European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to listen to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames. I share his concern about some possible dangers in the situation, although not perhaps in quite the way he expressed it—but I shall come back to that later.

I recall a question that was asked of a leading member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party shortly after the beginning of the inter-party talks. The interviewer asked him whether he was confident that Sinn Féin and the republican movement would stick with the political process. The reply was: he trusted the circumstances that led Sinn Féin to that point. My interpretation of it was they were not necessarily coming of their own good will; they had not had a damascene conversion; they were coming because the circumstances left them with this option. I agree, too, with the comments about how Sinn Féin Members elected to the Assembly have carried out their functions and it would take a very unusual situation to move them away from where they are.

I point to these circumstances because I think that it is a mistake to link this process, this legislation, with the maintenance of peace in Northern Ireland. I do not see a connection in the terms that have been said and I am dubious about whether this should be addressed as any more than scaremongering, and scaremongering on a fairly limited basis.

However, there are things to worry about. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, referred to what Monsieur Barnier has been saying and saw various ways of interpreting that, the third of which was the bleakest and, I think, the nearest to the truth. That is because pressure has been coming from Brussels and Dublin for some time for a significant change to be made to how Northern Ireland is governed. The drive is there to get Northern Ireland into a special situation: linked permanently to the European Union and with the union with the rest of the United Kingdom to that extent weakened. That is what Barnier openly called for a couple of days ago; it is implicitly what Coveney said in a newspaper article a week or two ago, where he called on the British Government to abandon some of their red lines in pursuit of peace and prosperity—so the threat is there as well. If that goes down the way—here I should say that our own Government have rejected this proposal; some of it was published some time ago—there is a danger that the things being said today and how the vote goes may strengthen the hand of Barnier in his demands on us and weaken the hands of our own Government. There has to be careful consideration of that.

I have not yet mentioned the amendment. I had thought of going through it in a little detail, but I shall confine myself to just one bit, subsection (1) of the proposed new clause. That reads,

“a Minister of the Crown or devolved authority must—

(a) act in a way that is compatible with the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998”.

I am all in favour of that. I am all in favour of acting in accordance with the terms of the agreement; I have a personal affection for that agreement. I will not go into detail on that, because it would take too long, but it is something I would like to see.

Then we come down to the very last line of the amendment. It talks about various things,

“not subject to an agreement between Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of Ireland”.

What is missing? There is something very important missing. There is no reference to the people of Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Northern Ireland Executive. Do not dodge that by saying, “Oh, the Assembly is not sitting at the moment”. There is a very important principle here, which is at the heart of the agreement. The heart of the agreement contained what we call the principle of consent with regard to the people of Northern Ireland, their future and the institutions they create.

A long time ago, back in the 1970s, Governments tried to impose an arrangement on the people of Northern Ireland, through the Sunningdale agreement. Another long time ago the Anglo-Irish agreement was made, without reference to the views of the people of Northern Ireland. Both were huge decisions and big mistakes by the British and Irish Governments which prolonged the political instability, and the violence as well. When we got to the agreement, thankfully by then the two Governments had learned the lesson and the negotiations fully involved the people of Northern Ireland and we, collectively, took control of that—“ownership” is the term used. This amendment would deny us that.

Some people have gone around suggesting that Brexit might damage the Good Friday agreement. Brexit is not going to damage the Good Friday agreement; this amendment will, because it excludes the people of Northern Ireland. If future arrangements are to be made over the Northern Ireland border it is obvious that you have to have the people of Northern Ireland and their elected representatives closely involved in that. If not, you are going to make the same mistake.

[Baroness Crawley (Lab)]

On that last point, surely the reference to the UK and Irish Governments contains the basic assumption that there will be extended talks with the Northern Irish Government, and it refers to the fact that the British and Irish Governments are the official guarantors of the agreement.

[Lord Trimble]

In the examples I mentioned, going back to 1985 and 1973, there was no consultation by Her Majesty’s Government with the unionist elected representatives. The Irish Government, of course, consulted closely with nationalists, so there was that imbalance. In any event, I come back to the amendment and I think that the proposed new clause has the wrong approach and should be looked at again.

I have one other point and it is simply this: we made the agreement 20 years ago; it was a bit rough at times for a short period afterwards but it has settled in. There are still some difficulties but I am quite sure that those difficulties will be overcome and these institutions will survive because they have the wholehearted endorsement of the people of Northern Ireland. In doing it, we also helped to change the relationship between Belfast and Dublin and, indeed, between Dublin and London to a certain extent as well: relations between them in recent years have been very good. They have been extremely good and I am delighted, but the behaviour at the moment of the Irish Prime Minister and Coveney, backed up by the European Union, is actually destroying that relationship and doing considerable damage to it. I know that we cannot directly affect that, but the message should go out very clearly to Dublin and to Brussels that they are not to continue to damage the basis of our institutions in pursuit of some petty objective, such as getting yourself elected as the head of a European body in Brussels.

That is where I want to stop. It is hugely important that the Government stand firm on this proposal to move to what is called the backstop and against a situation where Northern Ireland is to be moved away from the rest of the United Kingdom and permanently attached to Brussels, as far as these things are concerned. That is the wrong way to go.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, moved so compellingly by the noble Lord, Lord Patten.

