(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord will recall that on Report, I referred not only to cases of mesothelioma that Mr Tony Whitston drew to our attention from the Brymbo steelworks in Wrexham but to cases of pneumoconiosis that I have known. He is a slate quarry person; I come from a colliery area and I know of the long-term suffering of those victims. With mesothelioma, that could be done now and could be extended to other diseases in due course.
The support groups would be uniquely placed to monitor the service that such firms gave to mesothelioma sufferers, who could report back on their experiences to both the support groups and their successors. That is the answer to those who say that solicitors will not do this work at all unless they are cosseted by success fees. It spreads the work around the country to areas that are particularly concerned with this disease, where experience could be built up by firms of solicitors. It may discourage any idea of focusing litigation of this type in the City of London branch offices of firms that then claim to be paid at City of London rates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that that happens in some CFA cases.
As my noble friend Lord Faulks said on Monday, there are lawyers who are dedicated to achieving the best result for their clients and not so much for their fees. I have no doubt that they would flock to be placed on an approved list and forbear charging a success fee at all. I hope that such an approach will appeal to the Minister, the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice.
My Lords, I begin by congratulating the Minister on being a member of the luckiest Government there can ever have been in the history of Parliament. The odds against drawing three votes on crucial amendments, two on Report and one at this stage of proceedings so that the Government win the vote, as it were, must be immense. He has managed to do that and I congratulate him on it. I just hope for his sake and the Government’s that their luck does not begin to run out.
On this issue, the Minister also deserves some congratulation if, as I suspect he did, he played a part in persuading his fellow Ministers, and the right honourable and learned gentleman the Lord Chancellor, that there had to be some give or concession. If he played a part in that, I congratulate him and think that he has served the House well in that regard.
I, too, want to compliment those outside the House. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, stressed, the co-ordinator of the Greater Manchester Asbestos Victims Support Group, Mr Tony Whitston; Mr John Flanagan, the Merseyside equivalent of that organisation; and many others outside have worked incredibly hard to make sure that people who do not always have a very loud voice have had a say in Parliament—or rather in this House of Parliament. It is absolutely clear that when these matters were raised in the House of Commons when this Bill was first taken through, they were completely dismissed. It was only when the Bill came to the House of Lords that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, with his usual courage and zeal, managed to raise these matters, with the help of the noble Lords, Lord Avebury and Lord Wigley. Eventually, at the very last minute, he got a concession from the Government.
I pay tribute, too, not only to those I have mentioned but to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and the Conservatives who abstained in the vote on Monday night. Had they not played the part that they did, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, would not have gone through. I remind the House that it won by nine votes. If it had been lost there would have been no review or concession; there would have just been rejoicing in the Ministry of Justice. It was as close as that. It is because of the bravery of those who were prepared to abstain or vote against their own Government that we are here today congratulating the Government, quite rightly I am sure, on their concession.
Seriously, it is a good concession and we know, or trust, that the review will be genuine. We look forward to playing our part in making sure that the sufferers of this terrible disease get a fair deal when the Government have had their review. Not only the noble Lord, Lord Alton, but all of us will be watching very closely to see how developments move forward in this very vexed field. As for this House, for once it can congratulate itself.
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is the Opposition’s view that there should be no moneys taken from victims’ damages in these cases. That is the basis of our view. So we speak in favour of the amendment that has been so well moved.
There is a great feeling across this House that we have to protect victims of industrial disease and ensure that they and their families are not victims once again of reforms that are there to deal with dodgy whiplash claims and motor insurance premiums. In another place, as we heard this evening, there was a very powerful and intelligent debate on this subject. Those who often express the view that debates in this Chamber are always of a superior nature to those of another place should read Hansard carefully and look at what took place in that very short hour towards the end of Tuesday last week. It was a very good debate.
Honourable Members on all sides of the Chamber spoke with passion, knowledge and experience about this subject. Not least was Ms Crouch, a former insurance executive, who criticised both her Minister and the Association of British Insurers for their stance on these amendments. Indeed, as I understand it, she has spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, today and has also put out a press release. I am delighted that a number of Members of Parliament on all sides who spoke in that debate are listening to our debate this evening.
I could also mention Mr Andrew Percy who represents Brigg and Goole, which noble Lords will know is famous for its historic shipbuilding past, and Mr Andrew Bingham, the MP for High Peak, an area that also has a high incidence of asbestosis. They spoke against the Minister’s proposals and, to their credit, voted in the Opposition’s Lobby. Their concern was perfectly understandable. Why on earth, with absolutely no savings to the state, are we reducing the amount of money that victims get from those who harm them, while handing that money to lawyers or insurers instead? Those Members on all sides who voted were not persuaded by the stupid assertions—if I may call them that—of the Minister in the other place that industrial disease sufferers should be treated in the same way as an organised gang faking whiplash injuries for payouts or someone lying about a slip or a trip on a pavement crack. Again and again, the other place heard stories of horrific suffering of victims—and the fact that you simply cannot fake cancer of the pleural linings, peritoneum or cardiac sheath.
The history of asbestos-induced diseases—and, indeed, general industrial diseases—is not a proud one for the insurance industry. It knew for decades that asbestos killed before it acted and only then at Parliament’s promptings. Insurers have fought cases—to the death—trying to get out of paying just awards to genuine victims. There is a long history of insurers fighting claims until after the death of the claimant. It is in part thanks to their tireless lobbying that compensation levels in England and Wales are not by any standard generous in cases of this kind. They are forensically calculated to reflect pain, suffering and loss of amenity and costs of past and future losses. They are far less than victims receive in comparable jurisdictions. For example, Mealey’s Litigation Report in 2007 maintained that the average jury award in the United States for mesothelioma was $7.5 million—the average award here is £65,000. Of course, the differences between jury and judge-calculated awards and our judicial systems apply, but there is a huge difference.
No one could argue that the damages victims of this disease receive are very great; they should certainly not be eaten into in the way that this Bill, if allowed, would permit. We start from a low baseline before we even consider docking damages to prevent these claimants coming forwards.
Does the Minister not support my argument that it is better that there should be no success fees at all, rather than that success fees should be claimed against the insurers, which is what this amendment amounts to—in other words, a continuation of the current system? Does the Minister not agree that in these cases, which are easy to prove once you establish the insurer, success fees are really irrelevant?
I am grateful to the noble Lord again for calling me the Minister—it is a couple of years, I think, since that was the case. I take his point though; it is a serious point. I am not convinced that lawyers who take up these cases, if this Bill in its present form becomes law, will not take success fees. In fact, I am pretty certain that they will. I cannot see why they would not. It may be a shame, but in the reality of the legal world, if they are entitled to take success fees, they will do so.
