Prospectus (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Wednesday 16th October 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I begin by sharing an area of disagreement between myself and my colleague, despite the fact that she is far more expert in this area than I am. I pick up the issue that she raised at the end of her speech: the extension of the prospectus exemption for public bodies. I would like to hear from the Minister what risks he thinks we are taking on board as a consequence. There is a rationale to allowing the other members of the EU in effect to use our marketplaces without a prospectus: we know them all; we all participated in the same membership structure of the EU; every one of them is a democracy; and their financial services and most of their activities are governed by laws that are either common or very close to ours. So we have a very high level of confidence in the integrity of the bodies involved.

From reading this extension, I need to ask the Minister this. Presumably, as it reads as such, if President Assad of Syria were to decide to use the capital markets to raise some additional funds to prosecute his current war against those whom he considers rebel forces within Syria—he has joined with Kurdish forces—it will not be a problem. They can come to the UK; the law basically says yes. It is the same for a long list of countries including Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It seems a big step to have taken and not one that was extensively discussed in Parliament. I have raised this before, but never had much of an explanation or any analysis of the risks entailed. It is important that the reputation of our capital markets here continues to be protected. I know there are forces who want to see regulatory dilution—which noble Lords often talk about—who have a much more casino attitude towards financing and who love the idea of all the buccaneers being able to come in and use British markets while we make money from them. I raise those issues as they are genuine concerns that need to be addressed.

I want to address a related issue. Look at some of the fintechs. I am thinking particularly of crowdfunders, but this could apply to many others. The dominant crowdfunders across the European Union have typically been UK-based. The big four have been raising money for everything from charities to small businesses—but they are critical to start-ups and small businesses—from investors across the 28 countries of the EU. They are raising money not just from the UK market but from Estonia, France and Germany. That has been crucial to many of our small businesses and start-ups.

I now understand that, with the removal of passporting, the e-commerce directive and now the prospectus directive, they no longer have a mechanism that enables them to raise that funding. If we no longer have in common a single prospectus that operates across the 27, their ability to raise funding across the 27 is reduced to raising money from the one. There are consequences to that, which I wonder whether the Minister might address. I think all the four that I named have now set up an alternate location within the 27, so I suppose we can expect a shift of business out of the UK or a cost from running two operations, one in the UK and one outside. But it will make it difficult for new players in the crowdfunding arena to start up within the UK. It will be far more logical to set up somewhere within the 27 —Berlin being one of the most attractive locations. Those questions have to be addressed.

I want to pick the Minister up on equivalence. He made the point—which I think is right and fully accept—that the purpose of most of these SIs is to make sure that, at the nanosecond we leave, nothing has changed in the rules and regulations that people follow. I understand that but, initially, these conversations took place in the context of Mrs May’s intentions for a long-term relationship with the EU. It was one where we remained very close to the single market, with only rare circumstances in which there was an overweening reason to diverge. We are now, I understand—the Prime Minister has been very open about this—in the very different situation where divergence is the intent and leaving is in fact seen as an opportunity to break away from being close to the single market. Therefore, suddenly the issues of equivalence become much more difficult and complex. Although there has been fairly limited concern about long-term reciprocity—there are various temporary arrangements that run, typically, for only a matter of months—it is now becoming far more serious. That is why, on this side, we are constantly raising equivalence as an issue. It would be very wrong to assume that it is a given.

Perhaps I may pick up and address in a slightly different way the point that my colleague made. She basically explained how originally equivalence was meant to be much more focused on outcome rather than actual rules, but the EU is a rules-based organisation. It will not change the way that it works just for us. We might say that we are happy to give equivalence where we think there is equivalence in outcome. That is fine but, frankly, most people do not care very much about getting an equivalence decision from the UK. It is a pretty small market. However, we do care about getting equivalence decisions from the EU. The situation is not symmetrical. The EU has the customer base and the cash, and it uses the many instruments that London wishes to provide. Therefore, I point out that a lot of complexity is entangled in all this and, although this matter does not relate narrowly and directly to these SIs—except, for example, as in this one, where the removal of any mutuality in the prospectus directive is an issue—a lot of questions are embedded in all this.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my Liberal Democrat colleagues for ranging in an interesting way over many of the issues relating to SIs in general and to this one in particular. We seem to have converged on one or two of the same ideas. I have of course slavishly worked through the Explanatory Memorandum in an attempt to understand it, and I quite enjoyed this one—you have to have some peculiar tastes to be here—until I got to paragraph 2.14, where a problem was being explained. The paragraph says:

“This decision was made to provide continuity for market participants after the UK leaves the EU and comes into effect on exit day. To maintain this continuity, this Direction will be amended to refer to the EU Prospectus Regulation”.


There is then the astounding sentence:

“This amendment is not contained within this instrument”.


At that point, my ability to read the document failed, because it explained a problem and then said that we are apparently not going to do anything about it. I hope that the Minister can enlighten me on that. Apart from that, I have only a couple of points to make.

To show my naivety, it was not until I got to paragraph 2.18 that I was informed that the prospectuses have three constituent parts—a registration document, a securities note and a prospectus summary—so I am now better informed. However, having explained how things are passported and so on, paragraph 2.20 then says:

“However, a prospectus that contains one of these registration documents will still require FCA approval for the securities note and the prospectus summary”.


I accept that it is my lack of understanding, but I cannot for the life of me see why one of the three is treated in one way but the other two are treated differently, so I would value an explanation.

We have all alighted on the same issue set out in paragraph 2.26: the exemption for public bodies being extended, apparently, to public bodies of the whole world—not “apparently”; that is what it actually says. At first I thought that this exemption must be discretionary, because there must be some public bodies where you would want a pretty solid prospectus. This would seem to allow some small town in Zambia or Zimbabwe to benefit from this exemption, so I would be very grateful if the Minister could spell out what the safeguards are for this, because it could lead to quite serious risks if there are not appropriate ones.

Financial Services (Electronic Money, Payment Services and Miscellaneous Amendments) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Wednesday 16th October 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be brief thanks to my noble friend Lady Bowles, who takes all the pressure and burden off my shoulders. I thank her very much. I also thank the Minister for his clarity and advance notice of his speech. I want to bring up a couple of issues. As with my colleague, it seems to me good sense to follow the tactic of contractual run-off. That that was not in one of the earlier SIs was probably an oversight given the volume that the Treasury has had to deal with, and I do not think that anybody can raise too many eyebrows at that.

I want to focus a little more on the third-country benchmarks, because I wonder whether that really was an oversight. The UK may have assumed that third countries would stand in line so that, on the first possible day that they could have a discussion on recognition of benchmarks, they would be knocking at our door and begging to be able to go through the process. It has been a rather salutary experience to find that many countries have not been all that concerned about standing in line to make sure that they continue to be able to use London for a wide range of their activities—most of them are exploring alternative markets fairly vigorously and with quite a bit of enthusiasm. Making it easier and taking away some uncertainty for a period of three years therefore makes great sense, but I suspect that the initial thought was that London was so necessary to everybody that it could not be replaced by anyone in any way and consequently did not have to think carefully about providing the opportunity now covered by this SI.

That brings me to the issue of equivalence which the Minister mentioned, although I know it is not essentially embedded in this SI. He said that the UK almost from the moment we leave—if Brexit happens—would begin potentially to diverge. Different interpretations and different rules might come under the umbrella of Solvency II, but their UK life would be different from that for the 27 countries within the European Union. That is one of the things that worry me more than anything else. While all these measures focus on the UK discussing how it will allow EEA firms to continue to use London, the real issue is whether UK-based firms can continue to service clients across the EU, because that is obviously where the overwhelming majority of the client base is.

Let us look at insurance. Commercial insurance is the most significant part of that industry and the overwhelming majority of its clients are EU 27 companies. I have no idea whether any relaxation in terms has now been offered by the EU that is greater than the original temporary permissions. As I remember, most of the temporary permissions from the EU expire next March, so potentially we are looking at some fairly rough waters. If the Minister is making a statement that underscores the expectation that the UK will have a different interpretation or will step away from our common heritage quite rapidly after Brexit, he is doing a great deal to diminish any willingness on the part of the European Union to extend temporary permissions or to consider that the terms are being met for equivalence. I counsel him to think carefully before flagging up an intention to create divergence, when such divergence is largely at a cost to the UK financial services.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister to the Moses Room. I do not know whether he has done any propositions here before, but I hope he is not overwhelmed by the number of Peers in attendance.

The Liberal Democrats are blessed with people who understand this industry. I am afraid that the Labour Opposition is blessed with me; I do not know the industry and have had to slog through the Explanatory Memorandum to try to understand what it is all about. I note the Minister’s praise of the Treasury staff and others involved in its creation. As a constant critic of Explanatory Memorandums, I also extend praise, because slotting together these 58 SIs must have been a dreadful task. Nevertheless, I fall back on reading the Explanatory Memorandum and hope I add some rigour to the exercise by insisting on explanations where the plain language has failed to get the information across to me.

The first issue I raise is in Regulation 1(2) itself, which says:

“This regulation and regulations 2 to 7”,


et cetera,

“come into force the day after the day on which these Regulations are made”.

By my understanding of the “made affirmative” process, that means they are actually in force now—I stand to be corrected on this. One of the problems we have had all the way through is that this is a so-called no-deal SI, so what happens to the parts of the regulations which are now in force if in fact we get a deal? Will they be repealed, when and by what mechanism?

Plunging into the Explanatory Memorandum itself, the first place I paused was paragraph 2.5. Here, there is an amendment to FSMA,

“so that the Financial Conduct Authority … can, if necessary, be exempt from consultation requirements where an urgent change to BTS is needed to protect UK consumers. The ability of the FCA to make urgent rule changes, where necessary to protect consumers, is an important crisis management tool in the UK regulatory framework”.

I always worry about these urgent tools where consultation is abandoned. If it is important and about a crisis, and if there is no consultation because of the timescale, is there subsequent consultation? Should amendments made under these circumstances be subject to some sort of review process?

The next area I will look at is paragraph 2.6, which says:

“Updates are necessary to take account of EU amendments made to the CRR which became applicable in June 2019. The CRR cross-references to be updated are in domestic legislation concerning the recovery and resolution of banks, and the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions”.


For my sins, I have been involved in this legislation over the past several years and know that this is really important stuff. Is it possible to give me some sort of feel as to what these changes effect? Clearly I could go back through the many documents, but it would be useful if the Minister could give a short explanation.

Financial Services (Miscellaneous) (Amendment) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Tuesday 7th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am so glad I did not have to write the content of this SI; it was hard enough trying to work one’s way through it when simply reading it. It is obviously the result of a combination of “Oops!” and communication with customers. I see absolutely no reason to oppose it. If anything, this underscores the complexity of trying to make arrangements for dealing with a no-deal scenario. I hope we never have to use it, because we would run into more “Oops!” if we ever found ourselves in that situation. I hope the Treasury is going ahead with a mapping exercise to try to link this all together, because how anybody who functions in the industry can ever work their way through all this is completely beyond me. Frankly, if you ever needed an argument for remaining, it seems that this alone provides it.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this is one of many no-deal SIs on which I have been forced to represent Her Majesty’s Opposition from the Front Bench—a pretty unattractive pastime. The principal reason for this is the fact that most of these SIs amend an SI that amends an SI that amends an Act that is many years old, which makes it fundamentally difficult to understand them. When one has put all the intellectual effort into understanding the so-called no-deal SI, one then discovers that the actual substance of the SI is frequently merely technical or consequential.

I found that this SI, and particularly its Explanatory Memorandum, really won the prize for being the most difficult to understand yet. In my frustration, I thought I would find out to what standard an Explanatory Memorandum should be created. I had the inspiration to go along to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee offices to seek guidance. I was once on that committee when it had a much grander title, the Merits Committee, and the staff there were always helpful and competent. I asked, “What is the guidance on the creation of SIs?” They said there were two pieces of guidance: that given by the committee itself and the Government’s guidance, which—for reasons I do not understand—is actually issued by the National Archives. The guidance from the committee itself is some 17 pages long. The latest version is from July 2016. Its objectives are caught in one particular paragraph:

“The purpose of the EM is to provide members of Parliament and the public with a plain English, free-standing, explanation of the effect of the instrument and why it is necessary. It is not meant for lawyers, but to help people who may know nothing about the subject quickly to gain an understanding of the SI’s intent and purpose. Legal explanations of the changes are already given in the Explanatory Note which form part of the actual instrument”.


The latest government guidance from the National Archives, the fifth edition on statutory instruments, dated 27 November, states at paragraph 2.9.2:

“The purpose of an EM is to provide the public with an easy-to-understand explanation of the legislation’s intent and purpose—why the legislation is necessary. Avoid repeating content you have included in the Explanatory Note. Your explanation should be concise but comprehensive, and should not generally exceed four to six pages. Use plain English and avoid … jargon”.


I put it to noble Lords that this document fails.

I then turned to the EM itself, which at paragraph 15.2 states:

“Katie Fisher, Deputy Director for Financial Services EU Exit Domestic Preparation at HM Treasury, can confirm that this Explanatory Memorandum meets the required standard”.


She is wrong. It does not.

However, in my frustration, I rang the number given at paragraph 15.1 to try to understand a little more and my conversation resulted in an email from Richard Lowe-Lauri. At long last, after much toil, I feel that I do largely understand the Explanatory Memorandum, as prompted and helped by that useful email. What did I find? I found at the end of this exciting process that the issues tackled in this SI are technical, consequential or merely corrective. Therefore, I have nothing to object to, except for one very minor question about paragraph 2.4, the last sentence, which happens to be about five lines long. It states:

“It also inserts provisions into other temporary regimes, allowing EEA financial services firms to continue to service existing contracts with their UK customers post-exit, and mitigating risks faced by UK firms using services provided by non-UK central counterparties and trade repositories”.


I could not find anywhere how and what the risks were that we were mitigating and how they were being mitigated. Otherwise, I have no objection to the SI.

Financial Services (Miscellaneous) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Thursday 21st March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have no issues with the first of these SIs. It is another that deals with errors and omissions; I suspect we will see quite a number of them. I do have serious concerns about the second SI, but not with its content or the fact that we need it if we are to take the step of leaving with no deal. I want to understand what happens to the financial services industry as a consequence. Perhaps the Minister can help me with this. He will know that I have been involved, from the earliest days, with the development of fintechs in the UK. An example is crowdfunders, whether they are US ones that have created a core European subsidiary in the UK, or home-grown ones, of which we have quite a few. We have been a magnet particularly for young people across Europe with a tech and finance interest to come here and start their companies. Those companies have, essentially, been pan-European from the first breath that they took. For example, under the e-commerce directive, a crowdfunder has been able to put up a project and seek investments through its online presence—the only way it exists—all across the UK plus the 27.

I understand from the SI that a crowdfunder based in the EEA will no longer be able to seek investments from UK investors unless it goes through the process of registering with the FCA and having its UK activities regulated by the FCA. I suspect that most will not bother. When you have 450 million people you can go to, going to an additional 65 million is probably not worth the effort. It is taking on the burden of an additional regulator just for a small part of the investor base you will be catching on to. If you do, you have only one regulator to deal with, and I assume that this is reciprocal. So if I am a UK-based crowdfunder, do I now have to go to the regulators in every one of the 27 and seek to become registered, certified or whatever else it is, to be able to continue to raise those funds? It is unusual for a crowdfunder based in the UK to raise most of its money in the UK. As I said, these have been pan-European from the day they took their first breath. They think that way, they are structured that way and their employees are designed in that way. Are we, in effect, hearing a death knell for crowdfunding and a whole series of related fintechs that are UK-based but have been reliant for building their investor or participant base from a pan-European, 500 million-person community? If there is this consequence then I am extremely concerned. Perhaps the Minister can explain; I may have it completely wrong.

After having some conversations I am quite concerned about a second point. Is the Minister clear that the UK companies that would find themselves trapped in this position are aware of it? Looking today at websites such as Seedrs or Crowdcube, there are hundreds of projects up on their systems seeking new investors. Those would presumably be grandfathered in this run-off programme, but dozens of new ones go up every single day. Do they understand that, in a week’s time, they may have to stop putting projects up in a way that can be accessed by a pan-European community? If not, are they in a position where they may be in breach and there may be serious repercussions as a consequence?

We are looking at an industry which many hold up as part of the fundamental future of financial services, an area the UK always considered itself a crucial leader in, and which we see as underpinning so much of our future prosperity. Can the Minister help me understand the consequences of what is about to happen?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak mostly about the first SI, if only to moan a bit. Paragraph 3.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum says that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee,

“noted that the legislation proposed to be amended by the instrument includes: four Acts of Parliament; seven ‘pre-EU Exit’ statutory instruments; 12 ‘EU Exit’ statutory instruments that have been considered by the House during the last six months; and several items of retained EU legislation”.

As far as I can tell, there are 36 amendments in this SI which have no themes or interrelationship. To get a feel for how difficult it is to work on the SI, paragraph 2.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum gives up almost altogether and says:

“Part 3 also makes minor technical amendments to correct the following financial services EU exit instruments. Further information on these instruments can be found in the EMs accompanying the instruments on legislation.gov.uk”.


If I threw all that in, it would take hours. Indeed, if one devoted just 10 minutes’ attention to each amendment, it would take six hours to read the thing.

The Minister said, rather grandly, that this had been considered by the House of Commons. I too noted that fact and leapt at the Official Report to give me some help. It told me that the Commons committee sat at 6 pm —that is quite keen—but adjourned at 6.11 pm, having completed its work. Members devoted 11 minutes to this SI. I am sure that, due to their natural brilliance, they scrutinised it fully, but I am rather slower than that.

There is a real problem of how we get proper scrutiny. I sought help from the Civil Service, as one is invited to by the Explanatory Memorandum. As I understand it, the amendments fall into three groups. One group corrects errors; I would value knowing how many of the 36 are error corrections. Another group makes previous SIs compatible with those created subsequently by other departments. So we have one bit of government making SIs that create complications in another; it is a bit brave to consider creating complications in Treasury SIs.

The third group comes from a review of the previous legislation. One worries about that until turning again to the Explanatory Memorandum. The Treasury has been consistent and kept paragraphs 7.1 to 7.8 identical in all its 50 SIs. Paragraph 7.4 says that these SIs,

“are not intended to make policy changes, other than to reflect the UK’s new position outside the EU, and to smooth the transition to the situation”.

Therefore, I want a categorical assurance that in these 36 amendments there is no new policy. If there is new policy hidden among them, will the Minister tell me what that new policy is?

Turning to the second instrument, I found almost the opposite to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. Not that I am suggesting that what she said was not valid, but I thought this was a commendable Explanatory Memorandum. It is a stand-alone document that one could understand and it seemed that it was doing what the SI should do. In other words, it was dealing with inevitable consequences, so I am content with it. I think the essence of what the noble Baroness was saying is that here is yet another bad consequence of leaving the European Union, and to that extent I totally agree with her.

Financial Services (Distance Marketing) (Amendment and Savings Provisions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Tuesday 5th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be exceedingly brief. That the third of these SIs is basically to correct deficiencies in earlier SIs underscores how complex all this is. Obviously we have no objection to correcting errors in earlier SIs. Again, I do not have objections to the first two SIs, on distance marketing—which sounds like cold calling—and buy-to-let credit. My head was spinning when trying to read them but they seem to be logical under the circumstances. But is there something that is not there or that I have misunderstood? In both circumstances, many British people and continental Europeans live their economic lives beyond country borders. They have done so particularly in the context of the EU because we have been part of a single market and a European family.

Many people who think of themselves as not financially sophisticated have economic activities which go beyond the boundaries of the EU; for example, they might have a property in Spain that they let, investments in different countries, or pensions arising from periods of work. There are all kinds of complexities. Do I understand from reading these SIs that the problem that is not resolved is what happens if there is a dispute or an insolvency? Is it that the legal mechanisms that would have been in place with full membership are no longer available and that these SIs have been unable to on-board any mechanism for dealing with disputes, insolvencies and those kinds of issues? If such were to arise, would the UK resident, for example, with a buy-to-let mortgage for a property somewhere in the 27, have to prosecute their case through that country’s national court system, rather than being able to do so as part of the unified ECJ umbrella, and therefore face a series of difficulties which cannot be corrected through SIs?

I say this because we talk constantly of continuity but it seems that there might be partial continuity with discontinuity embedded in it, particularly around the areas of dispute and insolvency. I could be wrong and I stand to be corrected.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we have no objection to any of these SIs. I have read them through as far as I was able, and they seem to be logical.

The distance marketing SI particularly caught my attention, because many citizens are subject to distance marketing that perhaps they do not really want. I note that the Explanatory Memorandum at paragraph 7.30, “Criminal offences”, states that various failures to abide by the rules of the regulation we are creating will be a criminal offence and that those guilty of it will be,

“liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale”.

I have a dilemma because, on the one hand, I am going to say that that does not sound very threatening, especially if you are a large firm—I think this relates to firms as well as to natural persons—and I would value it if the Minister would write me a letter on that. I also recognise that, if the SI sought to change that, I would argue that it was smuggling through a policy change. I am not suggesting that it should, but can the Minister clarify whether this is genuine consumer protection that firms fear or whether the punishments for offences are too low to be impactful?

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Tuesday 5th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I begin with a thank you. My noble friend Lord Sharkey and I—I know that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, will speak for himself, as he always does so well—very much appreciated the opportunity to meet the Minister, the Economic Secretary and key staff to talk in detail about this statutory instrument. I completely concur with the comments of the Treasury Select Committee that these are sweeping powers which, under normal circumstances, I do not think anybody, in any part of this House, would dream of granting to a regulator. However, under the circumstances we would face in a no-deal scenario, it seems vital that the regulator has the ability to mitigate a crisis cliff edge for key parts of the financial services industry.

I note that in the guidance published by the Bank of England and the FCA last Friday, they will be attempting to limit the transitional period, as the Minister said, to 15 months, so that firms will manage within that 15-month period to go from where we are now, essentially—let us call it scenario A—to life outside the EU in a no-deal scenario, which we will call scenario B. It would give them some 15 months, typically, but with the capacity to extend that to two years if necessary. Also, the Bank of England has made exceptions for the bail-in rules, the stay in resolution rules and the FSCS rules, all of which relate closely to financial stability. We appreciate that it would be very hard to provide any transitional time for those rules and their consequences, but does the Minister have any comment to make around the significance of deciding on those three exemptions? Can he confirm that, if we were to have no deal and find ourselves in that reality and the regulators decided that the situation was better managed by finding some flexibility around these three rules, the regulator has given away the capacity to do so? Or does it retain an opportunity to change its mind and provide some mechanism for adjustment? One would hope that that was not necessary. Across the credit rating agency assessments, we will get only a 12-month extension, though I think all of us recognise that that is probably not problematic for any of the players.

In our discussion, as the Minister indicated, we asked for more frequent reporting than just 12 months from now. It seemed a bit like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted to wait for that period. We very much appreciate that the Treasury and the regulators have agreed that they can update us every six months: that is exceedingly helpful. We also appreciate the description that the Minister gave when he had to make a correction, which we perfectly accept is a very minor correction. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, picked up the fact that the complexity here is extraordinary. It is very hard to predict, very hard to track and very hard to play through the scenarios and understand exactly how each needs to be handled, certainly in advance. So I think we might find ourselves trying to take advantage of the offer from the regulators of specific discussions if a particular issue arises. I am grateful again that the Minister has had a conversation with the regulators that led them to say that that will be open to us: it is exceedingly welcome.

This underscores the point of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, about the extent to which, given all this complexity, there might be some way to provide some mapping of exactly what is happening where—what is moving and what is changing. That is a big ask at the moment, I understand, but if there could be some thought around that, it would be very useful, not just to this House and the other place but to the industry, which I am sure must be struggling with all this, although it very much appreciates the detailed engagement it has had with the Treasury, with Ministers and with the regulators. If we move to a practice of mapping under such circumstances, that might be a healthier environment to get to. It was one of our asks of the Minister that he felt he could not commit to at this point.

Our second ask was for some specific examples. My noble friend Lord Sharkey is unable to be here. He was particularly concerned to work through some specific examples in his head, so he may come back to ask for something more detailed. I particularly appreciated that the Minister gave an example of an issue that, as he knows, has exercised me: how do we manage the fact that our major financial institutions have significant exposure to EU and EEA assets and will incur higher capital ratios because they will no longer have preferred status if we leave on a no-deal basis? I was very glad that he gave us that particular example.

We very much hope that we do not have to use this, and it would be exceedingly helpful to know that we are not going to have no deal, because despite all the preparation that I understand is being done with real concentration and thought, it does not deal with the fact that there is going to be an almighty problem. I can see firms—all of them, though they are competitors—in different stages, different states with different micro-problems, all of which regulators are trying to manage so that there is no knock-on effect on financial stability or to the economy. It is going to be an extraordinarily difficult situation to manage, and anything we can do to make sure it does not happen will be extremely useful. If I can encourage anyone in this House to take no deal off the table, let me use this opportunity to do so.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I feel the need to start with my standard speech about how much I object to being here processing statutory instruments for a no-deal situation. I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in her dislike of such a situation and the chaos that will prevail. Having said that, I am forced to say nice things about the Government and, indeed, about the Lib Dem Front Bench in this whole affair. The Treasury SIs we have passed so far have, to a large extent, despite some of the speeches, been fairly non-controversial. What I have been looking for all the way through are attempts by the Treasury or the Government to smuggle through policy changes, which they promised not to do in the original legislation, and I must say that, broadly speaking, I think the Treasury has not sought to smuggle through any of significance. However, the result of that is that our debates have been rather dry.

This SI was quite shocking on initial reading. Part 7 has such sweeping powers, with no formal parliamentary involvement, that I thought—and we spoke to our colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench about this—that we really had to take it very seriously. I once again repeat my thanks to the Liberal Democrats for coming along on this and to the Government for the positive way in which they have reacted. For the record, I will briefly run over our concerns and note that they have been largely covered in the speech made by the Minister. We were first concerned about the limitations in the power in Part 7; there is a time limit of two years, and it is important to emphasise that that limitation is not just for making directions—rather, directions must cease within two years of exit day. That is fairly clear from reading the document.

It is more difficult to grasp the scope. One of the useful things we discussed at our meeting with John Glen, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, was scope. Scope is difficult to get into words, and we thank the Minister for the detailed examples in his speech, which will, we hope, be useful for practitioners in understanding it. In particular, we had some concerns over whether it might be used in crisis circumstances, and received a very strong assurance that separate legislation would be used in such circumstances.

I come finally to the lack of any parliamentary involvement in the process. This was clearly also the concern of the Treasury Select Committee; being a big, powerful committee, using its own mechanisms, it can rapidly draw Ministers to account. It did that with the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, and got assurances from him, as I understand it, that whenever the power was used to create a direction it would be advised. Clearly, it was then able to summon a Minister to hold the Government to account on its use. We did not have such a parallel situation, so we asked, and then got this assurance in the speech, that whenever such a notification went to the Treasury Select Committee, a copy would come to representatives on both our Front Bench and the Liberal Democrats’. The second part of that, in a sense, was an assurance that we would get access. I do not mean to suggest the Minister is not an important person, but at the end of the day his interest is in DfID. He simply speaks for the Treasury here. It was good that the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said that he would make himself available to answer any of our questions about how the power had been used. That was very reassuring.

Embedded deep in the SI and the Explanatory Memorandum is the fact that certain directions may have to be secret. We were concerned that when any organisation has the option of making something secret it tends to do so. We would like to know when and for what reasons that is used. That was also acknowledged in the speech. Clearly this has to be post facto—obviously it has to be when it is no longer embarrassing—but it is important that the use of this power is fully understood.

Lastly, we felt that 12-monthly reports on a power that was going to last for only two years would be insufficient. Assuming it is for the previous 12 months, the report takes a couple of months to write and so on, and then you are half way through the second year. The acceptance of six-monthly reports is extremely welcome. I repeat my thanks to the Government for co-operating in the way they did; it has allowed us to create a mechanism for an involvement of this House in the use of this power and, with those conditions attached, we accept the logic that says it is necessary.

Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Monday 25th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will focus briefly on the second of the two statutory instruments. I need help from the Minister, because I am struggling to understand the consequences of this, and I am looking specifically at STS recognition. The Minister will understand that achieving classification as an STS is advantageous because it is very likely to lead to preferential capital treatment. That is very important to banking institutions, which obviously want to keep their capital requirements as low as possible. At the moment, to qualify for STS classification, all the parties to an STS securitisation have to be located within the EU. If I understand the change that flows from this statutory instrument, if we were to leave without a deal, the regime we would move into says that in the UK an STS can be recognised provided that just one of the relevant players is located in the EU—most likely the sponsor. I raise this issue because it sounds as though securitisations in the EU and in all third countries now become available for classification as an STS.

I raise that concern because we are all very aware that the United States has gone back to its old tricks in mortgage lending, and asset-backed paper, backed by US mortgages, is once more beginning to raise some fairly significant issues of concern. We have been protected from that to some degree by the STS regime, which requires that all relevant players are within the EU. If I understand this correctly, that protection is now removed, and since third countries can now get STS classification and therefore preferential capital treatment, we increase the risk or the attraction quite possibly—or rather, quite likely—to UK institutions to once again start playing in that environment of US mortgage-backed securities, where we already know there is incipient trouble; I hope it is genuinely incipient, but some people are using much stronger language than that. I would therefore like the Minister to explain that.

The other issue on which I had a question was under exposures to national promotional banks. At the moment, national promotional banks located in the EU, again, are eligible to be provided with preferential treatment. It would therefore encourage a financial institution to invest in those national promotional institutions because if it lends to them, it faces a lower capital requirement. What is the situation that will fall out of the picture, according to the Explanatory Memorandum? It seems to be KfW, which is the German state-owned development bank. A UK investor who is lending money to KfW would no longer get that preference as it calculated its required capital ratios.

To me, this is the equivalent of “have gun, shoot foot”. KfW is a major player in funding small businesses in the UK. It has sat alongside the European Investment Fund and the European Investment Bank in putting significant blocs of long-term patient capital into large-scale infrastructure in the UK. I know that we have the British Investment Bank, but it is minuscule compared to the EIB, the EIF and KfW, and nothing I have heard from government suggests a scale-up to anywhere like the same dimensions. Why, then, would we, in a situation like this, try to discourage KfW from looking at opportunities to put its money into projects in the UK, and especially into that much-needed arena of small business? I find it slightly perverse but that is one of the things that this SI apparently intends to achieve. As I said, I am very fond of the British Investment Bank but, boy, does it have a long way to go before it can possibly replace those other institutions. Surely we should be encouraging KFW—we cannot do anything about the EIF or the EIB because of European rules—to keep it as a player.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I studied these two SIs with great care and could not object to their general direction. I even managed to think of three penetrating questions, which the Minister unfortunately answered in his opening statement, so I shall not repeat them. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Deben, for their contribution. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, was concerned about the FCA costs. To some extent, that does not worry me nearly as much is whether there are competent resources. I worry whether there are enough people who want to work in a regulatory atmosphere who have enough competence to take this mess called falling out of the EU, fit it all altogether and discharge all their responsibilities. I can only just bring myself to ask this as a question, because I know that the Minister has a standard answer.

Building on the comments made earlier, the facts of life are that this is a dreadful deal. There is nothing wrong with the instrument, but if you are going to get into a dreadful situation, there are dreadful consequences. Although the Minister may say, as I am sure he will, that the issue of reciprocity is not nearly as bad as we all make out because the other side will want to do reciprocal deals, my experience of negotiation is that it is not that straightforward. They hold the cards, and if reciprocal agreements are made, good, but I fear that they will be somewhat one-sided.

Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Monday 18th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer]

I can only agree. We have major transparency problems. I am working on the Trade Bill; it is unconscionable that we do not have available to us information that the EU would not only put automatically on a website but constantly report back on, with discussion between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament.

Let us set that aside so I can move on with this particular instrument. I reinforce the concerns about the impact assessment. I must say that the consolidated impact assessment discussed by my noble friend Lord Sharkey contains three pages dedicated exclusively to this SI—I am sure that the Minister will point that out—but anyone who cares to read it will discover that, although it is usefully descriptive, telling us a bit more about the instrument, what used to happen in the EU and what will happen under this instrument, it cannot be called three pages of impact assessment. It does not even attempt to monetise the impact and give us a sense of the costs and the value of the benefits—that is beyond it—and it never deals with the risks in any way. Never in my commercial life have I seen impact assessments that did not assess risk—but these do not even begin to do so.

That is very disappointing, particularly for the businesses which will be picking this up. They want to make sure that this SI goes through, because anything that reduces uncertainty in any area where there is not a cliff edge will be of great value to the relevant businesses—but, my goodness, they would have welcomed something much richer in terms of the discussion to give them some forward vision rather than one that just deals with the very short period of time that will immediately follow departure under a no-deal scenario. I find that very frustrating and a real weakness in the way in which impact assessments are being dealt with here.

That takes me to perhaps the last issue that I will address, which was touched on to some degree by my noble friend Lady Bowles. There is very little discussion in any of this about what I call reciprocity. In order for equivalence for the industry to be able to function without any kind of cliff edge in no deal, not only does the UK need to provide equivalence but the EU needs to grant equivalence as well. In many instances it has not done so, but it may do so in the future. My interpretation is that at the moment it is doing so only in areas where it thinks that not granting equivalence would cause financial instability, rather than looking at broader market access issues.

I take this as a real shot across the bows that we need to take on board, framing the EU intent as to where it will take future negotiations in this area. That is important and I am rather concerned that the Government do not deal with those kinds of issues in this impact assessment, because an honest discussion of that is crucial for businesses as they use the product and everything that we are printing to try to understand what the context is going forward. It has made me feel very gloomy that we will see a much more fragmented set of financial services. I am sure that London will remain a crucial global centre, but I can see the way in which the pattern is developing. It will have some very significant rivals that will take away very significant pieces of business. Over the long term that has real consequences for the UK.

In all that we have here there is one last issue which perhaps the Minister would address, because it could be my deficiency in reading all of this. At the moment we know that third countries operate, as it were, within the EU because the EU has granted them equivalence. As I understand it, the UK will be granting identical equivalence under this SI for the day that we leave if it is a no-deal scenario. But I am unclear about how many of those third countries are granting us reciprocal equivalence. Not only do we have questions about in which areas the EU is granting us third-country equivalence, I am not clear where we stand, for example, in terms of the US. Will we be granting the US equivalence using exactly the same pattern as that of the EU currently? It is not clear whether the US is granting us equivalence and on what terms—and that is just one of the many different countries with which we have built up a kind of network through mutual equivalence that has been established over the years.

Equivalence is extraordinarily complex. It is not a matter of a simple one-hour discussion about four or five easy to understand factors. It is exceedingly complex, it often comes with conditions and it may be limited in a whole variety of ways such as by time and by content. It may have many issues attached to it, and therefore negotiating new equivalence arrangements from scratch would concern me a great deal. I say that in particular because of what we have seen with some of the trade deals, where Liam Fox was absolutely confident that we could take existing trade deals between the EU and the 71 other countries with whom we had free trade agreements and roll them over. He has now been woken to the fact that most of those countries see this as an ideal opportunity to improve their position and to renegotiate. It has become a much slower, much more difficult and much more complex process. I want to try to understand where we are with our equivalence agreements, because potentially the situation is exactly the same. It is very different having an equivalence agreement to have access to the market in the UK from having access to a market of 500 million people. I do not know how many of these equivalence agreements are in play.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be brief on this instrument and brief to the point of extinction on some of the others. I wish I thought that that would have any significant impact on the length of the debates we are going to have, but I fear that my brevity may be somewhat wasted tonight.

Every time we look at a bunch of these instruments, I hope to be forgiven for making the simple, formal statement that I regret being here doing these SIs. Her Majesty’s Government should rule out no deal. The Prime Minister is behaving irresponsibly in not doing so, but unfortunately no deal seems increasingly possible. From my limited understanding of history, most bad things that have taken place were by accident. Unfortunately we have a Government who are playing a game of chicken and hoping that the EU will blink first without realising that one of the outcomes of a game of chicken is mutual disaster. Accordingly, we will not obstruct Her Majesty’s Government’s legislation in preparing for no deal because it is a genuine probability. It was good that at least one speaker in the debate—I think that it was the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull—pointed out that industry needs these SIs in order to get on with its business.

Virtually all the Treasury SIs have three parts. They tend to transfer functions, to transfer references, and to have a little policy where a decision has to be made if it is not self-evident where the status quo lies. This SI is similar. Its substance is set out in Regulation 2(1), which states:

“The Treasury may, by direction”,


and so on. In the Explanatory Memorandum there is a very important statement on this power:

“It provides ministers with a temporary power, for up to twelve months after exit day, to make equivalence directions and exemption directions for the EU and EEA member states. This power is intended to be used only in cases where it is necessary to make equivalence decisions for the EU and EEA member states quickly and efficiently to support UK market activity and the continuity of cross-border business”.


Unfortunately, nowhere in the SI is that assurance made. There is no limitation on the powers in the statutory instrument itself. As a minimum I hope that the Minister will repeat the essence of what is in the Explanatory Memorandum and assure us that this power is designed to be very limited. As I understand it, the power can be and in fact will be used after exit day. What I would value is if the Minister could explain the parliamentary process that will be associated with it because, so far as I can see, it boils down to nothing. I assume it just boils down to a Written Ministerial Statement. I hope that he can give us some more comfort that whenever this power is used, we will know about it and that he will be making a statement of some kind.

Finally, towards the end of Regulation 2—one usually runs out of energy before one gets to the end of these—paragraph (6) states:

“The power of the Treasury under paragraph (1) includes the power to revoke or vary an equivalence direction at any time”.


Could the Minister make it clear whether that paragraph dies after 12 months, like the power in paragraph (1)? The power to revoke or vary an equivalence direction—which seems almost as powerful as the power to create a direction—is pretty important and should die at the same time as the power in Regulation 2(1).

I will not make any other general comments, other than to note that all the SIs this evening, as far as I can tell, do not have reciprocity. The whole issue of the negative impact that leaving without an agreement brings is that there is no reciprocity. All we can do is create the rules that allow us to make the move towards the EU, and we have to hope the EU sees the sense in making reciprocal powers. This is just one more reason why crashing out of the EU is a thoroughly stupid thing to do.

Financial Services Contracts (Transitional and Saving Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Monday 11th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have just one quick question to follow on from the comments of my colleague, who is so much better versed in this than me. It struck me that we seem to have one timetable proposed by the FCA and a different one proposed by the PRA, without an awful lot of logic as to why one takes one approach and the other takes another. Are these two regulators working completely independently and sending over their various paragraphs that then get incorporated into the statutory instrument, or is there some coherent framework? If the regulators are not working together, what can we do to make sure that they will? It will be complicated enough for business without trying to work out which regulator is thinking which way. I would assume—I do not know—that some entities find that they face both regulators. Why the difference under the new rules that each regulator is bringing forward?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, it may have been exhaustion, but when I got to this SI, I concluded that it was all really quite straightforward. Having listened to the previous speeches, I am not so sure.

The SI seems to be summed up in paragraph 2.8, and it seems to me to be about run-offs in various areas. As far as I could see, the promises in paragraph 2.8 were carried through in the references to the various areas.

I, too, have some second-order questions about why the time limits were different, but I must admit that I comforted myself with the sure and certain knowledge that if any of them became in the least bit difficult, the Government would introduce an SI to change them anyway, so I did not overburden myself with that.

Paragraph 12.6 states that an impact assessment will be published alongside the Explanatory Memorandum. It has escaped me if it has, so I should be grateful if the Minister would tell me whether one has been published. If it has, I suppose it is my responsibility to find it; if it has not, a further apology on this matter will be gratefully received.

Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Monday 4th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

This is quite an important question. At the moment, LCH is the dominant clearing house globally and it is certainly the dominant player for any euro-denominated transactions. There is a shift under way to take some of this activity to Paris. The real question for a lot of the UK players is whether they have to relocate part of their operation to Paris to be able to play in both parts of what will become a much more fragmented European clearing system. That matters a lot for terms of compression and deciding what levels of margin companies have to keep. The reciprocal play matters. Today, the Bank of England and ESMA signed an MoU on how they will regulate these central counterparties. I do not know whether, or to what extent, that is the context. Am I being clear? No, I am being confusing.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

No, that is very good. It might turn my casual question into quite a substantial one.

I notice that all the Treasury SIs that the Committee has discussed say that there will be no consolidation and no guidance. I do not know how we can carry on like this. I have found it absolutely impossible to understand the overall scene that these SIs relate to. The scrutiny that one is able to give is therefore entirely dependent on the Explanatory Memorandums. As a generality, these assume quite significant previous knowledge and it is an uphill battle to get a feel for these SIs and to give them the appropriate scrutiny.

Collective Investment Schemes (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Monday 4th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer]

I find that very helpful and I thank the Minister for saying that.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument but I repeat my concern that we are considering such instruments at all. I and my party feel that the Government should have given a commitment that we would not have a no-deal exit; day by day, there is growing evidence that such an exit will be disastrous for our country. I will say no more on that but try to process these SIs on their merits against—how shall I put it?—the strict limitation that we are assuming a no-deal situation and recognising that things have to be done to achieve that.

The Treasury, I assume to be consistent, has reproduced the same eight paragraphs in all the Explanatory Memorandums. Paragraph 7.4, which I will repeat, says:

“These SIs are not intended to make policy changes, other than to reflect the UK’s new position outside the EU, and to smooth the transition to this situation”.


It is against that test that I spent my time studying the Explanatory Memorandum. It seems to do all the right things: it creates a new name; it says that passporting dies; and it goes on to offer a temporary permission regime. This regime may last for up to three years, or three years and 12 months, or three years and 24 months, or perhaps for ever. One has to view the SI in the light of that regime.

Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 29th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, with that provocation I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, that perhaps we should look at the quality of enforcement. I would far rather that we had too many warning signs, but captured a large part of the wrongdoing, than missed major wrongdoing because there were so many options where people could avoid early warning signs. I suspect we have an enforcement problem, and often in this House we have heard that echoed. It sits entirely outside what we are dealing with today. For goodness’ sake, let us be very wary of the seductive argument that where we fail to enforce we should not even investigate.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 3, 4 and 5. They are the product of ideas from all parts of the House: from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and particularly from Lib Dem Members. Amendment 4 strikes me as a very important innovation. Other parts of the Administration may want to ponder what should be done here, because while it will all be down to the Government how they use it, it creates a mechanism by which we get will close to being able to amend an SI. Clearly, no great measures are going to fall because we have no great power to influence them and we all know that we are not going to vote on such SIs.

However, to be able to discuss an SI with the Government—obviously not on the Floor of the House but perhaps by approaching Ministers on particular issues—before it is laid would be an important step forward. Proposed new paragraph (b)(ii) and (iii), inserted by Amendment 4, is also important for making how such an SI is generated much more structured. I hope this will give real transparency to SIs, which can at times be very complex. I end by thanking the Minister for his efforts on the Bill and almost by celebrating, for want of a better term, the extent to which we have been able to come to consensus.

Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer]

I say to the noble Lord—and perhaps to clarify for others—that I think there is a real difference regarding the in-flight legislation, which has gone through an extensive European process that we have been engaged in. That is a highly democratic process involving scrutiny and consultation on a scale that we rarely experience here in the UK. It has gone through the Council and Parliament, and the technical language is nearly all in place. That is in a different category from other provisions, which are typically dealt with in the schedule; everything is at a much earlier stage and—if we leave—we will not be engaged in the on-going process that shapes that outcome.

We can look for some flexibility on the first category. I say that in part because we are all incredibly conscious that just getting through the essentials of the legislation on our plate is overwhelming. The last thing I would wish to see is for us to fall out of equivalence by accident, because the Government put elements on which we have been engaged and on which we agree at the back end of their legislative priority list, and we find ourselves by default stepping out of an equivalent situation. That is a concern, and it is one of the reasons why we would like to explore some of the options my colleagues have been outlining.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the two groups of amendments in many ways cover the same issue. They are essentially about how much flexibility the Executive should have in using this new law. Taking noble Lords back to the creation of the withdrawal Act, it was an extremely painful process because we were naturally reluctant to give the extensive powers in the withdrawal Act to government. But we were in a sense battered into the very realistic understanding that, given the volume of work that had to be done, the only way to do it was through statutory instruments enabled by the withdrawal Act.

Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Tuesday 6th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be relatively brief on this statutory instrument. Again, it makes sense, but I have a couple of questions. One was raised by the Minister’s comment: I think he said we could be in a situation where we had an EEA entity effectively being supervised by the UK regulator, but its deposit guarantee scheme would be an EEA scheme. That sounds like a recipe for serious trouble. Surely one would expect the deposit guarantee scheme and the supervision to go together. Perhaps he could enlighten me as to whether I misunderstood that point.

Noble Lords will be aware that the reason there is a single, cross-EU level of deposit guarantee is to stop countries competing with each other. I think that Ireland at one time provided unlimited guarantees, so deposits flooded from across the EU, including the UK, into Ireland to take advantage of that greater level of protection. This was to try to bring everybody into a fairly narrow range, so that that unhealthy competitive element would not be there distorting the financial markets. Is it the Government’s intention to stay in line, basically, with the EU in this arena? If so, we come across a couple of curiosities. At the moment the UK guarantee is fixed at £85,000. If I understand the SI and the Minister correctly, that remains the level until a review in 2021. Of course, since that period we have had a devaluation of sterling, so if one was to do a current valuation of the €100,000 cap, it would be something more like £87,500. I understand that there is no need to review that till 2021, but a discrepancy is building.

I note that the Statutory Instrument says that:

“The first review … must not commence before 2021 unless unforeseen events necessitate an earlier review”.


Many people would say that a no-deal scenario would inevitably lead to a very sharp devaluation in sterling. Would that be considered an unforeseen event? I think it might be considered to be a foreseen event by many people, but for the purposes of this would it be considered an unforeseen event such as would necessitate an earlier review? It would be helpful to know, and to understand the intent that sits behind all that. Will the Minister help me with those issues?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, unlike with the previous SIs, I feel that I actually understand what the regulations do, and the Minister has said nothing to shake my faith in that belief. They seem to have fallen within the overall government assurances, in introducing no policy change but smoothing the scenario, and I have nothing more to add.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Ring-fenced Bodies and Core Activities) (Amendment) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, as a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, I am a very strong advocate of ring-fencing. I am pleased that the process is now well under way. Obviously, I remain vigilant for any opportunity for any person to try to find a way either under or over the ring-fence. Therefore, I would look very carefully at any change or exemption. In this case, the order seems entirely logical and a suitable way in which to deal with the conflict between two good pieces of legislation, finding the simplest path to reconciling them.

I have two simple questions for the Minister. Can he give us some sense of the scale that we are talking about? To be honest, I have little idea of how many accounts are sanctioned at any typical time. I do not know if we are talking about six accounts or 6,000. The reason why I ask is that it makes a difference in monitoring—that is, whether it is a relatively small number or a challenging number. I just have no idea. I do not know if the Minister will be able to throw light on that.

There has also always been a concern, in particular from the sanctions perspective, that people who do bad things—and, typically, if you are going to be sanctioned, you will have been doing something that we think is a bad thing—will look at the opportunity to use aliases, false names and so on to front their various accounts. There is always the possibility that, if those accounts are not recognised as being linked to the individual who is to be sanctioned, they can end up being moved over into the ring-fenced bank. With accounts in two locations, it may become much harder to recognise that they are the accounts of the same individual and ought to be treated in the same way. I am fairly sure that those who are sanctioned will look for any mechanism possible to escape it, but I have no idea if there is a mechanism within all this that provides us with some comfort that we are alert to the use of this particular change as a mechanism that might make life a little easier for those who wish to avoid the sanction that they are due.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this order and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for asking at least one of the questions that I had in mind, particularly on scale. I do not have quite the exalted background of the noble Baroness as being a member of the banking commission but, because I failed to duck, I have been involved with this legislation since 2010. I saw it through and feel a certain loyalty to it. When this conflict arises, like the noble Baroness, I want to see that conflict resolved. However, I did think, “Why are they going to spoil this beautiful banking legislation, which I have sought to understand over the past several years? Why can we not change the sanctions legislation?” I decided to try to understand the sanctions legislation to see if there was a way in which it could provide the flexibility rather than the banking legislation. I dived into Section 143(4) of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, but I have to say that, at that point, I hit a brick wall. For the life of me, I could not understand from that how the sanctions regime functions. I hope that the Minister can shed light on how the regime works—or perhaps he will write to me at some point.

To what extent has the alternative way of solving the problem been considered—creating flexibility in the sanctions regime to allow movements across the ring-fence that are required for other legal purposes and hence keep the accounts hosted on the right side of the ring-fence?

Electronic Presentment of Instruments (Evidence of Payment and Compensation for Loss) Regulations 2018

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Wednesday 13th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, first, I am delighted to hear the Government reaffirm that there is still a place in our financial lives for cheques. I remember that there was a time when the Treasury was considering their abolition. From looking at countries where cheques have in effect disappeared—talking to relatives in Germany, for example—it became clear that the way in which people compensated for that was to carry a lot more cash and leave a lot more cash at home. Much of that seem to be an invitation to petty thievery and street mugging, by which I do not think that any of us would be terribly charmed, so I am very glad that the Government have restated that today.

I looked through the regulations trying to think of something to say without finding very much. I have bank accounts in the United States, a legacy from my 20 years living there, and many states—I am not sure that it is all of them—already use this system of electronic presentation of instruments, so I have seen it first-hand and have never heard of any particular problems. There is a very good article in the Penn State Journal of Law in December 2015. The one issue it raises is that it is crucial to ensure that the rules minimise any surprises in any conflicting claims between the paper copy and its image. I understand from what the noble Lord, Lord Bates, said, that he feels that that issue is covered. If he can give me that assurance, I am delighted to welcome the regulations.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, have worked my way through the instrument and the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum—I also spoke to James Evans of the Treasury—and feel that I understand it. I have no objection. It would seem a sensible, modern improvement to the system.

In looking around the instrument, I alighted on the fact that it is a further extension of the computer systems which underline modern banking. Reflecting on recent press comment, I started to look at just how many computer problems the banking system had had over recent years. I counted at least four for RBS since 2012, three from HSBC, three in Barclays, three at Lloyds and, of course, the recent TSB event where 1.9 million customers were locked out of their online and mobile services.

As we know, banks have a special role in our society. If they fail, the impact is not a mere difficulty, as it is when any large enterprise fails; it is catastrophic to our society. The Bank of England has put an enormous amount of effort into creating an effective resolution regime which, because I have been in this role since 2010, I have seen all the legislation on. It has a resolution directorate staffed with people ready to move in if there is a problem with a bank to solve it over a weekend. But the problem seems to me to be that, just as a bank cannot be allowed to fail for financial reasons, it is increasingly true that a bank failing because of its technical capability—because of its computer services—would have an equally catastrophic effect on society.

I therefore ask the Minister whether, as we hand further tasks to these ailing computer systems, the regulators have an equivalent regime to ensure that the banks’ computer systems will never fail.

Cash Ratio Deposits (Value Bands and Ratios) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Wednesday 16th May 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I noticed that when the Bank of England consulted on this scheme it received only three responses. That highly recommends that I be brief in my response. Obviously, we as a party very much value the independence of the Bank of England. I am reminded that Vince Cable spoke of it in his maiden speech in 1997, so we have a long history of wanting to see that independence firm and strong. Obviously, that means that the Bank of England needs the required resources to be able to function.

That is provided for under this statutory instrument, which permits both increases in the amount and indexation, which means that the amount can be reset according to shifts in the gilts on a six-monthly basis. That presumably reduces both volatility and risk to the Bank. The amount of money we are talking about is not particularly large. In most banking institutions it is somewhere lost well to the right-hand side of the decimal point.

As one of those who made the effort to respond noted, there is no assurance in any of the paperwork that we have seen that this is genuinely value for money and that the Bank has looked carefully at its expenditure. There appears to be no particular accountability for the way the money is spent. Will the Minister comment on that?

This also gives me the opportunity to raise a second level. Most of us here would agree that we are not really ready to see banks being let off the hook in terms of their contribution to the public purse. One could call this deposit scheme, in a strange way, a version of a hypothecated tax since it is a mechanism for providing funding to the Bank of England. I wonder whether the Government could provide clarity on their policy, because they are cutting the bank levy—a very significant amount of money—and raising this. Is there any relationship between the two? I hope that the Government will never pray in aid this particular increase as an argument that they are continuing to be tough on the banks.

I will make one last comment. This is exactly the kind of measure that should be dealt with through statutory instruments. It is exemplary. It is a relatively technical issue and relatively non-controversial. I hope that the Government will take on board that this is the kind of purpose for statutory instruments. They are not a mechanism for driving through policy, which we have seen in so many other areas.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree that this is clearly a measure that is appropriate for statutory instruments, but I wish that it had not landed on my desk. Of course, we will not oppose this. This will not be the one in 1,000 occasion this afternoon, I am sure the Minister will be pleased to hear. However, after I had taken the trouble to half understand the scheme, I could not believe its bizarre nature. I could not for the life of me see why there was not a straightforward fee-based scheme. The scheme is planned to raise £169 million per annum. Why does the Bank not simply send the banks a bill and raise the money directly? My real fear—which is rather the opposite of that expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer—is: what if this formula is wrong?

The functions covered by this income are absolutely vital. The austerity programme that this Government continue to pursue would be even more disastrous for the economy if it were not for the monetary measures taken by the Bank of England. This funding supports the MPC and the FPC, which are effectively seeking, through quantitative easing, the bank rate and the controls it puts on the banks, to control monetary policy and create an appropriate stimulus over this period of austerity. I see that the Bank has said that if the money is insufficient, it will reprioritise efficiency savings. I have worked long enough in the public sector to know what an efficiency saving is—it is called a cut in normal language. I cannot think of any area of the Bank’s activity, together with the resolution and recovery regime, that is more important. It is essential that it is properly funded.

The formula set out on page 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum has a number of components which I am afraid I do not understand. The first thing that it assumes is that the income required is fixed at £169 million for five years. Once again, I ask: what if that is wrong? The next factor in the formula is the aggregate eligible liabilities, which are fixed at £2.8 trillion—I hope that I have counted the number of noughts properly—yet the impact assessment assumes, from the various analyses that have been produced, that this figure will go up by 2.9% per annum. Why is it fixed if in fact the Government, in analysing the scheme, assume that it will increase?

In fact, the only real variable in the scheme is what is called on page 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum the “portfolio yield”—that is, the estimate of the yield from investments. It is made up of three parts: 55%, 42% and 3%. The 55%, labelled “a”, seems to be the only seriously variable one. It is a 13-year moving average. Why 55% and why 13 years? The second element, labelled “b” in the formula in paragraph 7.17(c), is calculated on a six-month average, but it is calculated only twice and is then fixed for the rest of the period of this notice. The 3% at the end of the formula is a six-month average calculated every six months. This is a ridiculously complex way to collect a modest amount of money. I believe that the whole system by which this money is collected needs to be reviewed. The fee-based approach would be simple to introduce. You could apportion the burden on eligible liabilities, which have to be calculated with this scheme. My biggest fear would then be coped with. A simple system could guarantee sufficient funds for this vital area.

UK Convergence Programme

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Monday 16th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, in a way this is a slightly poignant debate because, as the Minister has outlined, although the UK reports against the various economic benchmarks for the stability and growth pact, it is not required to take notice of any recommendations of the European Union that might follow from that but merely to promise that it will endeavour to avoid deficit. That is an example of one of the many ways in which the European Union accommodated the preferences of the UK and its desire to pursue some independence in certain areas, particularly the economic—greater than that enjoyed by other countries. It shows the mutual respect that framed the years in which we participated as a full and enthusiastic member of the European Union. When we consider how we have responded to the positive and creative ways of making sure that the most significant needs of the UK were always dealt with in a rational and reasonable way, it makes Brexit even sadder.

I just want to say a few words. Within the last few weeks we have had several debates on the economy, so rather than constantly repeat their content I want to make a couple of comments. The first is that I am concerned that the Government—weeks later—still have not recognised the significance of the very poor growth forecast for the UK that was presented by the OBR: 1.7% in this fiscal year, dropping to 1.5%. That is at a time when every one of our major export markets is absolutely going gangbusters, with growth in excess of 3%. Rather than take on board seriously the importance and relevance of responding to that issue, the Minister once again stands up and merely quotes reductions in deficit rather than dealing with the fundamental problems that we face.

Obviously some of those fundamental problems are around productivity. Again, the Government always cite the recent slight improvement in productivity. However, I remind the Government that, if they are minded to cite that again, it was caused by a drop in the number of hours worked—a very worrying warning sign—and not by improvements in output.

Today, again, we have reports on consumer spending, which continues to decline. Looking at the UK consumer spending index, I see that consumer spend declined by 2.1% year on year in March following a 1% year-on-year drop in February. Those are significant numbers, and they concern not just face-to-face spending—in other words, the high street retailers and shops. We know that there has been a shift from face-to-face spending to online spending, but now, for the first time, there is a significant fall in the online spending numbers as well. The Government have to take this very seriously, rather than simply assume that all is well and that the economy is in a positive state. We know from the many people we talk to that wage pressures are having a significant impact on individuals as they face inflation every time they go to the shops, and that the pressure on public spending has become completely intolerable.

Before I sit down, I will use this occasion to say once again that the Government have to tackle the lack of public spending in schools, in prisons and, above all, in the NHS and social care. This is the time to put in place a team to look at a dedicated tax to support the NHS and social care. If we do not start to do that soon, and to put in place the appropriate response to the needs of that critical service, we will find ourselves in a dire position.

Unfortunately, the Minister praised Brexit as the future for Britain, but we know from the Government’s own analysis—we have all gone and read it over in 100 Parliament Street and have heard it in other places —that the forecast is for the UK to function at a significantly lower level than it would have otherwise. We are looking at a dark economic situation, and for the Government to constantly present it as rosy takes away any confidence we can have that they will tackle these fundamental and underlying problems.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we are holding this debate today in the context of weeks of key Brexit debates ahead. It seems odd to be debating a Motion on the issue of convergence as we embark on weeks of debate about how we will leave the EU. I will not make this speech Brexit heavy but focus on what the Motion asks us to approve.

The Motion asks us to approve the Autumn Budget 2017 report and the most recent OBR economic and fiscal outlook for the purposes of Section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993. This is made difficult because we cannot be confident about what the economy will look like this time next year when, according to the Government’s Brexit timetable, we will no longer be a member of the EU—and presumably will no longer be holding this yearly debate. It is also made difficult by a number of other concerns.

I do not share the Chancellor’s view of light at the end of the tunnel, nor do the households for whom the squeeze on incomes and living standards is a daily pressure. The OBR forecasts from March are marginally better in the short term, but they have revised forecast growth down in both 2021 and 2022 since the Autumn Statement. Amid such uncertainty in the face of leaving the EU, how can we expect these to be revised up at any point? Last year, growth in our economy was the lowest in the G7 and the slowest since 2012. In the last quarter of 2017, GDP growth was just 0.4%. That means that Britain was the slowest-growing major economy across 2017, behind both Italy and Japan. OBR forecasts predict growth will fall below even the weak 1.7% level that the Chancellor spent most of the Spring Statement boasting about. So we are looking at having 1.5% growth in 2022, 15 years after the financial crisis, which is absolutely nothing to boast about.

This Government have missed every deficit target they have set themselves. Public sector borrowing is still higher than forecast a year ago, and debt is over £700 billion higher than when the Tories came to power. George Osborne’s target for a 2020 surplus is a distant memory. The Government may be quick to point to productivity growth. However, we know from the OBR outlook that stronger productivity has in fact reflected the fall in average hours worked in the second half of 2017, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, rather than stronger output. The OBR forecasts in November actually revised down productivity and business investment every year for the next five years. We are lagging behind the rest of Europe, with the productivity gap between us and other G7 countries the widest it has been since 1991.

This Government are failing to support working people. We have an economy running on low pay and insecure employment. Some 60% of people in poverty in the UK live in households where someone is in work. Clearly something is wrong here. The Government say that the economy is growing, but the UK is the only major nation in which wages have fallen at the same time. Wages are still below their level in 2010 and wage growth is being outstripped by inflation. The IFS has said that real average earnings are expected to grow by just 3.5% over the next five years, meaning that their level in 2022-23 would be similar to 2007-08. The OBR has said that real earnings growth over the next five years is expected to remain subdued, averaging just 0.7% a year. Growth in real household disposable income per person is expected to average only 0.4% a year. The national living wage was once again revised down. It will not hit the £9 per hour that the Tories originally promised. In the Spring Statement, it was projected to be just £8.57.

The Government’s headline figures on the deficit exist only because debt is being pushed on to local councils, schools and hospitals. Our public services are suffering a government onslaught. National Health Service trusts will end this financial year £1 billion in deficit. Doctors and nurses are struggling and being asked to do more, while 100,000 NHS posts go unfilled. Recorded crime is rising, yet the Government have cut the number of police officers by 21,500 and the number of firefighters by more than 8,500. Our prison and probation services are in dangerous crisis, and yet another prison riot has been reported today.

This Government are responsible for the first real-terms per capita cut in school funding in 20 years and are today trying to deprive 1 million children of a decent school dinner. They have trebled student fees to £9,000 and abolished the maintenance grant, meaning that the average working class student leaves university heavily in debt. Local government will face a funding gap of £5.8 billion by 2020 and is drawing down more reserves. More children are being taken into care, yet children’s services alone are facing a £2 billion funding gap by 2020, while more than 1 million of our elderly people are living with their care needs unmet.

After eight years of failure on housing, from rising homelessness to falling home ownership, the Government have no plan to fix the housing crisis. Statistics released just before the Spring Statement reveal that housebuilding has still not recovered even to pre-crisis levels. The OBR was not able to adjust its forecast on housebuilding as a result of any policies in the Budget.

The Spring Statement missed an opportunity to prepare our economy for Brexit and was a missed opportunity to invest in the services that we as a country will rely on increasingly in the post-Brexit future. The Chancellor may have kept his promise of no new fiscal policies, but that means that struggling families with low pay facing benefit cuts to free school meals will have to wait until the autumn for any kind of relief. I am not sure that they can afford to wait that long.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the most significant actor in forecasting the development of the UK economy is, of course, the Office for Budget Responsibility. It is mandated to provide two forecasts each year, yet there has been no updated forecast on the impact of Brexit since the Economic and Fiscal Outlook of November 2016. Uncertainty about how the Government will respond to the choices and trade-offs they face during the withdrawal negotiations renders forecasting extremely difficult. There has been no meaningful basis on which to form a judgment on the final outcomes.

The Government have given the OBR short shrift, referring it to the Prime Minister’s Florence speech as definitive. In that speech, Theresa May said the UK would seek to achieve a deep and special partnership with the EU and that this should span a new economic relationship. Not surprisingly, the OBR did not consider that a basis on which to update its analysis. However, the OBR did set out to forecast the outcome for certain parameters of the negotiations. It made several key assumptions about what will happen when the UK leaves the EU next March. New trading arrangements with both the EU and leading states will slow down the pace of import and export growth over the 10 years following the 2016 referendum.

The Treasury Select Committee finds this situation highly unsatisfactory, given that the OBR is required to produce regular reports analysing the risks surrounding the economic outlook for the UK. Committee members saw no reason why the OBR should not provide an update, the rationale being that it already has information on migration flows and can assess the likely state of the public finances, plus the OBR has already formed the judgment that,

“the consequences of Brexit on economic growth, whether positive or negative, are likely to be so substantial as to dwarf the impact of the financial settlement”—

a settlement that has so exercised members of the Cabinet through and since the referendum campaign.

While the Select Committee report came too late to be considered in the other place during its debates on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, it is being discussed tonight. The amendment in my name and the names of my noble friends Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Judd offers this opportunity and calls on the OBR to publish a fresh economic outlook, something that would incorporate the terms of the withdrawal agreement and inform Parliament’s conclusions on whether to act on the outcome of the negotiations. Challenging as this task might be, a flow of firm and up-to-date information will obviously be in demand over the course of this year. Parliamentarians have the right to ask the OBR, the best placed institution, to provide the information we so clearly require. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, I shall say only a few words because of the lateness of the hour, but I support this amendment. The Government have continually used the argument that they cannot provide detailed forecasts of the impact on the UK economy, jobs and other opportunities either because they do not know the full clarity of what the end agreement will look like or because any disclosure might compromise their negotiating position. I have always found that a little strange. Having negotiated trade agreements on our behalf for 40 years, there is, in fact, more expertise about the impact of these arrangements on the other side of the channel than there is on this side, so we are really not fooling anybody in any of the discussions that we have.

Setting that aside, at the point that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, describes, neither of those arguments stands any more. We will have completed our negotiations and will know the details of what we have negotiated. Do the Government not agree that transparency is both possible and crucial at that moment and, therefore, that the analysis that the noble Lord just described is vital and owed to Parliament and the British people?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer]

But this will surely be one of the most important debates and most important votes ever held in this House. Is the noble Baroness suggesting that it is not appropriate and necessary for the OBR to provide the information that probably only the OBR is capable of providing to make sure that that vote is taken with the best knowledge available? That would be extraordinary.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Surely the OBR is up to its ears in political debate. It produces the document on which Parliament discusses the Budget, taxation and all parts of the economy. The OBR is part of the political process. It is a neutral and independent part of the political process, but it is not without the political process.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Carrying on Regulated Activities by Way of Business) (Amendment) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Kramer

Thursday 1st February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I may have been the first person in this House to use the phrase peer-to-peer lending, to the enormous amusement of Lord Peston, who misunderstood it as “pier to pier”, which, as he said, was impossible. It is now a widely accepted, very successful strategy. I am not sure if this is officially a conflict of interest, but I declare that one of my children is an employee of a peer-to-peer lending platform. Back in the old days—and certainly before my son was involved—my noble friend Lord Sharkey and I helped to construct the framework that sits behind the regulations. We obviously missed a trick in allowing this discrepancy to enter the regulation, and for that, I—also on behalf of my noble friend—apologise. I am very glad that the Government are clearing up this misconception.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I came to the order in a state of almost complete ignorance, having never been involved in peer-to-peer activity in my life and not entirely understanding what it was. I did some research, and it seems that through peer-to-peer lending, the lender can get a better rate of return and the borrower has to pay less. I am reminded of the advice I would give anyone when it comes to financial affairs: “If it is too good to be true, it is too good to be true”. It is too good to be true in the sense that, in a peer-to-peer environment, one can lose one’s total investment and one is not covered by the FSCS guarantee.

I then did a bit more googling, and picked up an article from Which?, which stated:

“Two of the biggest peer-to-peer (P2P) lenders in the UK have been beset by problems over the past month, with RateSetter forced to make up a near £9m loan-deal gone sour and Zopa customers experiencing a severe cut in returns. So, is the market for peer-to-peer lending headed for trouble? RateSetter has announced that it had to intervene to protect investors from losing money in struggling wholesale loans. The company, which lent £664m last year, has now confirmed it has left a peer-to-peer lending trade body for breaching transparency rules”.


I say that because, with no experience, you have to turn to Google, but it does not look as though the peer-to-peer environment is entirely without problems.

I then read the order and the Explanatory Memorandum and it seemed to me in some way deregulatory. The last thing I naturally want when I read about this is for peer-to-peer lending to be deregulated. I then tried to understand the situation more carefully, and I concluded that peer-to-peer lending activity involves three parties: investors, platforms and borrowers. It is important to be absolutely clear what the order does to each of those groups. In my understanding, investors are in no way regulated and therefore the order has no impact on them, except where the investor is a company or firm involved in financial services.

My question to myself, which I have partly answered, is: are the platforms regulated? As has already been said, they are. Perhaps the Minister would enlarge slightly on his brief reference to the regulation of the platforms. The key question is: is the regulation of platforms in any way impacted on by the order?

Finally, under the present regulations, are borrowers regulated? Clearly they are if they are in the financial services business, but if they are ordinary firms, are they in any way regulated? I think that that is what the order seeks to address. The final question that sums up everything is: is the SI in practice solely related to borrowers? Does it leave the protection of customers using the platform in its present regulated state?