Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(4 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Stirrup (CB)
I start by saying that the integrated review is a good piece of work. It sets the strategic scene well and I agree with many of the conclusions that it draws. There are inevitably areas of detail that merit more examination and further debate but, alas, there is no opportunity for that today. Given the short time available, I shall make just two points.
First, despite the much-discussed tilt to the Indo-Pacific, the review correctly identifies Russia as the most immediate threat to our security. The maintenance of our commitment to NATO, the associated transatlantic relationship and the continued development of our military capabilities, including in new fields such as cyber, are therefore crucial. But we will continue to face challenges from Russia below the threshold of conventional war. Success with these requires robust international responses, particularly among our European neighbours, but such responses will become increasingly difficult to agree, as issues of security become more entangled with those of trade and supply, and short-term national concerns trump regional solidarity. Nord Stream 2 and its possible effect on Europe’s ability to respond effectively to Russian adventurism is a case in point.
How do we rise to this challenge? The integrated review says that the UK will work with its European partners “where our interests coincide”. Surely there can be no greater example of mutual self-interest than the peace and stability of our own continent. But our ability to influence our European partners has undoubtedly been weakened by Brexit. We are no longer directly involved in the engine rooms where EU foreign and security policy proposals are developed, and our high-level relationships with our neighbours are subject to the tensions and frictions that will arise from time to time, as a consequence of our divergence from previously common positions. These are now inescapable facts of life that will require determined and sustained effort if we are to counteract them, but the review has little or nothing to say about how this is to be done.
My second point concerns China. The review says:
“We will continue to pursue a positive trade and investment relationship … while ensuring our national security and values are protected.”
This is likely to prove an almost impossible balancing act and we need to be clearer about the choices we will have to make and where our true interests lie. China patently does not wish to be constrained by the post-1945 global order. Whether it wants to dictate the course of other nations may be open to question; that it wants to be free of constraints imposed by others is beyond doubt. We are now engaged in a global contest to determine the rules by which international behaviour will be governed for most of the remainder of this century. The outcome of that struggle is crucial to our national interest.
The Government have rightly said that the UK should help to shape those rules, but this will mean opposing China. It will require us to be part of a grouping that can muster sufficient economic strength, military power and technological advantage to influence decisions in a way that runs counter to China’s purposes. As a proud and modern superpower, China will not take such opposition lying down. There will be consequences. We should, of course, seek to trade with China and to engage with it on important issues such as climate change, but we should also expect our stances on global governance and human rights to disrupt those efforts, perhaps severely. Our strategy should make clear that we place long-term benefit over short-term advantage and that we are prepared to face up to the difficulties that this will cause.
Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(4 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I welcome my noble friend. I assure him, and agree with him, that the United Kingdom will always prioritise how we respond to the threats that we face. As I am sure he will acknowledge and agree, our armed and security forces work tirelessly to protect the UK and our interests at home and abroad. However, I agree with him that we need to be dynamic in our response to the ever-changing and evolving world, including some of the new threats and opportunities, be they in cyber or space.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, a number of pending defence capital investment programmes will be crucial to both our future military capability and the UK’s prosperity agenda, but a one-year financial settlement risks crippling them. Can the Minister assure the House that such important strategic issues will be decided by informed debate and not pre-empted by short-term Treasury fiat?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
I assure the noble and gallant Lord that we continue to stand by our Armed Forces. He will note that the Government are investing an additional £2.2 billion in defence over this year and next, which will put our total spending at £41.5 billion. I give him the added assurance that the Government will continue always to prioritise how we respond to the threats that the UK faces. Our Armed Forces and security services work tirelessly in this respect and are fully funded.
Queen’s Speech
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(8 years ago)
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Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, while the focus of the gracious Speech was this year very much on Brexit-related matters, and while these will no doubt consume a great deal of our time and attention over the forthcoming extended Session, the wider world is becoming no less troublesome in the meantime; nor will the issues that confront the international community allow us to sit on the sidelines while we agonise over our relationship with the EU. As the Minister has reminded us, North Korea continues down its dangerous path towards an intercontinental nuclear missile capability; China’s military growth continues to alarm its neighbours; Russia’s tactical opportunism within Europe risks conflict through miscalculation; Syria remains riven between competing factions; the nations of the Gulf are at one another’s throats; and, of course, terrorism in all its guises still casts its fatal shadow across our society.
