UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 9th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to participate in this debate, which was so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, the excellent chair of the International Relations and Defence Committee during the period of the inquiry. It is also a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who was the inspiration for the inquiry.

In the considerable time since the report was published, the two underlying issues that have driven so many of the conclusions have not changed. Polar ice is continuing to melt and, partly as a consequence of that and partly because of wider international stresses, the Arctic has moved from being an area of co-operation to one of contest and, potentially, conflict. This has to be of fundamental concern to the UK. Our geographical location means that instability in the Arctic threatens the security and prosperity of these islands, and we should therefore devote the necessary care, time and resource to protecting ourselves in this regard.

As the report makes clear, the Arctic is likely to see a dramatic increase in destination shipping over the coming years. There are two main reasons for that. The first is the increasingly accessible resources, particularly subsurface resources, in the area. The second is the geostrategic importance of the region, particularly to the nations that wish to reshape and then dominate the international order over the coming years.

Both issues have attracted the attention of the Chinese Communist Party, which has declared China a “near-Arctic state”. Although in 2013 Russia was reluctant to grant China observer status in the Arctic Council, events have moved on considerably since then. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has left it increasingly beholden to the Chinese for their support. There seems little doubt that over the coming years China will increasingly leverage that alliance into greater involvement in the Arctic. That involvement may be, at least initially, in pursuit of scientific and economic benefits, but it would bring China into NATO’s backyard, with all the scope for misunderstanding, accident or even direct competition that this would involve.

Meanwhile, Russia, which owns some 50% of the Arctic littoral, retains a significant military presence in the region. The war in Ukraine has impacted its ground forces in the Arctic, but its maritime and aviation forces remain formidable. Of course, the accession to NATO of Finland and Sweden has added a new dimension to alliance challenges, as well as opportunities, in the Arctic. Competition for resources, tensions over environmental issues and the search by some for military advantage all create the conditions for instability and insecurity.

While most witnesses to the inquiry asserted that neither Russia nor China was likely to initiate a conflict in the Arctic, unlikely is not the same as impossible, especially given the risk of miscalculation. That risk is exacerbated by the much higher likelihood of grey zone operations in the region. For example, greater access to Arctic waters is likely to mean a considerable growth in undersea infrastructure there. We have seen from the recent incident involving the “Eagle S” tanker how aggressively Russia is seeking to disrupt such infrastructure. The report highlights several other grey zone activities that are possible or even likely in the Arctic. These in themselves are a threat to our security, but they could easily escalate into something even more serious. A conflict involving NATO which started elsewhere could, and almost certainly would, spread to the Arctic.

We have long had a close military relationship with our Norwegian partners. In my younger days I flew in many NATO exercises in the Arctic, guarding against a potential Soviet attack through the Finnmark gap. We also have newer but equally strong connections to Sweden and Finland. The Arctic is therefore not just an area of strategic importance to the UK but one where we have experience and expertise. This is reflected in our leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, our partners in that organisation are becoming concerned about the weight of effort and the priority that we are according to this crucial role. They look to us to set a strong example and they are not seeing it.

The inquiry report also highlights the inadequacy of our air and maritime contributions to the High North, which is scarcely surprising given the small number of platforms available to the Navy and the Air Force and the many demands placed on them. These are all particularly serious consequences of our already inadequate military capabilities being spread too thinly. The security of the Arctic is crucial to the safety of the UK, so we have a vested interest in deterring conflict in the High North. To do so, we and our partners in the Joint Expeditionary Force need to demonstrate the capabilities and the will to counter Russian aggression effectively. We are failing seriously and falling short in that regard.

We also need the capabilities and will to deal with grey zone operations in a way that protects our interests and guards against escalation. The recent announcement that the UK will lead Operation Nordic Warden in response to the threat to undersea infrastructure is welcome, but where are the necessary resources to be found? The forthcoming defence review needs to set out the unanswerable case for an increase in the defence budget to at least 3% of GDP, but it also needs to take a much more ruthless and realistic approach to priorities than its recent predecessors did. It must make clear that the security of the Arctic is of fundamental importance to the UK and should therefore be resourced accordingly.

