Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Stockwood Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for bringing forward this group of amendments, which raises several important questions around the future shape of payments regulation once the Payment Systems Regulator is brought within the FCA. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes for introducing Amendments 47A and 101A with simplicity and clarity; I note the support from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

Despite the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I do not favour extending the FCA’s service user objective to include consumer redress or access to cash; indeed, I am against a levy for such purposes. In any event, payment system operators do not deal with customers. That is done by financial services firms.

I am more receptive to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on applying the secondary growth and competitiveness objective to the regulation of payment systems. Does the Minister intend to do this? If so, can it be done by the proposed regulations or does it need to go into the Bill? I should add that, as with so much in the Bill, the framework is broad while the substance is left to later regulations. That is a real concern, as it leaves a lacuna in parliamentary accountability.

We have been through the arguments on consumer credit and in-person banking, but I log them again for good order. I want also to address two central themes running through this group: first, the need for proper industry engagement and accountability in regulation-making; and, secondly, the question of whether the new regime is sufficiently clear and future-proofed.

On the first point, we welcome the amendments that seek to strengthen the consultation requirements and ensure adequate time for meaningful industry engagement, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, set out in her Amendment 48. That would have a dual effect. First, it would increase transparency and accountability for regulators. If regulators are required to consult properly, explain their reasoning, engage with those affected and publish clear strategies, we have a better chance of understanding not only what they are doing but why they are doing it. One point that is clearly of concern to other noble Lords is the extent of the discretion afforded to the Treasury in designating and de-designating payment systems.

The second effect is that this would ensure that those affected by regulation have a meaningful opportunity to have some input in our deliberations on the Bill and our discussions with industry. It has become clear that the regulatory environment seems to be planned and developed at some distance from the firms that are expected to comply. New regulations, handbooks and guidance may make sense to the people sitting in the FCA or the PRA, but they do not always make sense to those at the coalface: firms, compliance teams, payment providers and market participants. They have to interpret them to implement them and live with the operational consequences.

In this case, those with an interest go way beyond the regulators’ normal clients. For example, concerns have been expressed by retailers, which are usually quick to spot practical problems. I remember well that, when I was at Tesco, we were introducing the euro into our businesses in Ireland and elsewhere. Because of inadequate consultation, the timing was wrong, with training and IT changes needed during the busy Christmas period—a recipe for cost and chaos.

This is a real problem. If regulation is developed in a silo, away from the experience of market participants, even well-intentioned regulation can become impractical, disproportionate or poorly targeted. We end up with the regulator and the regulated working from different understandings of how the market actually functions. That is why I hope that the Minister will look constructively at the amendments that seek to strengthen consultation, transparency and meaningful engagement both with professional bodies and with market participants. Without proper planning, there will be a risk to growth—and, indeed, to the UK’s reputation on payment systems, which has generally been good.

The second major issue is the question of what exactly is covered by the regime. Is the Bill regulating the market as it exists today or preparing the UK for the market as it will exist in a few years? We will speak about digital finance and digital assets in later groups, but the point is highly relevant here, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned. If the Bill is to modernise and improve regulation, why does it feel in places as though it is being designed for a market that may already be out of date? We have the legal system, the financial services expertise, the markets, the professional services ecosystem and the technology capability to be a world leader, but leadership requires clarity and confidence from the Government and I do not think we are yet seeing enough of either in this Bill.

That brings me to the wider point about accountability and scope, which was raised on Monday. If the PSR’s functions are to be absorbed into the FCA, how will this new regime be properly held to account? How will the Government ensure that payments regulation does not become simply one more area lost within the wider FCA structure? I would be grateful if, in addition to my initial questions about growth, competitiveness and the level of delegation, the Minister could address three points.

First, how will the Government ensure that industry and professional bodies are brought into the regulation-making process early enough for their input to make a meaningful difference? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that the new regime is sufficiently clear and future-proofed to capture new forms of payments and digital finance, rather than regulating for the market of the past? Thirdly, how will the new payments regime be held to account once it sits within the FCA and what mechanisms will exist to ensure that Parliament, industry and consumers can properly scrutinise its operations? A lot of clarity is needed on this part of the Bill, which we of course support in principle. I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade and HM Treasury (Lord Stockwood) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Holmes and Lord Vaux, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles, for tabling these amendments, and to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I will speak first to the amendments concerning the regulation of payment systems and then turn to Amendment 48 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which raises a separate issue concerning the consultation processes of the FCA and PRA.

There is no doubt that payment systems are critical economic infrastructure. They must be secure and resilient, but also support competition, innovation and good outcomes for the households and businesses that rely on them. That is the purpose of the Bill. It consolidates the Payment Systems Regulator’s functions within the FCA to create a more coherent framework. This is an institutional reform and should not be seen as weakening consumer protection, competition regulation or regulatory standards. The PSR has been effective in driving competition and innovation among payments firms, but the current framework is too fragmented. The Bill will reduce the number of regulators with which firms need to engage.

It is worth stating that the Government have not rushed into this. We consulted on this proposal almost a year ago, in September 2025, and have been working on the details ever since. We published a detailed response in April this year. Throughout this process, the Government have been clear: the intention is not to fundamentally change how this part of the sector is regulated; it is about changing who regulates it to produce a more streamlined system. When I respond to each amendment, I hope that noble Lords will keep this in mind. I hope to reassure noble Lords that the Bill already provides the right framework.

I understand that the desire of Amendment 47A is to ensure payments-specific expertise and that the interests of users and the industry are heard in the FCA. However, the Government do not consider a new statutory payments system panel to be necessary, because the Bill ensures that the FCA’s general duty to consult in relation to its general policies and practices includes participants in regulated payment systems, including those who use or are likely to use services provided by participants in payment systems. We believe that this will ensure that their views will be considered without needing to recreate separate structures within the newly simplified regulatory framework.

I understand the concern in Amendment 49 about whether systems that involve digital settlement assets fall within the definition of a payment system. The Bill attempts to be clear that they can and are capable of designation, even where enabling the transfer of funds is not their primary purpose, reflecting how they may support payment activity within wider platforms.