With all this going on it might be thought that we would have little time for navel gazing, but that, alas, is likely to prove a vain hope. It will nevertheless be important for us to lift our sights from time to time and to contemplate the dangerous world that we inhabit and for us to play our part in containing the global risks to our safety and prosperity. The gracious Speech indicated that the Government would ensure that the UK maintained and enhanced its role on the world stage, but this was a vague commitment, included almost en passant. If such an undertaking is to mean anything, it will require a clear-eyed assessment of the risks we face, the will to address them and the tools that are necessary if one is to exercise power in the real world.
As far as risks are concerned, we should view the current situation in the Gulf with considerable alarm. The stability of that region has long been a crucial national interest for us in the UK, but that stability is looking ever more precarious. The wider security and economic implications could become deep and damaging. The Ministry of Defence and the Government more widely have in recent years placed great emphasis on and made much of their Gulf strategy. Could the Minister therefore tell us how the most recent tensions between Qatar and its neighbours have impacted on that strategy and how the Government are responding to this worrying situation?
On the issue of international terrorism, I have been dismayed by recent remarks that seem to attribute our status as a target to our own foreign and security policy. Have we forgotten why Osama bin Laden founded al-Qaeda in the first place? It was not to attack the West but to overthrow the regime in Saudi Arabia. Have we forgotten the underlying purpose of Daesh? It is not to attack the West but to create a caliphate to oppress the peoples of the Middle East. At their root, these organisations are less concerned with pitting Muslims against non-Muslims than they are with achieving dictatorial power over Islamic nations. There is no doubt that in seeking to counter their loathsome practices and violent purposes we expose ourselves to their wrath and retaliation, but fear of a response should not dictate our policies. History has shown us that appeasement leads only to worse suffering in the long term. There is, of course, plenty of scope for debate about how exactly we should respond to these challenges and there is certainly much room for improvement in the Prevent strand of our counterterrorism strategy, but in formulating our policies the yardstick should be what is most effective in the long run, rather than just what will be safest for us in the short term.
We have been criticised for our extensive engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, for our more ephemeral involvement in Libya and for our lack of presence in Syria. We seem to be in the position of someone who is criticised if they go straight ahead, if they go backwards, if they turn left or right or, indeed, if they stand still. The real problem is that we often have grand ambitions that are totally unrealistic. We cannot transform countries overnight, if at all; nor can we dictate the constitutional and political arrangements under which people live. We can, however, observe the patterns that emerge in international affairs, support those patterns that are reasonably benign and work with partners to suppress those that are malign. This is a limited objective, it is true, but one that we have at least a fair chance of achieving.
To do even this much we will need the necessary tools. The gracious Speech reiterated the Government’s commitment to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. This is welcome, but I, like others, would draw your Lordships’ attention to the words “at least”. Despite the Minister’s remarks about the equipment programme, there is no doubt that the fall in the value of the pound over the past year is impacting on what the MoD can achieve within the present budget. When added to the unrealistic estimate of the extra funds that could be released through efficiency measures—an unrealism that has a long and inglorious history in government accounting—the defence programme is clearly under severe pressure.
Even in these circumstances, it would be unwise to expect a sudden flow of great largesse from the Treasury, and I indulge in no such fantasy. Our overall economic position remains challenging, with a continuing, if reduced, deficit and a burdensome level of debt. Nor should the MoD be exempt from the search for ever greater value for money. But the Government’s first responsibility remains the protection of the citizens of the UK and their interests. If they are to meet this crucial obligation, they need to ensure that the defence budget continues to grow in real terms and that the growth represents actual spending power and not funny money.
Finally, our Armed Forces will, as ever, require talented and courageous people of the highest quality if they are to discharge their onerous responsibilities as we and they both expect. They do indeed have superb people, but we must recognise that they are not keeping enough of them for as long as they should, and this is particularly true when it comes to female personnel. I am proud that the Royal Air Force has led the way when it comes to the promotion of women to the most senior ranks, up to and including two-star, but there is much more still to do. Too many talented people, especially women, are leaving early because the terms of their service are not flexible enough to accommodate their evolving personal circumstances and the associated pressures. We cannot afford such waste: it is expensive in terms of training replacements and it impacts on our operational capability.