The land border between the United Kingdom and Ireland is a state border—for tax, excise and legal jurisdiction. It is also a border across which public services connect, public agencies operate, people make their daily commute, livestock graze and goods flow back and forth without restriction. The levels of integration across the Irish border are among the closest in the world, bringing material economic benefit to the island—particularly to Northern Ireland—and, even more importantly, a remarkable transformation of a border that fewer than 20 years ago was a highly securitised boundary, close to which hundreds of people lost their lives. Soldiers, police officers, customs officials, farmers, factory workers, musicians and teenagers were all killed near the border because of a conflict about the border.

The 1998 Good Friday agreement and the Act that followed it, which is referred to in the amendment—I point that out to the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice—brought that conflict to an end by making the border a point of co-operation, without raising questions about the sovereignty or constitutional integrity of either the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland. This was made much easier by the fact that common EU membership of the United Kingdom and Ireland had already removed many of the barriers to such co-operation and movement. This was because the EU came to form a customs union and create a single market, both of which transcended state boundaries. Thus from the quiet rural hamlets of Fermanagh and Monaghan to the busy border towns of Newry and Dundalk there is no need for customs controls, no tariffs payable, no need to pay VAT at the border, and no checks for quality, standards or regulatory compliance.

As a line of soft integration between the UK and Irish jurisdictions, the Irish border has faded into relative insignificance, allowing Irish and British citizens—nationalists and unionists—both to feel quite comfortable in Northern Ireland. Given the bitter sectarian and violent history, this is a remarkable achievement. But it is also a fragile one, and we ignore that at our peril. To withdraw from the EU is to remove Northern Ireland from the conditions that currently make the Irish border so frictionless. Finding a resolution to the border conundrum while respecting Brexit must somehow preserve those connections and protect those benefits of co-operation. This is an economic necessity as well as a political imperative.

In their joint report with the European Union of December last, the UK Government repeated their commitment to protecting the operation of the 1998 agreement and to the avoidance of a hard border. Indeed, they went so far as to preclude,

“any physical infrastructure or related checks and controls”.

The amendment would bring into legal effect the commitments the UK Government have already made to the European Union and to everyone. In Brussels, a means of doing so in legally operable terms in the withdrawal agreement is currently being negotiated. It is essential that we do likewise in passing this amendment to the Bill.

Any customs partnership must be tight and seamless enough to avoid such checks while ensuring that the border is not a back door into the EU’s single market. Any technological facilitation must not entail physical infrastructure, random checks or compliance checks at any point. The amendment will provide much-needed security and legal certainty, with no fudges, creeping barriers or sly erosion of the finely honed balance. It will ensure that cross-border movement, north-south co-operation and day-to-day, mundane integration will continue to happen unimpeded. It does not tie the Government’s hands on the precise solution, except to insist upon what everyone says they want anyway: namely, a border as free, open and invisible as it is today. In my view this can only mean reproducing in some form the customs, trade, rules of origin, standards and regulatory arrangements that we now have across it.

It is our responsibility to ensure that Brexit does not mean the emergence, at any level, of any new conflict about the border, because that would be both economically catastrophic and politically lethal. That is why this amendment is so vital.

Northern Ireland Border

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. With regard to the notion of the cybercrimes that we have all been threatened with over the last few years, I note again that much of the movement of goods that come into the EU is dealt with through electronic consignment. The risks that are already established for all trade are real risks, and we must take them into account as we seek to address all the challenges as we go forward.

With regard to the question about the nature of the border, the issue I come back to again is that when we reached that agreement between the EU and the United Kingdom Government in the joint report of December, it was based upon a mutual understanding that we wished to see a border in name alone to allow movement to continue. That is the position of the United Kingdom Government and, importantly, also the position of the Government of Ireland—the two principal interlocutors in this matter. We must never lose sight of the fact that they are the most affected, and we must find and secure an agreement that suits both sides. On that basis, they form the principal component parts of the negotiation elements that will unfold in the coming months. It remains the objective of the Government to deliver a seamless border, as we have promised and as has been promised by the Taoiseach himself.

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, reference has been made to the need to preserve the Belfast agreement, with which I am wholly in agreement. However, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the December paper, which made reference to regulatory alignment but did so in the context of cross-border arrangements under the Belfast agreement. That is the only part of the Belfast agreement relevant to this discussion: namely, the cross-border co-operation that exists and through which there is a good case for saying that there has to be regulatory alignment for a body that is operating on both sides of the border.