I certainly do not have the experience of the noble Lord in this area of the law, but with the greatest respect I ask whether his view is not as speculative as mine. We just do not know, but I would have thought that the history of legal proceedings of this kind is that where success fees are available they will be sought. Maybe not always up to 25 per cent, but they will be sought.
Surely it would be for the Lord Chancellor to amend the regulations that he has to make to prevent success fees being charged in these circumstances.
That may be what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, would suggest to the Lord Chancellor that he should do, but is there any indication that that is what will be done? Will regulations be put before Parliament that say it is forbidden to take a success fee in a case of this kind? If so, will not the Lord Chancellor run into exactly the same sort of problems that critics of this amendment raise here against the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and me? Will that not be the position?
Not if there is an abuse, as the noble Lord suggests. If claimants’ solicitors in cases which are not difficult to prove start charging success fees, which the Lord Chancellor or public opinion decide is simply not acceptable, then the Lord Chancellor will have the power to stop it.
It may not be difficult to prove, and I understand what noble Lords say about that. But there is a history, I have to say, of insurance companies taking an extremely long time to agree to settle cases of this kind. For whatever reasons—and I do not want to go though them tonight in this House—it may be that a case will take quite a considerable period of time, even if, at the end, liability is not denied. I want to stop soon and allow the Minister to respond.
My Lords, this House dislikes the Bill. I am referring not only to the 11 defeats and two draws that the Government sustained on Report or the defeats today but to a wider feeling that Part 1 in particular is mean-minded, picks on the poor, disabled and vulnerable and is not worthy of this country’s traditions and its legal system. This view is held virtually throughout the House. There were more than 50 speakers on Second Reading, but it is difficult to recall anyone who spoke up for Part 1.
I believe that many Conservatives are offended by the way in which the Government have picked on the poor and the vulnerable. It is against their traditions and they are unconvinced that there are any savings to be made by decimating social welfare law, particularly as the Government have consistently refused to give figures, in spite of committees asking them to do so.
I also believe that the Liberal Democrat Benches are offended by the taking out of scope debt, employment, immigration and, if the Government have their way, welfare benefit cases. If they had been in opposition now, I venture to suggest that they would have opposed Part 1 of the Bill with all their might, yet somehow, with some brave exceptions, which I will not name, they have been cajoled into voting for exactly the things with which they disagree most. The Minister is a liberal and humane man and I occasionally feel sorry for him, too. He has been obliged to put forward, particularly in relation to Part 1, nonsense after nonsense in support of his arguments.
Of course we welcome the Government’s amendment concerning upper court appeals. It was always ridiculous that claimants at an Upper-tier Tribunal—the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—should not automatically get legal aid to argue their case, which, as the Minister has just reminded us, can be only on a point of law. The Government knew all along that it was ridiculous and the Minister, to his great credit, never tried to argue seriously against it. We were always going to get this concession at some stage. I do not want to be difficult about the concession; we are grateful for it and for any part that the Minister may have had in getting it.
However, the position is still deeply unsatisfactory with regard to First-tier Tribunal appeals. Last Tuesday, in the other place, an extraordinarily unconvincing pantomime took place between the right honourable and learned gentleman the Lord Chancellor and the honourable Member Mr Tom Brake. I should explain to any noble Lords who do not know who Tom Brake is that he is the Commons equivalent of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. That is meant as a compliment to him.
The Lord Chancellor hinted tantalisingly—using expressions such as “if we can solve the problems”, “if we can find” and so on—that an arrangement might be reached whereby a lower-tier judge could certify a point of law and give legal aid to a claimant. I do not think it unfair to describe that arrangement as vague, unthought-out, superficial, strictly back-of-an-envelope stuff and, as we know, arranged very much at the last minute. Amazingly, however, it resulted in the said honourable Mr Brake immediately withdrawing an amendment that he and others had moved—not unlike my amendment today, as it happens. I am afraid that no one was fooled by this last-minute arranged minuet of an agreement. In a boxing match, it was a clear fixed fight, with Mr Brake going down to a knockout by arrangement in the second round.
That is absolute rubbish. I say now—I would say it in a speech later—that it is not worthy of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, to attack Tom Brake in that way when he is not here to answer for himself. I am proud to be an associate of Tom Brake, who leads on legal matters in the House of Commons from the Back Benches, as I do here. He very bravely put forward that amendment and achieved a great success in getting the concession that he did, which I will develop at a later stage.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for the amendment. He knows that we on these Benches raised this issue before Second Reading. It is necessary to have flexibility brought into the Bill for two reasons: first, because economic conditions may improve and it may be possible to revert to a more generous legal aid scheme; and, secondly, because those of us with experience of litigants in person know they can clog up the courts and that, consequently, it may be necessary for urgent amendments to Schedule 1 to introduce legal aid to enable people to be legally represented. It is not fully appreciated by the public that legal representation shortens cases and leads to justice, rather than litigants in person trying to fight their own cause.
I thank the Minister for the concession that the Government have made today. The clause as it stands before we pass the Government’s amendments should never have been in that form when the Bill was published and was always crying out for amendment. Indeed, members of my party in the Commons did their best to ensure that that happened. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and other noble Lords for persuading the Government that the clause needed changing. I shall not, of course, press my amendment; I will not move it.
I know the Minister and all other noble Lords will agree that the House seems somewhat empty today because our noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree is not with us in our deliberations. He took an active part in all the debates on the Bill for many months and, even though we could all see that he was not in good health, insisted on coming here, speaking his mind and voting in the way his conscience told him to vote. He took a real interest in the Bill and—I know all noble Lords will agree—it was a delight and privilege to work with him. It does not seem right or just that he is not here listening and speaking his mind. Having said that, I thank the noble Lord for the concession.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI must be under a misapprehension. I thought that this group was about the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, had so succinctly moved and about my own amendments to which I also hope to speak, perhaps even more succinctly in due course. I am listening carefully to the noble Lord, as I always do, but it seems that his amendments are part of the group that begins with his Amendment 132B. I am surprised that the noble Lord has not waited to speak to his group as it appears on the Marshalled List. Perhaps he can explain to the House why he is doing this.
I am very happy to do that. I will speak to it further in due course. Frankly, I am anxious not to make the 31-minute speech that I made when we last discussed this particular issue and to relieve your Lordships of that burden. I am splitting what I intend to say, which I think is necessary to cover the whole field, so that it becomes a little more understandable. I take the noble Lord’s rebuke in good part, but let me repeat that asking for the status quo in mesothelioma cases only is not the way to go forward.