It will remain the case that service personnel must make sacrifices that would be unacceptable in most civilian occupations. It will remain the case that the demands of operations must often take priority over personal preferences. We must never lower our standards in this regard. Even with these caveats, however, it is surely possible to develop more flexible terms of service that allow people, for a limited period, greater opportunity to accommodate their personal circumstances and thus to retain them and all they offer for much longer. I am therefore grateful to the Minister for outlining the plans that the Government have to deal with this issue and ask that he keeps us updated as the MoD seeks to accomplish what will no doubt be a difficult balancing act.
For Parliament, the next two years may well be predominantly about Brexit, but we live in a complex, dynamic and dangerous world that will care little for our preoccupations. We cannot afford to drop our guard in such an uncertain security environment. We cannot allow the pressure of immediate political events to make us introspective and insular. If we mean what we say about developing a Britain that is confident, outward-looking and engaged, then surely it is here—in this place—and now that we should demonstrate the truth of those sentiments.
EU Foreign and Security Strategy (EUC Report)
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(9 years ago)
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Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, as a member of the sub-committee that conducted this inquiry, I am delighted that we have the opportunity today to debate this report. As we do so, though, it is perhaps worth pausing, just for a moment, to reflect on why the EU’s strategic review of its foreign and security policy is so important to us. After all—some might argue—if the people of this country vote on 23 June to separate themselves from the Union then that review will be of no more than academic interest to us.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, has observed, nothing could be further from the truth. We acceded to the EU in 1973, yet more than 400 years earlier, in the 16th century, we were busily engaged in maintaining a balance of power in Europe, making use of alliances with such partners as Portugal, the Ottoman Empire and the Netherlands. During the 18th century we engaged in the stately quadrille, in which we, Austria, France and Russia moved through a series of changing alliances designed to provide security within Europe. After the Napoleonic Wars came the Concert of Europe, then the Triple Entente. The failure of the League of Nations in the 20th century led eventually to the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland; and in the aftermath of the Second World War, we moved on to NATO and then the EU.
The plain fact is that, for most of the past millennium, the security of these islands has been bound inextricably to the security of the rest of the continent, and that will continue to be the case whatever the outcome of the referendum on 23 June. Whether we are inside or outside the Union, the EU’s foreign and security policy will have huge implications for us in the UK. We have, and will continue to have, a critical stake in its success or failure.
So what can the EU do now and in the years ahead to improve the effectiveness of its policies in these areas? In the limited time available to me, I should like to point to three areas—already touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, in his excellent speech—where it might focus its efforts. First, it must recognise that its strategy must link ends, ways and means in a coherent and achievable fashion. There is a common saying which holds that you cannot will the end if you do not will the means. This is certainly true, but it can be expressed in another form: you cannot will the end if you do not possess the means.
When we talk of “means” in this sense, we refer essentially to power: the power to persuade others to change their minds and/or their courses of action. That power can take many forms. Moral authority, economic weight, diplomatic skill, military force—these are all dimensions of power, but many of the sources of such power, and the authority to wield them, reside within individual states, not with the authorities of the EU. In many ways, therefore, the EU as an institution acts as an organising, co-ordinating and focusing instrument for such power, rather than its source. This does not mean that the Union is powerless, far from it, but it means that for its foreign and security policy to be effective, the EU must recognise and account for the limitations inherent in the means by which that power is generated.
However and wherever it is generated, though, most elements of that power will depend upon a framework of economic strength. Delivering that strength is not the remit of those working on the foreign and security policy, but their efforts will be largely in vain if the EU and its members cannot restore their economic vigour. Riches cannot by themselves guarantee security, but poverty can pretty much ensure its absence. That holds, of course, for individual states just as much as for the continent more widely.
My second proposition concerns the need for prioritisation, as set out in the report. Not long ago there was perhaps a sense that security within the immediate environs of the EU could be taken broadly for granted—that while we might not have seen the end of history on the global stage, we had witnessed it within Europe and the EU could therefore focus its attention and spread its benison further afield. That dangerous illusion has been dispelled. The threats to the security of our continent and to the members of the EU are serious and growing. The EU needs to act strategically to counter them. Of course the Union has wider interests and should not ignore them, but its priority must be its own members and the European neighbourhood, not grandiose schemes for global security.
