Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Thomas of Gresford
Main Page: Lord Thomas of Gresford (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Thomas of Gresford's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I have two very short points on this. First, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley. I do not think paragraph (a) in the amendment works: the registered address does not have to be the place of business, it often is not and there are often perfectly good reasons for that; but paragraph (b) is incredibly important, concerning this use of people’s addresses for, effectively, fraudulent purposes. Often, the first thing the person whose address it is knows about it is a letter from HMRC with a massive VAT demand: this is particularly used for VAT fraud. It is really important that Companies House works closely—a point discussed on a previous group—with other agencies, particularly HMRC, to make sure that this sort of thing is knocked on the head.
My Lords, the Companies Act says at Section 9(5) that an application
“must contain a statement of the intended address of the company’s registered office”.
That is all on registration. That opens up the sort of abuses that we have heard from the noble Baroness and the two noble Lords who have already spoken. I tend to agree with the two noble Lords, having been a solicitor myself, that it is perfectly responsible for a solicitor’s or accountant’s office to be used as a registered office, but nevertheless, the way in which the Government have attacked it does not cover the whole ground. It is very sensible, in addition to the way the Government have put it, to define an appropriate office in the negative sense. That would not include the solicitor’s or accountant’s office, for the reasons given.
My Lords, I have very little to add to what my noble friend said. This is clearly a bit of a curate’s egg and Amendment 23 is a good start, but there are objections to it, which were very well set out by the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Vaux. As my noble friend said, it is quite usual to use professional offices as a registered office. I hope the Minister will acknowledge that new subsection (2) in Clause 29(3) is not as good as it should be and that he will take on board some of the points made about Amendment 23. Then, we would be in a much better place.
My Lords, I do not really understand this provision. The purpose is to create a basic offence of strict liability—that is what the Minister and the Explanatory Notes say—but the wording that inserts the basic false statement offence says:
“A person commits an offence if, in purported compliance with a notice … or in purported compliance with a duty imposed… and without reasonable excuse, the person makes a statement that is misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.”
It is the words “without reasonable excuse” that bother me. I do not see how a strict liability offence can have an excuse. Last week it was well-publicised that someone in the other place said, “Yes, I misled, but I had a reasonable excuse because no one told me. Indeed, I was advised that there was nothing wrong.”
What is meant by a reasonable excuse? How can it be, as put forward, a strict liability offence in circumstances like that? This of course goes to officers who are in default, which is another contradiction within that proposed new paragraph. I ask the Minister to take this proposed new clause back to those advising him and ask whether it is correctly drafted. I do not think it is.
Further to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said, the use of the phrase “false statements” rather than “inaccurate statements” is quite significant. A false statement carries with it the connotation of a deliberate inaccuracy, whereas simply getting something wrong is rather different. I agree with him that without reasonable excuse the prosecution would have to prove the absence of a reasonable excuse, which is contrary to the concept of a strict liability offence.
My Lords, to add to the point that has been made, if the burden of proof is going to be changed so the defendant has to prove his innocence, it is essential that the clause be carefully drafted to make that clear. Otherwise a judge who is trying to direct a jury really does not know how to do it.
I am struggling, as are others, with the wording in subsection (2) about
“every officer of the entity who is in default”
because I do not know what “default” means. In most of these circumstances, this may be something that is filled in by the company secretary and they do not necessarily get the approval of everybody who might end up being in default. I would like to know more about that.
In his introduction, the Minister said this was bringing the Bill into line with what was in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. I am afraid I have been rather busy on other Bills so maybe I have not read everything that I should have about this one. I did the last economic crime Bill but I am not sure what is being referenced there, will the Minister elaborate on what this is being brought into line with because I am a bit confused? If what is said here is exactly the same as what has been said in that Act then we also have a mistake there that we need to correct if its wording is as ambiguous as this.