European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting
Monday 20th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I am a co-signatory, with the noble Baroness, to Amendment 3, which leads this group. There is little that I need to add to what she has already said or, indeed, to what was said in the debate last week. However, I would like to raise one or two points with the Minister.

Looking at this as dispassionately and objectively as one can, one wonders whether Clause 21 was drafted before there was any confidence that there would be a new devolved Administration in Stormont. The impression is given that everything was going to have to be decided in London still, whereas since then there has been a very dramatic and welcome change in Northern Ireland—I give credit to the Minister and his colleagues for the part that they played in that. However, it looks as if this was thought through before that element was fully appreciated. It makes much better sense to go through the proper process of primary legislation and not to divert into secondary legislation for this purpose.

Last week, I quoted the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who referred to this clause as being, “Henry VIII on steroids”. It is the most egregious example of a really powerful use of a Henry VIII power in the whole Bill. There are several others, but this is the most obvious one because, as the noble Baroness has already said, it allows the change in the statute to be made without a reference to Parliament fully in its role as scrutineer. The Minister will recall that, in a powerful recommendation, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said:

“Even if the House accepts that there is a good reason for Clause 21 to allow regulations to modify the 2018 Act, the power should, in our view, be limited to the minimum necessary. We therefore recommend that the Bill should spell out the purposes for which the power is to be used rather than leaving the matter at large.”


The Bill should spell out how the power should be used, rather than the House just getting assurances from the Minister.

In last week’s debate, the Minister was kind enough to refer to this issue in the following terms:

“It would be very easy for me to say: ‘You have just got to trust me’. That is not what I am trying to say, and it would be foolish as noble Lords should not try to trust me. The important thing is to test me, and to test the Government. That is why, as well as putting these points to the House now, and setting out the areas in which we do need these necessary powers, I am happy to put that in to a note which I will supply and make available to all noble Lords who are interested in this, so they can see where we believe this power will be required to deliver the very thing that Northern Ireland wants: safety and security within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.”—[Official Report, 14/1/20; col. 639.]


As the noble Baroness has said, there is apparently such a letter: I have not seen it. I took part extensively in that debate. I was in the Committee until almost the last moment on Thursday; I was in the House again this morning at 9.30 am. I cannot be accused of being absent on leave; I have been around. Why did that letter not come to me? From what the noble Baroness said, I can assume that there is an attempt to justify this part of the Bill. I have huge respect for the Minister and his respect for this House is well known, but, frankly, it is not satisfactory for Members of your Lordships’ House to be given that sort of undertaking from a Minister. It makes it very difficult for me and, no doubt, other Members who attended that debate but did not take part, if they have not seen the justification given in the letter.

Given that the House has now voted to amend the Bill, it is going to the Commons, even if it is for a very short time. There must surely be an opportunity for the Minister to explain on the record—not just with a letter, which may go astray—why the exceptional use of Henry VIII powers which I have described is being made at this juncture. That is all I need to say at the moment, but I shall listen with great interest to what the Minister may say. Perhaps he is going to read us the letter.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, refers to this as an “exceptional use” of Henry VIII powers. I wish I could be comforted to that extent, but it seems to me that the use of Henry VIII powers is an endemic vice in government, and I wonder why Ministers and officials never learn. The Henry VIII powers taken in relation to Clause 21 are very extensive indeed. I certainly accept what the Minister says, that it is not their intention to amend the devolution settlement, which ought to be amended by primary legislation. It is, none the less, offensive in principle to take such powers: it does not need to be done. The Government seem to think it is expedient, but it is actually very bad for trust between Parliament and the Executive, and, I think, bad for trust between politics and the people.

The Minister and I had a brief exchange in Committee on this, and on the particular question of whether the powers that the Government propose to take to themselves to alter primary legislation, or even abolish primary legislation by statutory instrument, would be subject to the affirmative or the negative procedure. He said his advice from his officials was that they would be subject to the affirmative procedure, and I agree that that is indeed the case where Clause 21 is concerned, but when we come to Clause 41, which is the most all-embracing, there is a socking great Henry VIII power. It is an almost megalomaniac provision and there is no such assurance available. As I understand the legislation, and as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, more significantly, understands the legislation, the exercise of those powers under Clause 41 would be by the negative procedure. That is even more offensive, and it would be very helpful if the Minister would comment.

I hope the Minister will accept that, as a matter of general principle, the use of Henry VIII powers is objectionable; that if they are to be taken, they need to be defended in very clear and specific terms, as they have not so far been in the consideration of this legislation; and that the offence is compounded where the proposal is that the exercise of those powers should not be subject to the affirmative procedure.

Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 2nd March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours for persisting with this theme, and for bringing this issue back once again at Third Reading however forlorn the prospect of acceptance of his compromise amendment may seem to be—and it is. As other noble Lords have said, the issue that it deals with is one of very great importance for the House of Commons. I believe, in any case, that by introducing these provisions for the recall process, the House of Commons has demonstrated a catastrophic lack of self-confidence. Specifically, the means of policing its own affairs that the House of Commons has traditionally used is the operation of the Standards Committee. Through the provisions in the Bill, and particularly through the amendment brought in by the Labour Party to reduce the period of suspension from 20 days to 10 days, which would trigger the recall process, the effect will be greatly to reduce the practical capacity of the Standards Committee to perform its proper function.

