Brexit: The Customs Challenge (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Monday 1st April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, it was a pleasure to serve on the sub-committee chaired so effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, whom I thank.

After all these months of delay, waiting for the Government to respond, we should consider where we are overall. The Government are hardly prepared for the customs arrangements that would be needed for any version of hard Brexit, and the businesses and individuals who will have to operate in this environment have few clues as to what to expect. People in haulage, ports and administration have a sense of application to do their best, but nobody has been able to tell them which best they should do.

All the time, the clocks are ticking. Complex supply chains face multiple difficulties without any real prospect of resolution. With the small cavalcade of lorries in Kent, the appointment of a ferry company with zero experience, zero ships and zero port agreements, the emergency plans for food and medical shortages and the declaration of the possible need to contain civil unrest with military deployments, it is hardly surprising that nobody is oozing confidence. The sunny uplands are a fantasy. We Brits are a pragmatic and phlegmatic lot, but this has felt to me like launching Eddie the Eagle down a precipitous slope to jump against seasoned athletes, our best aspirations amounting simply to hoping he will survive.

In the area of customs, I still do not know what our national vision is. How does that vision, if there is one, link trade and customs provisions with economic performance, and thus with other vital interests such as security, defence, foreign policy, justice, home affairs and other key sectors? Customs and trade are essential components of a successful economy, and a successful economy holds the key to everything else.

In all markets between nations, including the WTO’s often dysfunctional system, we generally acknowledge that there must be rules so that everybody knows the standards within which they will trade. Even outside the EU’s customs union, checks and intrusive procedures are still inevitable. How else will we deal with, for example, the enduring compliance with preferential rules of origin? If we are to enjoy the frictionless benefits of being inside, do we really think it right to do so without accepting that there are both rights and responsibilities?

Customs arrangements underpin many of the things the United Kingdom values very highly: mitigating risks to public health, reducing environmental risk, food safety, the operation of financial regulation, the social market and decent workers’ rights. None of these is a second-order issue for the quality of our social fabric.

The sub-committee pulled me back to thinking about our national strategy. The United Kingdom may no longer be a great power, but we can be a very good second-tier power and project ourselves internationally with effect. To do so we need to demonstrate our ethical trustworthiness, and this must be underpinned by serious intellectual endeavour. We need credible forces, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and my noble friend Lord West often remind your Lordships’ House, and the foundation for it all is a sustainable economic capacity to deliver on these other interlocking attributes. No nation on earth can do these things on its own—not one.

Let the House be candid about the economic world we inhabit today. Customs problems are not the only problems on the economic horizon, and we had better understand the cumulative effect of all the problems we may well face. China’s growth is now far weaker than it was before 2007, and in essence has been driven only by the injection of a $586 billion stimulus in 2009. That is now impacting on much of the world’s economic prospects. The recovery of the United States is evidently unstable. The poor are becoming poorer. Average wages last year retreated to the purchasing power of 1978, and US retreats always have their effects in Europe and Japan. Europe is sluggish at best. Germany had zero growth in Q4 last year and barely sidestepped recession. Italy has negative growth, and the UK’s growth was the weakest since 2012. There is a correction as the post-2007 recovery regimes are changed and monetary tightening takes effect. The yield curve has inverted, showing how anxious investors have become—always a warning of recession. The eurozone crisis deepens.

Private debt once again threatens the stability of many major economies. In the United States, private debt is higher than before the housing and mortgage crisis of 2007, and is now fuelled by borrowing to speculate. Global debt is three times global GDP. It impacts on corporations and individuals, and in China on just about everything and everybody. Growth is squeezed out by unsustainable and unpayable debt. Investment in wages and productivity continues to be in grim decline. In short, the predictive indices that have preceded past financial collapses are as visible today as the queues once were outside Northern Rock.

This is the economic climate into which we want to add the uncertainties of trading without proper customs arrangements, reintroducing significant friction between us and our nearest huge markets, and our political, trading and security partners. It is hard to believe that anyone would take such a course willingly. Of course, there may be no certain and smooth economic path open to us, but following the worst options could well be the straw which breaks the camel’s back.

Our country has been served very poorly, both by its Government and by the Official Opposition, but it would surely prefer to meet its global and domestic strategic objectives in leadership and values, intellectual capability, security and defence through a viable military—to meet its obligations in the world as it has always tried to do. While customs may appear to be just a piece of this jigsaw, it is about economic capability and therefore about the interplay of the overall strategic fabric. We can do without cutting unmendable holes in that fabric.