Amendments 50 to 53 seek to make designation mandatory once the relevant payment systems definition and designation threshold is met, and to restrict the Treasury’s discretion to revise or withdraw designation notices. The Government do not consider that appropriate. As I have already stated, payment systems are technologically dynamic. The Treasury must retain discretion to assess the circumstances and to regulate proportionately, taking into account the relevant factors. Making designation automatic, or withdrawal too restrictive, could introduce rigidity and unintended consequences. Therefore, the Bill preserves the existing position whereby the Treasury may designate a system where it meets the definition of a payment system, and only where the relevant threshold is met. The Government have determined that it is appropriate to maintain a designation regime for payment systems because it facilitates more targeted and proportionate regulation.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am not sure I fully understood the Minister’s response to Amendment 55. Does the FCA’s secondary growth and competitiveness objective apply to payment service systems under the Bill? That was the clarity I sought.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

It does indeed. Returning to Amendments 55A, 55B and 55C, I agree that the FCA must be able to consider user access and market entry by infrastructure and payment service providers. The Bill already achieves that. The FCA’s payment systems objectives are intended to be equivalent in substance and scope to the PSR’s existing objectives.

The noble Lords, Lord Holmes and Lord Vaux, asked about drafting differences between the FCA and the PSR objectives. Changes in drafting of the FCA’s payment systems objectives are for simplification only. The FCA’s payment systems objectives retain the substance of the PSR’s objectives.

Turning to Amendment 57, the Government are committed to improving financial inclusion, but a new levy on payment system participants is not the right mechanism. The better course is targeted and proportionate action, including through the Government’s financial inclusion strategy and the recent allocation of £132.5 million in dormant assets funding to Fair4All Finance.

On Amendment 101A, the Bill already provides for the secondary competitiveness and growth objective to apply to the payment systems’ general functions. Any reporting on that secondary objective would include its application to payment systems’ regulation, as appropriate. Therefore, the Government consider the amendment unnecessary and are satisfied that the Bill already gives the FCA the right objectives to support innovation, competition and growth.

Finally, Amendment 48 seeks to introduce maximum and minimum lengths for the consultations undertaken by the FCA and PRA. I understand the desire to ensure that, where regulators consult on proposed rule changes, stakeholders have a fair opportunity to consider the proposals and respond properly. However, this amendment would impose a rigid statutory timetable on consultations, which will cover a very wide range of issues that vary considerably in complexity, urgency and market impact. The Government’s view is that it is appropriate to allow the regulators to determine the appropriate consultation period, rather than being bound to timings set in primary legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is right on how we describe the interpretation of the drafting; I commend him for his skill in reading a very technical provision that I have had difficulty reading. He asked why payment systems that involve digital settlement assets are treated differently. This reflects the particular characteristics of digital settlement assets and the way the market is developing. It also reflects the existing arrangements under the PSR framework.

The Bill preserves flexibility to bring relevant systems within the scope of payment systems regulation, where they support payment activity. That does not mean automatic regulation. The system must still be designated by HMT before the FCA’s main powers apply. This approach ensures that the new framework is both future-proofed and proportionate. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, raised the issue of consultations with industry. The FCA works closely with industry, and the Bill sets out clear consultation requirements on the FCA to support this as it takes on this new role.

As I said at the start, I cannot accept these amendments, but I appreciate the spirit of where they come from. The Bill is aimed at ensuring that we have the right institutional framework for this part of the sector, while ensuring that we do not weaken those consumer protections. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, may I come back to the question of consultation? We are being asked to have a high degree of delegation with this change of governance for the Payment Systems Regulator. The Minister seems sure that the regulator will meaningfully consult the right people at the right time. It seems extraordinary to leave so much discretion with the regulators, particularly, as I explained, when they are moving into very new areas. He has rejected the idea of a panel, which would be one way of getting expertise into the system, and I wonder if he will think further about this.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

To come back on that, we have heard the criticism of the FCA loud and clear. The intention is for further debates to come back to what we believe is the current state of oversight and governance, and we are open to the conversations that the debates will lead to.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this important debate. One of the key themes that ran through it and the Minister’s response is the question of clarity, or the lack thereof. Certainly, as a consequence of these changes as currently drafted, there is less clarity on payment systems regulation and on how the competition and innovation requirements will be satisfied in a broader context. I fully support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on his amendments, and I will come to the important amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

I am disappointed that the Minister did not take the opportunity to offer a consultation about consultations. The reality is that the Minister could take this opportunity to bring clarity to increasing and varying levels of opacity and unnecessary levels of control in the hands of the regulator, where they currently exist. We have seen this in financial services in recent Bills that we have considered; it goes beyond financial services to this sense of leaving regulators with greater powers as a consequence of significant statutes passed, as opposed to Parliament debating and determining these decisions, which in no sense would tie the regulators’ hands. In fact, the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would assist the regulators, because it would bring clarity on how to operate these consultations. There is a significant issue with consultations in financial services, and a significant issue with government consultations across the piece. It is not a party-political point; it has been the case for years. This is an opportunity to bring clarity to this and enable more firms, more individuals and more perspectives to be brought into what would then be better consultations and better outcomes as a result of that consultation process. I very much look forward to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, bringing her amendment back on Report. It is strong; it would not let too many cats out of too many bags—even though I stand with a Labrador at my feet—and I do not think that this will be the last we see of a number of these amendments. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Stockwood]

56: Schedule 2, page 78, leave out lines 27 to 30
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove a subsection which duplicates section 131Z19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by paragraph 18 of Schedule 2).

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, the purpose of the government amendments in this group is to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Bill operate clearly, consistently and in line with the Government’s original policy intent. They are technical and corrective in nature and do not change the underlying policy of the Bill. However, it is important that noble Lords understand the purpose of the amendments so that they can agree that they are minor and technical, so I will explain them briefly.

Amendments 56, 60 and 63 make minor, technical corrections to Schedule 2, which, taken with Clause 13, abolishes the Payment Systems Regulator and gives broadly equivalent functions to the FCA. Amendment 56 removes a duplicative provision from new Section 131Z9 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 that is already covered by new Section 131Z19. Amendment 60 corrects a cross-reference so that the Bill refers to the correct FCA payment system powers when setting out how the Competition and Markets Authority is to determine an appeal.

Amendments 61, 62 and 63 ensure that references to the chair of the PSR, which will be obsolete after the PSR is abolished, are deleted in the correct places in Schedule 1ZA to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which concerns the FCA’s constitution and governance.

Amendments 143 to 145 are also minor and technical amendments. Amendment 143 and 144 ensure that Section 66A of FSMA is amended in a coherent and orderly way, regardless of whether the amendments to that section made by Clause 27 are commenced first or the amendments to that section made by Clause 36 are commenced first. Amendment 145 amends subsection (4) of new Section 55AA, inserted by Clause 29(3), to ensure that the language used there is consistent with the language used elsewhere in FSMA. The amendment simply replaces the words “is in force” with “has effect”. These amendments do not change the policy or legal effect of the affected clauses. They are drafting amendments for the purposes of coherence and consistency only.