If the House of Commons is to rehabilitate itself in the public esteem, it must be seen to be able to take responsibility, and to provide effective means to take responsibility, for matters of internal discipline and for disciplining Members of Parliament who transgress or commit serious wrongdoing. In so reducing the realistic scope for disciplinary sanctions that the Standards Committee can recommend to the full House, the House of Commons has portrayed a lack of self-confidence and done itself a deep disservice.

So I add to the plea from my noble friend Lord Hughes of Woodside that the Front Bench will accept the amendment simply to allow Members of the House of Commons to think again about this. Very few of them participated. Very few of them voted in the debates. Many of them did not realise the import of what was approved by the House. They ought to have that opportunity to think again, in their interests and in the interests of parliamentary democracy. I think that we in your Lordships’ House are fully entitled to offer our advice to them on this matter. As another House of Parliament, and as citizens, we have an interest in the integrity, good name and good functioning of the House of Commons.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I am very sympathetic indeed to Amendments 1 and 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for the very specific reason that I have followed the progress of the Bill throughout its stages in both Houses and I can confirm to your Lordships that a whole number of implications which have arisen in this House were not addressed there—for one very simple reason: all the votes were on a free vote. I am very enthusiastic about free voting in both Houses, but of course when there is a free vote there is not the same guidance from the parties about the full implications of the measures in front of the House—whether it is this House or that House.

I can confirm absolutely the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Hughes of Woodside and Lord Howarth, that this issue of what could easily happen—in the terms that have been so forensically analysed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours—in the Standards Committee, simply were not addressed in the debate in the other place. I suggest to my noble friend Lord Forsyth that if the recall mechanism was in place, for example, I do not believe that party leaders would feel that it was appropriate to appear to prejudge the outcome of an inquiry by removing the party Whip. I think that they would be inclined to leave it to the commissioner, the committee and then to the recall process—and eventually, of course, to the electorate, as is the intention behind the Bill.

On those grounds, I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench will be prepared to think very carefully about how we must give the House of Commons another opportunity to think through the implications of this part of the Bill.

Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler]

As the noble Baroness will know from her ministerial experience, they are already under the Ministerial Code—properly so. I want to turn to the critical issue, which is of course the one raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, about the Bill of Rights, parliamentary privilege and exclusive competence. I am not a lawyer but I experienced—or suffered, whichever way one wants to say it—two years, I think, sitting on the Joint Committee looking at the issue of parliamentary privilege. As a result of that experience, I contributed to the discussions in this House when we were looking, after the expenses scandal, at the whole issue of IPSA.

What is absolutely clear—my noble friend the Minister effectively made it clear again today—is that if Parliament decides that parliamentary privilege should be constrained in a particular respect, it is up to Parliament to make that decision. That is what the Bill is already doing, to some extent, without my amendments. The noble Lord is quite right that there are implications for parliamentary privilege, but it is not a yes/no or a black/white situation, it is up to Parliament to decide if and when it wants to constrain and restrict its own position in relation to parliamentary privilege.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I am not a constitutional lawyer either, but would the noble Lord agree that the House of Commons now bitterly regrets the passing of the legislation establishing IPSA?

[Lord Tyler]

I am not sure that the noble Lord was here during the debate on that Bill, but I was and took an extensive part in the debate. I was very concerned about a number of elements, including the way in which MPs seemed to be all too easily restricting their own responsibilities in terms of exclusive cognisance.

I want to go back to the whole rationale for trying to find a route in this particular direction. My noble friend Lord Forsyth, who was as generous as ever in recognising the contribution to the work of this House of his coalition colleagues, identified very precisely that there was a recognition throughout the House at Second Reading—as was made so clear by the Constitution Committee—that putting this new responsibility on the Standards Committee was a serious weakness in the Bill. That is where we are coming from.

My noble friend the Minister has been very generous in his response but there has not been any government reaction to that very serious weakness. Frankly, I do not think that this is a good Bill, but it is made even worse by the responsibilities and the danger of serious politicisation of what has previously not been a political process in the Standards Committee—again, I regret very much that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is not here.

Wales Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 11th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

The noble Lord is absolutely right about the significance of grants that I hope would continue to be made from the Government in London—the Government of the United Kingdom. I have some anxieties that the conferral of tax-raising powers on Wales may be the prelude to a rather drastic withdrawal of redistributive taxation and grant giving across the United Kingdom as a whole. The noble Lord is quite right that these are very difficult issues. I acknowledge the force of what he said on that particular point.

Where I have a reservation about this group of amendments is that they seem to envisage perpetual referendums. There is a reference in all of them to referendums. Personally, I very much hope that the people of Wales will not reach a point in their politics when they conduct a referendum on independence for Wales. I do not want to contemplate that. Nor would it be a good idea if the people of Wales developed the habit of conducting a series of referendums on ad hoc issues. To the extent that we resort to referendums to solve tricky issues in our domestic politics, we tend to undermine representative government and the Parliament of Westminster. I will just finish the point and then give way to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. We would equally undermine the authority of the Welsh Assembly if it became a habit or reflex to have referendums, however populist that might be.

