Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd
Main Page: Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd's debates with the Leader of the House
(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I raise an issue with regard to the time limit. It is not from the wording of the amendment, which I support, but the wording in the victims’ code. At the moment it says that, first:
“The Attorney General must consider the matter as soon as possible”.
What does that mean? Secondly, it says that they must do so
“no later than the 28th calendar day after the sentence was imposed … in business hours and”—
I emphasise this—
“with sufficient time for consideration”.
How can the victim know how long the Attorney-General needs before the 28 days runs out? It is a hard cut-off, but with something rather woolly leading up to it. The victims’ code could do with a little revision to make it quite clear, in addition to the points that my noble friend has made and the very tough example that she gave, just how this would operate. I would not know, to meet that condition, how long before the end of the 28 days I should get a note through the Attorney-General’s door.
My Lords, I support the principle put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that there should be proper information provided to victims. This should be proper in the widest sense, so that they fully understand; we do not want disappointment and secondary victimisation. The whole question of time limits and extending them is not a suitable matter for debate at this hour of the night. What is important is the principle.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Sandhurst for Amendment 113, in relation to the unduly lenient sentence scheme. It seeks to ensure victims and their families are given the necessary information about the scheme and, where this does not happen, provide for an extension of the relevant deadline. I understand the distress that victims may feel if they believe that the sentence given to an offender is not sufficient. The unduly lenient sentence scheme provides a way to ensure that victims, their families and members of the public can request for sentences for certain serious crimes to be challenged, by asking the Attorney-General to consider making an application to the Court of Appeal for a sentence to be reviewed.
Amendment 114 seeks to allow extension of the time limits for applications under the scheme, which must currently be made within 28 days of sentencing. However, the scheme has a fixed time limit to reflect the importance of finality in sentencing for both the victim and the offender. Although we will keep this this limit under consideration, there are no current plans to remove the certainty of this absolute time limit. The 28-day time limit reflects similar constraints on defendants appealing against conviction or sentence; it is important for both victims and offenders that we avoid ongoing uncertainty about the sentence to be served.
Amendment 113 puts forward a duty to inform victims and families of the scheme. It might reassure my noble friend to know that the current victims’ code is already clear that victims should be informed about the scheme by the police’s witness care units at the same time as they are told about the sentence; this is expected to be done within six days of sentencing. It may also help if I explain that “witness care unit” is the generic name for a police-led function that provides information and support to victims, as well as witnesses, in cases progressing through the criminal justice system. Under the victims’ code, the witness care unit is responsible for providing services to victims who are not witnesses in the trial, as well as those who are.
For example, under right 9 in the code, all victims are entitled to be told at the end of the case the outcome, including a brief summary of reasons for the decision where available. This also includes telling victims about the ULS scheme when they are told the sentence in the case, which is in paragraph 9.6 of the code. It is heartening to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that the scheme is well used, despite examples of where it has not worked being given by others in this short debate.
In answer to the noble Lady Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Thornton, as part of the CPS’s bereaved family scheme, the CPS and the trial advocate will meet the family at the court following the sentence to explain it and answer any questions. The scheme will be highlighted in appropriate cases as part of this.
My noble friend Lord Sandhurst raised an unfortunate case in which consideration under the slip rule means that 28 days had elapsed. In general, the law officers and the Attorney-General’s Office endeavour to review any sentence referred to them, the only exception being those where there is insufficient time to do so; for example, if it is received late in the day, the statutory time limit runs out. In those cases where the slip rule applies, CPS guidance instructs prosecutors to apply for the sentence to be corrected under the slip rule quickly and within the 28-day period for the ULS scheme. This means that, if the application is unsuccessful, the Attorney-General is not time-barred from being able to make an application under the ULS scheme within the 28-day period.
Where there seems to be broad consensus in this debate is on the need to do better on informing victims and their families about their rights under the scheme. This has been brought up by the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton, Lady Hamwee and Lady Newlove. I am open to discussing further with noble Lords how best to ensure that victims are better informed of the scheme and its deadline, but I respectfully ask that my noble friend withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, would it be possible for the Minister to find out whether the police keep records of the notification of the witness unit and, if the records are kept, what the statistics reveal? This is really an argument about whether we have the right mechanism, rather than the principle. Obviously, the Minister cannot do that this evening, but if the Ministry of Justice or the Home Office could find out, that would alleviate the problem.
The noble and learned Lord makes a very sensible request, and I will do my best to write to him.
My Lords, Amendments 119A to 119C in my name have been drafted to allow the independent public advocate to act for the victims of incidents, or series of events, that might have occurred before the passage of the Bill. As currently drafted, the Bill does not permit this.
Underpinning my original conception of the independent public advocate in my two Private Members’ Bills that were the genesis of this part of the Bill was the belief in the need for greater support and agency for those who had been failed by the state—which is meant to serve them—in what the Bill describes as “major incidents”. This is particularly the case when the full extent of such an incident may be revealed only over a period of time. In these circumstances, it is perverse to exclude from such support, which is outlined in the Bill the sub-postmasters whose lives were wrecked by the Horizon scandal, for example, or those whose lives were devastated by contaminated blood transfusions in the 1970s and 1980s, or by nuclear tests in the 1950s and 1960s. These are all catastrophic events that have, in some cases, become apparent only over quite a long period of time.
