Arbitration Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely endorse what my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann has said, but I would like to say a word about the procedure that the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, has invited the Minister to adopt. Surely the stage of conferring with people as to what they think about this amendment has passed. This matter could have been raised in the Committee of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas —it was not, of course—but now it is a matter for this Committee to decide whether or not to accept the amendment. It is as simple as that. With great respect, I think it is a matter for the Committee and not for anybody else now. I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann that this amendment should not be accepted.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with both the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Hoffmann, that this amendment ought not to be accepted. However, it seems to me, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, said, that everyone agrees with the sentiment behind what the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, has proposed.

I had thought that we had agreed how to deal with this matter when the then Minister dealt with it at a hearing of the Special Public Bill Committee. I raised this point by way of an amendment to the old Arbitration Act. The Minister agreed, in response to that, that he would write to the arbitral institutions and we would see what the best practice was. I had assumed that all that would be made public, and I am entirely at a loss to understand why the letters that were written and the responses have not been made public. It would be extremely helpful to have all this information put into the public domain to show, for the benefit of London, what was being done to address this point. As I understand it, these were documents written by the Minister in his capacity of trying to deal with a problem that had arisen and was discussed in this House. It would be very helpful to have a discussion and look into the matter in detail. If something needs to be done—more than is being done—we can return to it. Certainly, we ought not to delay the Bill by this amendment.

Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments (2019 Hague Convention etc.) Regulations 2024

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Friday 24th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome this instrument. It is a singular achievement that we have done this. To an extent, it will remedy the EU’s refusal to allow us to accede to the Lugano Convention. As the Minister said, it is extremely important in making sure that litigants who come to this country know that their judgements will now be much more easily enforceable. I add that the Arbitration Bill which was before this House would have achieved exactly the same objectives. It is extremely important to the international position of London as an arbitration and litigation centre that we keep our law up to date.

I thank all noble Lords—the Minister, in particular, as well as the Whips and the Government Chief Whip, the Leader of His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition and their Chief Whip, and others on their Front-Bench team—and others in the other place for all they did to try to get the Law Commission Bill into the wash-up. A lot of loud noise was made, but it did not succeed.

I want to look forward and say that it is critical that overseas litigants who might choose London to have their disputes arbitrated, whether in contracts now or for the future, realise that this is, I hope, but a temporary hiccup and that we will find the means, with the co-operation of the Government and the Opposition, whichever roles they may be playing, and with the welcome support of those on the Liberal Benches, to go forward without having to go through it all over again. The Bill was agreed. There is one small amendment to be made to clarify something, but I hope we can get it on to the statute book as early as possible. It is a Bill that would help this country make money, and that, I am sure everybody agrees, is an imperative.

I thank the Minister enormously for what he has done while he has been in his position. As a Minister in the Ministry of Justice, he has laboured mightily on many matters, but I thank him in particular for what he has done to ensure that London stays at the forefront in the highly competitive world of dispute resolution in court and in arbitration.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I too very much welcome this measure for various reasons, which are set out very well in the Explanatory Memorandum. Some of the features which are set out in it are the care that has been taken to consult at various stages, the response to the consultation, and working together across the various jurisdictions within the United Kingdom to achieve harmony in the way we respond to the challenge that this convention has presented us with. The result is a happy one, and I am very happy to offer my support for this measure.

I join with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in his remarks about the Arbitration Bill. For the reasons he has given, it is extremely important that this Bill be brought back at the earliest possible opportunity and with the least possible complication. I know that there are procedures that always have to be gone through for Law Commission Bills, but it was very thoroughly debated at all its stages. It was really ready to go and it is a great disappointment that it has been lost because of the calling of the election. I hope that all those involved can move quickly to bring the Bill back, so that we can get the benefits the noble and learned Lord has identified.

Lastly, I join with him in expressing great appreciation for all that the noble and learned Lord the Minister has done in his position on behalf of the Ministry of Justice. It has been a pleasure to work with him and we wish him well for the future.

Subsidy Control Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Tuesday 22nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 55. I first thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Fox, for their support. The amendment has two purposes, one of which has been outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, dealing with the position of the CMA. The second is to deal with the position of the devolved Governments and legislatures.