[Lord Tyler]

I just wanted to draw the attention of the noble Lord to the fact that there is of course a very considerable section of the Bill dealing precisely with referendums—or referenda, as I prefer to describe them. The noble Lord will have to accept that these are entirely relevant to the Bill and therefore a very likely prospect in Wales at some point.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

They are relevant to the Bill but the fact that the Bill deals with referendums does not make referendums any more desirable. On the question of gerunds and gerundives, I hope that there is perhaps a noble Lord in the House who can resolve this issue between the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and myself, and tell us whether they should be referred to as referenda or referendums.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I am delighted to be a cosignatory of Amendment 15 in the name of my noble friend and others. I want to take issue to a very limited extent with both my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, who I think are being slightly too pessimistic about the level of interest of young people in registration. The Scottish example is wonderful in that respect, but it is also true that Bite the Ballot, to which reference has been made, has made some real progress this year. It has been by making sure that it there is peer-to-peer encouragement—I do not mean Peer in the sense of Members in this House, I mean the real reference of young people to young people of the issues that are at stake. I have today had an Answer to a Question from the Minister for the Cabinet Office. My Question was:

“To ask Her Majesty’s Government what action they are taking to improve electoral registration rates among those attaining the age of 18”.

I will not read the whole Answer because it is substantial, but just two important paragraphs:

“To support the transition to Individual Electoral Registration, the Government has invested £4.2 million in 2013/14 shared across every ERO in Great Britain and 5 national organisations to support the costs of activities aimed at increasing the rate of voter registration.

The Government has also introduced online registration in Great Britain. As of midnight 28 October, 478,177 16-24 year olds had registered online”.—[Official Report, 10/11/14; col. WA 4.]

In a relatively short period this is a success story. I do not think that we should be too depressed or pessimistic about this problem.

As the Minister will know, I have sat for some time on a small cross-party informal group advising the Electoral Commission. Therefore I take very seriously indeed the guidance it gives us. In its note on this part of the Bill and the amendments to the Bill, it says:

“We strongly support the principle of EROs—

that is obviously electoral registration officers—

“visiting schools and talking to young people about democratic participation. This should form part of their local strategies to promote electoral registration generally and to target those groups who are least likely to be registered to vote … All 22 EROs in Wales have specific plans in place highlighting how they will work with schools and the further education sector in order to engage with attainers and young people”.

I think there is a consensus across the House—certainly among all those who have already spoken—that this is an important issue. Maybe, however, the concern some of us have is whether it is appropriate for statute. Is it appropriate to be in the Bill to this extent and in this detail? Hence the very brief amendment that I endorse.

I accept, however, that my noble friend the Minister may well feel that the Government are already committed —in supporting the Electoral Commission financially, and in terms of guidance and instruction where that is appropriate—to make sure that what we are seeking will happen with or without this amendment. I therefore look forward with interest to hearing how the Minister feels that we can best achieve the objectives which I think we share throughout the House.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, is it not a principal purpose of education to enable young people to think for themselves, to form views on informed and discerning bases and to take good decisions? In no sphere of life is this more important than democracy. Education should be a preparation for democracy. That is why I support these amendments, and very particularly Amendment 14.

Wales Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 15th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to add my signature to this group of amendments. Although I am very proud of my Celtic ancestry in a different part of the United Kingdom, I am not Welsh, not a lawyer and not even a Methodist local preacher. So I can be incredibly succinct in saying that what is so important about this group of amendments is that it is based not on any theory but on practical experience both in Northern Ireland and now in Scotland, as my noble friend Lord Roberts has said. I hope that, in that spirit, the Minister will be able to accept these amendments in toto because they do not in any way extend into a new area. They simply take advantage of the practical experience we have had in other parts of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, given the very disappointing levels of registration and turnout among young people to which both the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, and my noble friend have referred, we clearly need to be a lot more energetic and imaginative in the ways in which we seek to engage young people in our democratic processes. I find the proposals in these amendments very attractive, but I wonder whether the Minister, or the noble Lord who moved these amendments, would offer any thoughts on two issues.

The first is that it is going to cost money. The noble Lord, Lord Roberts, suggested that these processes could be carried out even, perhaps, at a profit. I would be grateful if he could clarify how this might occur because, if we ask electoral registration officers to take on additional responsibilities and to become busier, it is likely to cost money. In this time of austerity, when local authorities are operating within such extremely stringent financial limits, there are questions about priorities. When local authorities are finding it extremely difficult to carry out the responsibilities that they wish to do in relation to education, social services, housing and so forth, where would the pursuit of improved levels of electoral registration best lie within their scale of priorities?