I now turn to Amendments 147 to 150, to Clause 33. Clause 33 allows firms to apply for senior approval, subject to conditions or a limited period; they are known as permitted conditional applications. This helps support a more flexible approvals process. Amendments 147 to 150 are technical amendments that fix an error in the original drafting and will ensure that the framework operates as intended. Without these amendments, there is a risk that decisions will not be properly formalised and that the period for determining applications will not be applied consistently.

Amendments 147 and 149 provide that the period for determining permitted conditional applications is the same as for other senior manager applications. Amendments 148 and 150 provide that regulators must give written notice when they approve a permitted conditional application. Taken together, these amendments will ensure that the statutory framework works clearly and consistently in practice.

In summary, this group of government amendments makes technical corrections to ensure that the Bill works as intended. I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting them.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have given the Minister notice that I intend to object to these amendments, so if he presses them, I will object and therefore they will not pass. It has been the custom of our House that when the Government table amendments to Bills, they notify all Members of the House—because the Government cannot determine which Peers might be interested in which amendments—and explain the amendments. It may well be that some of these amendments are technical and mean simply the correction of errors, but Members of your Lordships’ House should have the opportunity to consider them properly.

I became aware of this only late last week, when I suddenly realised that several government amendments had been put down—these and others—and that I had had no letter. I do not believe that anybody else has had a letter. Because of that, we ought to maintain the customary practices of your Lordships’ House. As I said, I will object to these amendments if they are put.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the government amendments in this group and declare my interest as a director of South Molton Street Capital, which is regulated by the FCA. I thank the Minister for explaining so clearly these amendments. He has described them as minor technical amendments and as descriptions around making language consistent with FSMA. Notwithstanding that, at the outset, we welcome these amendments in so far as they are intended to make the Bill clearer, correct cross-references, remove duplications and ensure that the legislation works as intended. The amendments before us are technical in character and, where they improve the coherence and operability of the Bill, we do not object to them.

However, following the words of my noble friend Lady Noakes, I want to raise a broader procedural point, because I think it matters for how this Committee is able to scrutinise the Bill properly. We understand that not all noble Lords who have taken a close interest in the Bill were engaged by the department on these government amendments. That is a concern. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us a clear commitment that, ahead of future stages, the Government will make every effort to engage with not only the Opposition Front Bench but noble Lords across the Committee who have raised substantive concerns, and to provide timely, written explanations of any further government amendments.

I understand that my noble friend Lady Noakes will be writing to the Minister about the way in which the Government have handled engagement and oversight around these amendments. Given the reservations of my noble friend and of her committee, it is right that we do not agree to these amendments today but rather see them reintroduced on Report, as a matter of principle.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am happy to apologise to the noble Baroness for any mix-up. It was my understanding that it was not necessary to do an all-Peers letter for only a handful of technical amendments. With that in mind, we believe that the amendments we have proposed are minor and technical in nature and were tabled in good time before the Committee’s first debate. They are on drafting errors and remove duplicate and obsolete provisions, ensuring that the relevant provisions in the Bill and FSMA operate clearly and consistently. I trust that my explanation has given the noble Baroness the information she needs, but I will withdraw the amendment for now and bring it back on Report.

Amendment 56 withdrawn.

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I have spoken at length because the Government need to show that this reform will be proportionate, sector sensitive and practical. Clause 14 is too vague. Too much is being left to later regulation. The sector is being asked to prepare for a regime whose shape remains unclear in an industry that is rapidly changing, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Holmes. We will need to return to this area on Report, but some helpful answers would make that process easier.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Neville-Rolfe, the noble Lords, Lord Altrincham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for tabling these amendments relating to the implementation of anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing supervision reform. I would be more than happy to meet the noble and learned Lord to discuss his points in detail before Report. I thank him for that kind offer. I am also more than happy to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville- Rolfe, on her questions, although I will cover professional privilege in my response.

I recognise the broad concerns that sit behind these amendments. We all want to get this right. However, the Government do not believe that these additional statutory requirements are necessary. I will start by setting out why Clause 14 should stand part of the Bill. Because the UK is a global financial hub, we face heightened vulnerability to illicit finance, as has already been mentioned. The UK has a robust set of anti-money laundering rules, but the supervision of those rules is simply not consistent. The Government understand the burden of compliance, but their recent statutory instrument made money laundering regulation more proportionate by ensuring that requirements are enforced when and where the risks are highest, and reduced where they are not.

In October 2025, the Government announced their intention to reform the supervision framework, with the FCA becoming the supervisor of compliance on anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing rules for professional services firms. Clause 14 is designed to support this transition and ensure that the new supervisory regime can function effectively. It is worth restating that we believe that the vast majority of companies take seriously their responsibility to ensure that their clients’ funds are clean. We are grateful for their efforts; they are important gatekeepers, protecting the integrity of the UK economy. This reform will bring professional services firms in line with other regulated sectors, such as financial services, which are already overseen by a public sector supervisor. This is fair and proportionate.

The Government have recently published their updated anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing national risk assessment. It found that all professional services in scope of this reform remain high risk for money laundering, based on an extensive analysis of the available evidence and intelligence. Clause 14 is essential to ensure the effective implementation of these supervision reforms. Without it, the Government would lose the ability to make important provision in respect of co-operation and information sharing between the FCA and professional bodies.

Ongoing co-operation between the FCA and professional bodies will be key to ensuring that firms’ reform is effective; it has been mentioned by many noble Lords today. It will mean that additional burdens on firms, including dual regulation and issues around enforcement, are minimised. Without this, implementation of reform will be less effective, and firms will likely face additional burdens, which the Government are determined to avoid.

The Government’s objective is to simplify and strengthen the fragmented supervisory system, improve consistency across sectors and support more effective action against economic crime. Effective supervision depends on robust co-operation and information sharing between supervisors and other partners across the wider AML/CTF framework. Co-operation and information-sharing mechanisms will ensure that additional burdens on firms, including dual regulation and issues around enforcement, are minimised, addressing key concerns raised by stakeholders. Clause 14 provides the basis on which those future arrangements can be established. The Government therefore consider Clause 14 essential and strongly support its inclusion in the Bill. To re-emphasise the objective here, this is about simplifying and strengthening a fragmented supervisory system, improving consistency across the legal and accountancy sectors and ensuring that firms are supervised to a consistently high standard. There is no proposal to introduce new anti-money laundering obligations on businesses.

I turn now to Amendments 65 and 67, which are concerned with whether firms will continue to receive appropriate support and whether the FCA will possess sufficient sector-specific expertise, which has been raised by many noble Lords today. The Government agree that these are important issues. However, they are already central to implementation planning. The Treasury’s recent consultation on the FCA’s duties, powers and accountability demonstrated the importance that stake- holders place on sector expertise, guidance and engagement. The Government have been clear that implementation must involve the development of specialist expertise within the FCA and close engagement with existing supervisors and representative bodies.