My final point concerns the worrying disconnect within the EU between hard and soft power. The EU’s strengths lie very much with the latter, but power cannot sensibly be divided up into discrete parcels. Clausewitz maintained that war was the continuation of policy—or politics—by other means. The nature and measure of the power appropriate to the conduct of international affairs will vary not just between, but within situations. So while the EU may not, and indeed should not, be the principal instrument for the exercise of hard power, it should nevertheless be able to co-ordinate its own activities effectively with the application of such power.
As the report makes clear, the Berlin Plus arrangements, which were to provide for such co-ordination by linking NATO and EU activities, have proved ineffective. This is a dangerous situation. There are many dimensions of power that are unavailable to NATO and the same is true of the EU. Together they can supply the continent with the spectrum of power necessary for our security, but if they cannot do it seamlessly and coherently, then we are in danger. The two institutions must find a solution to this dilemma.
There are, of course, several other very useful recommendations in the report, and I hope that the EU will give them all the serious consideration that they deserve. I sense that throughout the continent there is a growing realisation that we need to pay much more attention to our security, and that this may at last be beginning to be reflected in the appropriate budgets. It is still too little, but it is at least a beginning. The UK has rightly given a lead to our partners in this regard. We need to continue to give such a lead in that and all other areas of this crucial debate.
Queen’s Speech
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, many things have changed in the 11 months since last year’s debate on the humble Address. Some things have improved, such as the UK’s broader economic outlook. Some have loomed larger and grown more intense, such as the debates on Europe and the proposed separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom. However, for those of us interested in security and international order, things have become markedly worse.
This time last year we were hoping, against all our instincts, that Secretary of State Kerry might make some real progress on the Middle East peace process. The pessimistic angels of our nature, alas, proved only too right on that particular issue.
This time last year there was some hope that inclusive governance in countries such as Egypt and Libya might gain a firmer footing. In 2014 that hope has grown fainter.
I cannot claim that we had many realistic hopes for progress in Syria last year, but the outcome has been even worse than our fears. Meanwhile, the political and security situation in Iraq has continued its downward spiral, as we have seen most recently with the events in Mosul.
On a slightly less gloomy note, negotiations continue on the Iranian nuclear programme, and while many obstacles remain, we still have the chance of a deal. However, lest we become too cheerful, events in Pakistan serve to restore our sense of gloom. There, Government hopes of political progress with the Taliban have proved illusory. The recent attack at Karachi airport demonstrates vividly how seriously the internal security situation has declined in that country.
In Europe we face the prospect of a major power ignoring state borders and international agreements to which it is a signatory. Whatever provocation Russia may feel it suffered, nothing can justify its actions in the Crimea and subsequently.
Further afield, frictions continue over the South China Sea, and both the United States and China raised the temperature considerably at the recent Shangri-La dialogue. North Korea remains as dangerously delusional as ever. I could go on, but time does not permit.
What can we conclude from this tale of woe? For my part, I believe that we are witnessing two major strategic shifts, both of which could pose serious challenges to our future security and prosperity. The first, and most obvious, is the rising economic might of China and its use of increasingly sharp elbows on the international scene. The major points of friction may be far removed from us geographically but, in this globalised world, the consequences will certainly be felt here. The second development is the continued unravelling of the Sykes–Picot agreement, and the subsequent post-1918 arrangements that were intended to tidy up the detritus of the Ottoman Empire. The most malign consequence of this is the growth of an ungoverned space straddling the Syria-Iraq border, and the emergence there of extremist Islamic groups, such as the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria.
This is the backdrop to the rapidly approaching general election, and the subsequent security and defence review. It is not a pretty picture and, on the assumption that the United Kingdom still has the strategic intent to contribute to the international order and stability that are so important to this nation, it will require some serious thought. There has already been debate over the lessons we should draw from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. No doubt there are many, but for me there is one that stands out above all others, the lesson that the Athenians taught the Melians during the Peloponnesian war: the strong do what they can; the weak suffer what they must. In a number of ways, we in Europe have grown weak.
