Criminal Justice (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I want to make a couple of points that I have made on previous occasions. I am always unhappy about things that deal with the law being discussed only by lawyers. It seems to me that non-lawyers should sometimes refer to the matters in front of us.

I heard the Minister say, kindly, that we now have the impact assessment. I am always fascinated by how the Government can say that they do not intend to provide guidance because a measure relates mainly to technical changes before they have produced the impact assessment. That seems like a decision before the fact. It is also interesting that the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“No, or no significant, impact on the private, voluntary or public sector is foreseen … The impact of this instrument, including on individuals, is negligible”.


That cannot be true if, for example, this information is not available; the noble and learned Lord made the point a moment ago that that will have a considerable impact on individuals.

The point I really want to make to the Minister is that this is another example of trying to deal with Alice in Wonderland. The idea that we would seriously not give the information we have to the rest of the European Union, nor hope that they would give us that information, seems outwith any kind of sense. I am perfectly prepared to accept that we will have to pass these regulations—because, no doubt, if that situation arose when we are not a member of the European Union, many of these provisions would not function in any case—but I wish that Ministers would just admit every time that it is much better to have a system in which you share than not. We are all fixated by the lunacy of the whole business of Brexit but that does not mean that a little humility from Ministers would not be welcome. They could say, “We are sorry to be in this position because it makes things very much worse”, instead of pretending that everything will be the same, that we will just fix things, that everything is perfectly okay and that if we have a no-deal situation, this will just go ahead. That flies in the face of the truth.

Every time we discuss these statutory instruments, we increasingly recognise what a nonsense the whole proposition is. I just want to hear that occasionally from the Government. They do not seem satisfactorily engaged in trying to solve the problem anyway, but it would be nice to hear an occasional ministerial comment that they are sorry to have to put this forward because it is obviously not a sensible situation or better than what we have at the moment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the regulations deal with the current situation of mutual assistance, not just the passing of information from one country to another. That is what we are concerned with.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to taking account of convictions. As he explained, a lot of work has been done to make sure that convictions are presented mutually in an agreed format, which assists a sentencing judge greatly. The regulations—particularly in Part 6, entitled “Taking account of convictions”—provide that all individuals with prior convictions from outside the UK, whether from the EU or non-EU countries, are treated the same. Clearly, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out, there is a developed system of mutual assistance relating to convictions. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the difference between the system developed between EU member states and that developed with non-EU states “outside the UK”. Those are the words used in the impact assessment. What difference in standards can we expect between the two systems?

Perhaps I may turn first to compensation for victims of crime. A significant change has been made because, at the moment, there is an obligation on EU member states not simply to offer advice but to co-operate in providing access to their compensation schemes. It is proposed that that system should go and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority will simply offer advice instead. We know from the impact assessment that, for example, it is not known at the moment how many British nationals have applied for compensation from EU compensation schemes because victims can apply directly. I am anxious to know whether the Minister can enlighten us about the nature of the advice that will be given to people injured as a result of criminal activity abroad as compared with the mutual assistance given under the current scheme. It seems that there could be a very considerable difference between the two situations. The Explanatory Memorandum states that there is currently,

“a system of formal communication between the relevant authorities”.

That will go, so what is the advice? If an injured person happens to learn about the scheme covering the offer of advice from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, presumably he or she will have to take the initiative of approaching the CICA to obtain it.

I turn to mutual assistance. Of course, EU protection orders and supervision systems have not been used considerably, as the memorandum makes clear. These are important possibilities that no doubt could have been developed more than they have. For example, if a person has engaged in violent conduct towards their spouse in a European country and the spouse has taken out a protection order, there is great value in that being enforced in this country as well without any further proceedings. However, according to the regulations before us, it seems that separate and additional applications for protection will have to be made to the British courts.

It is a similar case as regards supervision orders. If a person found guilty of criminal conduct abroad to the effect that a supervision order has been made against him moves to this country, unless there is a separate and additional application to a British court, the protection against him that a supervision order provides will no longer exist.

The mutual recognition of financial penalties is another important area. Currently, a fine imposed in one EU country can be enforced in another. What mechanism does the Ministry have in mind following the implementation of this instrument—should that ever come about, which seems highly unlikely—for recovering financial penalties imposed in another EU country? How will that compare with the recovery of financial penalties from non-EU countries at present?

Although these regulations appear complicated and technical, there is an important principle of mutual assistance involved. Among EU members, we have built up systems that protect the people of this country. These are all to be swept away and replaced by separate applications and so on. This seems an undesirable outcome that has not been given the publicity it deserves.

Brexit: Powers of EU-UK Joint Committee

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 20th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the UK and the EU are obliged to implement the joint committee’s decisions, which will, under Article 166, have the same legal effect as the agreement itself—but there will be no ratification of any decisions taken by the joint committee, obviously. In the absence of any agreement on an issue by the joint committee, under Article 170, the issue will then be referred to the arbitration panel, whose decision will be final and binding. Again, it will not go back to Parliament for discussion. What control, if any, does the House of Commons have over the joint committee’s decisions?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, there are two obvious controls. First, Ministers or others will attend the joint committee with a mandate from Parliament. Secondly, pursuant to Section 25(2) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, a decision that constitutes an amendment to part of the treaty or replaces part of the treaty made by the joint committee would require ratification.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, United Kingdom Ministers always speak with one voice.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The Minister said that there will not be two civil servants and we hear that there might be Ministers. Who will be the UK’s representatives on the joint committee, and how will they attain a mandate from the House of Commons—one which those negotiating recently most clearly did not have?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the final constitution of the joint committee has not yet been agreed. It will be addressed once exit has taken place. However, those who represent the United Kingdom on the joint committee, be they Ministers or others, will carry with them a mandate. They will be answerable to Parliament for the decisions made by the joint committee and the joint committee cannot implement decisions unless they are agreed to by both parties.

Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, the amendment which the regulation seeks to make is obviously highly desirable. However, I have a question for the Minister, because I cannot for the life of me see how it achieves its purpose in expanding the financial remedies available under domestic legislation. As far as I can see, the only passage which might possibly have a bearing is Regulation 2(2)(a), where we are told that the words,

“in relation to matters relating to maintenance”,

are being deleted. Without more context, it is extremely difficult to see whether this achieves what the regulation seeks to do. I am happy to take the Minister’s assurance that it does, or perhaps he can explain it a bit more. It is characteristic that these instruments are so economically worded that, without a whole lot of legislative material in hand, it is sometimes hard to make sense of them.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, this is a necessary rectification of the earlier regulations. Subject to what has already been expressed, we have no objection to it.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I join my colleague in the House of Commons, and others in your Lordships’ House, in welcoming these amendments which meet concerns raised by family law practitioners, as mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum. They were concerned about the prospective narrowing of the jurisdiction for financial remedies and the type of remedies which would be available.

This raises the question of what consultation took place before paragraphs 14 and 16 of the EU maintenance regulation were originally amended. To be fair, the Government have been persuaded by family law practitioners that the concerns raised were valid, hence the revised amendment in this statutory instrument, but surely adequate consultation in advance of drafting it would have avoided the need to amend it. What consultation, if any, took place? What assurances can the Minister offer that this scenario will not be repeated?

This is not quite the MoJ equivalent of the fantasy ferry projects subscribed to by the former Lord Chancellor, Chris Grayling, but it is rather disturbing. It comes, after all, only some seven weeks since the original regulations were approved by both Houses, and just over four weeks since they came into force.

The Law Society is content with the changes, which effectively revert to the relevant Hague conventions and some English law extant before 2011. I am glad that the Government have recognised the problem, just about in time, and made the necessary change. However, it underlines the need for proper consultation before laying new regulations to comply with the fate which appears to await the country.

Services of Lawyers and Lawyer’s Practice (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft amending instrument forms part of our ongoing work to ensure that, if the UK leaves the EU without a deal, our legal system will continue to work effectively. Your Lordships will be aware that, in preparation for leaving the EU, the Government have signed a UK-Switzerland citizens’ rights agreement, as they have done with the EEA states that are outside the EU. This instrument will modify the way in which relevant retained EU law is revoked in order to retain regulatory provisions for those in scope of the UK-Switzerland citizens’ rights agreement if a withdrawal agreement with the EU is not agreed and implemented before the UK’s exit from the EU. This draft instrument makes changes to the relevant legislation in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland. Scotland is legislating separately with the same policy intention.

Noble Lords will be aware that the UK, as an EU member state, is required to implement two European directives for legal services which are extended to Swiss nationals under the EU-Switzerland free movement of persons agreement. As part of preparations to leave the EU, the Government laid a statutory instrument to amend the domestic legislation implementing these two directives. The original statutory instrument revokes the relevant provisions in the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal.

This draft instrument amends the way in which the domestic legislation is revoked, retaining some provisions for Swiss lawyers and those in scope of the UK-Switzerland citizens’ rights agreement. This is to ensure that retained EU law operates effectively in the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal, and that deficiencies in retained EU law are remedied in a way that reflects our agreement with Switzerland.

The UK-Switzerland citizens’ rights agreement grandfathers recognition and establishment rights for UK and Swiss lawyers, provided that they have transferred into a legal profession of the other state before exit day. It also protects the rights of UK and Swiss lawyers who are established, registered and providing services under their home title. So long as they remain registered, they will be able to continue to provide services as they do now. It also provides a transition period of four years for lawyers to register as registered European lawyers or to transfer into a legal profession of the other state under these arrangements. These arrangements include citizens who have started but not finished studying for professional legal qualifications.

Finally, it allows lawyers and law firms to continue to provide up to 90 days’ temporary services a year for at least five years, where a contract to provide such services was agreed and started before exit. Swiss lawyers will also be able to apply within four years of exit day to join an English and Welsh or Northern Irish profession on the basis of three years’ qualifying experience as a registered European lawyer, in addition to routes available to foreign-qualified lawyers. For Swiss lawyers and law firms with interests in the UK, this instrument will bring legal certainty. It will effectively implement in domestic law the obligations that we have undertaken at the level of international law pursuant to the UK-Switzerland citizens’ rights agreement, which is why it is necessary to bring forward this instrument at this time. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Ministry of Justice team on producing an impact assessment which would meet the deepest desires of the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Foulkes. It is excellent. It fully covers the material and, combined with the evidence base, must have involved a great deal of work. The tragedy is that it refers only to 10 Swiss lawyers in this country—and not only that but it has no effect unless we leave the EU without a deal, which looks increasingly unlikely, having regard to the Motions passed in the House below. However, in itself this instrument contains nothing objectionable.

Withdrawal Agreement: Attorney General’s legal opinion on the Joint Instrument and Unilateral Declaration

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Statement made by the right honourable Attorney-General in another place. The purpose of the Statement was to provide the Attorney-General’s opinion on the implications of the three documents produced following the Prime Minister’s dash to Strasbourg yesterday. The purpose was, of course, what the Prime Minister had promised to negotiate, referring to,

“not a further exchange of letters, but a significant and legally binding change to the withdrawal agreement”.

According to the Mail on Sunday—not a newspaper that I necessarily follow in any respect—the Attorney-General is reported to have said:

“I will not change my opinion unless I’m sure there is no legal risk of us being indefinitely detained in the backstop. I am putting my hand on my heart. I will not change my opinion unless we have a text that shows the risk has been eliminated. I would not put my name to anything less”.


Before considering the merits of what the Prime Minister has obtained it is worth considering what has not been achieved. As I predicted in the debate yesterday—was it only yesterday?—there is no change to the withdrawal agreement. Its 597 pages remain unchanged. That is not entirely true, because they have been reduced to a smaller volume. The text, however, is completely unchanged. So too are the 26 pages—I think now 28 pages—of the political declaration.

The result is that the legal risk remains unchanged. As the Attorney-General states in paragraph 19 of his latest opinion:

“The legal risk remains unchanged that if through no such demonstrable failure of either party, but simply because of intractable differences, that situation does arise”—


that is, the situation in which no new agreement is reached—

“the United Kingdom would have, at least while the fundamental circumstances remained the same, no internationally lawful means of exiting the Protocol’s arrangements, save by agreement.”

I had the opportunity to hear the Attorney-General’s Statement in another place this morning, and I understood him to be reconfirming that position in his answers.

