(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not agree that these are simply technical amendments. The issues arise from Clause 7, headed, “Dealing with deficiencies arising from withdrawal”, which gives a Minister of the Crown power to,
“make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate”,
deficiencies. Clause 8 of the Bill that we have discussed at such length deals with a Minister of the Crown making regulations as he considers appropriate,
“to prevent or remedy any breach, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom … of the international obligations of the United Kingdom”.
Clause 9 is headed, “Implementing the withdrawal agreement”, and similar powers are given to a Minister of the Crown. Schedule 2 is headed, “Corresponding powers involving devolved authorities”. Part 1 of that schedule deals with deficiencies and Part 2 with international obligations. Part 3 is headed, “Implementing the withdrawal agreement”. One would have expected corresponding powers for Welsh Ministers and Scottish Ministers in those areas within their own competences, but each of those parts of Schedule 2 says that regulations may not,
“confer a power to legislate”.
Therefore, unlike the powers granted to a Minister of the Crown in the UK Parliament, the powers to legislate are withheld from Ministers in the devolved Assemblies. That is the critical issue, which is a matter of principle and not at all technical.
My Lords, I regret that I was unable to speak at Second Reading. I promise that I shall not make up for it this afternoon; I shall be very brief.
With the clauses before us this afternoon and evening, we have reached a truly load-bearing piece of the Bill. In my more anxious moments I sometimes think that the very weight of the kingdom is resting upon it, and that, if it is misjudged, the chances of the union eventually crumbling would be worryingly greater.
I do not doubt the Government’s good faith in the negotiations within the Joint Ministerial Committees but, as other noble Lords have already mentioned, the devolutionary spirit of 1998 needs to suffuse the discussions in those committees’ deliberations, and, indeed, ours in both Houses of Parliament.
If the European question infects and envenoms the union question, the country will suffer a self-inflicted blow of immense proportions. Of course, there is a need to retain an effective internal market within the UK. That is absolutely crucial, but the sustenance of the union—the essential quiddity of our nation—is paramount, which is why I express my wholehearted support for the thrust of the amendments in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead.
My Lords, first, I both echo and reaffirm what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said: there must be respect for the devolved Administrations. I emphasise that as emphatically and cogently as I can at this Dispatch Box, and I confirm that the Government are wholly committed to demonstrating that respect.
As a number of your Lordships observed, the Government have tabled amendments to Clause 11, and we will give them our full consideration shortly. We have to acknowledge that the position we ultimately reach on Clause 11 will have implications for related policy on devolution in the Bill. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, acknowledged that. I can reassure your Lordships that we are mindful of the need to revisit the approach we have taken for the Schedule 2 powers in the light of that forthcoming debate on Clause 11. I therefore thank the noble and learned Lord Hope for instigating this debate on whether the devolved Ministers should be permitted to sub-delegate their Schedule 2 powers.
Amendments 266 and 278 would remove this restriction from the correcting power and the international obligations power for Scottish and Welsh Ministers and for Northern Ireland departments. Amendment 292 relates to the withdrawal agreement power and would have a wider effect, but I understand that the intention is the same. I should be clear that we do not oppose in principle the idea that these powers should be able to be sub-delegated to and by devolved authorities where appropriate cause is shown. This is already evident in the Bill. Noble Lords will see that this restriction—for instance, in paragraph 1(4)(b) of Schedule 2—is already qualified to allow for the sub-delegation of a power to make rules of procedure for a court or a tribunal. This ensures that the power can be sub-delegated where appropriate to ensure judicial independence. We have invited the devolved Administrations to offer any examples of where sub-delegation would be needed, and we have made clear that where they identify such examples we shall consider drawing further exceptions to the restriction. So far, no examples have been given.
It has been our intention—this may surprise the Chamber—not to make the powers in this Bill any wider than is appropriate. Opening up the possibility of sub-delegation by devolved Ministers in all cases where no prior need has been demonstrated does not align with this intention. However, I have listened to the contributions made this afternoon and have heard the concerns that your Lordships have expressed today. I have taken particular note of the question of respect as it relates to the perceived unfairness of a possible disparity between the devolved ministerial powers and the corresponding powers for UK Ministers.