My Lords, the amendment raises the issue of third party litigation funding. I made a lengthy contribution in Committee which I do not propose to repeat. The basis of the amendment is to bring under government control third party litigation funding. Your Lordships may recall that a voluntary code has been entered into by those who are concerned in third party litigation funding and I suggested in Committee, and I repeat, that it is far better that the Lord Chancellor should take a look at this and bring in something along the lines of what I have suggested in my amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have said before that we are grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue. It is a possible problem and a number of noble and learned Lords and lawyers outside have given warning signals. At the moment we are looking at how voluntary regulation is working in the area. However, my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor is very aware of the situation and is keeping it under review. We do not think that statutory regulation through this Bill is either the right place or the right time but we welcome the fact that my noble friend has put this issue on the political radar. Both lawyers and legislators will have to follow the matter closely to see whether we will need to return to it at some future date. In the mean time, I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
This amendment concerns the third party insurance company, which approaches a prospective claimant and offers to settle without there being adequate medical evidence, without the claimant being informed that he has a right to legal advice and without the offer being in full and final settlement of the cause of action. In Committee, I hesitated to suggest that it should be a criminal offence, and suggested that the best way of dealing with the matter should be that such settlements would be void, which would enable a claimant who subsequently discovered that he was in a far worse condition than he had thought to reopen the matter and to claim damages for the injuries that he received. That is a practice that has crept in. It means that people accept settlements without proper advice or evidence of what is wrong with them and without a proper calculation of their losses. It seems to me that a lot of people are vulnerable to that type of approach. That is one side of the problem. The other side is that it encourages people with no basis for a claim at all to make one and accept a sum of money that means that, over a large range of cases, the insurance company benefits. That is just as bad as that people should be incited to put forward fraudulent claims.
My noble friend’s answer in Committee was that the FSA rules are sufficient to cover the matters of which I complain. That immediately makes me ask who enforces the FSA rules. What control is there over the employee of a third-party insurance company who, quite clandestinely, makes offers of this sort to settle cases that are perfectly valid and which he knows to be valid? So at this stage I put forward the suggestion that it should be a criminal offence for people to engage in this type of behaviour. That may be going a step further. Perhaps my original concept that the alleged settlement obtained should be void was the right way to go. But certainly there is an abuse going on and I expect the Government to do more than to refer to FSA rules when there is no one to enforce them. I beg to move.
The Minister would be well advised to give serious consideration to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. This is not one that he moved in Committee—he has moved it for the first time today. The House knows that he has become an expert in this field of litigation over the months that he has spoken to me about it. He may well be right that it is no good the Government taking a position that looks like it may take some time to develop. It is something that needs to be done and thought about pretty promptly. Therefore, as far as we can, we support the amendment.
My Lords, I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Martin, who talked about the proper role of the House of Lords. Although the hour is late, my noble friend Lord Thomas has demonstrated one of the benefits of this House in bringing to the Government’s attention an area where there already is or could be a malpractice that will have to be dealt with. As he explained, this is a practice where an insurer approaches a claimant directly, usually immediately after a road traffic accident, with a view to settling the claim, where an insurer’s own policyholder is at fault in a car accident. As I understand it, claimant representatives refer to this practice as third party capture, whereas defendant representatives call it third party assistance. As I indicated in Committee, I shall continue to refer to this practice as third party contact.
Amendment 142D would make it an offence for an insurer to make such an unsolicited approach to a potential claimant in a personal injury case. The amendment also specifies those requirements which must be met before an insurer may make an offer to settle such a claim. This includes a requirement to obtain adequate medical evidence of injury and to advise the claimant of their right to obtain full legal advice before accepting the offer and making it clear to the claimant that the offer to settle is full and final.
It is unclear what my noble friend means when he says that this practice should be an offence. If he refers to this as being a criminal offence, I do not believe that a criminal sanction is appropriate or proportionate. You would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that something amounted to an unsolicited approach. As I explained in Committee, the Financial Services Authority regulates the insurance industry and requires insurers to treat their customers fairly at all times and that this covers third party claimants.
Third-party contact does not in itself cause detriment to the consumer and may be to their advantage, as a claim can often be resolved quickly. In addition, this practice can allow insurers to reduce the legal costs associated with handling a claim and this in turn reduces costs for all policyholders. However, I am aware of the concerns around the potential risk of conflict of interest and the need for the claimant to have independent legal advice before any settlement is agreed. This matter was looked at by the FSA in its review of third-party contact during 2009-10 and it did not find conclusive evidence that unrepresented third parties could have achieved higher compensation had they obtained independent legal representation.
Following the FSA’s review, the Association of British Insurers published a code of practice in June 2010. The code contains specific guidance for insurers on contacting claimants. This limits unsolicited contact. For example, and I quote:
“Insurers will not make unsolicited visits to an unrepresented claimant at their current address, including hospitals”.
The code also requires that claimants are informed of their right to seek independent legal advice and other options available for them to resolve their claim.
Most of the issues which this amendment seeks to address in respect of the handling of third-party contact claims are already covered by existing regulation. The FSA rules require that insurers fully inform third party claimants of their legal rights, including to independent legal advice and alternatives to settling directly with the insurer. The Government do not believe it is right or appropriate to introduce further sanctions or regulation in this area, especially when a scheme already exists to monitor insurers’ activities. That said, I can reassure my noble friend that if a serious concern arises in the future in this area—and we will keep it under review—we will not hesitate to take this up with the Treasury and with the FSA.
I am therefore grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue with us, but for the reasons that I have mentioned I hope that he will agree to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberIf the noble Lord does not move his amendment perhaps I may move my Amendment 10 in the same group.
I was not sure whether the Government were minded to adjourn the House now, it being 10 o’clock. Clause 8 has always taken a considerable amount of attention from those inside and outside the legal profession. People are very struck by the fact that it was very much a one-way ticket; namely, that the Lord Chancellor would have the power to take extra matters out from legal aid by regulation but not have the power to put them back in. Many people felt that that was very unsatisfactory.
The solution was to do it the other way around; namely, that he could put things into legal aid but could not take them out by regulation. But we see the virtues of the amendments, which are not quite the same in wording but come to the same thing, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and my noble friend Lord Hart. Although I will move my amendment, I would be more than happy to accept either of their amendments. I very much hope that the Government will be happy to accept one of their amendments. I beg to move.
My noble friend will know that I have been urging this course upon him since the Bill was first drafted and I am delighted with the undertaking he has given.
It is only a question for me to decide whether to put my amendment to a vote, but I do not intend to do so. I can see one or two faces opposite looking anxious—or perhaps they look confident. It is only graceful from this side to thank the Minister for arranging this concession by the Government. It is much appreciated and we look forward to seeing the draft amendment when it comes forward. In the mean time, I seek the leave of the House to withdraw my amendment.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is very little left for me to say from the opposition Front Bench, except that we are, as we were in Committee, completely in favour of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It adds considerably to the Bill and is a very important statement of principle that should be there.
I have to say that I was surprised by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. There was a change in his attitude between Committee and this stage. I remember very well—
No, that is not the case. As the noble Lord will recall, I opposed this amendment in Committee in very much the same terms.