It is also worth restating that—despite rumours to the contrary—there are no changes to the arbitration provisions and no new system of arbitration: it will still be lawyers who make this decision. It also follows that the statement in paragraph 16 of the Attorney-General’s opinion of 13 November 2018 still stands. That statement was as follows:

“It is difficult to conclude otherwise than that the Protocol is intended to subsist even when negotiations have clearly broken down. The ordinary meaning of the provisions set out above and considered in their context allows no obvious room for the termination of the Protocol, save by the achievement of an agreement fulfilling the same objectives. Therefore, despite statements in the Protocol that it is not intended to be permanent, and the clear intention of the parties that it should be replaced by alternative, permanent arrangements, in international law the Protocol would endure indefinitely until a superseding agreement took its place, in whole or in part, as set out therein”.


I understand that still to be the position and invite the noble and learned Lord to confirm it.

In his Statement, the Attorney-General focused particularly on other available remedies in the event that the European Union can be proved guilty of bad faith in not reaching an agreement. He says—this is important, and the noble and learned Lord repeated these words earlier—that the new documents are,

“not about a situation where, despite the parties properly fulfilling the duties of good faith and their best endeavours, they cannot reach an agreement on a future relationship”.

Again, therefore, I ask the noble and learned Lord to confirm that the Government accept that if, while acting in good faith, both parties cannot reach an agreement, the backstop would endure with no predetermined end date. I underline the phrase “can be proved to be” acting in bad faith, because that would have to be demonstrated—would it not? —and it would be for the United Kingdom, if it was asserting that position, to prove it. Can the noble and learned Lord confirm that? The burden of proof, as we lawyers say, would be on us.

I also question the likelihood that that could be proved. I have made this point before in the House. It would be a very strong thing—a virtually impossible thing—for this arbitral panel to find on proof that senior statesmen and politicians were acting in bad faith, rather than simply being unable to agree on what are important matters for them—for their constituents, as for ours. As a practising lawyer —at least when he is not fulfilling governmental responsibilities—would the noble and learned Lord agree that the prospects of proving that, when the EU negotiators are saying, “No, we did not regard these proposals as being in the interests of the EU”, are vanishingly small? If he were advising a client, he would tell him so now.

In his previous advice, the Attorney-General referred to the difficulties of proof and the egregious nature of the conduct that would be required to establish a breach of those obligations by the EU. These are very strong things to have to prove. I respectfully suggest that, in reaching a view on how much comfort these arrangements give, that must be borne very much in mind.

The Attorney-General says that he believes the risks of an indefinite stay are reduced. He does not—it seems to me—explain in his advice why they are reduced. I understood that, in short, he sees a greater political will to reach an agreement. That is a political judgement. It is of course open to him and to others to take the same or a different view on the political will. I cannot, however, agree that anything in any of the three documents changes the legal reality.

In paragraph 4 of his opinion, the Attorney-General referred to a,

“systematic refusal to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests”.

A systematic, contumacious or deliberate refusal even to consider proposals would, I suppose, be evidence of bad faith—but that is as far as it goes. A sincere disagreement about the terms, however, is not bad faith.

As for the third document, the unilateral statement, it is that and nothing more. It is what the United Kingdom says that it thinks, but that does not make it so. I do not, therefore, share the view that there is anything in these legal documents that shifts the legal risk.

I am loath to go back to the codpiece that I referred to yesterday. However, I said then that I did not really understand how that soubriquet had come into being. From what I have read since, it is apparently code for figleaf. I regret to say that despite the energy and good faith of both the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General—which I respect—these are no more than a figleaf, and Members of the other place are left to make their political judgments on the basis of the Prime Minister’s deal.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I do not propose to repeat the speech I made yesterday, in which I suggested that it was inappropriate for lawyers to determine an issue as important as whether the backstop had run its course. I am very pleased that in the conclusion to his Statement today, the Attorney-General emphasised that matters of law affecting withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision that each of us must make. As it is a political decision, it is really not right to ask lawyers to determine whether a state is acting in bad faith, as the noble and learned Lord said a moment ago. I commend the Attorney-General for sticking firmly to the opinion that he first gave and not being shifted, despite the enormous pressure I have no doubt he is under.

An aggrieved party under this instrument would have to persuade the arbitrators to prove—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said—that the other party had failed the best endeavours test with the objective of applying the backstop indefinitely. Further, he would have to prove that there had been a persistent failure or a systematic refusal to consider the other side’s proposals. Only if the arbitrators found in the aggrieved party’s favour would they be able to use temporary measures to suspend the backstop—and I emphasise the word “temporary”. The other party could cure the problem at will at any time by taking the necessary measures to comply with the ruling.

My first question to the Minister, therefore, is this: what does he envisage to be temporary measures? What does that mean? Clearly, it would not be a permanent unilateral withdrawal from the backstop. What would happen at the Northern Ireland border to the free passage of goods if temporary measures were taken? Would it be a smuggler’s free for all or a clamping down?

The Attorney-General originally advised that it would be highly unlikely that the United Kingdom could take advantage of the remedies available to it for a breach of good faith and best endeavours because of the difficulties of proof and the egregious nature of the conduct, which would have to be established. I remind your Lordships that according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “egregious”, which the Attorney-General in typical fashion rolled off his tongue, means “shocking”. Is it now then all about timetables? That is all that the instrument appears to lay down. I listened to the Attorney-General talking in the other place about time being of the essence. To every lawyer, that phrase means that if the timetable is not adhered to, the whole agreement is defunct. The United Kingdom negotiators have not shown themselves to be particularly conscious of time over the past two and a half years. Will a breach of the timetable on either side now amount to egregious, shocking conduct, sufficient to trigger the dispute settlement arbitration procedures?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions. Referring to the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, I will perhaps begin where he finished. If the noble and learned Lord was to revisit his study of early Italian Renaissance sculpture, he might be reminded that the fig leaf can cover some very important bits. Therefore, one must bear in mind that the use of analogies is not always entirely helpful.

In paragraph 19 of his opinion, the Attorney-General set out his view that the legal remains unchanged. But that was not the question that was being addressed. The issue that exercised people was one of an extreme nature, which one would, frankly, never anticipate arising where parties have entered into an international treaty in good faith and intend to discharge their obligations under that treaty in good faith. As I observed in a previous debate, if you simply do not trust the person with whom you are contracting or entering into a treaty, there is little point in doing so—you would not proceed in the belief that they would ever finally discharge their obligations. Here, however, we proceed in the confident belief that their obligations will be addressed and met.