I ought to deal first with the position of the CMA. Although I co-signed amendments with the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, before Committee, the amendments he put down did not include two of them; I am not sure why. I have restored them all, because it seems to me that, on analysis, if the Bill is to be regarded as a serious attempt to uphold the rule of law and not as a piece of window dressing to satisfy our international obligations, we need to look more carefully at the position.

There are three methods of enforcement. The first is to have transparency and force disclosure. We know of the force that has; the effect of sunshine as a disinfectant is well recorded in history.

Secondly, there is the need for the CMA to investigate. It seems to me that without the CMA having powers of investigation, you do not have a properly independent system of enforcement compliant with the rule of law. It cannot be right to leave enforcement to those giving subsidies. You must have someone independent and objective in making the investigation. That is a requirement of the way in which all investigations are carried out; they have to be independent and impartial. I simply do not understand why the CMA cannot be allowed to conduct investigations that it thinks should be carried out, not merely those that the Secretary of State wants carried out or that are referred to it. Of course it will carry out the investigations referred to it by the Secretary of State independently, but it does not have the necessary power to do it where it thinks it is in the interests of enforcement.

For a similar reason it seems clear that, as was proposed in the amendments in Committee, the CMA ought to have powers of enforcement before a CAT—this is where it differs slightly from the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont. Again, independent powers of enforcement are essential. The Secretary of State will have some powers, as will those who say they are injured as a result of what has happened. But that is essentially, to take an analogy with the ordinary enforcement system, a system of effectively private prosecution. My experience of private prosecutions has always been that, unless they are funded for extraneous and charitable purposes, such as is done by the RSPCA, or there is money in it by obtaining a conviction for those who are businessmen interested in getting a private prosecution, it is unlikely that there will be private enforcement. There is no doubt that this kind of enforcement action is extremely expensive. Therefore there is a real risk that there will not be much effective enforcement and that such effective enforcement as there is will be directed only at what I would call big money cases. Having a justice system that deals only with big money cases is recognised to be no just system at all.

The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, put it very pithily by creating Juvenal: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” It seems to me that that summarises it in four words. There must be someone independent, both to investigate and to bring a matter before the courts if necessary, who can ensure that the Secretary of State and others uphold the rule of law. That is all I wanted to say about the position of the CMA.

On the second purpose of the management, I can deal with that briefly. It is an important question even at this hour of night, because it raises the issue of equality between our nations. I spoke at length about this when proposing the amendments in respect of seeking the consent of the devolved authorities and giving them certain powers, but this is an egregious example of inequality. Whereas the Secretary of State qua Minister responsible for England and the giving of subsidies in England can refer matters dealt with by, say, the Welsh, Scottish or Northern Ireland Governments to the CAT, there is no equality the other way round. That seems a fundamental flaw in this part of the Bill. It could be remedied by an undertaking by the Secretary of State that, if he was asked by the devolved Governments to make a reference, he would do so, and I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give such an undertaking.

What is important about these issues of equality is that they matter in two respects: first, that there is equality, but also that there is seen to be equality, and the equality between the nations is fundamental to the union. Secondly, there is the purpose of the amendment relating to the devolved authorities—this differs from the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lamont. It seeks to make clear that the devolved Governments will always be interested parties for the purposes of appearance before the CAT. Again, this could be clarified. It would be far better if this was done in legislation, but at least it could be taken some way by the Minister making this clear.

I am sorry to have spoken at such length at this hour of night but these are important points of principle. They go to the rule of law and the position of the CMA, but also go to the equality between our nations and the survival of our union.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment. We should pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his insight on the importance of enforcement to make the system work. His two points do not need repetition but the first, about the role of the CMA, begs a question. Why should the CMA not have the powers that are being referred to in this amendment? As far as the equality issues are concerned, the question is: why not? One point in the amendment that particularly appeals to me is the reference to interested parties. All the bodies mentioned there—the CMA and the three devolved Governments—are interested parties. It may be that, as the jurisprudence of the system works its way through the process, this will be established; but it is far better to have it made clear at the beginning, so that its position is plainly established, and the enforcement process can be put through in a proper manner. Paying tribute as I do to the noble and learned Lord, I entirely support his amendment.