Not quite in the same terms. As I understood it, the noble Lord and some others in Committee opposed it on the basis that it did not go far enough, not that it was unnecessary. I recall very well the noble Lord saying:
“I entirely agree. I think that the Government are making a mistake in welfare law and that cutting legal advice and assistance for people at the bottom end of society will cause more problems than it solves; it will not achieve the savings that the Government think it will”.—[Official Report, 20/12/11; col. 1708.]
I should be interested to see whether the noble Lord repeats those comments when we come to a later stage. All that I can say is that it is my feeling—
The comments were not said in the context of Amendment 1, and we will deal with the other matters when we come to them.
Indeed—I fully concede that; but I have to say that I do not concede the point that I am about to make, which is that if the noble Lord were in opposition and a Bill such as this was brought in by a Government whose party was not his party, he would oppose the Bill with all the great force and passion that he could and support the amendment 100 per cent.
Some noble Lords in Committee thought that the amendment did not go far enough and did not follow the words of the Constitution Committee. This is a very modest amendment that could have gone further. We think that it catches the right note, does not try to go further than it should and is very much in the context of Part 1. If it is the position of some noble Lords that the amendment does not go far enough, that is surely an argument in the context of this debate to vote for the amendment, because its position is closer to their position than if they were against it. If the view is that the Bill should reflect the Constitution Committee’s opinion and nothing else, this is certainly the amendment to vote for.
There is nothing wrong at all with this statement of principle occurring at the start of a major Bill that if passed in its present form will transform the legal aid system, particularly as it affects the very poorest, who rely on civil justice in order to get their rights. It is therefore important that we set off in the right way. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Exeter—if I may say so, with respect—caught the mood absolutely correctly when he talked about the function of the law, which is to look at worst-case scenarios. He is absolutely right; the Bill does not do that. It takes a very rosy view of what will happen when, for example, there is no legal aid for social welfare law. What will happen then? I know that we will debate that in the days ahead, but it is a matter that we should consider in relation to the amendment.
I have gone on for longer than I had intended. We support the amendment completely and we very much hope that the House will, too.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my name is attached to this amendment.
My neighbour’s wife was parking her car in the car park nearest to the Wrexham Council offices some months ago and she put the sticker, which cost her 80p, on the windscreen but it fell on to the seat. It was still visible there but those who were collecting in the area decided that this was in breach of the regulations, so she was charged £40. A certain amount of correspondence took place with Wrexham Council, as you might imagine—indeed, the ticket was produced—and it was pointed out that there was no need for this, but nothing happened.
In the end, a magistrates’ court warrant was issued, after a lot of argument, and it was enforced. By this time, the 80p that had been paid for the sticker had become £450. The bailiffs alleged that they had been to the premises on a number of occasions. There was no sign of them having done so and the people concerned were in throughout the period, but that is what they said, and they charged an extra fee for every attendance at the property. There was absolutely no control over what they were charging. Of course, as has been stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, they said that a distress warrant cannot be withdrawn. Indeed, on a bailiffs’ website that I have just looked at, they say precisely that, that it is impossible to withdraw a warrant once it has been made.
I decided to look at the case that the noble Baroness referred to, the MacRae case at Hereford and Worcester Magistrates’ Court in 1998. According to the judgment that I read, the procedure was based essentially on publications in 1990 and 1992 of the Home Office’s best practice advisory group on fine enforcement and relied substantially on a computerised fine enforcement system. When an offender is in default and has not contacted the court to request more time to pay, the court issues a final demand. If there is no response to that, the computerised system produces a draft distress warrant, which passes through certain manual checks to ensure that there are no known circumstances that would make it inappropriate to issue the warrant. MacRae decided that once that computer has produced the distress warrant and one or two people have looked at it, that is the end—the bailiff can do nothing about it.
The noble Baroness referred to Section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. That was the response received from the Ministry of Justice. Section 142(1) states:
“A magistrates’ court may vary or rescind a sentence or other order imposed or made by it when dealing with an offender if it appears to the court to be in the interests of justice to do so”.
So there is power, which is contrary to what was said in MacRae and to what appears on current websites by bailiffs, and which is in accordance with the advice given in the case to which the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred.
However, there is confusion. My neighbour eventually paid up the £450 because his wife and children were in tears. Rather than keep that scene of distress going on, he produced his chequebook and paid up. What is happening is that people are being bullied on the doorstep. This amendment would put that right. It would make it clear and would clarify what is currently wrongfully being done, in my submission to your Lordships, by bailiffs.
The amendment states that a warrant of enforcement may be suspended or withdrawn but very importantly it states that a,
“person enforcing a warrant … shall be paid a single fee”.
There would not be any of these ghost returns clocking up the fees for every attendance at the property. The amendment makes specific provision for those who are in a vulnerable position and are not in a position to stand up to these bailiffs when they come round to collect. That situation has been a disgrace. This is an opportunity for the Government to put it right and clarify what the law is so that we all know what should happen and what the proper procedure should be. I support the noble Baroness in her amendment.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI shall add that he was saying it in the context of a married woman, who had no separate identity in those days. She was regarded as a part of her husband.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a relief to know that the Ministry of Justice, like New York, never sleeps. No doubt the opinion will be pored over and there will be further discussions before we get to Report.
I invite my noble friend to do this now. He says that the proper way to proceed is for one-way cost-shifting to be introduced by tailored Civil Procedure Rules. Your Lordships will recall that on Monday the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I made the point that there should be guidance from Parliament, not simply a discussion between the Executive and the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, about the parameters of those rules and what the boundaries and structure are to be. I would be grateful to know from the Minister the position on this particular point. He is shifting the burden of the success fee and the ATE premium over to the successful claimant. Is that going to be co-ordinated and timed to come into effect at the same time as one-way cost-shifting? That is the key issue. If you do not have one-way cost-shifting, you are shifting to the claimant the liability for the defendant’s entire costs, if he should lose, and consequently an enormous premium. We heard of premiums of £900,000. I am familiar with a premium of £80,000. I think that the standard is in thousands for any sort of claim. If, on the other hand, one-way cost-shifting comes in and the defendants’ costs are paid by the defendants win or lose, we will be concerned with a premium for a much smaller thing, which is the disbursements of the claimant, should he lose. The risk is that much smaller.