It is therefore important that, in the context of the further agreement, the parties have fixed a date of December 2020 by which to use their best endeavours to arrive at an alternative to the backstop. It is in these circumstances that it is considered appropriate, as the Attorney-General observed in paragraph 7 of his opinion, to note that the provisions now represent materially new legal obligations and commitments which mean that unconscionable behaviour on the part of the EU, and failure to fulfil its obligation to seek suitable and alternative practical means of dealing with the backstop, would have to be properly addressed in the context of the arbitration provisions.

It is in that context that I come to address the questions posed by the noble and learned Lord, which touch upon each other. He began by asking how, if there is bad faith by the European Union, we would prove it. There are circumstances in which it would become apparent that the European Union was intent upon seeking to trap the United Kingdom in the backstop, notwithstanding the provision of alternative arrangements. But let us be clear: one does not anticipate or foresee that that would ever occur.

On that point, I note that the backstop has significant drawbacks for the European Union, just as it has significant drawbacks for the United Kingdom. If it were ever to emerge, the backstop would result in Great Britain enjoying the benefits of a customs union and paying nothing for that. The relevant payment in respect of the customs union would come from trade in Northern Ireland, not in Great Britain. Let us remember that there is very little in this that benefits the European Union, let alone the United Kingdom.

If we were, however, to find ourselves in a situation in which there was shocking or egregious conduct on the part of the European Union, the arbitration measure would be available. In finding that there was a breach, the arbitrators would be entitled to grant temporary measures. That would include a temporary suspension of the operation of the relevant backstop provisions with regard to the border.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, asked, quite rightly, what would happen at the border. One answer is that we would find ourselves in that situation only where the European Union had not been prepared to engage with coherent, sensible proposals put forward by the United Kingdom to deal with the border and ensure that it could remain entirely open. If a suspension was ordered by the arbitrators, it would then be open to the United Kingdom to implement those proposals unilaterally at the border in order to deal with the issue. If thereafter—in utterly extreme circumstances—the European Union was to persist in refusing to engage with the temporary suspension of the protocol, the arbitrators would eventually come to the conclusion, quite rightly, that the protocol was simply not required; that it was no longer “necessary” because the alternative arrangements during the suspension had clearly worked to the satisfaction of the European Union, which had done nothing in the meantime. Again, I stress that we are talking about the most extreme of circumstances. I do not contemplate that, politically, anyone will go there.

Services of Lawyers and Lawyer’s Practice (Revocation etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect to the noble Baroness, we cannot legislate to ordain the EU 27 or any EFTA country to recognise the legal qualification of someone who has qualified in the United Kingdom. We simply cannot do that, so, after 29 March, in the absence of any withdrawal agreement and any negotiated arrangement with the EU 27, such people will have to do what any other third-party-country lawyer does, which is to go to the relevant jurisdiction and apply the host country’s provisions on registration and qualification. There is no doubt about that.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

I congratulate the Minister on his timing. This is part of the no-deal preparations along with the fake travel jam, the lorry jam in Dover and the hiring of ferries with no ships, but it is a bit late now, with about half an hour to go to the vote, to frighten the horses any further. It is extraordinary that parliamentary time should be spent in debating a statutory instrument of this nature. It is applicable only if the UK leaves the EU without reaching an agreement. The effect of that is to throw the United Kingdom on to World Trade Organization rules for general agreement on trade and services.

If that were to happen, the most-favoured-nation rules would come into operation prohibiting preferential treatment of any signatory state above another. The whole purpose of this statutory instrument, therefore, is to reduce EU and EFTA lawyers currently practising in this country to the level of the lawyers of third-party countries from around the world whose rights to practise and establish in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, absent a trade deal, are absolutely minimal, if they exist at all. As the noble and learned Lord said, this SI affects about 700 lawyers currently registered with the Solicitors Regulation Authority, 17 registered with the Bar Standards Board and some five EU lawyers registered in Northern Ireland. The other side of the coin, however, which would be of concern to the legal profession, is that the EU will obviously seek reciprocally to reduce the rights of United Kingdom lawyers practising in the EU to those WTO rights.

One of the most important differences between the WTO regime and the existing EU framework is the practice areas in which foreign lawyers are allowed to provide services in Europe. While the directives allow EU, EEA and Swiss lawyers to practise host member state law, including EU law, it is not possible under the current GATT schedule for commitments of the EU, which limits third-country lawyers to providing legal advice in home-country law and public international law, to practise in EC law.

While it is possible in theory for individual member states to grant higher levels of access to foreign lawyers, in practice most member states have not gone beyond these GATT commitments. It follows, therefore, that British lawyers will lose a number of significant rights: rights to provide legal advice on EU law; the right to requalify in host member states; and rights of audience in domestic and European courts. Further, according to the settled case law of the CJEU, lawyers from third countries practising in Europe cannot claim legal professional privilege to protect their clients’ interests. Legal professional privilege is not available to them.

It is not surprising, then, that in 2016 the Law Society of Ireland received nearly 1,400 applications from practitioners to requalify in Ireland. Those were British lawyers, mostly from antitrust, competition or trade law practitioners, based in London or Brussels. Last week the Irish Taoiseach specifically said that they were looking at Ireland taking business in legal services away from the United Kingdom. This statutory instrument, therefore, risks unnecessary conflict with the EU legal profession. There will be no reciprocity. Even if there were a no-deal withdrawal from Europe, surely there would have to be an agreement to retain an open market for legal services allowing mutual rights to practise across the borders. You will see no trace of that in the political statement that accompanies the withdrawal agreement. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, pointed out last week, we are in a competitive position. Commercial courts where the proceedings are conducted entirely in English have opened up already in Paris and Amsterdam. The noble and learned Lord said that they are being actively promoted as a much better alternative to the United Kingdom because their judgments will be recognised and enforceable across the EU and because of the certainty of their position.

If the EU does unto us what we are doing to it by this statutory instrument, British lawyers will have no rights of audience in these new English-speaking courts. That is a most curious result. Instead of spending time abolishing the rights of European lawyers to practise in this country, the Government might spend time in negotiating mutual rights to practise to replicate the current position. There is nothing, as I have said, in the political declaration that points to such negotiations. I ask the noble and learned Lord: where are we? Have there been any talks on this issue?