Subsidy Control Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd February 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I shall add two very short points. First, it seems to me absolutely fundamental to a democratic society that the laws made by a legislature permit everything to be done openly and stop anyone prohibiting publication at any time. As the committee said, there is enough discretion in the earlier subsection. Secondly, accessible and open legislation is essential to the rule of law. It seems to me that this clause is an attack on both democracy and the rule of law and has no place in this Bill.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, when the Minister comes to reply, would he explain the purpose of Clause 47(6), which requires that the direction must be published? We need to understand the purpose of that subsection before we look at Clause 47(7) which is the subject of this discussion. As I understand it, it is there in the interests of transparency and clarity. If that is the purpose, it is even more surprising that there is a power to disapply.

After all, the purpose of the direction is to inform somebody. Who is it who is to be informed? It is not subject to parliamentary procedure, but it is there for a purpose. We need to know from the Minister expressly what that purpose is, so that we understand the significance of Clause 47(7).

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I rise briefly to support both amendments. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, looks at this from the position of the victim. It is, of course, right to acknowledge the huge progress that has been made over the last 20 or so years in improving the position of the victim—but we have not got to the end of the road. The important point of his amendment is that it gives further protection to the victim at two important stages: first, where things have gone wrong and there is an inquiry, and secondly and much more importantly, in the victim exercising the right of review where there has been a failure to prosecute. It seems to me, therefore, that the duty of candour is yet another step in putting the victim—as is so often said by politicians on both sides—at the heart of the criminal justice system.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, looks at this from a broader perspective, which encompasses the position of the defendant and the greater public interest. We should think of experiences over the years. One can go back, for example, to a problem that arose in Tiger Bay in Cardiff over 30 years ago, where the inquiry into the Lynette White murder investigation went on and on. One cannot help feeling that, if there had been a duty of candour, it would have brought that very damaging case to an end.

I say nothing about the undercover policing inquiry as it is still ongoing, but it seems that there is ample evidence that we need to enshrine this duty of candour to protect the position of the defendant and the wider public interest by making it absolutely clear that the police owe that duty—and they should be grateful to have that duty imposed on them, because we need to restore, above all, confidence in our constabularies.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments as well. I look at the situation from an unusual perspective and with the unusual experience of sitting as the senior judge in Scotland in a criminal appeal. It was a case of murder, and I was not able—because I was sitting in a court where all the evidence was already out—to develop what was at the back of my mind, which was that the police had identified the wrong individual, who was then accused and convicted. I will not go into the facts of the case for obvious reasons, but it struck me that the court at that late stage was powerless to deal with what I thought had not been a frank and fair police investigation. I make that point simply because stages are reached where the situation is beyond recall, but I was deeply disturbed by what had happened in that case and could not do anything about it. So I welcome the steps that are being taken to improve the standard of candour among the police at all stages in the investigation of crime and its aftermath.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead [V]]

My Lords, it is all too easy to think that a sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, which is what paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 6 by implication permits, is a relatively light matter. It certainly is not. Any conviction for a criminal offence, whatever the sentence that results from it, can have the most serious consequences for the individual; for example, opportunities for travel, employment and obtaining insurance can all be affected. The issue, therefore, is one of principle. It should not be for Ministers to create criminal offences by statutory instrument.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd [V]]

I will be very brief, as this amendment really has no purpose in the light of the result of the Division.

I too agree that, as a matter of principle, it was wrong to seek to include this power in the Bill. Furthermore, it must be recalled that, in relation to most aspects of private international law and the reciprocal enforcement of orders of other courts, the courts have significant powers by way of committal for contempt or injunctions. It cannot be justified to create and impose criminal offences with sentences of imprisonment in the circumstances of this particular Bill.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage & Report stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

May I add one observation? I warmly support the idea of a Parole Board review. It is plainly not contrary to Article 7, and, if one looks at whether it is justified as against the presumption against retrospective or retroactive legislation, there are reasons which justify taking that view, as has been explained in the debate. Ultimately, it may be for others to opine on that.

However, the one thing that troubles me is the retrospective nature of this. I accept—it is obviously sensible—that a mistake was no doubt made many years ago, before the full import of terrorist offences was understood, which assumed that you could safely release anyone at the halfway point. I have dealt with many appeals on terrorist cases and I can only confirm what has been said, which is how difficult it is to make the assessment. Therefore, it is plainly right that there be an assessment—but, if that is the position and we say, “Okay; the person is to stay in prison up to the maximum of the term imposed by the judge, until he is deemed to be safe”, the detention is lawful and there is justification for that retrospectivity. What I fail to understand—I am sure that it is my fault—is why we should apply this to a person who was properly sentenced, is not dangerous and should not be serving more than the minimum term. I cannot accept the argument that we are trying to make the sentencing system logical, which is confusing. Anyone with any experience of it knows that it is in sad need of reform, and the Law Commission Bill will help great a deal in that respect.