The FCA also starts from a strong foundation. It already supervises firms for AML/CTF purposes and oversees legal and accountancy professional body supervision through the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision. This gives the FCA substantial experience of both AML/CTF supervision and the professional services landscape. The FCA will also ensure that there is clarity for practitioners on sector-specific issues, such as guidance on the treatment of documents covered by legal professional privilege.

The Government have also recognised the value of practitioner expertise. Consultation responses strongly supported practitioner-led guidance, and the Government have indicated in their response to the consultation, published on 18 June this year, that engagement with sector experts and existing guidance bodies will remain an important feature of the future regime. The Government therefore agree with the importance of preserving sector expertise and ensuring that firms continue to receive effective support. However, these issues are already being addressed through implementation planning, continued engagement with existing supervisors and representative bodies, the development of specialist capability within the FCA, and future guidance arrangements. The Government do not believe that additional statutory obligations on either the Treasury or the FCA are necessary to achieve those objectives.

Amendments 64B and 69AA reflect important stakeholder concerns surrounding the need for proportionality and a risk-based approach, appropriate protections for legal professional privilege and client confidentiality, and the need to minimise duplication and impact on supervised persons. These concerns were raised by respondents to the recent consultation, and the Government agree that they are very important issues. Amendment 64B would require regulations made under new powers to consider proportionality and a risk-based approach to supervision, provide appropriate protections for legal professional privilege and client confidentiality, and avoid duplication between regulators. It would also require the Treasury to publish an impact assessment prior to making regulations.

However, the money laundering regulations, or MLRs—the legislation that provides for our supervision regime—already provide protections in respect of the need for a risk-based approach and legal professional privilege. The risk-based approach underpins our supervision regime and is already set out in the legislation. The Government took additional steps to ensure that the existing regulations are proportionate through changes made via statutory instrument on 9 June 2026. The MLRs are kept under regular review to ensure that they are proportionate.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, particularly asked me to cover this point, so I take the opportunity to do so. The FCA will not be able to compel disclosure of legally privileged material under new responsibilities. It will provide guidance to ensure that privileged material is appropriately protected during supervisory activity. That is because this Government are committed to respecting the distinctive obligations that the legal sector has. Regulation 72 of the MLRs provides explicit protection for legal professional privilege. This will apply to regulations made under the new power conferred by Clause 14.

Finally, the power in Clause 14 will ensure that reciprocal co-operation and information-sharing between supervisors and professional bodies is central to the new regime, minimising duplication. Regulations made under the new power in Clause 14 will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. In making regulations, the Government consider the impact on firms; this is formally set out in our published regulatory impact assessment. Therefore, the additional requirement introduced by Amendment 64B would be duplicative of this process.

Amendment 69AA would require the Treasury to review regulations made under the new power in Clause 14 within three years of them being made, and to lay before Parliament a report summarising the conclusions of that review. The Government are already required to review the MLRs at intervals not exceeding five years, a requirement that would also apply to regulations made under the new powers in Clause 14. As a result, the Government regularly review the regulations to ensure that they are effective and proportionate, and to respond to emerging threats. This is evidenced by regular updates made to the regulations via secondary legislation, with the most recent changes made this month.

The Government’s aim is to minimise duplication and burdens on firms and to protect legal professional privilege and client confidentiality. These will be the most important factors when considering reviewing existing regulations. Consideration of these issues is already fundamental to our supervision regime, and the regulations are consistently reviewed to ensure that they continue to be fit for purpose. Therefore, the Government consider these additions to be unnecessary.

Amendments 66 and 69 are ultimately concerned with readiness and implementation. They seek assurances that the FCA will be capable of supervising professional services firms across different regions of the UK, and that the reform will proceed according to a clear timeline. The Government share the objective of ensuring the implementation is successful. While significant implementation planning has already taken place, substantial work will continue ahead of commencement. The Government have consistently recognised that this requires careful preparation, phased delivery, detailed transition planning and close collaboration with existing supervisors.

The Government have also been clear that effective implementation will require the development of sector-specific and jurisdiction-specific expertise, including a strong understanding of the legal sector, as mentioned, and of professional services firms of all sizes across all parts of the United Kingdom. HMT will work closely with the relevant bodies in Scotland and Northern Ireland to ensure that implementation reflects the distinctiveness of their legal systems and is aligned with existing legislative and regulatory frameworks. This is already managed through governance and business planning. The FCA already operates nationwide and has confirmed that it anticipates having a significant presence for the new regime in its offices outside London, to ensure it has the capacity to supervise these additional sectors.

However, the Government do not believe that placing reporting requirements or implementation timetables in primary legislation is the right approach. Implementation of this reform is a complex programme involving systems development, recruitment, training, funding arrangements and transition planning. The Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure that these activities are delivered effectively. However, that does not mean firms will be left without certainty. The Government are already working closely with the FCA, HMRC and existing supervisors to ensure reform is implemented in an orderly way, including ensuring that businesses are clear about when transition will occur and have sufficient time to prepare for change. A statutory timetable risks becoming outdated and may constrain the Government’s ability to manage implementation in the most effective manner.

Furthermore, the detailed provisions on supervision reform will ultimately be delivered through future secondary legislation. This means that the Government will retain control over commencement and can ensure that functions are conferred only once appropriate implementation preparations have been completed.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

Since it is Committee, I have a couple of points to raise with the Minister before we finish this important section. First, I think the industry needs some idea of the timeframe for these reviews and for the implementation of these changes. That may already exist in ministerial statements, but it would be extremely helpful if the Minister could look into that and let us know. We have had the experience of the defence investment plan, and the uncertainty that can be created when you do not know when major changes are being made is bad for the sector.

Secondly, on parliamentary privilege, a very niche point, do the plans to protect it apply to in-house counsel as well as external legal counsel? Small companies, such as estate agents, would not want to have to employ expensive solicitors and lawyers if they do not need to.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will have to write to the noble Baroness on those points, to make sure that my answers are correct.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Bull) (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, is not here to withdraw his amendment, I will take it that his amendment is withdrawn.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all who have taken part in this short debate. We are sympathetic to the broad purpose of requiring regulators to think strategically, but, if the regulatory strategies are to be meaningful, they must not simply become static documents published every few years then left on the shelf. As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, that is not the way we do it in business. Common practice is for five-year strategies, reviewed annually, and annual plans.

The amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Ashcombe would reduce the strategy period from five years to three years. He is right that markets can change very quickly, as we keep hearing. A five-year strategy risks being set in stone for too long, unless the Minister is able to clarify that the plans will be updated regularly. If not, a shorter period, such as three years, would have real benefits. Perhaps the Minister can explain why the period of five years has been chosen and how he believes the strategies will remain agile and flexible.

I am delighted that the Minister said that he was prepared to accept Amendment 70 on competitiveness and growth. As I have said several times, the growth of the UK financial services sector is key to growth more generally. Regulation should say how the Government—or the regulator—understand that objective, how they are giving effect to it and how their regulatory approach is supporting growth in the market, because the UK has a large and dynamic financial services sector. My noble friend Lady Lawlor emphasised that point, which we should not forget, and we cannot assume that its international position is guaranteed. Regulation has a direct effect on investment, innovation, listings, lending and market depth, as well as on the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business, so, if regulators are not required to think explicitly about this, the growth objective risks being honoured in theory but neglected in practice.

Amendments 71 and 74 on consultation are very welcome. As we have said in our debates on previous groups, bringing experts into the room in a timely way is a vital part of the regulatory process.

In my view, the boards of regulators have a part to play in the strategic plans, but my recollection is that those engaged in regulated companies were excluded from the non-executive roles on the PRA and the FCA. Is this still the case? My own board experience is that conflicts of interest can be managed. I believe that regulators will benefit from current knowledge from the industry, particularly given these new statutory strategies, the digital changes to which we keep referring and the expansion of the scope of the FCA. I would like to hear from the Minister what the current rules are—perhaps in a letter, as I have not raised this point with him before.

I also support the principle behind Amendments 72 and 75 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. They would require the FCA and the PRA to review their rulebooks and explain how they will simplify or remove rules that are outdated, unnecessary or duplicative. Regulation, as has been said, tends to accumulate. New rules and duties are added, but old rules are not always removed. Guidance, expectations and supervisory practice develop over time. A long-term strategy is not only about what new initiative the regulators want to pursue; it should also be about what the regulator can simplify. If a regular rulebook review is done with a view to making regulation less burdensome, cheaper to operate and supportive of growth, that will be a very positive step.

The amendments on Treasury recommendations also raise a serious question around accountability and regulator independence. There is, of course, a balance to be struck. We do not want day-to-day political interference in regulatory decisions but nor should independent regulators operate without clear strategic accountability to Parliament and the Government of the day, as my noble friend Lord Massey and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, explained better than I can. The Government should explain why the Treasury’s recommendation-making power is framed as it is, why it is limited in the way proposed and how Ministers expect it to operate in practice.

Finally, on the Clause 16 stand part notice, I understand the concerns raised in the debate. The value of that clause will depend entirely on whether the strategies produced are meaningful, responsive and capable of being scrutinised. If they become generic documents with broad statements of aspiration, they will add little. If they provide clear commitments, measurable priorities, proper engagement with growth and competitiveness, and a disciplined approach to reviewing the rulebook, they will be useful.

I very much look forward to a full response from the Minister to the points that have been made.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by explaining the Government’s purpose behind Clause 16 and why it should stand part of the Bill.

The Government have often heard feedback calling for the regulatory system to have an overall long-term strategy with clear goals, where the regulators consider the cumulative impacts of their policies and the interaction between supervision and rule-making. The reforms introduced by Clause 16 are intended to address this feedback and will improve transparency around the regulators’ long-term direction and focus, which the Government consider will support effective oversight and scrutiny of the regulators.

Clause 16 requires the FCA and the PRA each to prepare and publish long-term strategies so that stake- holders, including regulated firms, can better understand the regulators’ approach to the sector, and so that the Government and Parliament fully understand the regulators’ priorities and can more effectively hold them to account on how they are translating their objectives into actions and results. When the Government consulted on this proposal, it received strong support: 83% of respondents supported it and agreed that the regulators taking a more strategic and cohesive approach would benefit the sector by helping firms know what to expect.

I have listened carefully to the concerns raised by noble Lords. However, the Government remain firmly of the view that Clause 16 will support scrutiny. By requiring a clear long-term strategic overview, Clause 16 will help the sector understand and plan more effectively for regulatory initiatives and will help interested parties engage with the regulators at a strategic level. Without Clause 16, there would be no requirement for the regulators to set out, in one place, their long-term priorities and approach in advancing their objectives. The aim of the strategies is to make it easier, not harder, for Parliament and stakeholders to scrutinise whether the regulators’ actions are coherent and aligned with the framework that Parliament has set.

On Amendment 70, the Government agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that the FCA’s secondary international competitiveness and growth objective should be central to the formulation of its long-term strategy. Growth is the number one priority for this Government and the financial services sector, as many have noted, is key to delivering this. The Government always intended the FCA’s long-term strategy to set out its priorities for advancing our international competitiveness and growth objective. We are looking into this point to determine if this is fully clear within the drafting of the clause, and we are open to tabling an amendment on Report should we determine that it is needed. I thank the noble Baroness for bringing this to my attention and commit to keeping her and other noble Lords informed as this consideration progresses.

I turn to Amendments 69B and 73A. The noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked me to explain the Government’s thinking behind the time periods here. The Government have set the length of this strategy as five years because, as has been noted, it is the standard time period for organisational strategies and is very common in the business world, as many noble Lords will appreciate. It also aligns with standard parliamentary terms and therefore the requirement for the Treasury to issue recommendations to the regulators at least once per Parliament. However, the Government recognise that financial services markets can evolve quickly and it is important that the regulators’ strategic documents remain current and useful.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked me how the strategies would be kept under review. The Bill provides flexibility for the regulators to revise or publish a new strategy within the five-year period if circumstances require it, or to publish a strategy for a shorter period of time than five years. If they do the latter, it will need to be with an explanation about why this is appropriate. Five years is therefore a maximum interval, not a requirement to wait five years before making a change. For example, the Bill requires the regulators to consider whether they need to update their strategy or issue a new one whenever new Treasury recommendations are issued. The Government’s view is that this strikes the right balance between providing a long-term, stable framework and allowing regulators to respond when market, economic or regulatory conditions change.

On Amendments 73 and 76, the Government’s approach here is deliberate. The need for the regulators to take account of Treasury recommendations at a strategic level, rather than at the level of general functions, has been carefully considered. Under the new framework, the Treasury’s recommendations to the regulators regarding its economic priorities will inform the development of their strategic priorities. This is aligned with the change to the way that the regulatory principles will be applied, and I hope it demonstrates the Government’s confidence that influencing the regulators’ strategies is an effective mechanism for ensuring that they have an appropriate focus and are performing well.