Human Rights

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Thursday 21st November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman (Lab)]

My Lords, I echo the congratulations given to the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, and the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and to my noble friends Lady Kennedy of Cradley and Lord Mendelsohn on their outstanding speeches and look forward to their future contributions. I was intrigued to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, has five guitars at home, as do I. It sounds to me as if we have a basis for at least some sort of discussion.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for initiating this debate, which centres on human tragedy and the stance that we should take to it, and for providing the architecture for it: that is, the 1948 universal declaration, and the need to construct foreign policy with Article 18 in mind. Indeed, that was enlarged on by my noble friend Lord Parekh. Her Majesty’s Government—in my view, rightly—have set out their six priorities and their decision to serve on the human rights global machinery. I support these priorities unreservedly, not least because they flow from the voices of victims. These priorities orientate us. However, I hope that we will also explore the contradictions which result from them, as did the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, a few moments ago.

I have a similar objective to that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, which includes his point about multilateralism. I will focus on capital punishment as an example of a priority. Our strategy is to oppose the use of the death penalty because we promote human rights and democracy and because there are no circumstances in which we believe that it is appropriate or ethically justified. We want to influence people and dissuade them from using capital punishment, including those with whom we enjoy normal, peaceful diplomatic and trade relations, such as our traditional friends the United States, but also countries such as China or Iran. We are also clear about the imperative of developing relationships with those countries.

Iran, with whom we seek a renewed relationship, not least because we wish to reach an accord on nuclear enrichment and end conflict in Syria, has killed at least 120,000 people judicially and non-judicially since the overthrow of the Shah. It routinely executes minors, and nearly half of those suffering the death penalty are under 30. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Kennedy on her important intervention about children generally; the execution of children is part of that. There have been 59 United Nations General Assembly resolutions and countless reports by the human rights commission but they have had more or less no impact.

I support all that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said about the murders at Camp Liberty, North Korea, Joseph Kony, and much else. I also support what the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, said about Burma, the analysis of Syria of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and the remarks made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, about the suppression of people because of their caste. The United Kingdom’s priority is clear and right, yet “no relationship with Iran” is a position that it would be difficult to advocate or sustain in the world of real politics. We lobby at a high level, fund human rights and pro-democracy projects and take trenchant positions on all these issues. However, we cease diplomatic relations only exceptionally and unwillingly. That seems sensible and necessary in most circumstances.

The FCO has a priority to prevent torture and, a few moments ago, my noble friend Lord Clarke illustrated what this means in Iran. Again, the ethical priority cannot somehow mean that we cease to deal with states that employ torture, much as it is repugnant to us. That is not out of indifference or cynicism but because we need relationships to address a wide variety of global and regional problems. The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, spoke of the problem of dealing with tyrants. I can personally say that you may end up talking for days, as I did in Doha, with people whom you would rather see hauled before the International Criminal Court in The Hague, if only you could achieve that outcome.

The FCO also has a priority, which was rightly emphasised by my noble and learned friend Lady Scotland, to end violence against women and girls—a problem which is now frequently a weapon of war, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, so rightly said. We have a detailed policy that repays reading, as will study of what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby has said today. Equally, the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, talked about gay people’s rights. We should prioritise all these issues, just as we prioritise the renewal of the push towards democracy. In this case, we apply few tests of whom we will or will not deal with. There is no adequate litmus test available, and even when we hold our noses, we frequently have to prefer to talk.

Like the late Robin Cook, to whom the noble Lord, Lord Patten, also referred today, I ask myself what might guide us in these difficult times and give us a chance to set out a strategy that is neither naive nor bombastic about human rights. What guides the post-Cold War world, a world of multipolarity? There is a great instinct in general to hold nations directly or indirectly accountable for their actions. It is our current trajectory that I want to look at. Do we balance properly the ethical foreign policy that we should adopt, if we can, with the United Kingdom’s national interest and its commitment to human rights? There must be a new disposition between all these.

