Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Howarth of Newport

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on the rulemaking powers. I first draw attention to my interests in the register, in particular that I am chairman of the Financial Markets Law Committee, which is interested in clarifying and making certain the law.

It seems that there is a clear dilemma. The Bill is needed very urgently. It is sensible to make the changes to insolvency law that have been consulted on for some time and to provide for a new form of reconstruction, but these are needed now and they cannot sensibly be left to a later time. However, the Bill is of such complexity and, in some areas, of such novelty that more time is needed to sort out the many technical points that continue to arise, despite all that is being done by the Minister, his department and the insolvency services.

Points are being identified all the time. I will give just one example that possibly illustrates the interrelationship between new points and the scope of the delegated powers. It is unclear whether financial service creditors with super-priority have a claim on assets charged to secure debts without super-priority. The Minister might say that these can be dealt with under new Section 174A(3) to the Insolvency Act on page 108 of the Bill, but it is not clear that that power is wide enough. I take that illustration because it shows two points: first, that areas of uncertainty remain, and, secondly, that it is not clear that the delegated powers are drafted in wide enough terms.

Normally, I would absolutely deprecate extensive Henry VIII powers, but I really feel that these are needed in the circumstances of the Bill. It is absolutely essential that uncertain points can be clarified, I hope while the Bill goes through its remaining stages over the next week, but if not by swift rulemaking changes or regulatory changes to it. Points will go on being spotted—some have already been spotted and not rectified—but certainty is essential if we are to weather the problems that will undoubtedly arise over the coming months. We obviously need safeguards. I do not wish to add to the length of what I wish to say by going through the various solutions put forward by the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee, so ably explained by my noble friends Lady Taylor and Lord Blencathra.

However, I will emphasise that we cannot escape the need for delegated powers, we cannot escape the need for speed and we should make sure, because it is the reality, that we can iron out points of uncertainty as quickly as possible.

We might say that the courts can do this. I have no doubt that they can, but there are two things that one should say. First, there are issues of policy here which ought to be decided either in this House or by the Executive, and, secondly, there are bound to be mistakes which it is not possible for the courts to rectify.

The courts will of course have extra work, as people have acknowledged, and they may require additional resources. Amendment 62 suggests that there be a report on how the courts are managing and whether training is under way. My understanding is that a significant amount of training has taken place, but the adequacy and the scope of it is under the Constitutional Reform Act a matter for the judiciary and not for the Executive or for this House.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, as a fellow member of the Constitution Committee, I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I also endorse warmly the powerful points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover.

Amendment 66 would enable Parliament to “keep … under review”—a phrase we hear endlessly—the manner in which the Secretary of State keeps under review the use of the very broad Henry VIII powers to change the law on corporate insolvency by regulations which Clause 18 empowers him to make. As many noble Lords have said, if we are to have Henry VIII powers, which are in principle constitutionally offensive, a special and convincing case must always be made for their creation by the Government. If they are to be legislated for, they should be as narrow as possible to meet their specific purpose and they should not last a minute longer than—as far as this legislation is concerned —the emergency requires.

As has been noted, the powers in Clause 18 expire on 30 April 2021, but regulations already made under that power can be extended. Moreover, the Henry VIII power itself can be extended by regulations under Clause 22 for another year, and again and again thereafter. That being so, these clauses give the Government a blank cheque. So Amendment 70, which sets a final expiry date, is the very least that is required.

I am very attracted to the robust and no-nonsense approach of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe: simply abolish the clause. Clause 39, to which she spoke, is a wicked piece of legislation in constitutional terms. It creates a power for the Secretary of State to change the duration of temporary provisions and to keep on doing so, ad infinitum. It is the most self-indulgent of Henry VIII powers. It is constitutionally offensive, and it really should not stand part of the Bill.

I accept, as do members of the Constitution Committee and, I think, all other noble Lords, that there is an emergency which needs urgent legislative action and that, as long as the emergency persists, we will need provisions in place to protect as far as we can businesses that are vulnerable to the coronavirus crisis and of course the jobs of those employed by them or dependent on them indirectly. However, as has been noted also by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in an emergency—and this applies especially in a prolonged emergency—the more important it becomes for Parliament also to be vigilant and to protect the principles of the constitution.

The Bill, which the Government are fast-tracking, is huge. It has 47 clauses, 14 schedules and 234 pages. Like Henry VIII clauses, fast-tracked legislation should be rare. It should be specifically and convincingly justified and its scope should not extend beyond the minimum necessary to achieve its purposes, although the scale of this legislation makes even more questionable the appropriateness of the fast-track process.