What is happening now is something quite different. Those minor provisions in the December paper have been exaggerated into something that, in effect, would mean that Northern Ireland was still in the European Union, and thus left behind as Britain moves out of it. That runs contrary to and undermines the main plank of the Belfast agreement: that arrangements and constitutional matters were to be based on consent. The papers that have come forward—I hope that the Minister agrees on this—deal with issues that are moving into constitutional areas and should, if Dublin and Brussels wish to push the matter further, invoke an endorsement in a referendum. But we are not and should not be in that territory, and I hope that the Government will stand firm on this matter.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I thank my noble friend Lord Trimble for his intervention. He is absolutely right to draw attention to the components of the joint report that emerged in December of last year. As we have stressed, the Belfast agreement must remain at the heart of our agreement. The challenge we face is that the publication by the European Union today and the remarks of Michel Barnier are, one might argue, unhelpful in that regard because they are a cherry picking of the joint report. One element of that report has been selected but there were three component parts, labelled a, b and c. The European Union has chosen to latch on only to part c. The point is that each must be a component part of the ongoing negotiations and any attempt to cherry pick risks undermining the Belfast agreement, which is at the heart of the positions accepted by the United Kingdom Government, the Irish Government and, indeed, the EU itself. I thank my noble friend for using the word “consent”. Consent must be at the heart of the approach to this, otherwise we run the risk of unravelling the very agreement which has done so much to bring stability to Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland Budget Bill

Lord Trimble Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bew, who always interests one and regularly draws attention to things that should have been done. One thing that should have been done this evening—for which I have to apologise to the Minister—is to pay more attention to the annunciator in Fielden House. I ended up running across the road, but at least had some exercise while doing it. I should also join in welcoming the Minister to this House and to this issue.

I also want to thank the Secretary of State for holding the meeting at lunchtime today, attended by a dozen or so Members of your Lordships’ House who have a particular interest in this issue. I found that meeting very helpful. It was a fully frank discussion, and I would like to suggest to the Minister that it would be a good idea to do it on a regular basis. The request is self-serving in that respect.

The Secretary of State has held back with this legislation to the very last minute. If it is not enacted now, it is only a matter of days before the departments run out of money. It has to go through. The Secretary of State was quite right to hold it back to the last minute. The Bill is based on the last Budget drawn up in the Northern Ireland Assembly, which gives it a degree—a limited degree—of democratic legitimacy. However, that legitimacy will run out early next year. We are even now more than a year away from the last Budget drawn up in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Once we go into another year, it is very difficult to see how things can be sustained in that sense.

If we do not get an agreement and see progress in that respect, under the existing legislation the Secretary of State will have to name a date for an Assembly election. When we get to more than a year away, that will almost certainly be the point at which he has to take a decision on whether we go for an election. I do not feel that the best thing to do would be to have an election in the first few months of next year. It is the wrong time of the year; it is also the wrong time in the political climate, because the Brexit issue is not likely to have been resolved before then and is more likely to be causing more difficulties. I cannot think of a worse context in which to have an election.

However, if there is not an election, the Secretary of State will have to bring forward some legislation. That legislation might provide for direct rule or for some other things to be done. I know that the Government are reluctant to have direct rule—that has been said regularly. I have regularly indicated my agreement with that, because it is not a healthy state of affairs—direct rule was never a healthy state of affairs and it was always our desire to see it replaced by a local Administration. However, when I look at the present situation, I must say that I am coming more to the view that it would be better to go for direct rule if the matter cannot be resolved. I would like some other course to be taken—I have mentioned that in the past.

If we are to have another way of doing it, I would like to make a suggestion respectfully to the DUP. I know that you have worked hard in these talks and that positions have moved and positions have been tabled, to no good. Could I suggest that it is worth while to make another major effort? What I would suggest to you is to think of a good, even a generous, offer to Sinn Fein and to put it transparently on the table—not pieces of paper within the talks but put there so that the public will know exactly what is on offer to Sinn Fein. In that context, I would like to see the Secretary of State say to Sinn Fein that if you do not take up this offer, then I am going to do something. What I would like to see him do in that situation is what was suggested earlier: recall the Assembly and let it operate on the Welsh model, without an Executive—corporate Assembly, as it is known. That is worth looking at and, because it operated in Wales for a number of years, it is not without precedent.

The question then arises, what would Sinn Fein do? Would it boycott it? It would be difficult for it to boycott an Assembly. Would it go in and try to wreck it? Very probably. It would be an unpleasant experience for people who were in there, but it might just be worth while going through it, because if it is there either refusing to take part or taking part in a way of causing constant difficulty, then it is undermining essential public services and at some point the penny must drop with its electorate that this is not the way to do things. At the end of the day, that is about the only recourse we will have, and I think that the Secretary of State should adopt it; or he may wish to look in a different direction, which might be to change the procedures for forming an Executive. What we have at the moment is not what was in the 1998 agreement: it has come in, and I know the reasons it came in but I am not going to go into that. Changes were made and changes could be made again. Maybe a different way of doing things could be arrived at. That would at least be something worth doing.

We have to remember that Sinn Fein will oppose anything that is not in its interest. Our experience was that it never took decisions that were difficult for itself unless it was under pressure. You will not get it there by the quality of your argument but only by adding to it some degree of pressure. What that is, I will leave for the moment, but showing that the Government have the determination to go ahead without it is in itself pressure. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, will remember when Tony Blair first came to Belfast shortly after he was elected Prime Minister and one of the key phrases in the statement he addressed to the republican movement was that the train is going to move—the settlement train is going to move—and I want to see you on that train, but it will move without you if you do not come. That is the sort of language that we could well do with at the moment.