The victims need the support of the independent public advocate as they continue to search for justice and to right the wrongs that were done to them. These amendments will rectify this problem with the Bill’s current drafting. I beg to move.
I have a very short amendment—wholly unrelated to what has just been put forward—and I thank those in the Whips’ Office for suggesting that it remain in this group, and not, as I had proposed, move to a later group, which would be reached much later this evening. It does not really matter which group it is in, because it does not really affect anything else. It is a simple, short point in relation to the co-operation between Governments within the union and, therefore, has to do with devolution.
Clause 33 sets out the functions of the advocate who is to be appointed in respect of a major incident. None of the functions in this clause is a reserved matter, so under the Government of Wales Act, the Senedd has the powers to appoint. Therefore, in any particular incident, the Senedd could make provision so that it could appoint its own advocates. I do not believe a different view is taken by the Government in London.
It may also be the case that Welsh Ministers can appoint a non-statutory inquiry following a major incident in Wales, but that is not the kind of point to go into at this hour. The only power that the Senedd could not make provision for is for an advocate appointed under the Act to automatically secure interested person status in a statutory inquiry—those powers are reserved as they are part of the justice powers. Of course, a public advocate appointed by the Welsh Ministers would be free to apply for interested person status, and would probably get it—so I do not think it makes any practical difference. As I understand it, this point has caused the Senedd’s consent to the legislative consent memorandum to be qualified and reserved until this matter is resolved.
There are four short points to make. First, it seems sensible that the Welsh Government are involved as part of the scheme if there is a major incident in Wales. That would avoid any possibility of duplication. Secondly, it is important that the Welsh Government have a say in the person appointed. The advocate must have knowledge of Wales as well as the necessary ability to do everything in Welsh as well as English, since in Wales, English and Welsh have equal status.
Thirdly, significantly, it would be a further step in underpinning by statute co-operation between the Governments as part of the normal exercise of shared functions within a union. Fourthly, the Minister provided the greatest possible help in achieving something similar in relation to mission statements in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act, as provided for now in Section 2 of that Act. This seems to be yet another step that can be taken to put in place a strong statutory framework for co-operation to ensure that there is no duplication and there is good working co-operation.
My Lords, I support Amendments 119A to 119C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wills.
I suggest that the usual basis for avoiding retrospective legislation does not apply in this case. Generally speaking, we take the view that it is wrong for new legislation to have retrospective effect. That is because, if an individual behaves in accordance with the law as it is at a given time, it is regarded as wrong for the law subsequently to be changed—I believe this is a correct analysis—in such a way as to change the legal framework in which that person legitimately operated at the time when they acted as they did. However, that principle cannot be relevant in the treatment of victims of major incidents and the provision of advocacy services to such victims. It is not as if there is anything in the Bill that could affect the behaviour of victims or indeed the behaviour of others in respect of major incidents, regardless of whether or not those others may have been culpable in some way for the occurrence of the incident.
There is a safeguard in the Bill against stale incidents becoming the subject of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Wills, simply because they are past and could be a long way past, but the meaning of a “major incident” includes the definition in Clause 28(2)(c), which says that a
“‘major incident’ means an incident that … is declared in writing by the Secretary of State to be a major incident for the purposes of this Part”.
For that reason, the Secretary of State could take the view that, if an incident were so stale that it ought not to be the subject of a major incident determination, he or she simply would not make one.
The other point I wish to make is that the noble Lord’s Amendment 119C shows the importance of the possibility of making the legislation retrospective. It talks about a single event or a series of linked events over time. In the case of a series of linked events, it may be the last event that gives rise to the need to call it a major incident but all previous events need to be taken into account as well. Therefore, the amendment shows how important the Wills amendments could be—if I can put it in that way.
I will speak briefly to Amendment 120 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, which he has not addressed because no doubt he is going to wind up. I will not be winding up on behalf of these Benches as a result. His amendment concerns the possibility of declaring a major incident when only a small number of individuals are killed, injured or suffer major harm. To us, it is important that that amendment is permitted.
I take as an example—it is one that I simply thought of—the terrorist attack on Fishmongers’ Hall by Usman Khan in November 2019, when two people were killed and three more injured. In the words of the BBC a little while later, that incident
“touched the lives of so many”.
One knows that the incident must have touched the lives in a very serious way of those who intervened, those who witnessed the offences on London Bridge, and those who attended the Fishmongers’ Hall rehabilitation conference which led to such disastrous consequences. All were, in a sense, victims of the attack. All may have suffered, if not serious harm, at least some psychological harm. All may have needed some support. That need could be helped by the provision of advocacy services, advice or representation of some sort. The amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Wills and Lord Ponsonby, taken together, would secure that that would be possible, even in the case of past events.