Scotland

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

I think my noble friend hits the nub of the issue. Yes, he is right, and I am happy to agree with him: it is the largest real-terms Budget settlement for the Scottish Government in the history of devolution. It is £1.5 billion in this financial year and will be £3.4 billion in the next. The point he made is that how that money is spent is really important. We have seen poorer outcomes in Scotland for people in the National Health Service, with longer waiting lists, and educational standards have not increased as they should. This is where that money should be focused—to deliver real benefits for the people of Scotland.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, would the Leader agree that the presence of one of the RAF’s main operating bases on the Moray Firth and one of the Navy’s at Faslane, along with a number of Army units, reflect the strategic importance of Scotland within the union? They bring significant economic benefit to those areas, a situation that would be greatly enhanced if this Government could ever get around to funding defence of the realm adequately.

Taiwan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

There are two questions there. The first is: what is our relationship with the People’s Republic of China? It is one of co-operation, particularly when we need to address those global issues, but we will confront China, when we need to, particularly on human rights issues, which the noble Lord has raised on repeated occasions. On Taiwan, we are quite clear about the need for peaceful dialogue to resolve these issues. The Taiwan Strait is of interest globally, but particularly to the United Kingdom in terms of our trade routes. Dialogue is what we will try to seek to ensure that we have a peaceful approach to these issues.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Chinese are placing great emphasis on, and putting great effort into, what is known as cognitive warfare, which seeks to undermine the structures, processes and will of the West—not least through AI. This is a serious threat to our society; we are playing catch-up, and we are playing it too slowly. With that in mind, will the Minister remind the Foreign Secretary, before he goes to Beijing, of Virgil’s famous line:

“Timeo danaos et dona ferentes”,


although, in this case, it is the Chinese, rather than Greeks, bearing gifts whom he should fear?

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

Well, I think I understand the point of the noble and gallant Lord’s question. The fact is that Taiwan’s biggest trading partner is the People’s Republic. Trading across the globe with China is huge; it is its second biggest economy. It is also vital in terms of addressing those challenges that we face on climate. We therefore need to ensure that we have dialogue and co-operation. But we understand the other issues that the noble and gallant Lord has raised, which is why we committed to in opposition—and will deliver in government—a complete audit of our relationship with China as a bilateral and global actor to improve our ability to understand and respond to not only the opportunities but the challenges that China poses.

Sudan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 13th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, who brings great expertise to these proceedings. Indeed, the number and experience of all noble Lords assembled here for this debate, on a Friday on the eve of recess, are perhaps an indicator that, in this place at least, Sudan is not a forgotten war. I am grateful to the Minister for giving us the opportunity to demonstrate as much.

We have heard many moving speeches today about the terrible situation in Sudan and the plight of its people, with 50% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance and 8.5 million people at emergency levels of food insecurity. Nearly three-quarters of the country’s health facilities are out of service and 19 million children are out of school, 7.4 million of them without access to safe water. Simple human feeling ought to provide sufficient motivation to do all that we can to alleviate that suffering, and to bring an end to the conflict, which, of course, is a necessary precondition if such alleviation is to be really effective.

I want to go beyond that. Picking up some of the strands that have already emerged this morning, I want to set out some of the harder-headed—some might even think cold-blooded—reasons of national self-interest why the people of the UK ought to be greatly concerned about what might seem to many of them to be a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.

First, Sudan is degenerating into a large, chaotic and ungoverned space. We have learned to our cost the consequences of letting such areas develop and fester, and we have learned how extraordinarily difficult they are to tackle once they do develop. They become breeding-grounds for extremist groups whose malign influence spreads far beyond their own borders and can all too easily affect, both directly and indirectly, the security of this country.

