction threshold, which provides an additional basis for the CMA to review mergers involving large firms, including SMS firms.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Lansley will be reassured for the time being and not press their amendments.

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[Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)]

I will just add a couple of questions to the ones that my noble friend Lady Stowell just posed, and I am sorry that I have not been organised enough to share these with the Bill team in advance. Both relate to the importance of the collaborative nature of this legislation and how important it is that the tech companies are actually incentivised to work with the CMA as they go through this process. I too have had a couple of questions posed to me, in addition to what I would describe as the Ofcom-model question that my noble friend raised.

First, should the legislation require courts to avoid judgments that conflict with the DMU’s existing decisions? Otherwise, I think there is potentially a risk that you get two jurisdictions coming to contradictory conclusions. Secondly, how can we avoid litigation undermining existing DMU resolutions and therefore just extending and delaying any implementation? In both cases, there is a risk—although I defer to the huge expertise in the Committee on the need for the civil proceedings. We have to make sure that we do not undermine the very principle of trying to incentivise the SMS firms to engage in constructive dialogue through the process.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

The CAT’s class action powers have been a success, although probably not an unqualified success—but that is for another day. I just want to pick up on one point.

Nowhere is the asymmetry of power greater than between an ordinary consumer and a platform. We must try to find ways of enabling consumers to have greater self-reliance, to have mechanisms to achieve some redress of that asymmetry. When I was in the CMA, I did quite a lot of work on this subject, not only with respect to platforms but generally with respect to big firms, and that work largely got lost.

I suggest to the Minister that he asks for some work in this field to be done by the CMA, not only with respect to platforms but across the piece, to see whether a much more comprehensive programme—taking into greater consideration the reality of the asymmetries of power that we see have now developed in the marketplace —can be put together and give consumers greater confidence that they are not being ripped off, as so many of them are at the moment, frankly.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Tyrie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd January 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I very much echo the thanks expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, to all the companies and business that have given evidence and come forward to speak to us. It is true that, for a number of them, they have taken risks to do that. It is a sad fact of life now that their very survival could be at stake if some of their concerns become public. That is why we are here today, I suppose. That is where the market has left us and there is a need to address that.

To pick up on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, about the CMA’s assessment, I think that we have had a useful discussion with the Minister around all that. I certainly want to look at Hansard and at the reassurances that the Minister has tried to give on this. I very much take the point, incidentally—as mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, in moving his amendment—that SMS status does not mean that they have done anything wrong, so I do not want to get too hung up about giving that status in the first instance. What is important is how we follow that up and look at their behaviour going forward. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, spelled out, there is a danger that, if we are not careful, those who are given that category will game the system. That is what we are all anxious about.

I am not sure that the wording achieves what the Minister wants. I think that we are all genuinely clear on the outcomes that we want, as the Minister said, but the current wording does not achieve that. The five-year forward plan is playing into the hands of the wrong people, and we will not come out with the outcomes that we want if we stick with the current wording, so I very much welcome the chance to have further discussion about that.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

Before the noble Baroness leaves that point, I strongly endorse what she says. I make the point that we are here debating a set of powers that we would, in most contexts, otherwise consider extremely draconian, because there has already been abuse and market power has already been exercised in ways that we all consider unacceptable. That is why we need clarity on this point. We do not need to look into the crystal ball—we can read the book.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord very much for that insight. He is absolutely right, of course. We all understand his wealth of experience; it is very helpful to have his support on that issue.

I pick up on the amendment tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, to which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and I have added our names. He rightly raised that the significant powers given to the Secretary of State to vary the conditions would lead to tech companies being considered to have strategic market status. As my noble friend Lord Knight said, the list in Clause 6 is quite generic. In a sense, that should be enough for us. None of the things in Clause 6 is time limited, so it should be enough for the CMA and the DMU to do their work.

There is concern, therefore, about how the Bill is currently worded, as it does not give any constraints to the Secretary of State to change the conditions, apart from the affirmative SI—and we can all rehearse the arguments about what that means for parliamentary accountability. The Minister might say that it is necessary to add new conditions if new anti-competitive practices come to light, but I feel that the current wording—and I think that the noble Viscount feels this, too—allows not just for new anti-competitive practices but for the current conditions to be watered down. That is our real concern. The noble Viscount gave an example about specifying particular forms of market practice, such as online sales and delivery, which would then apply to only one or two companies and not the ones that, as I think we all understand, should be in the frame. I was not absolutely convinced by what the Minister said on this issue. It is a bit of a running theme and, as several noble Lords said, we will come back to the issue of parliamentary scrutiny. Perhaps we can look at that in the round at a future point.