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my professional interests, although my firm has not been engaging in EU law. I want to thank in particular the Law Society and the Bar Council for very helpful briefings on an important and complex issue. The provisions of the statutory instrument appear to be acceptable, inasmuch as it will still be possible for EU-registered lawyers to be admitted to the solicitor’s profession or to practise under their home title. Can the noble Lord give any indication of the numbers—the proportion of those whom we have heard are already practising in this country who would be likely to continue under this new regime? Is there any estimate of the impact of the change on the likely numbers of those who will be able to continue? What estimate have the Government made of the impact on UK lawyers currently practising in the EU? Is there any information about the likely impact on them? Can the Minister clarify what is meant by the reference in the Explanatory Memorandum to the,

“alternative examination routes open to third country qualified lawyers”,

and indicate how many applicants are expected to take that course of action? What will be the position of EU lawyers currently engaged in litigation in the UK who do not choose to be admitted to the UK professions by the end of the transitional arrangements on 31 December 2020? Will they, for example, have to withdraw from cases still under way on that date?

Civil Legal Aid (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, as I indicated a moment ago, the Government published a technical notice on a number of areas which anticipated the possibility of our leaving the EU without any form of withdrawal agreement. On 13 September 2018, we published a technical notice which set out arrangements for civil legal aid cases, including arrangements in relation to the EU legal aid directive 2003, which I will refer to as the EU legal aid directive. The regulations we are discussing today will allow us to implement these arrangements and make other necessary amendments to the legal aid framework in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. These draft regulations will provide clarity for lawyers and citizens in the event of a no-deal outcome. As I indicated, that is not what we hope for, seek or wish to have as our destination. I emphasise that this will deal with the matter in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland. It is a matter of devolved competence in Scotland. The Scottish Government will address it as they see fit.

If we were to leave the European Union without a withdrawal agreement, the current reciprocal arrangements under the EU legal aid directive would be lost. The EU legal aid directive sets out rules relating to legal aid in EU member states, other than Denmark, to ensure adequate access to justice in cross-border disputes. Its application is limited to civil and commercial matters. It only applies to cross-border disputes which are, very broadly, disputes where an individual who is domiciled or habitually resident in an EU member state requires legal services in relation to proceedings or to enforcement of a decision or authentic instrument in another member state.

In a no-deal scenario, we are seeking to ensure that legal aid provision—for matters within the scope of the EU legal aid directive but not otherwise within the scope of legal aid—is not made to individuals domiciled or habitually resident in an EU member state on a unilateral basis where there is no longer reciprocity from the EU member state.

The instrument also makes technical amendments to ensure that the legal aid legislation in England and Wales and Northern Ireland operates effectively following EU exit and makes changes to procedural requirements for legal aid applications in England and Wales. It amends the civil legal aid framework in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to remove the legislation implementing the EU legal aid directive, which will no longer apply to the United Kingdom.

Individuals who are domiciled or habitually resident in the EU member state who require legal services in relation to proceedings in England and Wales or Northern Ireland or who wish to enforce a decision will be subject to the same scope, means and merits requirements as those who are domiciled or habitually resident in England and Wales or third countries—in other words, it brings everyone on to a level playing field. Legal aid provision for those domiciled or resident in the UK participating in proceedings in EU member states will fall to each member state’s particular legal aid framework—again, we cannot legislate for those states.

Repealing the legislation implementing the EU legal aid directive will ensure legal certainty and clarity regarding legal aid entitlement. In addition, we avoid a unilateral arrangement where those domiciled or habitually resident in EU member states are treated more favourably than those domiciled or habitually resident in the United Kingdom.

If I may, I shall explain the technical amendments made by the instrument. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the Access to Justice Order 2003 require the provision of legal aid for exceptional cases not normally within the scope of legal aid where not to do so would be a breach of enforceable EU rights. LASPO also provides that the Lord Chancellor may make an order specifying circumstances where foreign legal advice may be provided when not to do so would, again, be a breach of enforceable EU rights.

The references in LASPO and the 2003 order will be amended to “retained enforceable EU rights”, because of course, pursuant to the 2018 Act, in our domestic law we will have retained enforceable EU rights, but we will not have EU rights. The terms will be defined with reference to the 2018 Act, as I said. That will enable the proper functioning of the exceptional case funding frameworks in England and Wales and, under LASPO, for the provision of foreign legal advice.

As to the procedural amendments, controlled work, which is referred to in the instrument, is a categorisation of legal aid work covering certain advice where the power to determine legal aid entitlement is generally delegated to legal aid providers—for example, initial advice and assistance. At present, it is not necessary for an individual seeking legal aid for controlled work in England and Wales to attend a legal provider’s premises in person where they are present or reside in the EU. Such an individual can authorise someone to attend on their behalf.

The draft instrument changes the exception to apply to those present or resident in the United Kingdom, and these changes will allow the benefit to continue to apply to those within the UK and ensure that those residing within the European Union will now be required to meet the same criteria as those residing in third countries are currently expected to meet when applying for controlled work and not present in the United Kingdom.

Licensed work is a categorisation of work that is generally granted where there is a need for representation in court, and the procedural criteria that currently apply for individuals applying for licensed work in England and Wales who reside outside the EU and are not present in England and Wales will now apply to those who reside outside the United Kingdom and are not present in England and Wales. In other words, it will level down the playing field as between those resident in the EU and those resident otherwise in a third-party country. As such, those residing within the EU will now have to meet the same criteria as those residing in third countries for the purposes of applying for licensed work in England and Wales.

With respect to the changes made to the domestic legislation implementing the EU legal aid directive and to the procedural requirements, the draft instrument makes provision for transitional arrangements for matters that are live under the repealed or amended legislation at the time of EU exit, so at least they will continue under the same rules as before.

As regards the impact, the department carried out an impact assessment, although one would not have been required in the context of the present instrument. I say that because in 2017, there were only 27 cross-border applications made between England and Wales and the central authorities in all other EU member states with regard to legal aid and of those, 20 of the applications were from EU member states for legal aid in England and Wales and seven went the other way. In Northern Ireland, it is estimated that there have been three applications over the past two years.