I want to touch briefly on Brexit at this point. It is relevant; it has been mentioned; and there has been a lot of discussion about the problems on the Irish border, which have come into focus and gone out again. My eye was caught by yesterday’s debate in the other place. Owen Smith, the Member of Parliament—successor to the noble Lord, Lord Murphy—referred to the issues on the Irish border and continued:

“I agree with the EU that one potential outcome that would solve the problem would be if Northern Ireland remained in the customs union and had some sort of special arrangement. That is a very interesting idea that we ought to consider”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/11/17; col. 82.]


Terms such as “special arrangements” have floated around in the past, but in the last wee while some hints of information have drifted into the public arena and pointed towards what some have called “the Hong Kong model” of a special regime for Northern Ireland. I think it is in the minds of some people that we should have a special regime whereby Northern Ireland is still part of the European Union for purposes such as, say, the customs union and other matters—I have even heard the common agricultural policy mentioned in that context—but on other matters still part of the United Kingdom. I doubt whether that is workable, but whether it is workable or not it is absolutely unacceptable. It is to disrupt the union. I know that David Davis has been quite firm on this, but I think that the Government are going to have to sit very hard on it, because it looks as though there is going to be an attempt to push the notion, and that would be a very big mistake, and obviously contrary to the procedures in the Belfast agreement. I conclude on that point, and thank you very much.

Northern Ireland (Ministerial Appointments and Regional Rates) Bill

Lord Trimble Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 26th April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, as has in effect been said, this Bill is necessary. Consequently, it will be supported and will proceed in this House. It also comes at the last minute. I understand why the Government have waited until the last minute before bringing forward these proposals, because they will want to proceed with the talks that have been going on as though that is the key thing where they want success. It is then natural to leave the Bill to the last minute before bringing forward necessary provisions if there has not been agreement.

We also have to consider what will be done in the future. When we look to that future we are dealing with a very significant anomaly where one party with less than a third of the seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly is in a position to collapse the Assembly, has done so and shows no sign of taking a different approach. I know the Government will hope that they can find an agreement between now and the new cut-off date in June, but the auguries are not good. We have to consider where we are.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Belmont, wants the new deadline to be final—that is what I understood him to say. If it is to be final, the question is: what will happen when that comes if things have not succeeded? In that sense, to come to what the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, said, we do not want a return to direct rule—I agree with him on that—but if we have a final cut-off date in June, we do not have success and we do not have direct rule, what do we have? We have to give careful consideration to this.

The problem at present is the inability to form an Executive. Are an Executive absolutely necessary? There may be other ways to deal with this. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, for not having consulted him on what I am about to say—he would be in a position to give a very interesting response—because I look to what happened with the first phase of devolution in Wales, where there was a corporate Assembly without an Executive that functioned reasonably effectively. As I understand it, that operated for some six or seven years, then the Welsh Assembly wanted to move to having an Executive, but that shows what could be done in this situation.

If, come the cut-off date in June, we are in a position to bring forward a little bit of legislation that vested the administrative powers in a corporate Assembly, that Assembly could continue to function and it would be able to move to have an Executive the moment that the party that presently will not nominate for an Executive shows a willingness to do so. We would have an arrangement that could be flexible and would not prevent an Executive being formed at a later stage, but would mean that the Northern Ireland Assembly would continue, that there would not be direct rule and that the administration can be carried forward by the corporate Assembly.

That is a suggestion. There may be others, but while the Government will not want at this stage to make any formal consideration of plan B, thought needs to be given to this. This is a modest suggestion that I would like to put out there. It might help to make some parties a bit more amenable when they realise that there is a plan B. I am well aware of the attitude that Sinn Fein can take to deadlines when they are there: it seems to regard a deadline as an insult and wait until it breaks the deadline before it does anything. That is the way it used to operate in the past. Maybe it has learned something in the interval, but I would not want to count too much on that. I leave those thoughts for people to consider.

Northern Ireland: Political Developments

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Tuesday 28th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dunlop]

As the Statement sets out, the focus and priority are seeking to get the Executive up and running. Of course, should that not succeed, we will look carefully at all the options as we go forward.

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the announcement by the Minister that he will be bringing forward legislation after Easter. I suggest that that legislation should be fairly comprehensive in providing for a number of scenarios. It might also be a good idea to do something unusual or a little different—the suggestion mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, is worth considering. The Minister might like to consider that the joint ministerial council is not a creature of statute and that it could operate with a slightly different membership than it has done hitherto.

[Lord Dunlop]

I will certainly reflect on what my noble friend has said. As is clear from the Statement, our focus is on getting the parties round the table to agree the outstanding issues so that we can form an Executive at the end of this window of opportunity. That must be the focus of our efforts at present.