I conclude that there will never be an unbending standard to judge every circumstance and, equally, that no foreign policy can be humanity blind because it might happen to suit us on a particular day because of a particular commercial interest. If we were to do so it would give full scope to dictators, war criminals, illegal arms dealers and others. It would demand of us only that we looked after our own security and financial profitability. We would have intervened in Libya because it had armed the IRA and not because it was slaughtering its own people. These are the issues that we have to face. We would have turned our backs, in those circumstances, on the 1948 convention.

Does the Minister agree that the core guidelines, which we may need to behave more appropriately now, are perhaps these? First, our foreign policy in these areas should obviously protect our security and that of our allies, while promoting conditions in which we are least likely to be attacked at home or have our people attacked in other parts of the world—and we should do so with our allies in a multilateral way. Secondly, while our choice of means in such circumstances would almost always lead to peaceful means, we must acknowledge circumstances where, for the right and wholly disclosed reasons and with parliamentary consent, wherever possible, we should intervene as a last resort with proportionate steps and reasonable prospects of success. I labour this point because, aside from our own security—the paramount reason—we also have obligations to protect. They are part of our international obligations and often imply preventing, reacting and rebuilding after conflict. I find it hard to conceive of retaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, as I wish this country to do, if only the United Kingdom’s interests ever determined the judgments that we made.

My noble friend Lady Howells made the point that human rights must be matched by a responsibility to protect; she is absolutely right. I commend my noble friend Lord Mendelsohn and the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, on their comments in this regard. In my final few moments I will commend also the work of the Canadian Government, who have captured this thought. Their international commission on intervention judges the evidence of serious harm, including mass murder and starvation, and whether the state involved is unwilling, unable or opposed to averting such harm. If these conditions hold, the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility to protect—something that we should take very seriously. It was close to Robin Cook’s thinking, and I believe that it was close to Tony Blair’s in his speech to the Chicago press club.

In all these cases, what we may need is a realistic checklist that gets us through how we are to deal with despotic, murderous and antidemocratic regimes—regimes for whom war crimes are just a tool that they use from their toolkit—and at the same time oppose the behaviour that they espouse. I commend the Canadian approach as being among perhaps the best architecture that has been designed. It was somewhat lost in the aftermath of 9/11 and it is hardly known or studied in many circles, but it should be. It should also be fully debated and I hope that on some occasion, we may have the opportunity to do so in your Lordships’ House. Let us try to make sure that we are debating the fundamentals of how we proceed alongside the examples of egregious harm.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for what she has said and hope to respond against the background of the four guiding principles that she mentioned in her introduction. The debate has 56 listed speakers with extensive knowledge and experience, which, in my view, speaks volumes for the case for a standing committee on foreign relations in your Lordships’ House.

This is a deeply unsettled, uncertain and unstable time. All leading powers are still hauling their way through a profound economic crisis, and United Kingdom policy has left us becalmed, or worse. The crisis makes the formulation of foreign policy all the more difficult—an international challenge in its own right. The state of the wider Middle East is unpredictable and the outcomes of the Arab spring are still far from clear. Progress between Israel and the Palestinians is imperceptible, and the nation with the greatest leverage, the United States, has for a while deployed far too little influence. However, I welcome the new urgency that we have seen in recent weeks, which is an improvement on the mistakes that were made by the Bush Administration in that region. The United Kingdom is largely absent as a force for progress, however much we may advocate it.

Nuclear proliferation continues. Iran is increasingly problematic, North Korea has become a fully fledged problem and south-east Asia a cauldron of tensions. Miscalculation is the present risk. It is a time, as my right honourable friend Douglas Alexander, put it,

“for careful words and wise heads”.

Global terror, now partially contained in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Pakistani tribal areas, has, as we know, sickening ways of growing new viperous heads on western streets and elsewhere in the world. Terror directed at religious communities, if anything, grows. Cyberwar and crime require constant attention.

Europe has moved along the spectrum from being seen as a source of enduring Nobel Prize winning peace and prosperity to being the plaything of populist politics. Those afraid of dealing with populism seem to buckle at every perceived blow, and the United Kingdom’s long-term interests are placed at great risk. The extent of cuts in defence expenditure reduces our flexibility so that we have to choose very carefully, within reason and international law, where we respond to threats. Alex Salmond seems intent on unravelling our deterrent capability, undermining Scotland and the United Kingdom in equal measure.

