Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Hardie

Monday 13th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hardie]

My Lords, this amendment reflects a similar amendment to that which was debated in Committee, along with other amendments, including an amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. The Bill regulates lobbying activities only where the object of the lobbying is a Minister of the Crown, a Permanent Secretary, a Second Permanent Secretary or a person serving in the government offices listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1. Again, I do not intend to repeat what I said in Committee, but it is my respectful submission to your Lordships that the class is too restrictive, as was observed by many noble Lords both at Second Reading and in Committee. There seemed to be a general consensus across the Committee that the persons listed would not be the first port of call for lobbyists, who would probably concentrate on political advisers, Parliamentary Private Secretaries and more junior civil servants before approaching Permanent Secretaries, Second Permanent Secretaries and Ministers. Indeed, in the very helpful contribution made by my noble friend Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, who is not in his place, it appears unlikely that Permanent Secretaries will be lobbied if the noble Lord’s own considerable experience is taken into account.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, confirmed my own experience that Parliamentary Private Secretaries have direct access to Ministers and are involved in some meetings determining departmental and government policy. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, observed in Committee:

“When this Bill was considered in the other place, the point was well made that it appears to have been written by people who do not understand lobbying”.—[Official Report, 5/11/13; col. 139.]

Lobbyists would focus on the channel for reaching the Minister and that channel would include a political adviser, a Parliamentary Private Secretary or civil servants below the level specified in the Bill. It is clear that the Bill will be of little effect if it confines communications to those currently specified in it and does not focus on those people more likely to be the object of lobbying activity. If lobbying is confined to the more effective targets and the Minister is not directly lobbied, there will be no requirement for registration, not even by the restrictive category of consultant lobbyist. Such a result is contrary to the stated desire and the desirable intention of transparency that underpins Part 1 of the Bill.

In his response in Committee the Minister—I am delighted to see him in his place after his illness—referred to the number of civil servants who would be affected if the scope of this provision were extended as proposed. As noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, observed in his intervention at col. 149, the number of such civil servants is irrelevant. What is at issue is the identification of the class of persons the lobbying of whom will require registration. That class has to be sufficiently wide to make lobbying transparent.

In view of the discussion in Committee, it is disappointing that the Government have not come forward with their own amendment to improve the Bill in this respect. The amendment in my name is an attempt to remedy that omission. Without this amendment, the Bill will fail in its objective of increasing the transparency of lobbying Government. It will further undermine public confidence in our political system because it will be seen as an example of Parliament either failing to understand the lobbying process or failing to take effective measures to address and identify a problem. I beg to move.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, Amendment 3, in my name and that of my noble friend, is grouped with the amendment just moved by the noble and learned Lord. As has already been made very clear this afternoon, the key issue is not the role, title or job description of the people who take part in the activity of lobbying but the activity itself. That is absolutely critical. I have a lot of sympathy with my noble friend Lord Norton, who, in his usual way, has put his finger right on that point. That is why I thought that it was extremely important to have the statement from my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness a few minutes ago about the nature, character, efficiency and accuracy of the register of meetings with those who are taking decisions, or making proposals to Parliament, on behalf of the Government.

I should say in parentheses, in welcoming back my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that way back at Second Reading, let alone in Committee, he expressed a lot of interest in the proposals that we were making from these Benches about improving the status of the record of meetings that was introduced for the first time—for which the Government should get credit—in the past few years. As I said in that earlier debate, I am not so worried about who the lobbyists are but am very worried that we know who they lobby, what they lobby about and when. The very full statement made by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness a few minutes ago goes a very long way to meeting that anxiety. We have made it clear at every stage of the Bill that, for us, that is the core issue. The proactive publication of data on ministerial meetings by the Government makes a potentially huge difference. That is what transparency should be all about.

We also believe it is important that that record should indicate when the meeting with in-house lobbyists takes place. Whether they are the managing director of a whisky firm, or a lowly employee of any other firm, it is the subject matter of the meeting, when it happened and with whom that is of considerable importance. I agree with my noble and learned friend and I am delighted that the House agreed too, a few minutes ago, that simply extending the register into a sort of enormous directory, like a telephone directory, with every lobbyist in the land, whether from a church, charity or voluntary organisation, would not really seem to be anything more than disguising the wood for the trees.

Amendment 3 deals very specifically, and only, with the issue of special advisers. Many in your Lordships’ House have had enormous responsibility in the Civil Service. What is unusual about a special adviser is that he or she of course is not responsible to the head of the department: he or she is not a full-time employed member of the Civil Service, and their first loyalty and responsibility is to the political master for whom they work. The special adviser’s responsibility is to the Secretary of State, or other ministerial politician, and his or her relationship is with them. It is therefore our view that this is the one major exception that should be tackled, either in this Bill or in some other way, because these are special people—special advisers are, by definition, outwith the normal hierarchy of responsibility to the Permanent Secretary in the department.