Further to this, the framework has been carefully designed to ensure that Treasury recommendations are taken fully into account. As I mentioned earlier, regulators must consider updating or producing a new strategy whenever the Treasury sends a new recommendation letter. The regulators will continue to be obliged to respond annually to the Treasury on their actions in response to the recommendations separately from the strategy document. This will support continued transparency and accountability regarding how the regulators are taking government recommendations into account.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I just ask for clarification. The Minister talked about the way in which the Treasury will make recommendations and the regulator must take them into account. I did not hear the word “Parliament” anywhere in that. Where is the capacity for parliamentary recommendations and oversight to make sure that they are taken into account? Or is the purpose of this legislation to make sure that that does not exist?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I think this is part of a broader discussion. I am informed that this takes into account existing practices for how the reviews and overviews take place. Unless we decide, in the following debates, that we need an amendment to provide parliamentary overview, this will apply to the current regulatory framework as the oversight currently exists.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I may be being a bit dumb, but I did not understand that at all.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I do not want to get confused about this. My understanding is that this is already existing practice, but I will take this away and write to the noble Baronesses just to confirm that this is exactly correct. We are trying not to defer from the practice as it exists today, but I will write to clarify that.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I just add that the point of the principles is that they are, in effect, Parliament’s recommendations set in law. I am struggling to see how that fits into the question of who can recommend from this point in time.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I do not understand what happens when the strategy is right but the rules are wrong. What happens then? That does happen. We have, as I have called it before, the example that keeps on giving: when the FCA got the motor finance rules wrong. What happens then, when there is no way to correct that? The strategy, to treat customers fairly, might be right, but the rules produce something that is patently unfair. How can that be changed? There is nothing to measure against that now —the principles have gone.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Again, we are trying to stress that the oversight that exists today will not be changed. The Treasury’s annual review should be able to take that into account. We believe that what we are putting forward here should not change the existing profile.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am sorry, but if you change something in primary legislation and rub out what is happening in existing processes, you have changed it. You cannot change something at a higher level than primary legislation.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

We will have to come back to these points at a later date. This is a broader conversation on oversight, and points have been made on this subject outside the Room. I hope noble Lords will allow me to come back to these points, as I think this will come up in further debates both during and after Committee.

Turning to Amendments 72 and 75, the Government agree that regulation should be proportionate and support the objectives behind these amendments. Indeed, the Bill forms part of the Government’s broader effort to reduce the burden of regulation on businesses, ensuring that the UK has a regulatory environment that supports growth while maintaining high standards. The Government have made a commitment to cutting the administrative burden of regulation by 25% by the end of this Parliament. The financial services regulators are actively contributing to this agenda. For example, the PRA is implementing new insurance reporting requirements that will cut paperwork by one-third, contributing to savings for firms of £66 million per year, and the FCA has proposed removing some transaction reporting that would save firms over £100 million per year.

However, the Government do not think it would be appropriate to impose a requirement that every long-term strategy must include a full review of all regulations and a plan for eliminating them. A universal rule review exercise each time a strategy is prepared or revised would not be proportionate and would reduce the regulator’s capacity to focus on other priorities. There are existing requirements in FSMA which require the regulators to keep their rules under review and to publish statements on policy and on their approaches to reviewing the rules. The Government consider that this is a proportionate approach.

Amendments 71 and 74 seek to require the FCA and the PRA, when preparing and revising their long-term strategies, to consult persons they consider would be affected, including those they regulate. I understand the intention behind these amendments. If the regulators are to produce long-term strategies that are meaningful and credible, it is clearly important that they are informed by engagement with those who are affected by them. The Government have a clear expectation that the regulator’s strategies will be informed by that engagement.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Can the Minister explain why that is not included in the Bill? The Government expect them to engage with the industry. One would normally write consultation expectations into legislation. That is the normal practice. Why was it not done in this case?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Again, we will have to come back to that point. One of the things we are trying to consider is how we do not overburden by creating more regulation, but we will have to review that point and come back to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

On that point, it seems to me that nothing is being done to challenge the burden of regulation on firms—instead, the obligations on the regulator are being reduced. When you reduce the obligations on the regulator—for example, to be proportionate—the corollary of that is that they are unrestricted in the way that they can then increase the burdens on firms. That may not be the talk, but that is the consequence of the legal construct that we are now looking at.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

There is a broad philosophical point being made about trusting the FCA and the regulators. Again, we will come back to this in further debates. It is a view that I understand, and we need to develop this through the process of the debate, but it is definitely not the intention to give them free rein to make laws randomly. I think we will have to come back to that later in Committee, if that is okay.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I ask for some clarification on this complex area. Under Clause 16, new Section 1JZA(7) states:

“A strategy may be revised by publishing a revised version of the strategy”.


Is the Minister confirming that, as it says in the Explanatory Notes, no consultation goes with that revision process?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

That is correct.

Amendments 71 and 74 seek to require the FCA and the PRA, when preparing or revising their long-term strategies, to consult persons they consider would be affected, including those they regulate. The Government have a clear expectation that the regulators’ strategies will be informed by engagement with industry, consumer representatives and other stakeholders. However, adding a statutory consultation requirement could lead to long delays between a new Government setting direction through a recommendation letter and the regulators putting a strategy in place.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Noakes, asked how the Government’s remit will work under the new system. The FCA and the PRA will now be required to have regard to their remit letters when producing or updating long-term strategies. The regulators will continue to be required to respond annually to remit letters, setting out the actions to which they will respond. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked about non-executive directors; I will write to her on that as I do not have the answer to hand.

The accountability of the financial services regulators is clearly an important matter of huge interest to the Committee. I have heard a range of views today on exactly what this should look like, and we will continue to debate this issue in relation to subsequent clauses. However, regardless of views on the wider matters of transparency and accountability, I am confident that the majority will agree that long-term strategies will add to our understanding of the regulators’ strategic priorities and approach, which must be a good thing. I therefore ask that Clause 16 stands part of the Bill.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I have some questions for the Minister. Does he believe that the FCA’s five-year plan provides a model for what the Government have in mind for compliance with Clause 16, if it becomes law? I will start with that question.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I apologise. Can the noble Baroness repeat that?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Does the Minister believe that the FCA’s five-year plan, which started last year, is the model on which Clause 16 has been based? Is the Minister expecting that sort of document to be produced in response to Clause 16?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

What the clause is trying to represent is that this is the starting point. There is definitely work to do and it needs to be improved.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Can the Minister expand on that?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

What we have set out in answer to that question is that there is clearly a need for greater transparency and thinking about what the five-year plan looks like. In terms of the interaction with the Treasury, the hope is that we can get it into a position where it has greater clarity and certainty about long-term planning. It will be an emergent process, to ensure that it is improved on.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I put it to the Minister that this clause has no specificity around it: no ability for the Treasury to agree the format or content of a five-year plan; no requirement for consultation; and no requirement for the involvement of parliamentary committees. We are being asked to give a blank check with these rather vague requirements. There are words in the Explanatory Notes about the Government expecting these to be “high level”, which is why I asked for the Minister’s reflections on what is clearly a very high-level document from the FCA. I am not getting any sense of what is likely to come out as a response to that.