Behind it all, the international institutions appear to be weaker, lacking leadership and often dysfunctional. The institutions where we so often place our hopes, such as the United Nations, the G20, the G8, the EU and the multinational forums of Africa and Asia—the machinery designed to learn the lessons of World War II—increasingly lack authority for any concerted strategy. They often let down the people in the world who are suffering the most. The case for liberal democracy and economics, and for the peaceful norms that we have sought to achieve in the past decade, appears to be weaker than it was a decade ago.

Let us face it: the United Kingdom’s voice in international affairs is less audible and sometimes not regarded as very relevant. I welcome the emphasis on international trade relationships in the FCO, but I cannot welcome the subordination of the other key skills of international diplomacy and statecraft that I think we are witnessing.

The two pieces of legislation in the gracious Speech—defence and some minor housekeeping on Europe—are unlikely to be the focus of today’s debate. The defence Bill will be studied. Its backdrop is a sequence of culls in the 2013 Budget and probable cuts in the 2015 spending review. Long-term commitments to real growth in equipment budgets, particularly the F-35B, mean that apportioning future austerity will determine where we project force in our national interest and through our alliances.

The Bill that ought to have been announced—if the coalition had had the courage of its 2010 convictions—would have enshrined the aid pledge made so volubly at that time. Driven by a “Farage” of populist rhetoric, the Prime Minister has dropped the legislation—how sad. Progress in Africa was central to the previous Government; I believed it was central to this Government. The damage to the millennium development goals creates greater uncertainty, insecurity and violence in Africa. It will impact on us and it is an historic error. Popular it may be in some short-term view; mistaken it certainly is. Better for Mr Cameron to use the G8 presidency to act on aid tax and transparency—perhaps he can move an amendment to the Queen’s Speech in order to do that and be remarkably “relaxed” in doing so.

In identifying and assessing risk in policy, we must be complete realists. The decision on Britain’s membership of the EU can be based—as the noble Baroness did a few minutes ago—only on a judgment of national interest. Committing now to an in/out referendum fails that test. I fear that we are not so much sleepwalking to the exit but that our Government have, in some cases, actively embraced exit or are indifferent to the consequences of the process we are now in.

We are three years into the eurozone crisis. The underlying causes remain. Politics and economics are marching in opposite directions. New structures are slow in the making. Failure will be devastating to frail major world economies, and some are now estimating a risk of a 10% decline in global GDP, and EU unemployment, already unsustainable, reaching 20%.

Many issues demand reform in the EU and an astute United Kingdom can contribute massively to that. But there are no credible substitutes for our current trade relations. The prospect of a free trade agreement between the two largest global blocs, the EU and the United States, offers opportunities that are otherwise unavailable. The key is to be at the international table—not outside the door, subject to the decisions within but without a voice or a vote.

What an amazing moment to blight our economic prospects with what will be a four-year campaign over a referendum, the terms of which nobody today can express with certainty. I declare an interest as leading a merchant bank and in that role I now routinely see due diligence risk questions from potential inward investors to the United Kingdom. Global businesses now contemplate the consequences of us fighting for four years and then potentially fracturing the EU by the withdrawal they fear is likely. It has become a due diligence risk. I put it plainly: a robust global economy is in the United Kingdom’s interest; the prosperity of our people should be our only goal. Of course, we will not simply defend the status quo—there are many things to be corrected—because that also hampers the interest and the goal I have expressed.

Advances in reversing proliferation as major powers reduce their arsenals are welcome. Iran and North Korea are not only dangers themselves but encourage other, often not stable nations to create a new balance of terror. Our limited role—and it may be limited—could involve assisting Washington and Beijing, the powers most likely to intervene, in that part of south-east Asia to show that new co-operation is desirable. Shared intelligence on the DPRK’s WMD assets and some information on their own military resources tasked to intervene might reduce risk and build confidence. Co-operation in these ways is always risky, but non-co-operation is riskier still.

Relations with China have wider implications, and I am not clear that we really know what we are doing. We need to grasp what faces Xi Jinping and the new leadership in China’s domestic transformation and foreign policies, which are plainly problematic for them, to foster deeper relationships. All these things pose sharp and deep challenges.

I look to 2014 for an honest debate on our aims and their outcomes in Afghanistan. It is unhelpful to do so with our troops still on the ground. It is better at this moment to pay tribute to their courage and sacrifices. In due course, we will need to take stock of the security position that we leave behind. We will want to know whether Afghans regard their Government as legitimate and their economy as sustainable. We need a prospectus where security, good governance, the rule of law, universal rights, pluralism and the engagement of all forces in social reconciliation direct the efforts of the United Nations in that country.