In addition, evidence shows that keeping someone in prison, particularly if it is for an Islamic terrorist offence as opposed to another kind of terrorism offence, might make them more dangerous. It therefore seems that the only reason that can be advanced is that it is not practicable for the Parole Board to deal with the matter immediately. However, if this legislation makes it lawful to maintain someone until the Parole Board decides that they are safe, what is the risk in saying, “That is the law; we don’t need to impose a two-thirds term”? I do not follow that. It seems that it is grossly unfair and very difficult to justify for someone who, in fact, is no danger. I cannot see the risk for the Government, but maybe I have not understood this properly, because detention in custody would be perfectly lawful, and it would be very difficult to mount a case saying that the prison authorities were negligent or in breach of duty in not getting on with the matter, when it is Parliament itself that has decided to make the change. On that basis, the Bill is plainly necessary, but I do not understand this one minor aspect of it, and I look forward to the Minister’s clarification.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I have some difficulty in understanding what exactly the amendment is trying to achieve. I have the greatest respect for all four noble Lords who have tabled the amendment, but to take the point on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, I do not think that the amendment meets the terms of the article. It seeks to address the position when the sentence was imposed, whereas Article 7 refers to the situation at the time when the act that gave rise to the criminal offence was committed. It is worded in such a way that the individual should have been aware at the time of his conduct what sentence he was likely to receive. The amendment does not address that, as it is not addressed to that point in time. On Article 7, it misses the point, and does not achieve anything.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said that the convention was a sideshow. That brings me to the other point, which I think I do understand, on the value of retaining the Parole Board at halfway through the sentence, partly for the reason that changing the system for those who have already been sentenced seems instinctively rather unfair to them. It also has a value in getting the Parole Board in as early as possible, because the longer it has to assess the element of risk, the greater the possibility that it can achieve something useful at the end. To shorten it, which seems to be the effect of the Government’s amendment, reduces the opportunity for the board to get into the depths of the mind of the individual and to see what it can do about the risk. If that is the purpose of the amendment, why not have the same rule for everybody? It is accepting the Government’s amendment for the newcomers—those who have not yet been sentenced. It would be more logical to apply the same rule throughout.

That goes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, when he asked what the change from a half to two-thirds would achieve, given that the Parole Board will be involved anyway. If it comes in halfway through, there is no question of the prisoner being released until it is safe for them to be released, which could well be right up until the end of the sentence imposed by the judge. Logically, it would be sensible to have the same rule for everybody, rather than split it up. The other point, which is worth emphasising, and perhaps an answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is that a great deal has been said about automatic release, but it is not unconditional release. This point was made very effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, when describing the deficiencies of the Parole Board system.

When the original scheme was devised with release subject to conditions, it was understood that these conditions meant something. I remember cases in which I was involved where people were returned to custody because they had breached their conditions. It was not just a day in custody; they were in for a substantial time until it was regarded as appropriate for them to be released again. In the case of life prisoners, sometimes they went backwards and forwards because they had breached conditions, and they went back in again. This is what we have lost, I am afraid. It bears thinking about that the release halfway through is not unconditional; it is a conditional release subject to the licence terms. That has a bearing on whether this is something that attracts the Article 7 attack in any event. For the reasons I have indicated, I am slightly puzzled by the amendment, and I am not sure that I would support it.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make one or two observations, having raised this matter at Second Reading. I am very grateful to the Minister for his amendment, which certainly brings about clarity and certainty. But, having discussed the matter with others, I want to make sure that the certainty and consequences are clearly understood.

The draftsmanship is elegant, because although under subsection (2) a court may have regard to decisions made by the European Court of Justice after exit so far as they are relevant to any matter before the court, making that provision subject to subsections (3) to (6) means that a court could do so only to clarify the meaning or effect of retained EU law as at the date of exit. It therefore has the effect of confirming what I describe as the ossification of retained EU law as at the date of exit. Only the Supreme Court is permitted to depart from any retained EU case law under the test set out in subsection (5).