The instrument is necessary to correct deficiencies arising from the UK’s exit from the EU and in LASPO. As I said, the Scottish Government are taking required amendments to legal aid legislation in their jurisdiction separately, in order that that, too, can be addressed. I hope that with that explanation, noble Lords will understand the need to put this in place in the event of our proceeding without a withdrawal agreement, without a relevant transition period and without the scope for negotiation to deal with these matters. I commend the instrument to the House.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I must confess that it is not easy to grasp the scope of these provisions, but then I last filled in an application for civil legal aid when I was campaigning politically for Britain to enter the European Common Market about 55 years ago. In a paper published by the Ministry of Justice in August 2017, Providing a Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework, the Government declared that they would seek to agree new, close and comprehensive arrangements for civil judicial co-operation with the EU. The paper stated:

“We have a shared interest with the EU in ensuring these new arrangements are thorough and effective. In particular, citizens and businesses need to have continuing confidence as they interact across borders about which country’s courts would deal with any dispute, which laws would apply, and know that judgments and orders obtained will be recognised and enforced in neighbouring countries, as is the case now”.


In paragraph 7 of that paper, the benefits of the current framework are described as follows:

“This framework provides predictability and certainty for citizens and businesses from the EU and the UK about the laws that apply to their cross-border relationships, the courts that would be responsible, and their ability to rely on decisions from one country’s courts in another State”.


As with the previous statutory instrument, nothing appeared in the political declaration which refers to these “new, close and comprehensive” arrangements. Again, perhaps the Minister can advise us how far he has got in discussing the future.

An important feature of civil judicial co-operation at present is the mutual provision of legal aid. The legal aid directive set minimum common rules relating to legal aid to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes and it applied to all such disputes involving civil and commercial matters but, in particular, it applied to family law: problems about children, the disposal of assets and so on. As the Minister said, its provisions were incorporated into English law by LASPO, and this SI’s purpose is to ensure that those domiciled or habitually resident in EU member states are not treated more favourably after we leave the EU than those who reside in England, Wales or Northern Ireland. EU residents who require legal services in relation to proceedings in our courts or who wish to enforce an overseas judgment will no longer have a right to legal aid for matters within the scope of the EU directive alone. The SI uses Henry VIII powers under Section 8 of the LASPO Act to revoke the domestic legislation implementing the EU directive in the UK, as the Minister fully explained.

So far as I can ascertain, this statutory instrument will prevent EU residents from seeking legal aid for exceptional cases that are not normally within the scope of UK domestic legal aid, but where not to do so would be a breach of “retained enforceable EU rights”. Will the Minister give a concrete example of what “exceptional cases” means? He told us something of the statistics but how often have such applications for legal aid in exceptional cases been made by EU domiciled people or residents? Can he confirm that EU residents, even after Brexit, can apply for legal aid in the ordinary way for, say, a case involving children across borders in an English court, and that it would be granted if the ordinary merits and the means tests were satisfied? Does domicile or residency in the EU disqualify an applicant from legal aid in the normal way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged for the contributions. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, makes a good point about the advantages for all in securing mutual judicial recognition and enforcement. That is why, at an early stage, we sought to take forward those discussions with the profession on what was required. He is right to observe that the matter is not contained in the withdrawal agreement or the existing declaration but is an ambition. That may seem very little but, recognising that, we have taken forward what we can, which is to deal on a unilateral basis with the more recent Hague conventions that have been entered into by the EU on behalf of member states. We have engaged in discussion to become an individual state signatory to those conventions. My recollection is uncertain but I think the 2005 and 2007 conventions were involved. We have engaged with the council of the Lugano convention, which deals with the reciprocal position between EFTA states and the EU, to engage on that. Again, to become a party to Lugano, we require the consent of the EU because it is also party to it. Those steps are being taken forward and we are conscious of their importance. I underline that.

On legal aid provision, there is no question of a disqualification being applied on the basis of residence in the EU. Let me be clear about that. The point is that the scope of the EU legal aid directive is wider than the scope of the legal aid provision under LASPO. This instrument is to bring that into line with LASPO and have a situation whereby, in certain forms of civil and commercial dispute, the directive would require consideration of a legal aid application that would not otherwise fall under the LASPO provisions.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I was asking what the exceptional cases are.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I was coming to that and would point out that the exceptional case provision is there for all cases that fall under LASPO. That will apply equally to those resident in the EU, as it would apply to those resident in the United Kingdom. Again, I point out that there is no disqualification or discrimination in respect of that matter; it is a case of ensuring that there is a level playing field whereby the scope of legal aid availability and the qualification for that aid are the same. It may not assist your Lordships much but there are provisions in the EU directive for taking account of differences in standard of living, for example, when applying financial criteria for legal aid under the directive. It is that sort of provision that we have to deal with to ensure that there is a level playing field. I emphasise that this instrument does not seek to disqualify anyone who would otherwise qualify for legal aid under LASPO, whether under the exceptional provisions or standard provisions of that scheme. I hope I can reassure your Lordships on that point.

I have rather forgotten the other points that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, so eloquently made, but if I sit down without answering, will he remind me afterwards and I will write to him? As I say, I want to underline the purpose of the instrument, which is to produce a level playing field, not a disqualification.

Brexit: Legal Position of Withdrawal Agreement

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am of course grateful to the Minister for repeating that Statement and for advance sight of it and the position paper published today. However, all Members of this House and, even more importantly, all Members of the other place are at a major disadvantage when asking questions because they have not read the legal advice upon which the Statement is based. It is totally unacceptable that we are in this position when aspects of the Attorney-General’s advice have been selectively leaked to the press over the weekend. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord can confirm that in the Attorney-General’s letter to Cabinet Ministers last month, as has been reported, he declared in respect of the backstop arrangement:

“The protocol would endure indefinitely”,


if trade talks broke down.

On 13 November in the other place, my colleagues the shadow Brexit Secretary and the shadow Solicitor-General were both crystal clear that what was sought was the final and full advice provided by the Attorney-General to Cabinet on any completed withdrawal agreement, made available to all Members of Parliament in good time for the vote on the deal. Offers short of that made by the Government, including the Attorney-General’s Statement today, were roundly rejected and the House of Commons passed the Motion unanimously. The Government could have voted against it and did not.