Difficult as the Pakistani elections have obviously been, it is truly significant that an elected Government have been succeeded by another. The UK must engage early, not least in the interests of Afghani security, but we should also try to convince Pakistan, if we can, that India is not its greatest problem—far from it.

I turn briefly to the Middle East, where we surely have a role. We deplore the rocket assaults on Israel and the threats made by Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah to eradicate Israel. We tell our Israeli friends that seizure and construction on Palestinian land and the line of the wall breaches international law and is morally wrong. New life is needed in what is neither peace nor a process. The two-state solution hangs by a thread. As matters stand, it will probably not survive. The immediate consequence could be the collapse of the Palestinian Authority with Hamas filling the vacuum. It might be followed by an Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank and a violent Palestinian response. The Israeli Government and Palestinians need to understand urgently that they are each other’s best prospect for stability and finally peace.

We will work hard to bolster the durability of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty—I hope that it is a priority for the FCO—providing the assistance that President Morsi appears to want.

Syria will continue to pre-occupy this House as a humanitarian and strategic disaster, although I welcome what the Minister said about aid being provided in Syria, which is plainly very important. Each passing week has made it harder to identify and support a secular opposition, although we must surely continue. However, I believe—and I hope that the House will forgive me for saying so—that we are behind the curve. We have failed to learn from Richard Holbrooke’s approach to diplomacy and statecraft in the former Yugoslavia. There was there, of course, American leadership, but there was also aggressive and creative diplomacy and a willingness to use force in the cause of peace, anchored to a resolution where no ethnic or other group was completely denied a living space, a credible state and economic institutions. It was a sort of cantonisation, I know, but it none the less persuaded people that they were not being driven out of their homes permanently and to their continual detriment. For many, it was the least-worst outcome, but, with the exception of criminals such as Mladic, it has survived as a solution and as a diplomatic triumph. John Kerry has obviously learnt much from this approach, and that is why I welcome the discussions that he has had with Russia. We should have done so many months ago.

None of this is said to be disobliging. I simply conclude by saying that we use the skills of the FCO and DfID very well but we can do so to greater effect by responding with dramatic measures when it is right but, for much of the time, working far more consistently on the smaller and more persistent scale. Foreign relations are hard to predict but they can never be allowed to be a rollercoaster. We need a new calibration: more solid, patient work and more realism about what works with our allies and when we can work best with them. Upgrading and higher numbers, as we have just heard reported, are excellent and I welcome them but there also needs to be more traditional tasking of that workforce to provide what I fear at the moment is a missing ingredient.

Middle East: Water

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Thursday 27th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, it is very useful to have this debate at this time. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and all noble Lords who have taken part. I especially congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Baglan, on an outstanding maiden speech. He is a great friend, a great diplomat and a great addition to your Lordships’ House.

At present, little is happening to inspire confidence in the Middle East peace process, much as we would all wish it. This fact alone should encourage us to seize the moment to engage in genuine strategic thinking about what is happening, what could make the problems of the region more acute and what might be done to mitigate them. To be candid, I fear that today’s debate will identify a problem that has been explored before. However, what we have is an opportunity to review past efforts to consider water insecurity and to evaluate whether any new proposals can take us forward appreciably. It is in this light that I welcome a debate on the work of the Strategic Foresight Group and the publication of The Blue Peace. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, for making sure that I had a full copy of it; I appreciate that greatly.

In particular, I welcome the fact that the report starts with hard data. No solutions, other than those that take a hard look at hard data, have any prospect of success. Some of the data are telling. The region is home to 6.3 per cent of the world’s population but contains just 1.4 per cent of the world’s renewable fresh water. Climate change will make that worse. This is a region greatly challenged by developing efficient, collaborative, multinational governance systems. All of these factors bear on the issues that we are discussing.

I started by saying that the issues of water insecurity and its implications for regional peace and prosperity have been discussed on past occasions. I shall set out just one or two examples. They have not led to concrete action and they illustrate why it is sensible to look at a new programme. First, in its quite remarkable periodic exercises in scenario planning, Shell considered not oil but water security in the Middle East. It considered social, economic and political dynamics in that context. Its analysis illustrated the dangerous confluence of factors that might increase regional insecurity.