Linked to that is my second question. I asked earlier what the Minister’s response would be to the question of whether annual plans were required. At the moment, both regulators produce annual plans for what they will do in the year, which provide a very rich source of information for the regulated community on what they can expect. If we are to have those levels of detail, it may not matter at all if an airy-fairy five-year strategy document is produced, full of drawings, pictures and stuff like that. If, however, we will not have anything else, and if the Bill takes out the one existing requirement on the PRA to produce annual plans, then we have a problem.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I can clarify that an annual plan is required and will still be required. Let me write to the noble Baroness to confirm that.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Can I conclude my remarks with a plea to the Minister? He has taken away a number of issues arising from this debate, on which he will be writing one big letter or several medium-sized ones. It is normal, when something as contentious as this arises, for all Members of the Committee to be copied in on any such letters, not simply the one noble Lord who raised a specific query.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Understood.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

May I ask the Minister for a clarification? In his answer to the question about not having consultation in the Bill itself, I think he said that the FCA would engage with firms but that he did not want this in statute. Do I understand that correctly?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

That is correct.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Why not?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

The sense is that it creates an administrative burden. We are trying to cut down on regulation as part of trying to accelerate growth, and we believe that that is the right balance.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Do we not want to reduce regulation on regulated firms, rather than regulators?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

They are obviously related.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, what an interesting debate this turned out to be. There are a number of flaws, which have been extremely well demonstrated by all noble Lords on this side of the Room. I thank the Minister for his answer to my question. I am also extremely grateful to my noble friend Lady Noakes for improving my amendment significantly by talking about annual plans, which is quite correct. However, it is imperative that we continue to have parliamentary oversight of the regulators. From the discussion we have had this afternoon, there is no doubt that this clause still has a number of legs in it, and the horse race will continue for some time. I am sure we look forward to coming back to this on Report but, with that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this is a welcome amendment because it raises important questions about the structure of our regulatory framework and in particular about whether the regulatory principle set out in Section 3B of FSMA—the eight principles—remain coherent, useful and properly calibrated to the circumstances in which we now find ourselves.

Over time, FSMA has accumulated objectives, secondary objectives, regulatory principles, “have regard” duties, reporting requirements and consultation obligations. Some of those are individually sensible and many were introduced for good reasons, but taken together, there is a real risk of regulatory layering. Duties and principles are added and new obligations are placed on regulators, but very little is ever taken away. The result is a framework that is increasingly complex and it is not always clear which duties genuinely drive regulatory behaviour and which simply sit on the statute book without translating into meaningful change.

The amendment asks the Treasury to review whether those principles are duplicative or remain necessary, and whether the framework could be simplified or improved. There is also a wider question, which was raised by the Financial Services Regulation Committee in its report last year, about whether these sorts of duties actually translate into anything meaningful in practice. It is one thing for Parliament to place a duty on a regulator to have regard to a particular principle or consideration—as my noble friend Lady Noakes mentioned, that is exactly what the Leeds reforms are trying to streamline—but quite another for that duty to shape decisions in a clear, measurable and accountable way.

Needless complexity matters for firms as well as for regulators. A complicated regulatory framework does not stay confined to the regulator; it filters down into consultations, supervisory expectations, compliance systems, legal advice and business decisions. If the statutory framework is unclear or duplicative, the burden ultimately falls on the firms that have to comply with it. At a time when we are asking financial services to support growth, investment and competitiveness, we should be especially alert to unnecessary regulatory complexity. The UK’s high regulatory standards are not in question, but there is a question as to whether the framework through which those standards are delivered is as clear, efficient and proportionate as it can be.

I therefore hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the amendment. I would be grateful if he could explain how far the principles have already been reviewed in preparation for this Bill, in the light of the comments from the Financial Services Regulation Committee. Do the Government accept that the accumulation of regulatory principles and duties can create complexity, and do they believe that the existing Section 3B principles remain fit for purpose? This amendment raises a valuable point; I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to this debate. This clearly animates a lot of discussion. I particularly acknowledge the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the work of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in effectively scrutinising the work of the regulators. It is important work, and we intend through this process to support that and not diminish it in any way. As was clear from those contributions at Second Reading, noble Lords place a strong emphasis on getting the regulatory principles right. The Government also take this matter very seriously.

Amendment 77 would require the Treasury to carry out and lay before Parliament a review of the regulatory principles in Section 3B(1) of FSMA. I am sympathetic to efforts to streamline the process of making regulation and to giving regulators a clear and manageable set of issues on which to focus. However, the Government have already considered this question and have carried out a review of the regulatory principles, as well as the other “have regard” provisions mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. The Government committed to this review in the Regulation Action Plan published in March 2025, and carried out the review with a view to identifying opportunities to rationalise those principles.

As a result of that review, the Government concluded that each of the regulatory principles in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is individually important; that they do not materially overlap with each other or with other requirements set out in legislation; and that they play an important role in providing transparency and supporting the Government and Parliament’s oversight of the regulators. However, the Government also found that the “have regard” provisions can reduce regulators’ ability to act strategically and with a clear focus.

Currently, the way that the principles operate results in the production of large volumes of information that do little to support effective overall scrutiny of a regulator’s performance. The Government have drafted the measures in this Bill with a view to rationalising how the regulators take these regulatory principles into account, without amending the principles themselves. We recognise that this is an area where there is significant interest; issues related to this amendment will continue to be debated during the passage of the Bill, when there will be an opportunity to discuss this area in greater detail. A further statutory review, beginning after Royal Assent, would duplicate the work that the Government have already undertaken.

I will come back to noble Lords’ specific questions in writing if I do not cover them later in the debate. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment raises an important question around private credit and how our regulatory framework should respond to emerging risks in modern financial markets. I look forward to the Minister’s tactful comments on this amendment, given that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, spoke so well in favour of private credit in our debate on the fifth group on our first day in Committee. Here we are with the problems of private credit on our second day in Committee. The Minister will be extraordinarily tactful in handling that.