The other issue on which I would be interested to hear the views of the Minister and of the noble Lord is whether we should move to giving the vote to young people at the age of 16. Of course we want to encourage young people to participate in our democracy. Many young people would wish to do so and feel ready to do so at 16. When I was the Member of Parliament for Newport East and used to hold meetings with sixth-formers in my constituency, I was quite surprised to find how many young people had their doubts as to whether it was appropriate to lower the voting age to 16. I would be interested to hear the thoughts of noble Lords opposite as to whether that sentiment has changed in the 10 years since I ceased to be a Member of Parliament for a Welsh constituency and whether, if we enfranchise people at 16, we will see them positively engaging in democracy with that new opportunity.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 39, which fits into this group covering various contingencies in relation to the resignation of the Prime Minister. My amendment would provide for an early general election if the Prime Minister resigned and, after 14 days, there had been no vote of confidence in any Government of Her Majesty.

This issue was raised by my noble friend Lady Jay during the proceedings of the Select Committee on the Constitution. She asked the Minister, Mr Harper, whether, if a Government resigned without losing a vote of confidence, that would trigger the 14-day provision. Mr Harper replied:

“If the government resigned and we were without a government, you would then have to have a process of government formation. I believe that we think that would be the case”.

That is not quite pellucid and it hardly inspires confidence that Ministers had thought rigorously about this legislation.

Mr Harper then wrote again to the Select Committee, stating that:

“There is nothing in the Bill that prevents a government resigning; the Bill is about the length of a Parliament. If a government decided to resign when the Speaker had indicated that he was not minded to issue such a certificate, then the 14 day period would not be triggered although, as I said to the Committee, a period of government formation would obviously follow. It would just not be time-limited”.

Your Lordships may consider that it should be time-limited and that we should not allow ourselves to get into the Belgian or Iraqi situation whereby a Government cannot be formed for very long periods.

Amendment 38 of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, specifies 28 days. As he anticipated, I think that 28 days is too long. His Amendment 35 does not specify any time limit, but just removes the 14-day provision altogether. It will be no surprise to your Lordships, following a previous debate, if I confide in you that that is a much more attractive provision. However, supposing we accept that time should not be unlimited in such circumstances. If we provided for 14 days before an early general election takes place, following the resignation of the Prime Minister, it would integrate provision for the contingency of the Prime Minister’s resignation with the provisions in the Bill for other early departures of a Government.

It may be wise to provide a clear remedy, given that we have the Bill. The Bill would abolish the royal prerogative of Dissolution. Currently, with the prerogative—as the noble Lord reminded us—if the Prime Minister resigns, the Queen takes soundings to see whether another party leader can form a Government. If he cannot do so, she dissolves Parliament. That remedy is removed by the Bill. The Bill allows resolution of the impasse only if two-thirds of MPs vote to dissolve Parliament. However, that is not a sure remedy, because the Opposition might prefer not to take their chances at an immediate general election—they might not co-operate to secure that two-thirds vote.

It is worth considering what might have happened in historical situations that some of us can at least dimly remember. In the Government of Mr Attlee in 1951, he chose to go to the country. Aneurin Bevan and Harold Wilson had resigned from the Cabinet, having disagreed with the Government’s budget. The Labour Party had a majority of five, and Mr Attlee judged that he could not carry on. Under this Bill, Mr Attlee could not have gone to the country. Under this Bill, Mr Heath could not have gone to the country in February 1974. Of course, Mr Attlee or Mr Heath might have appealed to the other leaders and secured a two-thirds vote of the House of Commons for Parliament to be dissolved and for there to be a general election. However, what might have happened in October 1974, when Harold Wilson chose to go to the country? Would the Conservatives, at that stage, have been ready to agree to a general election? We shall never know, but the answer is uncertain.

It may be as well to provide a clear remedy, although I anticipate that the Minister will point out that it would drive a coach and horses through the central purpose of the Bill, which is to prevent a Prime Minister from seeking an early general election. However, in such situations as I have sketched, it may be desirable and in the public interest for there to be an early general election. The fact that we have to debate these amendments once again shows the unwisdom of seeking to legislate for fixed-term Parliaments.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I have the greatest respect for my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, who has unrivalled academic expertise and authority in matters of this sort. I am a mere practitioner, so my contribution to this debate is very much probing, rather than definitive. I am generally concerned about the drift that would appear to be the theme of this group. The Committee is provided with three options. One would remove the 14-day period for the formation of a new Government if the existing one falls; one would extend that period to 28 days; and the other would keep it at 14 days but change the process by which it would happen. We therefore have a spectrum of three amendments, representing a scale: one with no period at all in which another Government could be formed; one with a 14-day period; and one with a 28-day period. Those of us of a centrist disposition might be naturally inclined towards the middle option—Amendment 39 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport. However, strictly speaking, Amendment 39 is not necessary, since it barely departs from the principle that the Government have already adumbrated in the Bill itself.