The demands for reliable water sources in the region become sharper when considered against the background of demographic change. Developments in medical science are likely to have a large impact on a region’s population, especially when it becomes increasingly possible to intervene in, for example, genetically carried diseases that have lowered life expectancy in the Middle East. Although the number of live births per mother halved between 1960 and 2001, it remains likely that the upward trend in population will continue. A far larger, healthier and, by definition, initially far younger population will in due course place greater demands on water resources. The more this trend develops, the greater the competition for water resources will be. Indeed, as Shell suggests, it will become more significant than competition for oil resources. Between the nations of the region, the population grew from 173 million to 366 million between 1970 and 2001. However, the amount of fresh water per capita halved in that period. The greater the competition, the sharper the possible conflicts over control of river flows, especially where there are few viable developments in the use of seawater or desalination.

The second example comes from the work of RUSI and Chatham House, which suggests that states in the region have begun to turn their attention to securing the military capacity, if necessary, to secure their future water requirements. I do not suggest that this inevitably leads to an arms race but it is likely to produce a significantly different military doctrine in the region. In a troubled region, that could promise still more trouble, as several noble Lords have said.

These have been brief summaries of important past analysis. I suggest with great respect that this report might have been a little stronger if it had also made an assessment of those efforts. However, what this research unquestionably adds to the past thinking flows from what I have tried to summarise. If water insecurity is liable to prepare people for potential conflict, it is imperative to argue that the better alternative is regional co-operation among nations that have not co-operated to any great extent. Water sources know no boundaries and the route between open and inland seas almost always passes through more than one polity. Cross-border management of this scarce resource is possible only if it is a peaceful option. A good deal of work, including by the Swiss Foreign Minister, has been done in observing that five of the seven nations covered by this report are already experiencing a structural deficit in water, with a huge depletion in the rivers of the region.

I am able, with some enthusiasm, to support the creation of joint water co-operation councils. Given the river flows—I will return to artificial channels—it is rational to advocate the creation of a council involving Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey, although there are obvious problems in the practicality of the grouping at this stage. I can see the rationale for a further joint water council, involving Turkey, Syria and Iraq, to manage the Tigris and Euphrates river basin. On the artificial channel proposals, I also support the idea of pressing the World Bank to go beyond its report and its research stage to see whether it can drive this towards reality.

My reservations are all obvious. In many countries, in each council grouping, there is more of a history of mistrust over water than there is of co-operation. That must change, but it will not happen soon. Some of the countries—Syria is the most obvious, as the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, noted—show that they are more likely to tear themselves apart and their political institutions are not likely to deal adequately with that. So that change will not happen any time soon either. The report suggests circles of co-operation, with Israel becoming involved only in a second phase. That may be a statement of regional realism, but I suspect that if there is not parallel development—or an attempt at parallel development—across all the nations in the region at the same time, one key and very valuable goal of this report could be undermined. That goal is this reality: with water co-operation and water security, it is not only available, potable water that hugely improves the human condition, but the development of the prospect of diplomatic normality, of peaceful co-operation in other spheres and of mutual economic development—in short, the creation of social circumstances in which health, education and all other advances become possible.

I wholly subscribe to that perspective, but I observe that the possibility of delaying the entry of one of the major military powers in the region, a state which has projected military power when aspects of its security are believed, by it, to be at risk, may significantly limit the potential for peace and normalisation that this kind of programme could achieve. This analysis may be wrong, but I think it identifies an important risk which may not have been addressed fully in the report.

If this report is to be successful in the way it is received, it needs to do a number of things with great effect. First, we must ask whether the proposals constitute a viable plan, owned and led in each of the participating nations and to which the international community and the domestic military of those nations can contribute without shaking local ownership. Secondly, will the institutional forms created generate coherence and greater coherence from the outset? There is a risk that they could be a theatre for staging conflict and we need to be sure to mitigate that risk. Thirdly, are all the lead nations involved? I have already commented on that. Fourthly, will the programme build local capacity, to ensure local ownership of technical and managerial objectives? I believe it has that capability. Fifthly, will the programme help focus aid and development priorities, providing the best and most sustainable outlets for aid expenditure? Sixthly, will the programme create employment, providing routes out of poverty and will it grow employment by cutting the costs of starting and doing business? The provision of potable water has, in general, been a significant factor in achieving that objective. Finally, is there a reliable and detailed audit of the impact of this kind of programme on all the local economies, showing the value of peace building as opposed to conflict and helping the programming of donor support? I admire much of what is in this report. If it can begin to address those questions about long-term stability, it will be a very important contribution indeed.