Northern Ireland (Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan) Bill

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Thursday 21st April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eames (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, in his amendment, but I do so from a point of view which has yet to be mentioned in this debate. On retirement, I have maintained the work that I initiated in those years with those former paramilitary members who were seeking a better way of life and a more just way of expressing their opinions. I have continued that work and am utterly convinced that one of the most extreme pressure points in ensuring that that process continues for the greatest number is contained in the words of the amendment, and for this reason. We may suspect, in the relatively calm waters of this Chamber and the Palace of Westminster, that some of the things that are said are not listened to by the likes of those who have former or present contact with paramilitary organisations, but let me assure noble Lords that that is untrue. Those words are read, thought about and used in deciding the meaning of this. Only recently, a group who I have been working with for some time said, “When will it be recognised that we are trying? We are trying to get out of this cauldron of paramilitary activity. When will society recognise that some of us do want out of it?”.

If the commission reports only at the sorts of intervals mentioned in the Bill, this important pressure will cease to have effect unless we accept what is sought in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice. As events move—and they can move very quickly in the world of the paramilitary—if this commission does not have the opportunity to tell civil society, “This is what’s happening”, and to tell it in a relatively speedy way after evidence has been uncovered, a wonderful opportunity will be lost. I beg the Government to think just as carefully about the meaning behind the proposal in this amendment as they do about what the amendment says. I beg the House to take this very seriously.

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, on what he has done over a number of years in this area. He was heavily involved with the Independent Monitoring Commission, which played a significant role in accelerating the move away from paramilitarism and enabling the institutions to be recreated on a more stable basis. That would not have happened but for the work of the International Monitoring Commission. Indeed, if the IMC had been in existence before the summer of 2002, as some of us were trying to bring about, I do not think that the institutions would have collapsed in the autumn in the way that they did. That is the context that one should put the IMC in.

It was a very bad mistake to wind up the IMC so quickly. Had it been there, things would have been somewhat different. I understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice: just bringing back the IMC as it was would not be appropriate because we are in a slightly different context. But within that different context, we want to see that the new body will be just as effective in the contribution that it makes. That means looking a little more closely at some of the provisions here.

The noble Lord’s amendment refers to reporting by the IMC, which he wants to happen more frequently. The way for the Minister to achieve that is very simple. In that first clause, he should set out the words used in the so-called fresh start agreement. That agreement says in its paragraph 5.1:

“The body will: report annually on progress towards ending continuing paramilitary activity”.

Then it continues,

“(or on such further occasions as required)”.

That is all the Minister needs to do. He can table a simple amendment that would carry out the exact terms of the agreement that the Bill is supposed to be implementing. It solves the problems that have been mentioned just as long as no one tries to put too tight a construction on the phrase “as required”. I suggest that one does that without adding to the language in the fresh start agreement itself.

Part of the reason for saying that we should make sure that the language does not go too far, is that when we look at how the commission will exercise its functions as set out in Clause 2, something strange happens to the language used. It says:

“In exercising its functions, the Commission must not do anything which might … prejudice the national security interests … put at risk the life or safety of any person”.

Of course, national security and risks to persons are matters to which people should have regard in a situation such as this and bear in mind carefully, but how will the words “must not do anything” which could engender prejudice or cause a risk operate? How is the commission to construe that phrase? It is something that could create a chill in the commission’s operations so it would have to think, “Is there any risk attached to what we are doing?”. At what level does the risk become something where it must not do anything to bring it about?

There may be a way out of this. Trying to rewrite this clause is not something we can do easily in the time available to us, but there is a way to put this on a better basis, and that is in the provisions for the Secretary of State to issue guidance about the exercise of the function. That might use language that provides a better balance than the words before us here. Mention of the guidance raises the question: when will it become available? Will it be available before Third Reading? If it is not ready then, will it become available in a form that will enable this House to give it some scrutiny? These are matters about which we would like to hear from the Minister, and he will bear in mind that our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has recommended that the guidance should be treated as a legislative instrument subject to negative resolution. That will enable scrutiny to take place here, so having it come out in a way that means we cannot look at it and then relate it to the overall objectives of the commission should be avoided if at all possible. I look forward with interest to what the Minister has to say on this point.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Scotland Office (Lord Dunlop) (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 1 and 2, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Alderdice, and Lord Empey, respectively. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been, as my noble friend Lord Lexden said, a very interesting and wide-ranging debate. My noble friend Lord Trimble raised a number of issues that go wider than the amendments. He asked, in particular, about the strategy to tackle paramilitary activity. The commission will report on measures of the three Administrations, including but not restricted to the strategy. He also mentioned issues that had been raised by the Delegated Powers Committee: the duties of the Independent Reporting Commission and the guidance the Secretary of State can issue. I have responded to the Delegated Powers Committee. My noble friend raised a number of detailed broader points and I am happy to respond to him in writing on those.