Therefore, I will concentrate principally on Amendment 35, which is the “back me or sack me” amendment. It would offer a Prime Minister who had lost the support of his or her party in the Commons the opportunity to go to the country instead of to the Palace. There is nothing wrong with that in principle. It might have provided some clear guidance to Thatcher, Major and Blair at moments when factionalism was on the cusp of becoming fratricide. However, again, the amendment is surely unnecessary. The Bill already allows for the Prime Minister to resign or for a new Prime Minister and a new Government to be appointed. What the amendment does is to take away from Back-Benchers in the House of Commons the power actively to insist on the replacement of the Prime Minister with another. That is the principle behind this change. Instead, it places the decision on going to the country, as now, back with the incumbent of No. 10. I thought Members on all sides of your Lordships’ House thought that was not necessarily the best result.

Under the Bill as it stands, a Prime Minister could effectively be disposed of, as Labour wanted to do with Blair for so long. A clear period would then exist for a new Government to be formed. Members of the Committee can imagine that, when Tony Blair eventually stepped down, the Bill’s provisions would have allowed Gordon Brown to form what he called a new Government, in much the same way that John Major did when Margaret Thatcher resigned. It is not, therefore, clear to me whether my noble friend seeks a move away from the principle that votes of confidence in the Government need not precipitate an election—the status quo—if another Government can be formed. Here is the nub of a very important principle. I wonder whether my noble friend is trying to move away from the principle that the Prime Minister must have the authority and confidence of the House of Commons to continue; and whether he is, therefore, moving towards a principle that there ought, automatically, to be an election if there is a change of Prime Minister.

In February 1974, Mr Heath said, “Who governs Britain?”. He did not say, “Back me or sack me”. We have referred to that election on several occasions in your Lordships’ House in recent months; it is one that many of us recall very well. I have no doubt that my noble friend could find much public support for that principle. However, on balance, I have always thought that British Governments should depend simply and solely on the confidence of the House of Commons to remain in office. That is a parliamentary democracy, not a presidential one.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

The noble Lord, Lord Rennard, makes an excellent point. However, I am optimistic because we are about to resume proper scrutiny in your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Tyler]

The noble Lord referred to slumbering Members on this side of the House. There is photographic evidence that the only people who actually went to sleep were people listening to his speech on his side of the House.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

On the contrary, I myself went to sleep, but not during my own speeches—although I might have done, and indeed the noble Lord might have supposed that I had done. I concede that at certain points.

We are about to resume a proper practice of scrutiny in the best traditions of your Lordships’ House. It is particularly important given that there was no Green Paper heralding this legislation, there has been no pre-legislative scrutiny, yet this Bill is of very great constitutional importance in itself and its provisions interact with other constitutional measures. For example, they interact with the provisions for boundary reviews that we just legislated in the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act. They interact with provisions that we can anticipate in a draft measure for reform of your Lordships’ House. They interact with the contents that we can anticipate of a draft parliamentary privileges Bill, which we are led to expect. I think that it would have been better if the Government’s proposals in all these respects had been laid out and available for pre-legislative scrutiny rather than that Parliament was required, effectively, to legislate on aspects of the constitution without having the ability to consider the interplay between different reforming measures. However, I am encouraged by what the Deputy Prime Minister said in the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House on 13 October last year in responding to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick:

“Of course, what matters now is the degree of scrutiny that”,

the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill,

“is subject to as the legislation passes through both Houses. On that we are very clear. We want to make sure that it is subject to the greatest possible scrutiny, which it rightly deserves”.

In that spirit, I beg to move Amendment 1 in my name.

The Bill, as drafted, prescribes polling at general elections on a Thursday. It ignores the debate about the case for polling at weekends or other ways in which polling can be facilitated for our citizens. It effectively closes down that debate, which has been proceeding somewhat desultorily for a number of years. However, it is a proper debate and I do not think that it should be instantly closed down. We all have a major concern about how to improve participation in elections in this country. I am indebted to the Library of the House of Commons for a chart that it has provided in one of its notes, which shows a tendency for turnout at general elections to have declined significantly between 1950 and 2010. The bar chart indicates that in 1950 turnout in the general election of that year was of the order of 83 per cent. It fell a little bit at subsequent elections, but in February 1974 it was at or very close to 80 per cent, which is remarkable. Of course, the country was in crisis at that time and it was perceived to be an exceptionally important election. Nevertheless, looking back from where we are now, we would regard it as quite remarkable that turnout was 80 per cent in February weather conditions in 1974.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, this has been a better debate than it looked like being. We were not exactly playing to a packed House at the beginning but more and more noble Lords have stood up and made short speeches that have been to the point and very interesting. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for his support. At least, I think I had his support for the amendment. If so, that was quite something because I, like other noble Lords, hold his views on the constitution and constitutional reform in the very greatest respect. He is quite right to press the Government to provide an evidential base in support of the propositions they put to the House in their legislation. I do not think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was able to respond with the evidence that the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, sought.

My observation is a little bit like his: I simply do not see it as being the reality that politicians plan systematically. They talk endlessly about strategies, but I have yet to see a politician who is capable of developing and sustaining a strategy over a year, let alone four years. It is wholly unlikely that the culture and work and behaviour patterns of either House of Parliament would be so dramatically changed as a consequence of knowing that the span of this Parliament was to be fixed for five years. Politicians improvise, and it is greatly to their credit that they do so—they need to. It is part of their responsibility to be responsive to public opinion and the shifts and tides of opinion and events; they are not good politicians if they are not. That is not to disparage or to criticise them. I would have a horror of a Government who were so tunnel-visioned and so rigid that they set themselves a five-year plan at the outset of a Parliament and determined to stick to it. It does not seem to correspond with political human nature, and it is an entirely spurious justification for introducing fixed-term Parliaments.