European Union (Definition of Treaties) (Second Agreement amending the Cotonou Agreement) Order 2011

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Monday 17th October 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, I should like to raise a couple of issues that have arisen from this. First, fishing has been mentioned a couple of times. One of the worst things to be inflicted on the developing world, particularly littoral states, has been the taking out of their fish stocks through EU agreements. Although this has improved over the years, given the complete lack of coastal protection for these nations and the voracious appetite of certain European fleets for those stocks, I wonder whether the Government will make sure through this agreement that the attempt to improve the situation continues.

Secondly, on aid, I am sure that the Minister will be well aware that there is a major aid effectiveness conference taking place in Busan, in Korea, next month. Are the Government encouraging parliamentarians to be present at the conference? There is a lot to be learnt not only by governments but by parliamentarians. Does she have any expectation for outcomes from that conference?

Lastly, it always seemed to me that the Cotonou agreement and its predecessors were made on a very imperialist-based system in terms of how the EU looks at the rest of the world. There is a division between those nation states who were the French and British empires and those who are not. I would like to think that at some point we can end that discrimination and look at the rest of the world in terms of its needs rather than in its imperial past. Do the Government share that view?

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the order. I should say at the outset that we support it. The changes and the coherence to be added are welcome; trade arrangements will improve; all of that is positive territory.

The Cotonou agreement as a whole has proved, as it was always intended to, an essential framework, fostering development, co-operation, economic and trade integration and security of political institutions in the ACP countries. It makes complete sense for the EU to have embarked on this course, not only because of our long-term economic and political interests in the ACP countries but also because it reflects the colonial past, the legacy of that past and the obligations that we plainly face in dealing with it.

It is encouraging that when the predecessors of the EU in the European Coal and Steel Community forged those institutions in 1951, many of them were still colonial powers in the very countries in which these arrangements are now in place as a result of the Cotonou agreement. That is positive in many ways.

The continued mutual obligations plainly mean that we continue to have a shared EU-ACP interest in co-operation. In many respects, this has matured from simple co-operation into interdependency. Those interdependencies are created for pragmatic, economic and moral considerations. It is encouraging to be able to talk about the work of the EU in such a positive way; we do not always seem to do that in our House; so I am a little encouraged to have had the opportunity to look at that without people snarling about it.

The renewal of Cotonou comes at a critical juncture. Last year, the World Bank estimated that 64 million people had been pushed into extreme poverty by the financial crisis. Of course, most of those were in countries in the developing world. Noble Lords have already mentioned the impact of climate change and famine, which have had an amplified effect because of the financial challenges in the international community, especially in those countries where we are still slipping backwards on the millennium development goals. Those tasks demand a multifaceted response, and that is what the Cotonou agreement and the changes and revisions now help us to produce.

There is a good deal of independent research in Australian universities and universities across Europe that demonstrates that it is the interpenetration of democracy and institution-building with economic progress which gives economic progress the greatest prospect of success. Much of that research also shows that in those countries where you do not have those institutional and democratic opportunities, economic development is tried to the greatest extent.

It is not a perfect agreement. The point has already been made that, even with the new language on non-discriminatory practices, one area has still not been resolved in any way that I think we would regard as satisfactory in Europe. The democratic, economic and civil rights that have been extended in so many ways seem still to exclude those who are in same-sex relationships. That is a great pity. I know that people in the EU have attempted to see these issues raised in the European Parliament and elsewhere but have not perhaps made the progress with the countries on the other side of the agreement that they would have wished for. I just hope that we will not say, “Well, we are where we are”, but take every opportunity that we have in all the revisions that still lie ahead over the 20 years that the agreement will be in place to see whether greater progress can be made.