The Minister will be pleased to know that I support the government amendments. They make good sense and give clarification in the Bill, which we always like.

We continue to believe that Amendment 1 is necessary to enable the CMA to proceed with speed once the Bill is on the statute book. Nothing the Minister has said so far has persuaded me that the silence in the Bill on this issue is sufficiently reassuring. I hope that we can find a form of words—if not ours then a different form of words—that will allow the CMA to look backwards, giving it absolute reassurance that it can do so and that it will not have to repeat any of its activities. This is all about tightening up the wording. We will reflect on what the Minister said, and I hope that we can talk about this some more. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 8, I will also speak to my Amendments 9, 10, 13, 35, 37, 42, 45, 46, 57 and 58. I thank my noble friend Lady Ritchie, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, for adding their names. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Tyrie, have some other amendments in this group to which I will respond at the end of this debate. However, I can confirm that we support the thrust of the noble Lords’ amendments and look forward to hearing their more detailed arguments in due course.

As I made clear at the outset, our concerns with this Bill are mainly about the detail, in particular the changes made by the Government at the very last minute on Report in the Commons. We support the model that is being proposed, although we share some of the concerns that will come up in this debate and in later ones about the extent of the widespread powers that have been given to the CMA and the DMU in respect of the big tech players, in particular their application to those being given strategic market status. The corollary to the decision to introduce this new approach is that the new power should be set out clearly in statute, which is the point that we have made, and that when it is used the DMU will need to be open and transparent to all those who have a legitimate interest.

There must be no question that the smaller challenger firms which—for various understandable reasons—may not be fully informed about discussions and negotiations between the DMU and potential SMS firms need to be able to access information about the regulatory framework and potential changes to it on an equal basis as the firms being considered for SMS status. How else will we achieve the balance that we are all aiming for in this Bill? Our amendments in this and other groups address this issue.

When this came up in the Commons, Minister Saqib Bhatti said:

“the Government agree that it is important that the DMU’s regulatory decisions are transparent and that the right information is available to the public”. —[Official Report, Commons, 20/11/23; col. 74.]

We agree with that. With respect, however, the DMU publishing summaries of decisions reached completely misses the point we are trying to make. The DMU must ensure that it has all the information it needs, including all the information held by challenger firms, before it makes decisions about SMS status and related matters. Challenger firms may have a different view of what SMS means to their businesses and consumers and it is unlikely that they will have perfect information about the DMU’s thinking. They will, however, certainly want to be engaged in the issues if they are made aware of them at the right time.

Many of us attended a helpful meeting with the CMA last week, where this issue was raised. It became clear that it already has good relations with a number of the bigger challenger firms. However, given that it is investigating anti-competitive behaviour, it is also clear that there will be many smaller start-up companies that will never be given a chance to get established because of the behaviour of the big players. We have a real concern about how we can make their voices heard too. We run the danger that the DMU will contact only the people it already knows about and will not hear from those who are perhaps most squeezed out of the process being investigated.

Our suggestion is that the DMU should have a statutory duty to send decision notices to third parties that it assesses are likely to be most affected by such a decision. To us, this does not seem to be unduly burdensome to the DMU. One could argue that a failure to know which challenger firms are likely to be affected could be very injurious to consumers and the economy at large. In the Commons, the Minister said he thought there would be “limited benefits” to introducing this requirement. I do not think the Government have made the case on this point and I hope they will think again. I also hope that they and the Minister will listen carefully to the points made in this debate.

In the last few weeks, we have met and received submissions from many challenger firms concerned about the Government’s position on the issue. They support the Bill but worry about the imbalance, as they fear it will have a deleterious effect on the regime. They have all made it clear that they support our amendments. I hope the Minister will be able to agree with our arguments. We think there is a strong case for involving the challenger firms at an earlier stage and giving them far more information. I would like to hear how and when the Government intend to do that. I beg to move.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

I declare a number of general interests with respect to this Bill. I am on the advisory board of BSV, a consumer class action being taken against crypto exchanges; I act as a consultant to DLA Piper; I have also had contact with many companies, several platforms and their advisors and many consumer groups about the Bill. As a former chairman of the CMA, I had a significant hand in constructing large parts of it. It is important that others bear in mind that anything I say on this is from the perspective of having been there for enough time to have taken too many of its ideas to heart. In fact, I have been lobbied in all directions on this Bill and for so long that I am losing count of which direction the lobbies all come from.