We on this Front Bench agree absolutely with the question that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has asked the Minister. It is crucial. To broaden the point slightly, the great danger in the Bill is that we are changing the current arrangements, but the way that they will work in practice is subject to regulations of which there is no sight at present. We need from the Government a statement about how they intend to implement this part of the Bill if they get it through. We have no idea at all. The example that the noble Lord gave is the best one of all. It is critical, but there are other examples where a great deal relies on regulations that are to be made at a later stage, sometimes to be passed by affirmative resolution, sometimes by negative resolution. It is not really a satisfactory way of changing the civil law in such a fundamental way. I would be grateful if the Minister, in his reply to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, would deal with the general point as well.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Martin, in what he has just said because I am concerned about the relatives of the victims of this terrible disease. We were addressed here in one of the committee rooms in the House by the Greater Manchester Asbestos Victims Support Group. One of the people who came with that group was Mrs Marie Hughes, who comes from my home town of Wrexham in north Wales. Her husband had worked as a youth in the Brymbo steel works, which is close to the town, but had gone into teaching and died of this disease at the age of 57 when he was head teacher. It had afflicted him a great deal later. I am very familiar with the Brymbo steel works, as was, because I worked there briefly during vacations as a young man.
What she told us about the effect of the disease upon her husband was that while attempting to come to terms with his diagnosis and his bleak prognosis he underwent gruelling, unrelenting and debilitating courses of chemotherapy, intensive radiotherapy and invasive surgery in the form of an extrapleural pneumonectomy, which involved the removal of a complete lung, half the pericardium and half the diaphragm in a desperate effort to delay the cancer’s ultimate grasp. He lived in constant pain and it was a vain attempt to improve the quality and extend his life. By the final three months, tumours had also developed on his spine, resulting in paralysis from the chest down, and all this while fighting to breathe. That is the effect of this disease on an individual who suffers it, years after he had been exposed to asbestos. Of course, from diagnosis to death is quite a limited period with mesothelioma: it is only about nine months, leaving behind a widow and a family who have to live with what has happened to their loved one.
I am very much in support of the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has moved with such great force, and the supporting speeches, because I have seen the effect on a widow of this terrible disease.
My Lords, I am proud to have been allowed to put my name, as an opposition Front-Bencher, on this amendment, which has been moved so well by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and spoken to so well by all the other noble Lords.
Industrial disease and exposure to toxic substances; employers acting negligently, in breach of their duty to employees, and often causing them great harm; and then outlawing and ensuring redress for these violations speak to what I consider the historic mission of the party I belong to and of the trade union movement. I know they are subjects that are of huge interest and concern to many people beyond that.
Health and safety in the workplace is something that we in these Houses of Parliament should be as proud of as we were of banning slavery. Instead, this year the Prime Minister chose for his first speech a comment that hoped that this was the year that killed off the health and safety culture forever. He cited a case where a teacher made children wear safety glasses to play conkers—a myth that the Health and Safety Executive cites as a prime example of the kind of mischief played by some to denigrate health and safety.
Health and safety in the workplace has nothing to do with conkers. Lack of health and safety has led to tens of thousands of avoidable deaths in the workplace. These amendments would ensure that in these cases—they have been described in detail and I am not going to go into that detail—employers pay their full redress and employees who have been harmed get their full restitution.
These are serious cases. There is no compensation culture here. Whereas motor claims increased by 43 per cent between 2007 and 2011 to nearly 800,000—which is why we on this side back my right honourable friend Jack Straw’s campaign—employer liability claims were down by 6.6 per cent to one-tenth of that. No one is faking mesothelioma, or coal lung. This is as far from the problems of undiagnosable whiplash as we can possibly get.
Industrial disease provides the most emotive and powerful examples of how health and safety is something we have had—and still have—to fight for. Despite the fact that we know so much about the clinical aspects and the impact on individuals, communities, and families, asbestosis is still being fought over in the courts. Insurers, sometimes not to their credit, are still fighting liabilities. Why is there this difference between these highly contested, difficult-to-prove cases that we have been debating tonight, for which people have been fighting year after year and, on the other side, clinical negligence? Why is there no sympathy from the Government for what are pretty analogous cases?
Do they not deserve a deeper consideration of the economics of bringing these cases? If the argument is proportionality, of course there are problems with proportionality when you are fighting some of the entrenched vested interests, such as the insurance lobby, and companies for which it is difficult to prove ownership and liability years after the event. We are at risk of abandoning these cases and these victims, not because they cannot bring the cases any more, but because they will not find lawyers to bring them. These are families and widows of workers who were exposed through no fault of their own.
I have in front of me the comments of a lady, Mrs King, whose husband died of mesothelioma. She says, “My husband died of mesothelioma as a consequence of asbestos exposure during the course of his employment. David and I received considerable assistance from the Derbyshire asbestos support group”. She arranged to see her constituency Member of Parliament. She received letters from her Member of Parliament, and wrote to him as well. I have to say that that Member of Parliament showed real concern in those letters about the tragedy that she had undergone. I pay tribute to him for the sympathy which he genuinely showed.
However, the exchange of correspondence, in Mrs King’s view, raised a number of points. The first was that the Member of Parliament seemed to accept that, in certain aspects, we are going to an American-style system. Mrs King’s view is that is not a good thing. That relates to a successful claimant having to pay some of their damages in costs. Secondly, the Member of Parliament, according to Mrs King, said that if a claimant loses the claim he will pay no legal costs at all. She points out that that is wrong: the losing claimant would pay disbursements. Thirdly, the Member of Parliament says it is not about whether claims will be brought, but about what lawyers get paid, and who pays those costs. Mrs King’s comment is that there must surely be genuine borderline cases today that will not be brought tomorrow because lawyers will not take the risk of not being paid.
Fourthly, Mrs King comments that the Member of Parliament says that defendants with a very strong defence pay out because of the costs they may incur if they lose. Mrs King does not understand that. She asks why they would settle in a case where they have a strong defence: if they have a strong defence, they will not lose. Lastly, the MP says that he may be cynical, but lawyers will not bring cases because they will not be paid as much as they are now. Mrs King thinks that that misses the point, the point being that lawyers will not bring cases at all if they run the risk in difficult, but genuine, cases that, if they lose, they will not get paid at all.
The Member of Parliament is in fact the right honourable gentleman the Lord Chancellor. As I say, he showed great sympathy for Mrs King and her predicament, but those were his responses and I suggest, respectfully, to him and to the Minister, that they are out of touch and do not meet the seriousness of the situation that has been described in Committee tonight.
Mrs King finishes by saying, “The chances of people like me or my husband being able to get justice would all change under the Government’s proposals. Even if my case has reasonable chances of success, I will struggle to find a lawyer to take it on unless it is virtually certain to succeed. The lawyers think the risk of losing is too great for the amount they will get paid for taking that risk. They simply will not take the case on”. That is the nub of this particular argument: people who have suffered a great deal will find that they will not be able to have their cases argued because of changes that are made. What I think that everyone who has spoken in this debate so far wants to see from the Government is a bit of flexibility, because these cases really stand out on their own.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I must move this amendment, since it is in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, of myself and of the noble Lord, Lord Bach. It is an alliance of all three parties.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe problem is that my noble friend the Minister has not explained why people are allowed recklessly to dissipate criminal assets in civil cases. Why do you have one rule for civil cases, when you can use what are described as criminal assets although they are not necessarily so, and another rule in criminal cases? What is happening at the moment is that defendants are recklessly dissipating legal aid. That is the point and that is why legal aid is so high in criminal cases—it is being recklessly dissipated. My noble friend Lord Carlile explained how it can be done: you can have application after application; you can have little trials within trials; you can have satellite litigation; and the case can run on and on for months.