Although certainty is therefore brought about, it is at the price of ossification, other than by appeal to the Supreme Court. Ossification is a principle alien to the common law, which, while it has always sought certainty, has also always allowed a significant degree of flexibility to enable the law to develop and adapt to changing times. The principles of common law development are thus denied in the application of retained EU law to any court other than the Supreme Court.

A further feature of the clause is that the Supreme Court is given no guidance as to how it may exercise its right to depart from decisions of the European Court of Justice, save by reference to the 1966 practice statement and the subsequent case law. I think it right therefore to remind the House that it is giving the Supreme Court a very considerable degree of untrammelled power, subject, of course, to the right to reverse any such decision. I am very grateful to the Minister for the assurance he has given that if, in the exercise of that power, decisions are made they will be fully defended, but it is a considerable power.

I will make two further observations. First, a consequence of confining the power to depart from European Court decisions to the Supreme Court may well mean a significant increase in the case load of the Supreme Court. As we know, it has much else to do. I therefore ask the Minister if he would reconsider amending subsection (5) to permit the Courts of Appeal of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland, and the Inner House in Scotland, to be given a similar power. Not only would that alleviate the burden on the Supreme Court, but the experience of many sitting in the Supreme Court has shown that it is generally greatly assisted if it has a prior judgment of the Court of Appeal or Inner House on the question before it.

The final observation I will make echoes what the Minister said. As was often said in Committee, the Bill seeks to provide for a functioning statute book on exit in the event that there is no agreement with the EU. It has also been said there will have to be significant amendment by at least one further Bill in the event of agreement. If, for example, it is agreed that certain fields of our law or regulation must remain aligned for the purposes of non-tariff barriers, it will be necessary to ensure that the courts can take this into account in interpreting retained EU law and therefore have regard to subsequent European Court decisions to ensure that the law or regulations remain completely aligned. It is therefore, I regret to say, a matter that, in the event of an agreement, we shall have to return to at a subsequent stage. Again, I emphasise my thanks to the Minister for the discussions he has had and the certainty and clarity he has brought about.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, we have the luxury of having three different formulations for a possible amendment to Clause 6(2) thanks to the ingenuity of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks, and the Minister. For my part, I prefer the Minister’s version, which seems to be, in a subtle way, a little more generous than the formulation of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which is:

“A court … may have regard to anything done … after exit day … where it considers it relevant to the proper interpretation of retained EU law”.


The government amendment says,

“relevant to any matter before the court or tribunal”.

I suspect that most of these issues will be issues of interpretation, but it is perhaps wiser to have the broader formulation just in case the formula in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is too tight to include something else.

As for “relevant and helpful” from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, one can regard something as relevant and unhelpful as well as helpful. Therefore, I am not sure that it really adds very much. Obviously, a court would not do anything with it if it is unhelpful. I suspect that those words are surplus to what one is really talking about.

I have two other points. So far as Amendment 23 is concerned, the additional words:

“Subject to this and subsections (3) to (6)”,


are necessary because of the change from the prohibition in the original formula—that is,

“need not have regard to”—

to the new formula, “may”. When you use “may” it is as well to have the cautionary words just to make it clear. There is another view: that the amendment is unnecessary because the court will, of course, look at the entire section in understanding what it is supposed to do, but it does no harm to put those words in. In the interests of clarification, it is helpful to have them there.

Finally, I add a word of support to the point the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, made about allowing the Court of Appeal and the Inner House, as well as the Supreme Court, to consider themselves not bound by retained EU case law. One has to bear in mind that the only way these issues will reach the Supreme Court under the formula in the Bill is by means of an appeal. It is not suggested that there would be a direct reference to the court. I am sure the court would not want that, because it would wish to have the issues properly focused by proceedings in the lower court.

I may be corrected if I am wrong, but I suppose that use can be made of the “leapfrog” procedure: if something comes up at first instance, it is possible to leap over the Court of Appeal direct to the Supreme Court. That may be a useful avenue in urgent cases. Usually, the Supreme Court is helped by the decision of the lower court. If the argument is focused at the lower court, it may not agree with it but it will at least have flushed out points that need not trouble the Supreme Court when dealing with the issue at the later stage. There is therefore something to be said for allowing the appeal courts to take up the same position as the Supreme Court in this field.

I simply endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said as something that the Government might like to consider. I do not know whether they are considering discussing the matter with the President of the Supreme Court to get her view, but there might be something to be said for that as well.