The principle in the Bill is that if the consultant gains access to or influences a Minister on behalf of a client, the public should know who they and their clients are. However, anyone who has been in this building for any length of time or who has lobbied knows perfectly well that influencing a Minister does not necessarily mean seeing them yourself. There is sometimes an even better way: to meet the Minister’s special adviser. Spads have a rather unfair bad reputation in the press. Many will remember Clare Short’s description of them as living “in the dark”. I think that was about a particularly period in the previous Government, perhaps, and it may not be appropriate for all periods of recent history. That epithet then led to a thought-provoking analysis of the role of special advisers in a book of the same name by the respected academic Dr Andrew Blick. In my limited experience of being on the Government side of the House in the past three years and therefore having spads in my own party, it does not feel as though many now live in the dark. We see them all the time. They are helpful, they are influential; in many cases persuading a spad is the first step to persuading a Minister.

I know that this is also part of their job: to meet outside groups. It is very proper and very effective—a proper role that they should undertake. Perhaps it is a better one than a civil servant in the normal hierarchy. Ministers have only a certain amount of time and sometimes it is the right judgment to ask a senior adviser to see someone first, sound them out and explain the Government’s thinking—there is absolutely nothing wrong with that. However, these meetings with outside groups are important and details of them, like the ministerial meetings which were so fully referred to earlier, should be transparent.

The first step we could take today to make that point in this House is to say that in this Bill those consultants who lobby spads should have to register, just as if they were meeting Ministers. It would then follow, of course, that although this is outside the immediate scope of the Bill, for this to be meaningful spads would also need to publish all their meetings with all lobbyists, whether they be consultant lobbyists or in-house, just as Ministers do. I very much hope that when we look in detail at the record of meetings in future to see how these can be improved and made even more influential and transparent, my noble friends on the Front Bench will acknowledge that this would be an important step to take.

This is not in any way intended to malign spads or imply that anything they do is wrong. It is the opposite. It says that what they do is useful and, on many occasions, necessary, but keeping any aspect of it hidden feeds a largely unnecessary suspicion that they are up to no good. I referred at earlier stages of the Bill to the fact that two of the big lobbying scandals in this Parliament have involved close advisers to Ministers rather than Ministers themselves, and that resignations resulted.

For example, the Murdoch empire recognised these facts of life very early on. We should too. Both scandals would probably never have got to this stage had encounters between close ministerial advisers and outside groups been a matter of public record. It is therefore as much in the Government’s interests as in the public interest—surely the two should fit hand in glove anyway—for this information to be freely available. I quoted before and I shall quote again. The Prime Minister memorably said:

“Sunlight is the best disinfectant”.

I agree.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Debate between Lord Tyler and Lord Hardie

Wednesday 18th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tyler]

I am very grateful to the Minister but also to others who contributed because, if we have done nothing else in recent minutes, we have demonstrated that there is a basic misunderstanding of the current law. It is therefore not surprising that many organisations outwith Parliament, large and small, have been confused by this issue. We should be absolutely clear, and my noble and learned friend’s latter remarks underline this, that if we are not very careful, if it were removed completely from the current 2000 Act by this Bill, this could result in those who have a direct interest in avoidance using this as a cunning plan to get around the constraints of the current law. I have read the Hansard from the time and this was anticipated as a potentially dangerous loophole in the debates in 2000 that led to the PPERA Act, and it would be totally wrong to just tear it up and throw it out.

Incidentally, in that connection, there have been comments about the role of the Electoral Commission. As I have frequently reminded your Lordships, I have a role as a member of the cross-party informal advisory group to the commission. I think that the commission should be taken to task for not identifying that this was a problem over 13 years of experience. It is unfortunate that in that respect it did not recommend to the previous Government and to Parliament that this needed to be looked at, whatever future legislation was going to try and tackle it.

It is clear from the contributions right around the House that many here who have contact with small organisations and charities know that in the past there has been a chilling effect, to use that expression, on those who wish to work in a collaborative way, which, for the reasons that have been explained so well by my noble friend Lady Tyler, needs careful attention. We need to try to avoid the existing distortions that have been identified as having been there for some time, although obviously are now more pressing, given the other changes in the Bill.

Obviously I, too, hope that between now and Report the promised discussions will result in a fairer, more rational approach for those who wish to campaign in an election together. I therefore hope that in the next two or three weeks we will see a practical solution. A number of ideas have been put forward to the Minister and I have every confidence, given what he has just said, that the Government will look at them very carefully. In the mean time—

[Lord Hardie (CB)]

Can I just clarify the noble Lord’s comments about the Electoral Commission, as I did not fully understand them. The criticism of the commission for not identifying this problem—was it that it ought to have identified it before the 2000 Act or between the Act and now? It was set up, as I understand it, by the 2000 Act so it could not have done it in anticipation of that.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, I am so sorry if I did not make that clear. Since the 2000 Act it has become increasingly evident that this was having an effect and discouraging a number of organisations from working together. This has come to a head now but the principle was explicit in PPERA in 2000 and it is unfortunate that the commission allowed some discussion to continue at a low level but was never in a position to nor felt able to recommend to government and to Parliament that this matter needed close attention.