In the old Stafford Assize Court, which possibly the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has visited—
Good. I have appeared there on a number of occasions too—not against the noble Lord, Lord Bach, I have to say. There is a plaque on the wall that commemorated what was then the longest jury trial in Britain. It was 23 days and they put a plaque up because it had lasted so long. Now 23 days is peanuts as far as any serious case is concerned. They go on for months and months: application after application; disclosure of this, disclosure of that, and so on; recklessly dissipating legal aid funding that could be available for social welfare law or for all the other things that have been excluded—
I will read what my noble friend said with great care. For 12 years, this power that he said was in the 1999 Act—introduced by a previous Government but never mind—was never used. My mind immediately flicked back to a case that I once had. I use legal language that lawyers will understand: I once had a case in which a young girl lost the skin from her leg in a motorcycle accident. All the skin was stripped off. Now the Government want her to pay for somebody else. She presumably gets general damages of £30,000. The Government would take a fair portion of that because she had the temerity to apply for whatever it is—legal aid. They then want to keep the extra for somebody else. That seems quite wrong in principle. I am not surprised that it is in the 1999 Act, though with the coalition Government in power I would expect an entirely different approach.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise with a sense of relief, now we have got through Schedule 1.
The amendments grouped with my Amendment 91 seek to clarify or perhaps extend the circumstances in which an exceptional case determination can be made under Clause 9(3). At the moment, as drafted, that subsection says that an exceptional case determination is one that,
“is necessary to make the services available”
because of,
“a breach of … the individual’s Convention rights … or … rights of the individual to the provision of legal services that are enforceable EU rights, or … that it is appropriate to do so, in the particular circumstances of the case, having regard to any risk that failure to do so would be such a breach”.
In other words, an exceptional case has to fall within a breach of the individual’s convention rights for funding to be granted at all. That is far too narrow a situation.
Amendment 91 is a perfectly simple amendment that says that exceptional funding should be available when,
“it is in the interests of justice generally”.
The amendments that are grouped with mine, in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Beecham, rather extend that definition, but the idea is simple enough. We believe that Clause 9 does not go far enough to address the gap in funding for parties that need representation. It is not sufficient to counter the adverse effects of litigants being forced to pursue litigation in person in areas of civil and family law where legal representation is important for the proper conduct of the case. I have already referred to what the Judges’ Council had to say on this issue in addressing a previous amendment.
The exclusion of private family law from legal aid is likely to make the operation of this clause particularly problematic. There is a long line of Strasbourg cases to the effect that at least some family cases not involving domestic violence require legal aid to be available. Serious injustice would be caused if parties to these emotionally charged cases were forced to act in person. In practice, even under the clause as drafted, it is likely that a large number of cases would have to be treated as exceptional because of the risk of a breach of the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the European convention.
However, the problem does not end there. Article 6 does not apply in cases of an administrative character. Many cases of that kind, which reach the courts from tribunals or decision-making officials, involve important issues about education, privacy or social care, for example. Unfairness can have devastating consequences for individuals. Not surprisingly, the English courts have long accepted that domestic law in these cases imposes the same standards of fairness as Article 6. However, Clause 9 would not permit exceptional funding to be granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice in a case of this sort. It is very interesting that the coalition Government, in which there is a certain element of the Conservative Party, are limiting exceptional funding to a breach of convention rights and not to the English common law that would show that an injustice might follow.
This amendment ensures that an exceptional case determination may be made where it is appropriate in the interests of justice generally, not merely in cases where there would otherwise be a breach or a risk of a breach of the European convention. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is an important group and anything I say of course comes with the proviso that we too support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. We have put down an amendment proposed by the Law Centres Federation, which many noble Lords will know is responsible in many ways for the law centres dotted around England and Wales. I think that it is generally agreed by noble Lords and those outside this Committee that the federation does a fantastic job on very small resources. It gives poor people and others a chance to have access to justice to sort out their legal problems. That is at the very heart of Part 1 and I am privileged to put forward this amendment, which the Law Centres Federation originally proposed.
Exceptional funding is a proposed essential safeguard in a legal scheme that obviously seeks to exclude whole areas of law from cover. It is a mechanism by which individuals who suffer particular injustices as a result of these broad exclusions that we have been debating can in exceptional circumstances obtain legal aid to help them assert their rights. We believe that it is wrong to remove whole areas of law from scope rather than consider individual cases, as no account is taken of the importance of the case to the individual or their ability to address their legal problems by other means.
Clients with physical or mental health difficulties or with low levels of education may be wholly unable to resolve their problems without legal-aided support. They will also be seriously disadvantaged when facing, as we have been debating in the past few minutes, unusually complex areas of law or well funded opponents employing significant expert legal resources. To address this injustice, the Government rely on their proposed exceptional funding provision in Clause 9.
However, Clause 9 as drafted is too narrow, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has persuasively argued, and is problematic in a number of ways. First, as I have said, the clause is too narrow and depends on proving human rights or European law concepts. These highly complex areas of law are still meant as the only gateway to legal aid for individuals who, by definition, are often not in a position to deal with their underlying legal problems.
Secondly, Clause 9 excludes any prospect of legal aid for the initial advice and assistance stage, which is often the stage at which most help can be provided to the client to resolve matters and has the inestimable advantage of avoiding more costly litigation. I ask the noble and learned Lord when he replies to consider whether the proposition that I have just put as regards the initial advice and assistance stage is out of scope.
The current draft clause states that to acquire exceptional funding a client would have to prove that refusal of legal aid would be in breach of “the individual’s convention rights” or their rights,
“to the provision of legal services”,
under European Union law or,
“that it is appropriate to do so, in the particular circumstances of the case, having regard to any risk that failure to do so would be such a breach”.
However, in determining which areas of law to leave in scope and which to exclude, the Government have used some more approachable tests: namely, is the client likely to be particularly vulnerable; is advice and representation available from other sources; is the area of law complex; and, finally, can the client deal with matters or represent themselves? Given those considerations, surely it is appropriate to have an exceptional funding provision also based on these tests. That is the basis of the amendment to which I am speaking at the moment.