The reality must be that the Government do not want MPs to see the advice for fear of the political consequences. There is no point in trying to hide behind the law officers’ convention; the Ministerial Code and Erskine May are very clear that Ministers have a discretion, as part of that convention, to make advice available in exceptional circumstances. Surely few circumstances could be more exceptional than these. The economic, political and constitutional integrity of our country is at stake and the House of Commons is tasked with authorising the deal.

Paragraph 82 of today’s position paper confirms that there is no unilateral exit mechanism from the backstop for the United Kingdom—I stress, no unilateral exit mechanism. Perhaps the Minister could point me to a precedent for such a locked door with only one party as keyholder, which would not be us. Can he point to such a precedent in another treaty of recent times, or at all? The Government’s argument that the backstop will be only temporary is a political one, and politics changes. It is not the same as a firm, legal position. But articles 1.4 and 2.1 of the backstop protocol are clear that its provisions,

“shall apply unless … they are superseded, in whole or in part, by a subsequent agreement”.

Put simply, this means that parts of the backstop could become permanent even in the event that a trade deal were agreed. Can the Minister tell us of his view as to the parts of the backstop arrangement in this protocol that he considers most likely to become permanent?

There is then the impact on the Good Friday agreement. Page 305 of the withdrawal agreement refers to the need for this protocol to be implemented so as to,

“maintain the necessary conditions for continued North-South cooperation, including for possible new arrangements in accordance with the 1998 Agreement”.

Can the Minister confirm what his view is about, first, new arrangements that he believes would be in accordance with the 1998 agreement and, secondly, which new arrangements he believes would not be in accordance with it?

It is of course for the other place to rule as to whether there has been an arguable case for contempt in what we on these Benches believe to be a failure to comply with the Commons Motion of 13 November. But for the sake of our economy, our jobs and our futures, all possible information should be made available to those asked to vote on this deal. The Government should do the right thing and make the advice available. With so much at stake for all our people and with eight days now before the vote on the deal, both Houses and the country deserve better from this Government.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I too am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement and for giving me advance notice of what it contained. On 14 November, the Government published an explainer document in conjunction with the text of the draft withdrawal agreement. Paragraph 158 states that the agreement contains,

“assurances that we cannot be kept permanently in the backstop”.

That is not the view of the Attorney-General as set out in this Statement. He says:

“There is … no unilateral right for either party to terminate”,


the agreement. The Northern Ireland protocol places the whole of the United Kingdom in a single customs territory with the EU. As the Attorney-General’s Statement says, that will continue to apply in international law unless and until it is superseded by a permanent agreement. Northern Ireland alone must additionally follow many of the EU’s single market rules and will consequentially, whatever the DUP may say, have a different status from Great Britain.

The legal statement that has been produced today rightly focuses in particular on Article 20 of the protocol. It is not a break clause, which might in defined circumstances permit the United Kingdom to break the arrangements and walk away from the single customs territory; it is a review clause whereby one party, if it thinks fit, may seek agreement from the other that the protocol is no longer necessary essentially to protect the 1998 agreement in all its dimensions. If there is agreement, the single customs territory comes to an end but, in the absence of agreement, the dispute is to be resolved by an arbitration panel whose decision is binding on both parties. If a question of the interpretation of Union law arises, the panel cannot determine it; it must seek a definitive ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Paragraph 11 of the annexe to the legal position document suggests that the arbitration panel would be considering, for instance, whether the parties were acting in good faith or lawfully. I understand that the Attorney-General has expanded on this in another place today. I regard that as a distraction tactic. Does the Minister not agree that the real question the arbitration panel would decide is not whether the parties were acting in good faith but whether, in its opinion, maintaining the single customs territory was still necessary for the purposes of the 1998 agreement? Is not the whole purpose of the protocol to maintain frictionless trade between the whole of the United Kingdom and the EU in order to avoid a hard border in Ireland? Is it sensible to leave such a highly political and sensitive question for an arbitration panel to determine, even though it will get its law from the CJEU? If that arbitration panel says that it is still necessary to maintain the single customs territory, we remain in it. We remain in the backstop. We remain in the single customs territory. There will be no trade deals being brought into effect. Does the Minister agree that that is the legal position?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for their observations. I shall begin by saying clearly that I am not going to comment upon leaks to the media that may or may not have been made and may or may not be accurate, and I am not going to comment upon any correspondence that the Attorney-General may or may not have had with members of the Cabinet. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I observe that the issue of contempt is one for the Speaker and Members of the other place, and I make no further observation on that point.

The steps taken by the Attorney-General and the Government in respect of this matter are consistent with and correspond to the undertakings that were given in the other place by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

A great deal has been said about the Northern Ireland protocol and the backstop. I begin by observing that it is the intention of the Government that the backstop should never be required and that during the implementation period we will engage in negotiation for an agreement that will mean that the backstop itself is not required. But of course there remains the possibility that it will be required; albeit it is one of two alternatives, because the alternative is to extend the transition or implementation period.

Let us look at the backstop itself. The noble Lord is quite right to say that, on the face of it, there is no unilateral right to withdraw from the backstop. That is quite clear in the terms of the protocol to the withdrawal agreement. But that is not the end of the story by any means. There have been various suggestions that somehow the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, will be locked into the backstop indefinitely, for ever. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked about the single keyholder being the European Union, which at its whim will simply decide to leave the door locked and walk away with us in the backstop for ever and a day. That is simply unsound as an analysis of the legal position.

Under the terms of the Northern Ireland protocol, and, in particular, Article 2, there is an express obligation on the parties to use their best endeavours to reach an agreement that will not require the maintenance of the backstop. The term “best endeavours” is well worn in both domestic and international law and imposes a strong obligation upon the parties to conduct themselves in such a way that they can realistically and reasonably achieve an alternative settlement. If that obligation is not obtempered or met by one or other of the parties simply because it wants to leave the backstop in place indefinitely, there is a dispute resolution mechanism. It is not just about acting in good faith or about whether or not the backstop is necessary; it is whether or not the backstop continues to be necessary because one or other party has not used its best endeavours to adopt or agree an alternative arrangement. That would be subject to arbitration in terms of the withdrawal agreement.

Pursuant to Article 178 of the withdrawal agreement, if there was a failure on the part of a party to obtemper the ruling of the arbitration panel, which can be arrived at by a majority, there would be the right on a temporary basis to suspend implementation of a part of the agreement that was being held in place simply because of a breach of that obligation of good faith. But it goes further than that. In the event that there was a persistent failure on the part of, for example, the EU to obtemper its obligation of best endeavours and to adopt what was plainly a suitable alternative arrangement for the Northern Ireland protocol, one would have regard to Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that a material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part. You then look at the definition of a material breach.

