European Union (Referendum) Bill

Debate between Lord Tugendhat and Lord Kinnock

Friday 24th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, said and therefore will not waste the time of the House by going over the points in detail. That was admirably done by my noble friend Lord Bowness and the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, in their speeches. I just want to make one particular point: both at Second Reading and in our debates today, I have heard it alleged that those of us wishing to amend the Bill are trying to sabotage the principle of a referendum and that there is some deep-laid plot to deny the British people the right to a referendum. The reverse is true.

As I said at Second Reading, I support the position set out by the Prime Minister in his Bloomberg speech. I shall campaign for a Conservative Government and when one is elected I shall campaign for a yes vote in the referendum when it occurs. But because I take that referendum very seriously, I am anxious that it should be held on the best possible basis: the details should have been fully thought through; it should be designed to provide the British people with the most objective possible choice and all the information that they require; and, before the referendum takes place, the British Government should have the best possible chance of achieving their objectives. I supported an earlier amendment and shall support this one, not because I wish to cut across the House of Commons or deny the British people the vote but because I wish to see the referendum carried out on the best possible basis and designed to achieve the result that the Prime Minister said that he wants to see.

[Lord Kinnock]

My Lords, the only reason we have the Bill, and certainly the only reason that we have a Bill with a deadline, is the repeated failed attempts by the Prime Minister to mollify and pacify the euro-secessionists within the Conservative Party. Because of the risks, speculation and difficulty to which it subjects our country unnecessarily, I think that it is the most fruitless and most dangerous appeasement since Danegeld.

What is the Prime Minister seeking to negotiate? That is central to the Bill. He was good enough to tell us in his Bloomberg speech that he wanted to negotiate a new settlement with our European partners in the next Parliament,

“a new settlement in which Britain shapes and respects the rules of the single market but is protected by fair safeguards, and free of the spurious regulation which damages Europe’s competitiveness”.

He does not go into more detail about that; I suppose that we will have to wait for it. He calls for a proper and reasoned debate and then says:

“I say to our European partners, frustrated as some of them no doubt are by Britain’s attitude: work with us on this”.

I use those quotations to illustrate the complexity and the need for co-operation with European partners to make any significant progress on the kind of negotiation that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer envisage: to negotiate a new settlement, which has at its centre powerful and influential participation in the single market but with our obligation shorn of any of the duties and contributions to which we object.

I think that that summarises fairly the approach to be taken in the event of the Prime Minister being engaged in that new settlement. That would make the whole process very fragile. The date, which is the subject of our debate now, makes it even more fragile. Why is that? Because the specification of the date of December 2017 means that the furthest possible realistic date to honour the undertakings of the Bill, by which negotiations would have to be concluded, would be, let us say, October 2017, 17 months after a general election in which the Conservative Party hopes to be victorious. It gets even more complex because, just underneath the provision relating to 31 December 2017 is the date of 31 December 2016 as the date by which the date for the referendum must be appointed by the Government.

Do people really believe that after the date of the referendum has been specified in December 2016, we can expect our partners in Europe—despite their distractions, which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has properly pointed out, with their acute domestic questions relating to their general elections—to whom the Prime Minister has appealed for patience, to stick with us when they know very well that we are facing a deadline of a maximum of 12 months, during which time the referendum must be held after the date has been appointed?

That brings me to my final point. I think that noble Lords will recognise it to be a practical point because, with the galaxy and diversity of talents and experience in this place, there is any amount of acquaintance with negotiation. Probably everyone in this House has done it, in one way or another, whether as a trade unionist, an employer, a politician, a civil servant, a manager or a parent. We have all engaged in negotiations and I suppose that there are a couple of basic golden rules about them.

The first rule is that you signify a deadline for the conclusion of negotiations only if that deadline can be one of your weapons—for example, “If we do not finish this deal by next Tuesday night, the deal’s off the table”, or, “If you don’t make the deal by next Tuesday night, we’re having a ballot and going out on strike”. So you use a deadline to influence the negotiations themselves, but only when you are a participant in negotiations and have sanctions. You can negotiate with your children, if you have a more democratic parental relationship than my children tell me I had in their upbringing, because there can be a withdrawal of privileges and a denial of this, that and the other, simply because they have not kept to their side of the bargain. That is part of growing up and of being a parent. You can do the same thing as an employer or a trade unionist, or any form of negotiator using sanctions to try to uphold the deadline and secure your objective.

What sanctions are in the hand or pocket, or the red box, of any member or putative member of a future British Government who have set themselves a deadline to negotiate a complex and comprehensive new settlement with the rest of the European Union, a prominent feature of which is our implacable right to continue to operate with full privileges and obligations in the single market, if we expect them to be willing to endorse that and give us our way in the name of reform? The reform objective is decent and very supportable. I have been working and campaigning on reform of the European Union in a variety of ways for a very long time past, so I support the objective of reform. However, what reforms can you undertake while ensuring that they are copper-bottomed, secured in negotiation and adopted as policy, or even as treaty amendments, if you are working against a deadline? In this case, there are no realistic sanctions to be employed against those who will not bear with us, negotiate in good part and come to a conclusion according to the timetable set down in the Bill.

The reality—is it not?—is that you never set a deadline unless you can enforce it and use it as a weapon of negotiation. If you make a deadline in any other circumstances, the calendar and the clock will do your opponents’ work for them—or at least, not your opponents but your partners in negotiation. It is easy to make the error sometimes and I have been known to slip into it very occasionally myself. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, to consider whether even his objective of securing this legislation to facilitate a referendum is really served by having an explicit deadline in the Bill. It is a deadline that takes no notice of the objective realities of our politics and other peoples’ politics, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, so forcefully pointed out. That is evidenced by any knowledge at all of the conduct of political and constitutional affairs in the European Union. A deadline takes no account of the even more basic realities of the biology and psychology of negotiation.