One has only to look at the ad-hocery that we have seen in this first year of the coalition Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, suggested. We have seen this Government attempt to get away with establishing a requirement for a 55 per cent vote to have an early general election. It was like a leak except that it was brazenly published in the interesting work of autobiography, memoir, history, political science or whatever it is by Mr David Laws, who candidly acknowledged—my noble friend Lord Hunt quoted from this interesting volume—the unembarrassed, shameless and self-interested calculation on the part of Mr Stunell for Liberal Democrats and Mr Osborne for the Conservatives. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, supported by my noble friend Lord Grocott, reminded us that we have a responsibility when we address questions of constitutional reform not to dress up our views and even our calculations of party political interest in high-flown constitutional sentiment—I suppose the term is not to be hypocritical. My noble friend is quite right that we are all susceptible to that temptation. It may well be that, from his vantage point there in the corner, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, is better able to spot when that aberration, that corruption, is occurring than many of us who are more impulsive participants. He was perfectly right. I suspect that I am simply too naive to make an effective calculation of party political interest. In a rather old-fashioned way, I think that it is our job to try to get all this right.

I dispute the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, that my amendment would drive a coach and horses through the principle of a fixed-term Parliament, because it proposes a fixed term within a tolerance of one year. It is a fixed term with a sensible flexibility. It is a compromise, but there are many compromises already in the legislation. The Government have introduced what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was candid enough to refer to as escape hatches. If the Government can introduce escape hatches, is it not in order or appropriate for us to amend this legislation to provide some pragmatic flexibility to enable the term of the Parliament to run between four and five years? That is a compromise between a fully fixed-term Parliament and the situation that we have at the moment where it is open to the Prime Minister, answerable to no one, to determine the date of the election. I believe that, previously, the date was for the Cabinet to determine. It was Lloyd George as Prime Minister who took it upon himself, on his own single initiative, to exercise the prerogative power, as one could term it, to call upon Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament.

What I am proposing lies somewhere between the two extremes. In reality, when you are legislating on most matters, you need to provide for a sensible degree of flexibility so that in practice people can carry things forward in a realistic way. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, said that it would undermine one of the great benefits of the Bill as she sees it; the requirement of the Prime Minister and the Government to face the electors on a pre-determined date. The proposal does compromise on that, but it still means that there will be a pre-determined date in the fifth year of the Parliament. I think public opinion would find that quite acceptable.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, absolutely rightly said that in this Committee we are all being driven to tinker with a fundamentally misconceived policy. I agree with him; I do not support fixed-term Parliaments. But we are, as the previous Prime Minister Mr Blair used to say, where we are. The Bill has received its Second Reading. It is not for us to seek to overturn the principle of the Bill that there should be fixed-term Parliaments. It is for us to limit the damage that this legislation may cause. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested that perhaps the least bad way forward would be to legislate for this Parliament alone and to drop the idea of having fixed-term Parliaments after the expiry of this Parliament. I suggest that it would be deplorable to legislate to rescue the coalition from its political difficulties; to provide some sort of lifeline to coalition partners who do not agree with each other and do not trust each other and have asked Parliament to bail them out of that predicament. That would not be a proper way for Parliament to spend its time. On the other hand, I am tempted to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it is less bad to do that than to saddle our country and our constitution with fixed-term Parliaments in perpetuity or until Parliament decides that it was not a good idea after all and therefore we should undo the legislation.

The debate on this amendment is really an amuse bouche before the important debate on Amendment 11 which we will have next week. That will be the debate on whether we should amend the Bill to provide for a fixed-term Parliament of four years in clear-cut fashion and without the compromise and flexibility that I have suggested. That is the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, my noble friend Lord Bach and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. That will be a major debate.

[Lord Tyler]

I wonder whether the noble Lord recognises that if he had not spoken at such length we could have progressed on to Amendment 11 this evening.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I assure the noble Lord that that is absolutely not the case.

We have had a useful exploratory debate on the issue of four and five years. The House ought always to listen with special care to the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn. As a former Speaker of the House of Commons, he understands that House in a way that few others do. The noble Lord has given us some reasons why Parliament should favour a four-year fixed term rather than a five-year fixed term and we should meditate on what he said. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, my Amendment 27FA would insert a new clause after Clause 11, and after the new clause inserted by the amendment of my noble and learned friend. His new clause relates to the size of the Executive—the number of Ministers. My new clause is intimately related to that and deals with the number of Parliamentary Private Secretaries. I propose that their number should also be reduced commensurately with any reduction in the size of the House of Commons. We are talking here of the so-called payroll vote—the payroll which consists not only of salaried Ministers and one or two unsalaried Ministers, but of Parliamentary Private Secretaries. Although they are unpaid, they are always somewhat sardonically referred to as being members of the payroll vote.