A failed Sudan could provide an ideal environment for criminal and terrorist networks. It is already a route for arms smuggling, and it could become a major exporter of violence. The instability that creates such conditions could well spread to neighbouring states. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the states of the Sahel are already fragile polities, and such stability as they do enjoy, limited though it may be, could be significantly undermined by the knock-on effects of the Sudan conflict.

All this poses serious risks to the UK. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are on the lookout for just the kind of opportunities that Sudan now provides. There are reports that the Houthis have been in discussions about co-operation with al-Shabaab, and there is scope for a widening and deepening of jihadist movements in the region. This should alarm us all.

Secondly, as we have heard, there is the potential impact on the security of the Red Sea routes. The Houthis have already demonstrated how easily commercial traffic through that area can be disrupted, and they forced us, in concert with others, to respond militarily. The conflict in Sudan could make these recent challenges look like small beer. An article in a recent edition of the Economist quotes a senior member of the Sudanese Armed Forces as saying:

“If Sudan collapses, the Horn of Africa collapses. It will be a great economic hindrance for Europe and America … Navigation will be impossible”.


The source of this quote may not be a disinterested observer, but the view expressed has been supported by others. If it is accurate, the consequences for this country would be so severe that some kind of response, probably military, would be inevitable. Even if the risk is only moderately likely, surely it would be better for us if we could pre-empt such a situation before it has a chance to develop. Surely the promotion of stability in the Horn of Africa is an important strategic objective for the UK. If so, the conflict in Sudan becomes a matter of strategic importance too.

Thirdly, there is the question of refugees. A fifth of the population has been made homeless, and they face the prospect of a deadly famine that could kill millions. At the moment, staying put looks like a death sentence, and the surrounding countries are probably not that appealing to them either. Europe would seem a much better bet and, as we have heard, some reports suggest that already 60% of the refugees in the camps around Calais are Sudanese. Can the Minister comment on that? Even if the exact figure is in question, we have heard from the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury that there is other evidence of growing numbers of Sudanese migrants. So the people-smuggling routes are likely to see—indeed, they are already seeing —a great upswell in business as a consequence of the war, and the traffic in human misery will increase yet further.

All this will put further pressure on European countries, including ours, that are currently struggling and failing to deal with illegal migration and its consequences. The rise in right-wing extremist parties will continue as a consequence, and the strains on our political and social fabrics will increase further. Surely such a prospect makes the war in Sudan a crucial issue for us, as well as for France, Germany and the other countries of the EU.

So, the demands of conscience and humanity apart, there are pressing reasons why the UK should view the war in Sudan as a strategic threat and should respond accordingly. But that response must, of course, be part of a wider and coherent international effort on both the aid and diplomatic fronts. Getting sufficient help to the population to stave off famine, and to dissuade them from putting themselves into the hands of the people smugglers, must be the immediate priority.

Beyond this, though, we need to help, encourage, develop and support the involvement of a group of international actors, including the United States and the EU, that will be sufficiently powerful to force an end to external support for, and involvement in, the war. Without such support and involvement, the internal factions would find it much more difficult to prolong the conflict.

Of course, the UAE is the principal, but not the only, culprit here. Russia is reportedly obtaining what is referred to as an “outpost” in Port Sudan in exchange for fuel and arms. Iran, too, is seeking a naval base on Sudan’s coast, which would certainly alarm Saudi Arabia and perhaps lead to the sort of proxy conflict that we have seen in Yemen. There are credible reports of Iranian and UAE drones being used in the conflict.

Dealing with such a complex set of issues will not be easy, but we cannot afford not to try. There are many other problems, from Ukraine to Gaza, that demand our urgent attention and that tend to distract us—but we cannot afford to be distracted. I indicated at the start of my speech that the conflict in Sudan is often referred to as the “forgotten war”. I am certainly not a fan of Leon Trotsky, but a slight adaptation of one of his maxims seems to me to be particularly apposite in this situation. So, in conclusion, I will plagiarise him just this once: you may not be interested in the war in Sudan, but the war in Sudan is interested in you.