Before addressing the substance of the amendments, I will give an overview of the Independent Reporting Commission and Clause 1, to which the amendments relate. The new commission is one of a series of measures set out in November’s fresh start agreement to tackle ongoing paramilitarism. The new commission builds on the precedent set by the Independent Monitoring Commission, on which the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, gave such distinguished service as a commissioner. As the House knows, the Independent Monitoring Commission operated between 2004 and 2011, during which time it monitored activity by paramilitary groups and oversaw the implementation of security normalisation measures, which culminated in the ending of Operation Banner in July 2007. Like the Independent Monitoring Commission before it, the Independent Reporting Commission will be an international body, established through an international agreement between the UK Government and Irish Government. Its objective will be to promote progress towards ending paramilitary activity. Its functions will be to report annually on progress towards ending paramilitary activity; to report on the implementation of the measures taken by the Government, Northern Ireland Executive and Irish Government to tackle paramilitary activity, including oversight of the implementation of the Executive’s strategy to end paramilitarism; and to consult a wide range of stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies, local councils, communities and civic society organisations.

I said that the commission will report annually on progress towards ending paramilitary activity. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, proposes that Clause 1 be amended to prescribe that the new commission must report twice annually. I have absolutely no doubt that this reflects the noble Lord’s considerable experience, as he suggested, as a member of the Independent Monitoring Commission, which reported twice annually while in operation. I am sure that all sides of the House would agree that there should be urgency in tackling paramilitary activity and establishing momentum in this process.

However, as I have outlined, the new commission, while subject to similar governance arrangements, has a different objective and functions from the IMC, as the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, recognised in his own remarks. The frequency with which it reports must necessarily take account of those different functions. This question was considered as part of the discussions that led to the fresh start agreement, where it was agreed that annual reporting would strike the best balance between ensuring regular and adequate oversight of measures taken to tackle paramilitary activity and allowing sufficient time between reports for progress to be made. Paramilitary activity has unfortunately been a scourge on Northern Ireland society for many years. The measures to be taken to tackle it, on whose impact the commission will report, will not work overnight.

An annual reporting cycle was judged most appropriate to properly measure progress towards the goal of tackling paramilitarism and offer meaningful commentary on the implementation of measures to this end. The fresh start agreement therefore gives the new commission a function to report annually on progress towards ending continued paramilitary activity connected with Northern Ireland, or on such further occasions as required.

[Lord Trimble]

The Minister says that he is quoting what was said in the fresh start agreement but, as I pointed out, that agreement, while saying “annually”, also clearly anticipated other reports as required. I hope the Minister will come on to that.

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[Lord Empey]

My Lords, as usual, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has an uncanny habit of putting his finger on something that sparks a series of comments.

I am no lawyer or expert in these matters. All I can say is that, when we came to the Belfast agreement in 1998, no agreement would have been reached had the constitution of the Irish Republic remained as it was. We had the issue of Articles 2 and 3, which claimed the territory of Northern Ireland as part of the nation. If I remember correctly, “the island and its territorial seas” was the terminology at the time. Had that remained in place, there would have been no agreement.

A treaty was eventually written to implement the agreement—although it was brought in here as the Northern Ireland Act 1998, there is of course a treaty. The Irish Republic effectively changed its constitution by referendum in 1998 to remove those offending articles. So in terms of our operational day-to-day relationships with the Republic, when we were going to meet Irish Ministers, deal with them and set up bodies with them—which, as the result of the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, appointing me to positions, I had the opportunity to do—it was clear to us that the perceived threat/claim no longer existed from a practical position.

However, the problem was demonstrated by the 1985 arrangements, when there were two separate documents, as was pointed out. There was the question of the United Kingdom being given its full title—the mirror image of this question. This country was not getting its proper legal title from the Republic. We are the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as anyone who looks at the passport will see. The Irish state was not legally permitted to acknowledge anything other than Great Britain as part of our national territory. That was where the agreement of 1998 made progress, in that it was then accepted that we are an integral part of the United Kingdom. That had been the missing link and something that we had attempted to achieve. Several noble Lords who are here today were part of that negotiation.

So we have made huge progress. I am not qualified to judge what the international implications of this could be, but we know from dealing with this issue that things can creep in over time to dilute the agreements that we have made, because there are always people who will never give up their ultimate objectives. We know that people have been prepared to kill, be killed and do all sorts of other things to achieve an objective which does not meet with the democratic will of all of the people on the island of Ireland, as was expressed by the 1998 referendum.

Your Lordships will recall that John Hume’s argument always was that, if you got the people on the island to vote, you would undermine the arguments of 1918 and the republican movement, because you would actually get people to vote to accept the position. That was, of course, the whole purpose of the agreement. People were forced into accepting that—through gritted teeth, I suspect—and we got the vote.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, for raising this matter, because it brings out whether people truly and actually believe what they have signed up to.

[Lord Trimble]

My Lords, everything that has been said by the previous three noble Lords who have spoken is significant, and how people feel about things and the language that is used is also significant, but in assessing the legal situation we must bear in mind that Ireland—the Republic of Ireland, the Irish Free State, whatever you want to call it—operates under a formal, written constitution. Here, I am speaking from memory, not having consulted documents to refresh my memory and ensure that it is accurate, which is a dangerous thing to do, but the 1937 constitution, in giving a name to the state, said that the name of the state was “Éire, which in English means Ireland”. That is a nice one to reflect on. That constitution was still in force in 1949, when the state was declared to be a republic, but that was legislation. No amendment was made to the constitution, so in Irish constitutional law, the name remained unchanged.