In Committee, noble Lords on all sides of the House expressed their concern that the capacity of the House of Commons to hold the Executive to account would be further enfeebled if the size of the payroll vote were not to be reduced in proportion to the reduction of the size of the House of Commons. An important amendment on that matter moved by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, attracted a great deal of interest and support on all sides. Since then, I have learnt that the Speaker of the House of Commons himself has expressed concern that reducing the number of MPs without a commensurate reduction in the number of Ministers would skew the Westminster playing field in favour of the Government, as has the steady expansion of the payroll. Those sentiments were attributed to Mr Speaker Bercow in an article in the House Magazine.

Mr Cameron has appointed a lavish number of Parliamentary Private Secretaries, considerable numbers of party vice-chairmen and special representatives. His latest appointment in that genre is a defence envoy for Gibraltar. The Member of Parliament who has been appointed to that distinguished role is someone for whom I have the highest personal regard, but the important point is that she will be bound into the patronage system and lose her capacity to express an independent point of view—certainly in terms of voting. Richard Hall, writing in the House Magazine, said that patronage sucks in more and more Back-Benchers, leaving fewer to hold the Government to account.

[Lord Tyler]

Given that the Government have appointed a number of Labour Members to perform particular tasks, does the noble Lord include them in the payroll vote—Mr Frank Field, for example?

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I entirely deprecate this tendency and I am delighted that the noble Lord has drawn our attention to a continuation of a baleful tendency that has persisted for many years. In 1900, there were just 60 salaried government posts, of which only 33 were filled by Members of Parliament. In addition, there were nine Parliamentary Private Secretaries. The total payroll vote in 1900 was 42. One hundred years later, in the year 2000, which was during the period of the previous Labour Government, the payroll consisted of 129 out of 659 Members of Parliament. We should also bear in mind that other legislatures—for example, the legislatures in the United States of America and in France—do not have to supply the ministerial Bench. We should not forget that when considering the Government’s claims that we are overrepresented in Parliament by comparison to other nations.

As a result of the exercise of patronage by Mr Cameron, possibly advised by Mr Clegg, there are now 95 Ministers in the House of Commons and 46 Parliamentary Private Secretaries. The Constitution Unit tells me that that represents more Parliamentary Private Secretaries than there have ever been. The payroll vote is 141 out of 650 Members of Parliament. A year ago, Mr Cameron, addressing the Conservative Party asked:

“How has the mother of all Parliaments turned itself into such a pliant child?”

The answer is that it has done so on the basis of thorough, systematic and unscrupulous use of Prime Ministerial patronage. The Prime Minister is now able to answer that question he posed a year ago. Ministers in the coalition Government profess to repent themselves of this; but, like Saint Augustine, they do not intend virtue just yet. This Bill provides an opportunity for them to embark on a reformed life, but they hesitate—indeed, decline—to take that opportunity.

This is a very important constitutional issue. It is about the capacity of the House of Commons to debate with some measure of freedom, to scrutinise with some independence and to hold the Executive to account. The capacity of your Lordships' House to do that is under threat, in consequence of the coalition having a political majority in this House. The plight of both Houses of Parliament must now be a matter of intense concern. The proposed new clauses provide the opportunity to assist the House of Commons to recover its capacity to perform the function within our constitution that the people expect of it.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 8th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 27A, 27C and 27D. I want to pay tribute to my noble friends on the Front Bench because this responds directly to a request made in Committee by my noble friend Lord Rennard and me that we should have some very simple, practical rules in the Bill to deal with the issue to which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has just referred. These amendments together seem to us fully to meet our concerns. I think that they are practical and sensible, but they recognise that in certain parts of the United Kingdom it will be very difficult to be precise; for example, in a big city like Birmingham where the wards are very big indeed—I believe that they run to hundreds of thousands of people. In those circumstances, obviously you cannot have a hard-and-fast rule. However, Amendments 27A, 27C and 27D meet fully the requirements of a realistic appreciation that wards will indeed be the building blocks of constituency size; but we have to have some flexibility to meet the particular concerns and needs of different parts of the United Kingdom. I am very grateful to my noble friends.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I have three amendments in this group: Amendments 27AA, 27BA and 27BB. These are technical amendments and I do not think that they have any political implications at all. Certainly I do not think that they do anything to challenge what the Government regard as the principles of this Bill. I am rather puzzled that in the definitions of local government boundaries on page 12 in Clause 10(3)(a), reference is made to the boundaries of each county, each district and each London borough, but no reference is made to the boundaries of other unitary authorities. If the noble Lord is able to tell me that other unitary authorities are covered by these definitions as already stated in the Bill, I have no problem; but I do not think that they are. There are unitary authorities that are not counties or London boroughs. Surely it would be desirable in principle if the Boundary Commissions, in applying rule 5(1)(b) on page 10, were to seek to avoid crossing the boundaries of other unitary authorities when drawing up the boundaries of constituencies. Professor Ron Johnston made that point in his evidence to the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform of another place. He suggested that it was no more than an oversight that other unitary authorities had not been included within the clarification of terms in the Bill.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 7th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, perhaps I may say a word about Amendment 14 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. Her amendment would provide that if there is not a majority in support of changing the electoral system,

“in any one of the four parts of the United Kingdom”,

the proposition should fall for the United Kingdom as a whole. I certainly hope that there is common ground around the House that we wish to strengthen the Union and bind the peoples of the four parts of the United Kingdom in one coherent political system and, as far as possible, in one political culture. It would be singularly unfortunate and divisive, were the referendum to be lost in one of the four parts—let us suppose, for example, that the people of Wales were to vote no but those of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland were to vote yes—if the people of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland were then to impose their preferred version of an electoral system on the people of Wales. I think that that would be divisive, traumatic and very unfortunate.

[Lord Tyler]

Is the noble Lord really saying that it would be divisive in those circumstances when it is clear that what would be much more divisive is that if one part of the United Kingdom was able to veto the clear majority of the decision of the rest of the United Kingdom? That is a complete nonsense.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

The noble Lord sees things in a mirror glass world and he is entitled to look at them from that perspective. However, I invite him to consider what the impact on the sentiment would be in Wales if, having voted against the proposition that, say, the alternative vote system should be used, it was none the less to be imposed by the rest of the United Kingdom on the people of Wales. I think that that would create a grievance and that it would be an unhappy development. The amendment in the name of my noble friend is well worth the House meditating upon.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 31st January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler]

While it is one thing is to express an opinion in the House, does the noble and learned Lord agree that having exhortation in the Bill implies that it is somehow necessary to encourage the Boundary Commissions to operate in a particular way? That implies a degree of a lack of trust in the work that they do. I wonder whether he would take this opportunity to reject the suggestion from his noble friend Lord Howarth that to express that sort of exhortation in the actual Bill is not helpful in this case. I accept what the noble Lord says about expressions of support and encouragement for a due process in the discussion that is taking place in the Committee, but to put it into the Bill itself seems to me to be a retrograde step.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Before my noble and learned friend answers the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, perhaps I could clarify that while I have asked the Minister to express on behalf of the Government their expectation of a high standard of publicity and consultation, it would certainly not be my view that we should resort to exhortation in the language of the Bill but rather that we should state a requirement in the language of the Bill.

[Lord Tyler]

The noble Lord actually said, and I listened with great care, that it should be in the new clause that my noble and learned friend should bring forward—that is, in the Bill.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

It was a word used by the Minister, I think the noble Lord will find.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 24th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I think that I was under the same misapprehension as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, until I actually heard precisely what the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, said. I should say that I know the constituency in question extremely well. My brother has lived there for many years, and of course Richard Livsey was one of my closest colleagues; I campaigned for him, I worked with him and for him both in the other House and in this House, and I was privileged to attend his funeral service, which was one of the most moving I have ever attended.

We should be clear, however: this amendment is not proposing that this constituency should be made an exception. It does not add to the list of exceptions. The amendment would change rule 4 for every constituency in the country. I do not understand why the noble Lord, who is usually meticulous in preparing amendments, moved it in totally different terms. It may or may not apply to the constituency of Brecon and Radnorshire but it certainly introduces a completely new rule for the whole country. Therefore, if I may say so, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, should look very carefully at the amendment. It changes rule 4. I understand that it may or may not apply to this constituency, but the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, is making sure that there is a completely new set of criteria for every constituency—in Scotland, England, Northern Ireland and Wales. It does not provide for an exemption.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I put it to the noble Lord that it is surely sensible, as my noble friend proposes, to develop sensible rules of general application, rather than to proceed by amending the Bill here, there and elsewhere by adding new clauses to create anomalies and exceptions to unsatisfactory rules, as we have them at the moment in the draft Bill. That is why my noble friend’s amendment is very sensible.

[Lord Tyler]

It does not do that; it provides completely new criteria, which would presumably change over time. That is not clear from the amendment. The amendment is defective, even in the terms in which the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has proposed it.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 19th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

The noble Lord himself is occasionally capable of quite soporific oratory. If I had fewer interventions no doubt I would be able to sit down rather sooner.

[Lord Tyler]

Perhaps I can help the noble Lord in that respect. Some of us have seen a fascinating grid, the Opposition’s speaking grid, that was left in some facilities of the House overnight earlier in the week. It was very helpful because we were then able to see when noble Lords were being instructed to speak on various amendments. Would either he or one of his colleagues tell us what the grid is for today? Then we could know when the noble Lord was going to speak and perhaps we could slip outside to have a cup of tea or even a snooze. At the moment, we are not given any guidance as to when various Members of the Opposition are going to speak and that is a pity because we could make more progress. Also, if I can make a suggestion to the opposition office that produced this grid, it would be helpful to know how long the noble Lord will speak.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I would personally be terribly disappointed if the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, were to take advantage of the fact that I was on my feet to go and have a cup of tea because I depend on his presence as a stimulus and discipline to myself. I might be tempted to speak more rashly and randomly if it were not for the invigilatory presence of the noble Lord in the Chamber.