We will have a wider debate on Clause 17 and the regulatory principles in future groups, but this amendment touches on some of those broader questions. The specific issue raised here—private credit—is an important and timely one. Private credit has grown considerably as a feature of modern financial markets; it has, in fact, grown partly as a consequence of regulation. We are dealing now with regulation of a consequence of regulation as the markets have evolved. It can provide an important source of finance outside traditional banking channels, supporting businesses that need capital to invest, develop and grow. For that reason, we should be careful not to respond to its expansion in a way that unnecessarily restricts access to safe and productive credit; indeed, the Financial Services Regulation Committee concluded in its report earlier this year that private credit has developed rapidly and plays a useful economic role.

That is particularly important at a time when we want firms to invest, expand and access the finance they need. We should not create a regulatory environment in which the answer to every emerging market development is simply more regulation without proper regard to the consequences. Indeed, the Government have been keen to support private equity through greater investment from assets such as pension funds in the UK. If they want this sector to continue developing, they must ensure that regulation supports, rather than restricts, access to credit for consumers who choose to use these products.

At the same time, it is right to recognise that financial markets do not stand still. The system changes over time, and the regulatory framework must remain alert to those changes. Areas such as private credit, non-bank finance, digital finance and other fast-moving parts of the system demonstrate the need for regulation that reflects the market as it is developing, not simply the market as it looked when earlier legislation was drafted.

The key point, therefore, is one of balance. We need a market that is dynamic, innovative and capable of providing finance to the businesses on which growth depends, but we also need a regulatory framework that is sufficiently up to date to understand and monitor emerging risks. We should keep in mind, though, that risk can never be eliminated entirely. The role of regulation should be not to remove all risk from the system but to ensure that risks are properly understood, proportionately managed and developed with an eye to supporting economic development and growth.

For those reasons, we will listen carefully to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the focus of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the vulnerabilities in the private credit system.

Although the Government are clear that the growth of private credit has brought benefits to the real economy, we and the financial regulators are very conscious of the potential vulnerabilities in this sector. Just last month, the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England joined their fellow G7 Finance Ministers and European Central Bank governors in agreeing that potential risks in the private credit ecosystem call for continued monitoring, including that of the interconnections with banks and insurers.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would require the PRA and the FCA to consider private credit’s interactions with the wider financial system in all cases where the regulatory principles are engaged, or else their decision-making could be unlawful. I assure her that the regulators are already working to understand these vulnerabilities deeply and to address them where necessary. This work does not require placing additional duties on the regulators.

I will highlight the existing work of those regulators. First, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee has been focused on the risks of private markets for many years, and the Chancellor’s most recent remit letter to the FPC asks that that work continues. I specifically note the Bank’s system-wide exploratory scenario on private markets, the SWES—as if we needed another acronym. It is examining how a stress scenario could affect the UK’s private markets ecosystem and interconnected banks, insurers and pension funds, with significant participation across the industry. The UK’s system-wide regulator, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee, is the right authority to carry out this work, and its findings will be laid before Parliament when it is complete.

For its part, the FCA also maintains a close focus on these risks, including in its firm-level supervision. Where specific issues are identified, targeted interventions follow. We also welcome the FCA’s work to improve the visibility of risks and data availability through its reviews of the alternative investment fund managers directive framework, and its efforts to raise standards on conflicts of interest, valuation practices and risk management.

I note the noble Baroness’s concerns about the FCA’s regulatory perimeter, but I emphasise that the marketing of funds in the UK is indeed subject to UK regulatory requirements, protecting UK investors. Further, the PRA continues to assess and mitigate risks from private markets to the banks and insurers it regulates. This includes its 2024 thematic review of private equity-related financing activities with banks.

Finally, given the cross-border nature of the private credit ecosystem, the Bank and the FCA are actively engaged in international work, including at the Financial Stability Board, which is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England. The Government believe that, under our regulatory framework, vulnerabilities in private credit are being understood and addressed where needed, but there is of course much room to improve. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will of course withdraw this amendment, but I wanted to get this issue on the agenda, and we need to continue to do so. I say to the Government: do not be complacent in this situation. A few weeks before the crash in 2008, everybody in government would have told you how well the financial sector was functioning. Being a cynic can be quite helpful.

I am particularly concerned about the impact on small businesses when we run into the next financial shock, because there will be one. That regulatory perimeter is a serious issue that the Government should be looking at. I do not know whether you can get the regulators to look at it voluntarily. As far as they are concerned, you go to Parliament only to explain; it is not where you take instruction. I am concerned about these issues. I look forward to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on private credit, which will come later. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that digital assets are a serious issue and that they deserve proper scrutiny. We come at it from a slightly different perspective. I note the point made by my noble friend Lady Noakes that this is not a matter for regulatory principles.

This week, as we have heard, the Bank of England published its final policy statement and draft code of practice for sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins. This may go some way to supporting institutional scale-up, but we are concerned by the general reaction, which has been that the fundamentals have not changed and that the prevailing regime we are left with could still leave UK issuers less attractive internationally.

We are very grateful for the work of the Financial Services Regulation Committee, under my noble friend Lady Noakes, with the help of her very distinguished committee. Yet again, it features in almost every part of this Bill. Its report, Stablecoins: Waiting for Regulation, makes it clear that the UK, in its view, is lagging behind the US and EU on stablecoin regulation. Stablecoins and other forms of digital money are no longer simply niche products or theoretical innovations; they have the potential to become part of the wider payments and financial infrastructure.

The danger now is that we risk creating, or at least allowing to persist, a regulatory grey zone. Firms need clarity on the duties, expectations and requirements that they will have to meet. That is why we are calling for a much clearer digital asset strategy from the Government. We need Ministers to take a position of leadership in this area. It is not enough to simply respond to developments as they arise in different parts of the digital stratosphere. We have tabled amendments alongside the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, who is somewhat expert in this area and is not here today, to probe the Government on the wider question of digital assets and digital finance strategy. We will come to those amendments in a later group. I do not want to pre-empt that debate now—not at this late hour, with so few people in Committee on such a hot day.

This amendment touches on the same underlying point: that the Government need to provide clarity and certainty. They need to provide leadership, whatever that is. I would be grateful if the Minister can briefly explain the Government’s position on stablecoins, and— in response to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has rightly raised—explain how stablecoins will help growth and competitiveness.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Amendment 79 would require the FCA and PRA to assess the impact on the taxpayer of any provision of backstop arrangements by the Bank of England to private stablecoin when exercising their general functions. I support the noble Baroness’s goal of ensuring that all government and Bank of England activity provides good value for the taxpayer. The Bank of England already has a duty, established in the joint memorandum of understanding with HMT, to

“ensure value for money by minimising financial costs and risks to its capital”.