The Government are tracking the Bill so fast that the House of Commons barely saw it. Its Second Reading and remaining stages all took place on the same day; the remaining stages were transacted in half an hour. The Bill was gone in a blink and the House of Commons did not perform its proper responsibility, I regret to say, of scrutinising it. If the House of Lords steps in where the House of Commons fears or has failed to tread, and if we seek to advise and to do so by way of passing amendments, Ministers and even Back-Bench Members of Parliament are wont to express some resentment. But we have a responsibility to scrutinise and improve important legislation. What else is Parliament for? Noble Lords have made a large number of important observations and criticisms of flaws in the Bill today, particularly in the very long debate on the first group. What we need to do, I suggest, is to separate policy for the emergency from policy for the long term.

This brings me to my second objection, beyond the inappropriate fast-tracking of some of this legislation. As many noble Lords have noted, the Government should not smuggle in permanent changes to policy and law via fast-track emergency legislation. There are three sets of permanent changes, as I understand it, in the Bill. There is a procedure for a new moratorium on enforcement action against companies in financial distress, even though this procedure may be detrimental to creditors and investors, and therefore be potentially as damaging as allowing the debtor companies to go to the wall. The Bill also provides for permanent new arrangements for restructuring companies that are in financial distress, and for restrictions on contractual supplier termination clauses.

In winding up on the first debate the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, argued that the Government had previously consulted on the permanent measures. Indeed they did, but that is no excuse for seeking to bypass full parliamentary scrutiny of important changes to the law on insolvency. We are not making a fuss about the dignity of Parliament. We are complaining about the Government outflanking a process which actually enables them to get difficult changes right and give democratic legitimacy to changes in the law. In another context, the Minister was very keen to restore full law-making rights to this Parliament. I wonder how he justifies what I would regard as this two-fold abuse of Parliament: fast-tracking such a vast law and using emergency legislation to enact permanent changes.

If the Covid-19 effects should, unfortunately, persist in a very damaging form, Parliament should return in new primary legislation to the question of what emergency powers the Government should continue to be able to exercise. I was attracted by the proposal made earlier by my noble friend Lord Liddle: that there should be post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, put it to us that delegated powers are essential in the emergency. Yes, they may be, but there should be proper sunset clauses attached to all the powers that the Bill creates, and especially the ones that are intended to be permanent, which should never have been in a Bill creating powers for an emergency. At the least, as the DPRRC has recommended, these powers should be amended to limit their use to a period only so long as the Secretary of State judges that the effects of Covid-19 require them.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Howarth of Newport

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, earlier in our deliberations we debated some relatively small-scale Henry VIII powers that the Government were seeking to arrogate to themselves. We listened to entirely unsatisfactory explanations from the Front Bench attempting to justify them. But here we have a really egregious set of Henry VIII powers—the most whopping great Henry VIII powers.

If you look at Clauses 21 and 41 together, you see that the Government are proposing to take to themselves a power not only to amend primary legislation but even to abolish any statute that may have been enacted in centuries past to right up until the end of this year. I do not for a moment think that is what the Government specifically intend to do but it is offensive in principle that they should draft legislation of this character.

Let us bear in mind that the purpose of Brexit is to restore parliamentary government. It is not a decent thing for the Government to do to take this opportunity to make a large power grab on the part of the Executive. The Government should be respectful of Parliament. They should be prepared to work with Parliament. If they have significant changes of policy and legislation that they wish to propose, I do not doubt that Parliament will engage very constructively with the Government in their purposes.

Henry VIII powers are objectionable in principle and it is essential that the Minister gives us a full explanation and, if he can devise one, a justification for the taking of these extraordinary powers, which are constitutionally improper. It will not do if he seeks to argue that circumstances in Northern Ireland are peculiarly sensitive and complex. They always are, but there are certain abiding constitutional principles that the Government should respect, and that should be the spirit of this new Government’s approach in their dealings with Parliament.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I will make one or two observations, if I may. I accept that it is plainly the obligation of the United Kingdom Government to take steps to implement their international obligations—the justification given by the Minister in his summing up yesterday evening. It is also right that there may be circumstances in which changes to the devolution legislation are needed. But there are ways of doing this, which have been admirably explained.

This Henry VIII clause is extraordinary because it enables the Government not merely to amend the Act but to repeal it. I cannot conceive that anyone who was drafting this with a degree of sense would ever have thought the Government would repeal the Act. When you look at the wording—it is quite useful to look at wording—this has been drafted without any regard to the realities of a union Government. This clause is manifestly deficient in that it goes way beyond anything that could conceivably be needed, even if you ignore the argument about the precedent being set.

The Government should think again. There are proper ways of doing things. I respectfully ask them to see whether they can come back with something different, or, at the very least, explain fully what they intend to do—what consultation they intend to carry out—before they repeal the Act. It is difficult to see how you would ever think that the Act needed to be repealed. One must always recall that the union of England and Wales was brought about by Henry VIII. It would be an extraordinary irony if a Henry VIII clause was used to begin the undermining of that union.