My Lords, my noble and learned friend referred to guidance that would be given to the director in due course about how he approached his task. I would indeed expect that the criteria for what is exceptional would be published by the director as one of his first tasks. An application form for exceptional funding would no doubt have a block saying, “You will not get this funding unless it is exceptional in the following sense”, or some guidance like that. Accordingly, it would be quite possible to publish criteria as to what the director would consider to be in the interests of justice generally, but I defer to the expression that was used by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about there being a real risk of injustice if legal aid is not granted. That seems an admirable way to approach it, and I will press that on my noble and learned friend in due course. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Lord as he is absolutely right about the social and financial costs of abolishing this sort of legal aid. It is impossible to say what they will be, but they will be huge, which I should have thought was fairly obvious.
The outcomes that we have talked about in this debate are not beyond the realms of probability, nor can anyone say that they would be unexpected. It is up to us in this Committee, and in the House perhaps on a future date, to decide whether the outcomes that have been described would cross the basic line of British decency that it is our obligation to defend. As part of that decision-making, we must look at whether these particular cuts are economic in the first place. Would they achieve even the Executive’s highly limited narrow goals of saving money?
The ministry plans to remove entirely funding for welfare benefits from scope. It claims that that will save £25 million a year. That sum normally goes to dealing with 135,000 cases per year. The advice is delivered, not altogether but pretty much through third-sector not-for-profit agencies such as Citizens Advice, law centres and many other advice centres. Advice goes to those seeking reconsiderations of decisions by the DWP and related agencies and to those appealing decisions before the First-tier Tribunals and then the Upper Tribunals. We have heard who receives the advice. Women are disproportionately users of this advice, as are ethnic minorities. As the noble Baroness indicated, 69 per cent—a very high percentage indeed—of those receiving advice are ill or disabled in some way.
As for who gets more complex advice—that relating to grounds for appeal—the published data for First-tier Tribunals show that of the 50,000 or so benefits-related cases heard a year, 90 per cent relate to disability-related benefits. That is hardly a surprise. For all its sins, jobseeker’s allowance is a simple entitlement for which to calculate eligibility. When there is a degree of subjectivity in deciding on the impairment caused by disability, agencies are more likely to make mistakes and thus require decisions to be appealed.
What does the advice funded by legal aid deliver? Colleagues in another place tabled a series of Parliamentary Questions to establish the percentage of people who win their appeals before tribunal with and without advice. The figures provided by the ministry show that in 2009-10 in welfare benefits-related cases, people were 78 per cent more likely to win if they had advice than if they did not have advice. For ESA the figure was even higher. People appealing employment support allowance decisions were more than twice as likely to win with advice than if they did not have advice. I point out what is obvious: those winning appellants are all legitimate claimants. They are not scroungers; they are not feckless—for the main part they have probably suffered some form of disability. They have been denied their rights by an emanation of the state, by the Executive, and they are legitimately challenging that decision.
It is just habit. Would the noble Lord agree that his statistics suggest that where there is advice, meritorious claims are brought forward and money and time are not wasted by tribunals in hearing litigants in person?
I agree absolutely. It seems to follow because the people who practise this kind of law—and we know that they are not particularly well-paid lawyers—are very careful, on the whole, to give advice on the position in law and not necessarily what the claimant wants to hear. It is right that people with hopeless claims do not go forward and those with meritorious claims do go forward—as they should do.
These are legal problems—let us make no mistake about that. The truth is that the welfare benefits field, as we have heard all round the House from great experts, is very complex in many cases and people need help with these matters before they can decide the right thing to do.
Judge Robert Martin, the head of the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, gave evidence to the Justice Committee inquiry some time last year. The 7,500 pages I referred to in an intervention are the reference material that was issued to the tribunals and which is now spread over six volumes. He made that point to the Justice Committee. He was asked by the chair, the right honourable gentleman Sir Alan Beith:
“Will it bring more people into the tribunal because they have not been advised that their case has no chance of success in the tribunal”?,
which I think is the question the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked me. Judge Robert Martin said:
“Yes, because a general public awareness of tribunals is very low. Very little is put into public education of the law and how to seek redress for grievances. There is this risk that we will see many people who have been drawn to the tribunal believing it is the most appropriate forum to solve things, whereas it may be just a mistaken conception about the tribunal”.
He continued:
“Legal help is so important in that triage function of sifting out cases which can be redressed but not through the tribunal or the court, and assisting those cases where the tribunal or the court can assist to have the case prepared in a way that maximises the chance of success”.
That gives the answer from someone who is, as it were, at the coal face. He went on to say:
“With the removal of legal help, we will have to spend a lot more time explaining simply what the tribunal is about rather than getting to the heart of the matter”.
This Bill is at its worst in this particular part. I argued at Second Reading—and I argue again today—that it is unconstitutional in that it removes access to justice for a large number of citizens, it is immoral because the state should not try to save a fairly small amount of money by targeting the poor and the disabled by removing their legal rights, and it is financially crazy because the savings will be non-existent. As benefits mistakes are not remedied, the problems will grow and the cost to the state will explode.
We are very proud of our legal system in this country and we encourage, quite rightly, foreign citizens to litigate their cases in British courts. They do so because of the extreme fairness and expertise of the British legal system from top to bottom. It is ironic, is it not, that we should be asking foreigners to litigate their serious cases in our courts because of the greatness of our system, while at the same time we seek to reduce some basic rights in law for our own citizens who are the least able to look after themselves?
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe issue that concerns me in Clause 4 is subsection (3). Under subsection (4):
“The Lord Chancellor may not give directions or guidance about the carrying out of … functions in relation to individual cases”.
That is fair enough, but he must,
“comply with directions given by the Lord Chancellor about the carrying out of”,
his “functions”, and he must,
“have regard to guidance given by the Lord Chancellor about the carrying out of”,
his “functions”.
What does that mean? Does it mean, for example, that the Lord Chancellor can phone the director or call him into his office and say, “Now, look here, you’ve got far too many of these judicial reviews going through in relation to government business. I am not telling you about any particular case, so I am complying with subsection (4). But when it comes to subsection (3), would you please bear in mind that my guidance is that we have got too many of these cases? The judges are complaining. The lists are full.”? What exactly is intended by Clause 4(3)?
My Lords, we have heard short but very impressive speeches on this very important group. Clause 4 is particularly important and it is absolutely vital that the Government get this right. We want to help them get it right all across the House. I hope that the Minister will have some freedom of manoeuvre on this matter, which is, in the end, a matter of some principle.
Perhaps I may start by commending the Government for bringing the Legal Services Commission inside the Ministry of Justice. When we were in power, we set up the Magee committee to produce a report on whether that would be an appropriate thing to do. It seemed to us at the time, and clearly to this Government, that there were a number of very good reasons why it is not satisfactory for the Legal Services Commission not to be an agency of government. In our view, it is appropriate that it should be and we commend the Government for doing that.