So this is not a case of being locked in with the EU holding the key. It has clear, express and unambiguous legal obligations to obtemper in the context of the Northern Ireland protocol, and if it fails to do so then there are remedies available. I reiterate that it is not a case of one or other party having the unilateral right simply to walk away from the protocol. That would not be appropriate in any form of international agreement. There is a mechanism whereby the agreement cannot be abused by either party and whereby if it is abused, there can be a resolution involving termination or suspension of a particular provision.

Candidly, I do not believe that two bodies such as the United Kingdom and the European Union are going to find themselves in a situation in which, over a period of time, one or other is not going to act in good faith in the field of its international obligations and is not going to discharge its obligations to use its best endeavours to arrive at an alternative agreement.

I hope that that goes some way to meeting the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, but I emphasise that, ultimately, I am seeking to address the legal issues that arise in the context of the withdrawal agreement and, like the Attorney-General, I am perfectly prepared to answer any question from this House on the law—albeit they may be better informed by other and better lawyers inside and outside this House. I have no difficulty in responding, in so far as I can, to legal issues raised with regard to the withdrawal agreement. The Attorney-General took exactly the same position in the House of Commons. He recognised his duty not only in government but to the House to give such legal assistance as he could to the House to resolve any issues that may arise in this context. That is where we stand.

I just add this. After 45 years, clearly there are issues to be worked out between the parties, and the withdrawal agreement will allow for the necessary time and legal means for that process to unfold in an orderly, peaceful and sensible way. I reiterate that I am at the disposal of the House to answer questions of law, although they might be better answered by other Members of the House. Thank you.

Private Burial Grounds

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I deeply regret that the noble Lord’s interest is posthumous. I am not in a position to answer the specific point raised by the noble Lord, but I will write to him and place a copy of the letter in the Library.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, what is the policy of the Government in issuing licences under these Victorian burial Acts which permit the digging up of bodies in order to hold new burials? For how long must a person be buried before his remains are exhumed? How many licences have been issued, and have there been any prosecutions?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as regards private burial grounds, the removal of a body from a burial ground would be an offence pursuant to Section 25(1) of the Burial Act 1857, unless there was a statutory consent for such removal.

Scotland: European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I thank my noble friend Lord Forsyth. It is fair to say that he can to a certain extent legitimately say, “I told you so”, and he forewarned that this would be an outcome. None the less, the Government did all they could, trying in every possible way to secure agreement with the Scottish and Welsh Governments.

The walkout yesterday was—daft. That is the word. It was a situation in which four SNP MPs had questions to the Prime Minister and they decided that they would walk out and not ask them. One of the poor souls had been trying since 2015 to put a question to the Prime Minister, and he walked out. It may take another three years or he may never put another question to the Prime Minister, and if you are to try to hold a Government to account, that is your opportunity to do it. At the selfsame time, it looks as if the Speaker of the other place was ready to have a debate on the very issues which the Scottish National Party was so aggrieved by, but of course that did not happen, because the members of the SNP were hotfooting it out to the television cameras to say how disgraceful it was that they were in that situation. It is regrettable and it was unhelpful to their own cause. I believe that we should have as much discussion as is required on the issues to ensure that nobody feels that they are being silenced, quietened or ignored. However, there are conventions in the other place which would have allowed for that discussion to take place, but they were squandered by individuals who perhaps did not believe that those opportunities were adequate for them and their purposes.

I accept the points raised by my noble friend about the powers themselves. It is difficult to reconcile the views of the Scottish National Party; it believes that Brussels can retain all the powers, but even if there is the slightest hint that the United Kingdom could in any way have any touch of these powers, that is somehow bonkers. The sanity of that is questionable—but perhaps that is not for me to question.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

May I say that it is unhelpful for the Minister to use language such as “bonkers”, “daft” and so on, as was the tone of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth? There is a problem to be addressed. The use of the word “veto” is also unhelpful. That suggests that the ultimate conclusion should be that one of the four entities that make up the United Kingdom should be able to block the other three. Can the Minister say whether any thought has been given to qualified majority voting on issues in setting up the framework? I would have thought that the people of Scotland would, even if they did not welcome it, be prepared to consider a proposal that had the support of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. For example, if it were 3:1, perhaps the Scottish people would feel that their views would be overruled by a majority. However, the problem at the base of it all is that Scotland and Wales, even though they have agreed to the settlement, and Northern Ireland, fear that they will be overruled by English interests.

I know that Wales was happy to be within the EU frameworks because they applied across the whole of Europe to all the EU countries. Therefore there was a certain parity, without the domination of English interests over Welsh or Scottish interests at that time. But when you bring it all back to the United Kingdom and consider that the United Kingdom Parliament is also the English Parliament, there is concern and fear to be addressed.

I suggest to the Minister that instead of using emotive language, even though he is supported by members of his own party, he should approach the issue much more calmly and seek a mechanism that would be acceptable. If, ultimately, other mechanisms are simply dismissed by the Scottish Government, perhaps the Sewel convention can come to the Government’s aid and they can pass this legislation without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. But they are building up trouble, not merely by going ahead with this Bill without the consent of the Scottish Parliament but by using the language like “veto”, “daft” and “silly” that is being used on the Conservative Benches. I urge the Minister to be more temperate in his use of language.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I thank the noble Lord for his words of advice, but Scots are renowned for telling it like it is, and I assure him that I moderated my language a great deal when I chose those words. What I saw yesterday was scandalous, and I think anyone who saw it would agree. It was a dereliction of a democratic role. That level of theatrics may play its part—I do not doubt that—but there are other things that should be done in the other place.

On qualified majority voting, in the United Kingdom we have a degree of asymmetry. Attempts were made by the other party to address this through regional assemblies within England, but that was simply not supported by the public will. It is not easy to accept in such a small island archipelago such as we are, where one nation is so dominant in terms of population, that we should somehow simply divide the land into four parts and pretend that each is equal and should be considered as such. That would not be easily done. I do not think that the Government today are ruling anything out, but we have to be realistic—something else the Scots are renowned for.