[A noble Lord]

Face the front.

[Lord Trimble]

My apologies. I hope that the microphone caught what I was saying and that the noble Lords could hear it, but I thank the noble Lord for drawing my attention to that. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, will not mind if I turn my back to him for the rest of my comments; that is no reflection on him at all.

I was saying that the 1949 Act did not change the Irish constitution, and in Irish constitutional law the name remained unchanged. There is nothing unusual about that, where common popular usage varies from the formal usage. There is a central European state that is always described incorrectly in our media as the Czech Republic. The name of the state is Czechia, but we call it the Czech Republic because we find it difficult to get our tongue around the name Czechia.

The point where we run into difficulties is that the Irish constitution was changed as a result of the agreement in 1998. What the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said about that agreement was absolutely true. But the question then is: did that constitutional change change the name of the state? I rather suspect that it did, but I would like to go and check. Perhaps I will pause at that point and leave the Minister to direct inquiries on our behalf.

[Lord McAvoy]

My Lords, this is an interesting debate, but I wonder—I might annoy a few people by saying this—about what the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, said about people’s perceptions and about the indication by the noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, that people feel strongly about this. I always listen very carefully and closely to the noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, because in his life he has experienced things which, to my mind, give him the right to speak on these issues.

I will pose a question—and maybe run for cover once I have asked it. Does this debate, with some of the things said here today, help the situation in Northern Ireland? Does it contribute to cross-community spirit? Does it allay suspicions? Or does it increase them? Clearly, in 1998 the people of the whole of the island of Ireland voted to accept the status quo, so any change must come through consent—and, as far as I am concerned, the principle of consent is a complete and utter guarantee that any change, if it ever happens, will be through consent.

Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, I managed to call on somebody to give me some advice on the current position. Article 4 of the constitution of Ireland refers to the country as “Ireland”. Legally, that is the country’s name. We cannot tell that country what to call itself. We in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland cannot dictate to somebody else what they can call themselves. To suggest that in any formal treaty or any signed agreement between our two sovereign countries we should tell the Irish Government that they should call themselves the Republic of Ireland is surprising, coming from the noble Lord, Lord Lexden.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rogan]

My Lords, Clause 7, which deals with the pledge of office, has seven objectives. The first six are so self-evident that no government Minister in any democracy would not adhere to them whether or not they had taken an oath or a pledge. However, the seventh pledge in new paragraph (ck)—

“to accept no authority, direction or control on my political activities other than my democratic mandate alongside my own personal and party judgment”—

is somewhat different and indeed significant, given that the IRA Army Council still exists and that we were led to understand that it directs political Sinn Fein.

The Secretary of State has clarified in another place that an individual who refuses to give the undertaking will not be able to participate in Assembly proceedings or receive any of the privileges of office or salary. That is very welcome but somewhat different from what applies to Sinn Fein Members of the other place, who refuse to take an oath of loyalty to Her Majesty yet suffer no loss of salary or expense. We have a situation whereby a sanction and penalty for refusing to give an undertaking is in place, but the glaring omission in the Bill is that there is no process for investigating or, more importantly, providing sanctions for those who breach their undertaking.

Not all politicians may be as honourable as noble Lords. A process for investigating an alleged breach of the pledge would be helpful. Surely some penalty must be administered to those who wilfully break it, perhaps after being given orders from a six-man Army Council. I support the amendment.

[Lord Trimble]

My Lords, I indicate my support for this amendment, which, as my noble friend Lord Empey says, was tabled in the other place and debated there. I think it was tabled by Sylvia Hermon, the Member for North Down, and it is a very sensible provision. What is the value of these pledges and undertakings if they can be disregarded? There has to be some form of penalty or sanction available in the event of the undertakings not being honoured.

At Second Reading, the Minister gave two reasons why the amendment was not accepted. The second of the two reasons was to refer to established mechanisms by which the Assembly holds its Members to account, including adherence to the Assembly code of conduct and so on. This is like asking IPSA to take on such a highly political job as deciding what sanctions to apply to Members who take directions from paramilitary and terrorist organisations and so on. That is not a terribly good reason to give for not accepting this. The other reason the Minister gave was that:

“The Government are firmly of the opinion that it would not be appropriate for us at Westminster to pre-empt the Assembly’s own consideration of this issue”.—[Official Report, 12/4/16; col. 225.]

I can understand that—it sounds reasonable enough—but you then have to bear in mind that the likelihood of the Assembly agreeing to significant sanctions as things stand at the moment is round about zero, and maybe even less than zero. Therefore that, too, is not a good reason.

I also add a rider to say that one of the things that disturbs me about our Government’s attitude to the devolved Administrations—it is not just in Northern Ireland but comes across in their attitude to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly—is that an exaggerated view of their position runs through all of this. This is the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. We have devolved matters, but power devolved is power retained. At the end of the day responsibility in all these matters rests with Her Majesty’s Government. For the Government to say, “Oh, we’ll leave it up to the devolved Administration” might sound appropriate and diplomatic but it gives far too exaggerated a view of it. To see how at the end of the day that puts you in difficulty, just look at the history of Stormont. The same exaggerated view of Stormont’s position from 1922 onwards was taken by this House, and the result of that was not good in that it led the central Administration not to pay proper regard to what was going on and not to involve themselves in what was going on. If Government here had paid closer attention to it, we might have avoided the Troubles. That is a small point, but I hope the Minister will bear it in mind.