The foundation of nearly all power is economic strength, and it is right that over the past few years we should have concentrated on this. We also have in this country a very useful range of soft power tools, and I look forward to the coming debate on the Select Committee report on that issue. But hard power is a key element in the mix, and we are approaching some hard choices on this score in the next defence review. The 2010 defence review sacrificed a degree of strategic coherence in support of economic and fiscal retrenchment but, as the Prime Minister acknowledged in announcing the results of the review, restoring that coherence, in Future Force 2020, would require real-terms increases in the defence budget in each of the years from 2015 onwards. The Chancellor has already made it clear that further belt tightening will be required after the general election. This may be so, but a failure to fund defence as envisaged in the 2010 defence review will fatally undermine the plans for Future Force 2020, and lead inevitably to further capability and manpower reductions in the Armed Forces. We must ask ourselves whether that would be a wise response to the massive challenges to international order that I have outlined. This is a serious question about a crucial issue, and it deserves serious debate. I hope that over the next 11 months we will have the chance, within your Lordships’ House and elsewhere, to conduct just such a debate.
Ukraine
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Warsi
I hear what the noble Lord has said, but the legitimate and natural interests of the Ukrainian people surely come before the legitimate interests of any other peoples. It must of course be right that the Ukrainian people are free to decide their future. I do not think that the European Union, or indeed the US, are forcing the Ukrainians to go down any path; I was at the Vilnius conference where these discussions in relation to the association agreement started. I refer the noble Lord right back to when these debates were being held at these Dispatch Boxes; we were incredibly careful with our language, constantly asked for matters to de-escalate and constantly spoke with the Ukrainians to ensure that the issues being raised by the Russians were being addressed.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, the outgoing Secretary-General of NATO has made clear his concerns about the trends in defence expenditure within the alliance, particularly in light of the international situation. The United Kingdom used to set an example in this regard and thus was able to speak from a position of moral authority. Given the fraught international situation and the issues that we are discussing today, does the Minister not believe that it is time that the United Kingdom resumed its rightful place in this regard?
Baroness Warsi
This question has arisen on a number of occasions when we have discussed Ukraine. The noble and gallant Lord will obviously always make a strong case for defence spending. I assure him that in relation to the resources required, certainly to step up the Baltic air-policing mission, the necessary Typhoons were deployed.
Ukraine
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Warsi
The noble Lord makes an important point. Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it has a long-standing relationship with NATO and contributes to NATO operations, and has done so for many years. I am, with my wide portfolio in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, responsible for sanctions and therefore have spent some time considering what we call smart sanctions: well judged and well targeted sanctions that have impact. Sanctions should not be to make us feel better; they should be put in place so that they work and have an outcome. It is exactly in that vein that we consider them.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, does the Minister accept that we should be cautious about being quite so dismissive about the military implications of what has happened in Ukraine? I am not referring to military intervention in Ukraine by this country or other members of NATO, but about current members of NATO. Some of our most recent members have a memory that does not need to stretch back very far to create a great shadow of fear of Russia. Having worked very closely with some of these nations, I can assure your Lordships that that fear is very real and very existent. Some of these nations have Russian-speaking minorities. Will the UK Government do everything within their power to ensure that in the ongoing negotiations and discussions, NATO takes every possible action to demonstrate unequivocally to Russia its commitment, its capability and its will to defend all of its members under Article 5?
Baroness Warsi
I think I probably dealt with some of those issues in answering a previous question. I understand the sentiments that the noble and gallant Lord expresses. I do not think I was being dismissive in relation to potential military action; I was trying to say that it is important that we do not hypothesise about whether certain things—for example, if defence spending had been done differently or a certain decision on another foreign policy issue had been taken differently —would have had an impact on Russia’s intentions. I think it is probably better for us to try to understand the Russia psyche on Crimea and Ukraine, which may give us a slightly better perspective on the thinking behind Russia’s actions.
Syria and the Middle East
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, as we debate Syria and the Middle East today, it is clear that we have witnessed and continue to witness a significant degree of political and social upheaval across the region. To that extent, the cards are up in the air, but we can have little control and less certainty about where they will eventually fall. This naturally poses some serious challenges to the formulation of a coherent UK policy in the Middle East. If we are to develop and maintain a credible strategic approach to the dynamic and complex challenges of the region, we need first a comprehensive analysis of the context and then a clear focus on those issues that are most important to our own security and prosperity. I do not mean to diminish the importance of moral and humanitarian concerns—we should continue our efforts in this regard—but as a nation we have limited resources and influence. It is therefore crucial that we identify our own policy priorities.
The context is surely an unravelling of the post-1918 settlement that was intended to tidy up the detritus of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France, of course, have their fingerprints all over this settlement. Consider Syria. The Ottomans ruled it for just over 400 years until 1918. The San Remo conference of 1920 placed Syria-Lebanon under a French mandate while, incidentally, putting Palestine under a British mandate at the same time. Syria became independent in 1946 but had no settled constitutional or political base. Between 1946 and 1956 the country had 20 different Cabinets and four different constitutions. The turmoil in Syria today is only the latest episode in a drawn-out process that has its roots in the end of Ottoman rule in 1918.
We now see long-buried fissures reappearing across many parts of the region. We see tribe pitted against tribe, Muslim against non-Muslim, Arab against non-Arab, authoritarian against libertarian and, perhaps most significantly, Sunni against Shia. Indeed, the last division is one of the most polarising and potentially one of the most dangerous. Overshadowing all this is the regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This, of course, encompasses some of the fissures that I have mentioned—Sunni/Shia and Arab/non-Arab—but the degree of national animosity and the pursuit of regional political dominance take the problem to a new level and the competition is increasingly being played out in Syria.
The political upheaval in Syria is different in nature from many of the others that we have seen elsewhere in the region. In places such as Libya and Egypt, the impetus for change came from, or quickly gravitated to, those in the cities and centres of population. In Syria it came from those on the periphery, particularly the impoverished and drought-ridden agricultural communities, and was directed against those at the centre. So change was more difficult to achieve, particularly since survival of the military leadership was more closely tied to the survival of the regime. Even so, it looked as if Assad could not last, but the intervention of Hezbollah changed the outlook.
Given the support of Iran and Russia, it is now hard to see how Assad could be removed in the near term. Given the support of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and to some extent at least the United States, it is hard to see how the regime could achieve a decisive military victory over the opposition groups. The most likely outcome in Syria is either degeneration into a Somalia-like failed state or division into a number of warring baronies. Neither outcome is palatable from a wider security perspective and both are likely to perpetuate large-scale human tragedy. Without substantial international intervention, for which there seems little or no appetite, it is hard to see a plausible alternative.
At the same time, two key sets of negotiations continue: on the Middle East peace process and on the Iranian nuclear issue. Both are likely to reach some sort of conclusion, whether satisfactory or not, later this year.
These then, are some of the key features of the regional context. With so many challenges and so little clarity on the likely outcomes, where should the UK place its own policy priorities? I should like to propose three areas. Top of the list, I suggest, should be the Iranian nuclear issue. The consequences of failure on this front for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and for long-term security within the region are likely to be extremely serious and to have a lasting effect on the UK’s own security. The ongoing negotiations are therefore critical. Of course, we have to negotiate well if we are to achieve the right outcome and, of course, we must take nothing on trust. Any agreement has to be verifiable. There will inevitably be different views on what constitutes a bad deal or a good deal.
I want to focus on two short-term issues that seem to me of fundamental importance in this whole process. The first is the sustainment of the agreed sanctions regime. As negotiations continue and some restrictions are lifted, there is a clear risk that sanctions as a whole will start to unravel. There will be a temptation for some countries or companies to jump the gun in order to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. That risk cannot be entirely eliminated, so it will have to be managed. It will require strong and obvious resolve on the part of the major economic players to take firm and painful action against transgressors. The UK and the EU more generally will have an important part to play here.
The other issue concerns the question of where we go if negotiations fail. What is plan B? In such situations there is often a reluctance to consider plan B at all in case this is taken as a belief that plan A will not work, but such precautionary thinking does not need to be public. We can and should be discreetly considering what options are open to us if it proves impossible, even with more time, to reach a comprehensive settlement. This will involve some difficult decisions, but leaving them to the last minute risks making the difficult impossible. Of course the implicit existence of a plan B could help to focus minds on reaching a satisfactory agreement in the first place.
The second policy priority, I suggest, should be our relationship with Saudi Arabia. This has suffered over recent months, not least because of divergent views over Syria and concerns about the negotiations with Iran. However, Saudi Arabia remains the pivotal country in the Gulf region and is of considerable economic importance to the UK. Given the differences in our societies and cultures, the relationship is never going to be an easy one. It will require hard work, a degree of tolerance on both sides and, above all, constant and clear communication. The relationship is too important to the UK and its interests for us to neglect it. How closely are the Saudis being consulted on the negotiations with Iran? What we might consider a satisfactory outcome might look very different to Saudi eyes. Although we cannot give them a veto over the process, attempting to deal with or mitigate their concerns must be a key policy objective for the international community as well as for us.
The third priority should be to contain, as far as that is possible, the wider regional consequences of a Syrian conflict. Jordan matters to us as an old friend and it matters to Israel because of the latter’s concerns over strategic depth, so it is key to wider regional stability. However, Jordan is being weakened and undermined by the conflict in Syria. As others have mentioned, the large number of refugees is putting great stress on the already weak economy. There is no doubt that the social impact of what is going on in Jordan as a result of the conflict in Syria is having enormous repercussions for the regime there. Therefore, support for Jordan, for its economy and for its political development should be a key part of the UK’s policy in the region.
There are of course other malign international repercussions of the war in Syria. The Lebanon is being seriously affected. Perhaps one of the most worrying consequences is the growth of an ungoverned space straddling the Syria-Iraq border and the implications for radical Islamist terrorist groups. For example, the recent activities of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant demonstrate the risk of such an ungoverned space. The group poses serious dangers to the future of both Iraq and Syria and potentially further afield. Containing this risk will require some sort of governance over the affected area. For this reason, if no other, the feuding baronies outcome in Syria that I described earlier, while unpalatable, would certainly be preferable to a Somalia-like failed state. Another wider consequence of the Syrian situation is the return of radicalised and battle-hardened jihadis from the conflict zone to their home states. Saudi Arabia is increasingly concerned about this issue and the implications for its own security. It also affects us here in the UK. In many ways, this is a challenge for domestic rather than foreign policy, but it is a challenge nevertheless.
There are, of course, other important issues, such as the Middle East peace process, that I do not have time to cover, but many of these, while crucial to the UK, are beyond our power to influence directly. As I said at the outset, the proliferation of challenges within the Middle East and the limits on our ability to confront them should force us to a clear-eyed analysis of UK priorities. Naturally, some may disagree with those that I have proposed, but in my view such an analysis is essential if we are to take a coherent and strategically informed approach to the many dangers that we face, rather than simply wringing our hands about them.
Iran and Syria
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(11 years, 7 months ago)
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Baroness Warsi
The noble Baroness comes to these matters with great experience and expertise. She has made valid points about the different seats of power within Iran. At the moment, we feel that the Foreign Minister and President Rouhani have a mandate under which they are operating. We have had a number of meetings with them; the Foreign Secretary has met the Foreign Minister on three separate occasions, and we genuinely feel that progress was recently made in Geneva. The offer on the table now being considered by the Iranians is something that they will have to come back to discuss; it may well be that on 20 November we will be much clearer about how committed all aspects of the Iranian seats of power are in taking this matter forward. At this stage, however, we feel that progress has been made and that there is an acceptance that this is in Iran’s interests.
In relation to Syria, the noble Baroness made an important point. It is why the statement from the national coalition issued only yesterday said clearly that the transitional council must not include al-Assad or others who have blood on their hands. I think those are exactly the kind of individuals to whom the noble Baroness refers.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, it is of course right that we should negotiate with Iran, with a clear eye and a suspicious mind. Surely the point of the sanctions in the first place is to get the Iranians to the negotiating table so that we can find some diplomatic solution to their nuclear programme. We should, therefore, be enthusiastic about the process, while being very suspicious about the detail. With that in mind, the Minister has emphasised the united front that our negotiators put up to Iran. That is not the perception one gains from the media. Does the Minister agree that that is very unhelpful, particularly as regards people such as the Israelis and the US Congress, who are already suspicious of the process, and that unhelpful and unguarded remarks made by people, such as those made by the French Foreign Minister to journalists, are likely to damage our cause rather than help it?
Baroness Warsi
The noble and gallant Lord will be aware that a number of tracks—sometimes bilateral and at other times multilateral—usually take place before these negotiations are finally concluded. It was important that the E3+3 came to the same place and that they presented a united front. I assure the noble and gallant Lord that that offer is now clear and that the E3+3 are all behind that united position. On sanctions, we are clear that Iran needs to take concrete steps which give assurance and build trust; by that I mean not words but actions. Once we see that change in actions we will be ready to act proportionately and respond.
Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
Lord Stirrup Excerpts(11 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, I, too, am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Luce, for securing this debate. The UK has long had important relationships with the Arab states of the Gulf Co-operation Council, and our interests remain as heavily bound up in that region as ever.
Our relationships are, of necessity, conducted largely on a bilateral basis with the states involved. The Gulf Co-operation Council, despite its name, is as much a vehicle for competition and rivalry as it is for co-operation. Nevertheless, it fulfils an important function and deserves our full support.
There are many dimensions to the UK’s relationships with the GCC states, but at the moment two issues seem to me to stand out from the rest. The first is the domestic situations in those states and the concerns within them over the continuing political developments within the region. I am thinking here less of the member states’ reactions to the events around them and more of their own political pressures although, of course, these are closely linked.
The status of the Shia majority in Bahrain—which the noble Lord, Lord Luce, has covered—is the most obvious example but the other states are experiencing their own pressures to varying degrees, as we have already heard this afternoon. The question is whether and how these internal political issues should shape our approach to the various states concerned.
We could adopt a boisterous, cheerleading approach and wave the flag for democracy. This would be a mistake, for many reasons. First, democracy can take many forms and mean different things to different peoples. After all, we cannot even agree between ourselves quite what it means. Secondly, too heavy a hand when dealing with the internal affairs of another nation can have unintended and quite counterproductive consequences. We need to tread warily. On the other hand, I do not accept the argument made by some that democracy, even in its loosest definition, has no place in certain societies and cultures. If, by “democracy”, we mean a stake in and some degree of say in the governance of a country, it seems that this is a near universal aspiration in developed and developing societies.
The shape of that democracy, however, is quite another thing. Anyone starting with a blank sheet of paper would not come up with our model. It works for us—after a fashion. Any system needs to grow from and be rooted in the culture it serves. Our understanding of the cultures of the Gulf states can be rather superficial.
It seems that we can best serve both our interests and the interests of the international community by being supportive rather than condemnatory; by being gently persuasive rather than hectoring; and by focusing more on long-term progress than on short-term moralising.
I am not suggesting that we turn a blind eye to repression and to abuses of human rights. However, I am suggesting that our responses should be more nuanced than has sometimes been the case. To those who would say that such an approach ignores our moral responsibilities, I would reply that it is about ways and means. Do we want to achieve our strategic objectives in the region, including our hopes and aspirations for the peoples concerned, or are we just interested in scratching tactical itches? For my part, I vote for the strategic approach.
The second issue, which is external to the GCC states, is their concern—their very real concern, I believe—over Iran. The status of Iran’s nuclear programme is very much in the news, and is certainly the wolf closest to the sledge. It is, however, a symptom of a wider regional tension over the perceived development of a Persian hegemony. Religion plays into this and increasingly manifests its role through a burgeoning Sunni-Shia cold—and sometimes not so cold—war. However, that is not the only fissure between Iran and the GCC. For the regimes in the smaller states it is an existential issue. For Saudi Arabia it is more about regional dominance.
We are all concerned about Iran, but the GCC countries see the issue through a different prism from us—and, indeed, in many cases, from one another. It is important that we understand this. We all hope that recent developments within Iran, and between Iran and the international community, will produce positive results—although we would be wise not to get carried away by the more acceptable face that Iran is seeking to present to the world.
In all of this, however, we should remember our partners in the Gulf and recognise how much more closely all of this touches them. I hope that we are talking to them regularly on these developments and, more importantly, listening to them. We have expended much effort over recent years in trying to persuade our friends in the region that we have their interests at heart, that their security matters to us and that we take seriously their concerns over Iran and its nuclear programme. Those reassurances will ring somewhat hollow if we neglect their views and opinions on recent and future developments.
There are many other issues on which we should be, and frequently are, engaging with the GCC countries. However, the final point I should like to make takes my earlier plea for a more strategic approach to political development into the wider arena. It probably seems quite clear to most of us that our crucial national interests are not only closely engaged in this region today but have been so for a great many decades. But if we were to examine the practical handling of our relationships within the region over those decades, would we reach the same conclusion? Far too often we have sent conflicting signals in this regard. We have engaged, disengaged and re-engaged. We have busied ourselves, distanced ourselves, and then dived in again. Is it any wonder that some of our friends in the region get a bit confused about where we actually stand?
If we are serious about the region, and I think it is in our national interest that we should be, then we must take a more strategic, longer-term view of our relationships within the region. Just as important, we must give such an approach practical effect on the ground. If we want to have real presence, to have real influence, then our friends must believe that we are not only there, but there to stay.