Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Chakrabarti
Main Page: Baroness Chakrabarti (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Chakrabarti's debates with the Scotland Office
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I think it very appropriate that the Ministry of Justice should decide as a principle as far as possible to preserve the existing rules as they currently apply in the UK immediately after exit day. The purpose is,
“to provide maximum certainty and stability for businesses and individuals”.
However, I am concerned about the impact on business, even though the impact assessment does not throw up anything in particular. I am always very conscious of the strength of Hong Kong, which built its reputation and financial power on the fact that it uses English common law as the basis of its legal system. That means that contracts are readily made and understood, which has been of great economic benefit to Hong Kong. I notice that the impact assessment refers to the,
“strong international reputation as a centre of legal excellence”,
that this country currently enjoys. Anyone connected with the law knows that our legal profession has a great reputation, English law is frequently the preferred law and English courts are used even though a particular dispute has nothing to do with England, so this is a very profitable part of the legal world.
I shall take as an example one matter referred to in paragraph 7.7 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which refers to,
“the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising from infringements of unitary EU intellectual property rights … Trade Marks … Design Rights and … Plant Variety Rights. These unitary EU IP rights will no longer apply in the UK … and UK courts will no longer hear proceedings relating to such rights after exit day”.
It seems to me that there is a whole area of law which may be cut out from the jurisdiction of English courts and the services of English lawyers.
That is compounded by the fact that these regulations remove the ability of UK courts to refer questions of interpretation of the 1980 Rome convention to the Court of Justice of the European Union—to my mind, that is a significant restriction—just as the interpretation of retained EU law generally cannot be decided by that court. We are going from a well understood legal system to something that is much more limited than we have been used to.
On the broad basis, however, the fact that the rights are generally retained is to be welcomed.
My Lords, in an attempt once more to be succinct, I can echo the point that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was making. The concerns from this side are essentially about regulatory diversion. I do not think anybody is going to object to these regulations; the concern is with ongoing regulatory divergence and its potential impact, whether it is on unfair competition cases or IP cases and so on. Perhaps the Minister might consider briefly that risk of regulatory divergence in his reply.
In relation to insurance, the Explanatory Memorandum says:
“The Government engaged with representatives of the insurance industry”,
in relation to “insurance risks”. Can the Minister outline the types of risks identified in that engagement? We are told that banks and insurers are shifting hundreds of billions of pounds in assets out of the UK ahead of exit day to keep their contracts and policies within the EU area. We have learned that Aviva, Britain’s second largest insurer, will transfer around £9 billion in assets to a new Irish company, for example. Does the Minister agree with having that sort of risk to our economy? Does this reflect the concern about different outcomes that could result from insurance contract cases being resolved differently in our courts and those of our EU partners in the future?
As I say, my general proposition is on the risks of regulatory divergence, but one can hardly object to the instrument itself.
I am obliged to the noble Lord and to the noble Baroness for their observations. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, observed, there will no longer be scope for a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union over the construction or interpretation of the convention. Given that the convention has been there since 1980, that may already have happened but we cannot say that it would never have happened again. But I say to the noble Lord—and I address this to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti as well—that, although there is no longer a basis for a reference by a UK court to the Court of Justice, the UK courts may of course have regard to the decisions of the Court of Justice going forward. Quite sensibly, they would have regard to decisions that bore upon the interpretation of the convention, or of Rome I and II as well. That would be of relevance to the incorporation in domestic law of provisions which had their genesis in those European Union provisions.
The immediate matter of insurance is quite narrow and concerns one of the limited derogations from the freedom to choose your own law, as it were. There is a limitation about choice of law where an insurance contract contains provision to cover risks located in the European Union. Essentially, there cannot be an insurance contract that covers risks in an EU member state where the law of Russia is chosen as the relevant law for resolving the contract. The difficulty faced in drafting these regulations was that the reference under the derogation was to a risk in an EU member state. We were going to be concerned not only with a risk in an EU member state but with a risk in the United Kingdom. This is why we have had to move from reference to “member state” to “relevant state”, which is, in turn, defined by reference to member states and the United Kingdom. It is a fairly narrow move, which I do not believe is, of itself, going to impact on the choice or application of law with regard to the type of contract to any material extent. I do not see how it would impact on the transfer of assets such as was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. This is not what this regulation is addressing.
I acknowledge that, if we leave the European Union without a deal—which is not this Government’s preferred option—there will be issues for banks, insurance companies and others with regard to their future arrangements in the European Union. No one would take away from that. That said, this is essentially implementing an existing scheme with just those changes necessary to make sure it operates in domestic law. I do not believe this is going to take away from the attractiveness of English law—or, indeed, Scots law—as a system for the resolution of commercial disputes. English law in particular remains the lingua franca for charter parties, major commercial contracts and so on. Because of the flexibility of common law, it will continue to be used for this reason. I do not see that this is going to result in any major change. No doubt there are options when it comes to choosing a common law system—such as the law of Hong Kong, Singapore or New York, for example. That already exists and we deal with it.
Noting all the observations that have been made, I beg to move.
Motion agreed.