The Cotonou agreement has carried forward the EU’s 1992 human rights and democratisation policy. We supported it at that time; we have supported it on all occasions since, from its inauguration through its revisions; and we support it today.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the all points that have been raised and for the general welcome for this move forward. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, is quite right that the agreement came about as a result of countries moving into the EU wanting to make sure that what had been part of their former empire was not disadvantaged. So it is a historic agreement looking after those countries and does not necessarily make best sense as we move forward. Looking at the current revisions to the Cotonou agreement, one is struck by the fact that it is moving towards looking at the regional dimension that may be more relevant for some ACP countries in the future. In the mean time, it is extremely important that those countries have access to the EU markets, which has benefited them enormously.

A number of points have been raised in the debate, and I welcome the Committee’s continued interest in the EU’s relationship with ACP countries and the Cotonou agreement. Europe is playing a major role in supporting developing countries, particularly in Africa, to meet the many challenges that they face. The second amendment to the Cotonou agreement is an important development in this regard.

Europe is not only a significant provider of development assistance but also an important global actor. The impact on poor countries of its policies in areas such as trade and the environment can be significant. We will continue to work with the Commission and other EU member states to call for further improvements in the effectiveness, results focus and transparency of EU aid, including the EDF.

The noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, is absolutely right that regional co-operation will be extremely important. It is excellent to see the emphasis being put on the African Union and its further development. He noted the fragility of some of these states; others are less fragile. Therefore, we agree that the emphasis on good governance is extremely important.

The noble Lords, Lord Chidgey and Lord Triesman, asked about discrimination. As we know, discrimination over sexual preferences remains a serious problem in many African states—there have been various pointers towards that recently. In effect, noble Lords are asking why we do not insist on the inclusion of a clause on non-discrimination. Article 8 clearly gives the EU a mandate to raise issues of discrimination of any kind in ACP countries, and the ability to have a dialogue to make progress on all issues of discrimination. It is a very important factor. The Cotonou revision gives the EU that mandate, but we realise that that is not, perhaps, as far as some might wish to go. However, this is a collective agreement, and at least it has that mandate in it. I expect we will find that that is taken further forward in the future.

My noble friend Lord Chidgey mentioned climate change, and its significance. We welcome the stronger statement on the global challenge of climate change in the agreement. The references give the EDF a clearer mandate to spend on these priorities. It is clearly recognised now that the mitigation of climate change—ensuring that we are not making things even worse, because it hits the poorest hardest and first—is extremely important to factor in when we look at development policy. The agreement acknowledges that that has to be integrated with development strategies.

My noble friend Lord Chidgey also emphasised the importance of civil society organisations, as well as governance. The EU certainly attaches great importance to the role of civil society organisations, and provides significant support to help them engage effectively on issues such as governance, democracy and human rights, across the ACP.

Looking at taxation, the importance of domestic revenue management is rightly something people are very concerned about. Many DfID country offices work with partner governments to strengthen tax policy and tax administration. That is certainly seen as important. For example, TradeMark East Africa, funded by DfID, has helped the newly established Burundi Revenue Authority to increase the country’s tax income by 30 per cent—which I am sure would be welcome in this country—from the first quarter of 2010 to the same period in 2011.

Then there is the question about Busan and whether parliamentarians will be present at the conference on aid effectiveness. I know that my noble friend Lord Chidgey is attending.

Middle East Peace Process

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Wednesday 4th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, given the time that I have, I am going to have to restate a position. The conditions for peace require a major development in good faith on all sides. Good faith in the pursuit of peace imposes a clear duty. Any progress cannot be destroyed by either party by taking steps or striking positions which they know in advance are abhorrent to the other.

The quartet, which we support, has set out what must be pursued actively, in good faith and in a climate of restraint. Israel should desist from expansion, from building illegally on Palestinian land and from making it ever less possible to create a viable Palestinian state. The question inevitably will arise about the sincerity of a desire for a two-state solution when that two-state solution becomes more difficult by the day in the financial, economic and other arrangements.

An equally plain and equally great impediment is the routine and continuous firing of sophisticated rockets and other munitions into Israel, which undermines confidence among ordinary people that a peaceful solution is possible. The refusal to recognise the right to exist of the Israeli state, not least by Hamas—whatever the noble Baroness may have said at the beginning—speaks to a long-term resistance to peace and that cannot be ignored. In terms of recognition, we also welcome the extension of the diplomatic status of Palestinian entities.

Two viable states, respect for life, respect for law including international law, and recognition of legitimate states and their right to exist are the foundations of what will strike an honourable peace.