Finally, I understand the Minister’s desire to be diplomatic, on the basis that he is only being diplomatic, and I realise that it will not be possible to accept the amendment without losing the Government’s timetable to get this out before the end of the Session—and that is fine. Can the Minister then change his language slightly when he says that he will leave it to the Assembly to see what it does with regard to it? However, if the Assembly fails to take action on this matter, the Government will have to consider what they do.

[Lord Browne of Belmont]

My Lords, I support Amendment 4, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Empey. As I have said before, Northern Ireland goes to the polls on 5 May and it is only right that anyone who engages or supports paramilitarism should have no place in a democratic institution. Newly elected Members will thus be obliged to give an undertaking to abide by the principles outlined in Clause 8 and Schedule 2.

I fully concur with the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that it is only right and proper that, when a Member of a legislative Assembly gives an undertaking and then is seen to breach that undertaking, within Standing Orders there should be a robust mechanism, first, to enable an investigation of any alleged breach of the undertaking, and, if proved, surely there should be sanctions that can be enforced. Otherwise, the undertaking those Members take will be meaningless. If not, the public in Northern Ireland will have little confidence in their elected Members and in the operation of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Of course, it is only right that the Northern Ireland Assembly should prescribe the nature of the sanction, but surely, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, it is for the sovereign Parliament to ensure that the Standing Orders of the Northern Ireland Assembly reflect the need for such sanctions.

Northern Ireland: Political Agreement

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Thursday 19th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, the existence of private armies anywhere within the United Kingdom presents a challenge to the authority of the United Kingdom Government, and responding to the existence of private armies should be with the Government in the lead. Pretty words said in the Executive are all very good and well, but it requires something more effective. The reason that the original Independent Monitoring Commission was effective at dealing with paramilitaries was that it had the power to sanction those bodies. Furthermore, not just the character of the persons who were in it but its independence had the effect of keeping the Northern Ireland Office honest and inhibiting its tendency to brush things under the carpet. We are missing on both those counts.

[Lord Dunlop]

My noble friend speaks with huge authority on these matters. With regard to paramilitary activity, the assessment done a few weeks ago showed that all parties in Northern Ireland are committed to the political path. Under this agreement, all the parties have signed up to ambitious commitments to eradicate paramilitary activity. A strategy must be agreed. It needs to be backed by the joint agency task force. The monitoring body is a crucial part of this agreement. It will need, at a date in the future, to be given statutory underpinning and will be the subject of an international agreement with the Irish Government.

Northern Ireland

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dunlop]

I very much agree with the noble Lord. I absolutely agree that an investigation is not the same as a prosecution. Indeed, an investigation is also an opportunity for someone to clear their name.

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, I draw the Minister’s attention to a potential anomaly. I am not talking about this individual’s case. If, out of all of the proceedings of the Saville inquiry, any charges are brought and a conviction obtained, the person convicted will not be able to apply for early release under the terms of the Belfast agreement. I do not know why the authorities, in drafting that scheme, put a starting date of after 30 January 1972. It was never a matter of discussion and I was not aware of it until long after the agreement. However, it is there and I am making this point because, if this anomaly arises, steps should be taken to ensure that the person is treated in the same way as other persons convicted of criminal offences during the Troubles. It would be wrong to treat people in similar cases to this person’s case in a worse way.

Northern Ireland: Paramilitary Groups

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Tuesday 20th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the publication of this comprehensive assessment. I ask the Minister to refer to paragraphs 12 and 13. Paragraph 12, with regard to the Provisional IRA, states that,

“some ‘departments’ with specific responsibilities”,

are still in existence. Is it not the case that the team of leading republicans who conducted an inquiry into the killing of Davison—which inquiry led them to conclude that McGuigan was responsible for that, which led then to the killing of McGuigan—were members of one of those departments with specific responsibilities, and it would have been part of their responsibilities to report their actions to the leadership of the republican movement?

With regard to paragraph 13, which refers to large-scale smuggling and other money-raising activities, as has been mentioned, is it not the case that the primary purpose of those criminal activities is to generate income for the republican movement to finance its political focus and objectives? This enables Sinn Fein to have the highest income of any political party in the British Isles. Should we not think about cleaning up this aspect of our political process?

[Lord Dunlop]

I note very carefully what my noble friend says, but I do not wish to speculate on detail that goes beyond the assessment. I note the conclusions in paragraph 13, which is the important basis on which we need to move forward. We judge that this strategy has a wholly political focus, that the PIRA of the Troubles era is well beyond recall and that PIRA’s leadership remains committed to the peace process. I do not wish to minimise for a minute the challenges that we still have. The important thing is to use this assessment to inform the urgent and intensive discussions that now need to take place among the five parties to resolve and eradicate for ever paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland.