Cash Ratio Deposits (Value Bands and Ratios) Order 2018

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Wednesday 16th May 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I noticed that when the Bank of England consulted on this scheme it received only three responses. That highly recommends that I be brief in my response. Obviously, we as a party very much value the independence of the Bank of England. I am reminded that Vince Cable spoke of it in his maiden speech in 1997, so we have a long history of wanting to see that independence firm and strong. Obviously, that means that the Bank of England needs the required resources to be able to function.

That is provided for under this statutory instrument, which permits both increases in the amount and indexation, which means that the amount can be reset according to shifts in the gilts on a six-monthly basis. That presumably reduces both volatility and risk to the Bank. The amount of money we are talking about is not particularly large. In most banking institutions it is somewhere lost well to the right-hand side of the decimal point.

As one of those who made the effort to respond noted, there is no assurance in any of the paperwork that we have seen that this is genuinely value for money and that the Bank has looked carefully at its expenditure. There appears to be no particular accountability for the way the money is spent. Will the Minister comment on that?

This also gives me the opportunity to raise a second level. Most of us here would agree that we are not really ready to see banks being let off the hook in terms of their contribution to the public purse. One could call this deposit scheme, in a strange way, a version of a hypothecated tax since it is a mechanism for providing funding to the Bank of England. I wonder whether the Government could provide clarity on their policy, because they are cutting the bank levy—a very significant amount of money—and raising this. Is there any relationship between the two? I hope that the Government will never pray in aid this particular increase as an argument that they are continuing to be tough on the banks.

I will make one last comment. This is exactly the kind of measure that should be dealt with through statutory instruments. It is exemplary. It is a relatively technical issue and relatively non-controversial. I hope that the Government will take on board that this is the kind of purpose for statutory instruments. They are not a mechanism for driving through policy, which we have seen in so many other areas.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree that this is clearly a measure that is appropriate for statutory instruments, but I wish that it had not landed on my desk. Of course, we will not oppose this. This will not be the one in 1,000 occasion this afternoon, I am sure the Minister will be pleased to hear. However, after I had taken the trouble to half understand the scheme, I could not believe its bizarre nature. I could not for the life of me see why there was not a straightforward fee-based scheme. The scheme is planned to raise £169 million per annum. Why does the Bank not simply send the banks a bill and raise the money directly? My real fear—which is rather the opposite of that expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer—is: what if this formula is wrong?

The functions covered by this income are absolutely vital. The austerity programme that this Government continue to pursue would be even more disastrous for the economy if it were not for the monetary measures taken by the Bank of England. This funding supports the MPC and the FPC, which are effectively seeking, through quantitative easing, the bank rate and the controls it puts on the banks, to control monetary policy and create an appropriate stimulus over this period of austerity. I see that the Bank has said that if the money is insufficient, it will reprioritise efficiency savings. I have worked long enough in the public sector to know what an efficiency saving is—it is called a cut in normal language. I cannot think of any area of the Bank’s activity, together with the resolution and recovery regime, that is more important. It is essential that it is properly funded.

The formula set out on page 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum has a number of components which I am afraid I do not understand. The first thing that it assumes is that the income required is fixed at £169 million for five years. Once again, I ask: what if that is wrong? The next factor in the formula is the aggregate eligible liabilities, which are fixed at £2.8 trillion—I hope that I have counted the number of noughts properly—yet the impact assessment assumes, from the various analyses that have been produced, that this figure will go up by 2.9% per annum. Why is it fixed if in fact the Government, in analysing the scheme, assume that it will increase?

In fact, the only real variable in the scheme is what is called on page 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum the “portfolio yield”—that is, the estimate of the yield from investments. It is made up of three parts: 55%, 42% and 3%. The 55%, labelled “a”, seems to be the only seriously variable one. It is a 13-year moving average. Why 55% and why 13 years? The second element, labelled “b” in the formula in paragraph 7.17(c), is calculated on a six-month average, but it is calculated only twice and is then fixed for the rest of the period of this notice. The 3% at the end of the formula is a six-month average calculated every six months. This is a ridiculously complex way to collect a modest amount of money. I believe that the whole system by which this money is collected needs to be reviewed. The fee-based approach would be simple to introduce. You could apportion the burden on eligible liabilities, which have to be calculated with this scheme. My biggest fear would then be coped with. A simple system could guarantee sufficient funds for this vital area.