The problem always—it would have been as much a problem for us as it is for the present Government—is with the words “independence” and “perception of independence”. The Minister will know, as all of us know, that many interested people outside this House are very concerned about the drafting of Clause 4 and whether it meets what the Government clearly intend. No one is accusing them of bad faith here. Clause 4(4) shows that they clearly intend that this should be a system that works fairly and well. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, pointed out, the wording is extraordinarily ambivalent and ambiguous, certainly as regards the relationship between subsections (3) and (4). The Government need to look at it again, and, I would argue, it probably needs to be redrafted.
I do not know whether noble Lords have had the opportunity to see an interesting, short note from Justice on this topic. Mr Roger Smith, who I think is well known to a large number of people who are interested in this issue and who has huge experience in this field, makes a very good point as to why this present drafting is not satisfactory. He says on what I think is an important part of the argument that:
“The provision will be most objectionable where the Director makes a decision to refuse legal aid for judicial review against his own minister. However justified that might be on the individual facts, it would be argued that the Lord Chancellor is being a judge in his own cause. Indeed, it may well be”—
this is the clever point—
“that interest groups are motivated to make exactly that accusation, regardless of the substantive worth of their application, precisely to obtain more publicity for their cause”.
As an example, among many others that could be referred to, he has shown where the Government have to tread extraordinarily carefully to make sure that independence is real and is perceived to be real. I therefore ask the Minister to be sympathetic and to look very carefully indeed at how this clause is currently drafted.
My Lords, I hope that I am correct in saying that our intention is that there should be a process whereby written applications can be made, but always with the provision that there can be an oral hearing in certain circumstances. The noble Lord makes a good point. I beg to move.
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 96 in my name. We take the view that the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against a refusal of legal aid is a little excessive. However, we take the point that was made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, a moment ago that the European convention requires that there should be an appeal process. We note that in Clause 11, headed “Determinations”, there is a provision in subsection (5) that regulations,
“must make provision establishing procedures for the review of determinations … and of the withdrawal of such determinations”.
That is fine, but we do not think that the review should be carried out by someone else within that executive agency about which I was talking a moment ago. We believe that an appeal should be made to an independent panel.
Your Lordships will recall that on Second Reading or on the first day of Committee I was involved in a clash over who had the longest involvement in legal aid. I recall that legal aid applications and appeals were very well dealt with by an independent panel of local solicitors within the area. It was all devolved. You did not have to come to London or attend a First-tier Tribunal in whatever building that tribunal sat. The matter was dealt with locally by people who understood the locality and probably knew the solicitor who was appearing before them to make an appeal, and had some idea how far they could trust that individual and how experienced he was.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI agree with the noble Lord and I shall say a little word about that before I sit down.
Admirable work has been done in the First-tier Tribunal to make it as friendly as one can. However, it is impossible—and the Minister has heard this from around the Committee today—to square the circle in that those tribunals still fundamentally are ruling on matters defined and decided through laws, rules and guidance, which is sometimes pretty heavy, that often carry criminal sanctions if violated. It is quite clear when one looks at official statistics on the First-tier Tribunals that the Government are wrong when they say that tribunals can be accessed without advice. You are twice as likely to win an appeal if you have had some basic advice rather than no advice at all. The Minister's team has kindly provided information that allows us to quantify the increase in likelihood of winning an appeal if the appellant has been advised. This is to the First-tier Tribunal. For some types of cases, such as employment support allowance, you are more than twice as likely to win. Given that it allows people to return to work, seeing thousands of cases that would have been won with advice is surely wrong headed.
Rather than saying that cases would have been won, would the noble Lord not use the expression “gained access to justice and obtained the benefits to which they were entitled”?
In my legal career and otherwise, I have always given way to better phrases used by Welsh lawyers and certainly by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and I do on this occasion too. Access to justice is rather important because you cannot win if you do not have access to justice. One of the worries is that the Bill will ensure that there is no access to justice for many who have had it up until now.
The reason for marked disparities is that appealing on welfare benefits inevitably requires, as my noble friend Lady Lister and the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, have just mentioned, an understanding, whether we like it or not, of complex statutes and rules and guidance that govern how the state evaluates an individual's eligibility for legal aid. Had legal aid not been present in 2009-10, if we apply the success rate for those without advice to those who did receive advice, 51,223 people in total would have lost their appeals. The long-term cost of supporting those people is incalculable. Never mind Second-tier, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court; to take out of scope advice on a review to the First-tier Tribunal is unfair and wrong.
The effect of people not being able to exercise their rights is again frankly explained in the Government's own impact assessment. The Government say that the changes may lead to:
“Reduced social cohesion … Increased criminality … Reduced business and economic efficiency … Increased costs for other Departments … Increased transfer payments from other Departments, in particular higher benefits payments for people who spent their savings on legal action”.
In welfare benefit cases, it is not enough to have legal aid at the Second-tier Tribunal upwards. In fact, if you do not have it earlier you are unlikely to ever get to the Second-tier Tribunal or above. Advice is needed when seeking to review, for example, DWP decisions before the First-tier Tribunal. It does not have to be expensive or sophisticated legal advice, but it has to be legal advice.
If advice is given at that stage, hopeless cases, as has been said, can be got rid of. First-tier Tribunals would not be so clogged up in the future. The Committee will remember what Judge Martin of the Social Entitlement Chamber said about unrepresented defendants—that at least 10 per cent of time is wasted in explaining what is going on. Proper cases can therefore go ahead quicker. In particular, many legal issues can be sorted out by the advice that is currently given so that the wrong can be put right before the tribunal ever gets involved.
That is what the present system does, although not perfectly. Lots of people do not take advantage of it and sometimes it does not work, but more or less it works pretty well. People get their advice, which frankly does not cost very much money and lawyers certainly do not get rich on it. The truth is that many cases no longer have to go anywhere near a tribunal. It does not encourage courts or tribunals: it actually avoids courts and tribunals. That is why it is slightly ironic that the Lord Chancellor said today in his Guardian article that legal aid’s,
“broad scope means that problems are dragged straight to the courtroom that could often be solved earlier and more simply elsewhere”.
That comment is not his finest: I would go so far as to say that it is rather absurd. The type of legal aid that he seeks to abolish is exactly the type of legal aid that he should be encouraging and reinforcing because it avoids courts and tribunals rather than encouraging them. In fact it often has some sort of mediating effect, and we know that mediation is an important and proper part of the Government's policy in this field.
The Minister has described himself today as a social democrat and someone who has a copy of The Rule of Law by his bed. If he is a person of that sort, he must see the argument that has been put in the Committee tonight.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it is clearly sensible that the agency should be brought within the scope of the public protection arrangements. I have nothing to add to that. The most important thing is that it should legalise the passing of information between the various agencies that are concerned with these matters.